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Abstract 
The focus of this thesis is the employment of the power of the United States to 
effect a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. America's power 
was used by President George Bush and his successor, President Bill Clinton, 
to achieve that goal. This thesis discusses the nature of power and the various 
instruments of statecraft, short of force, through which power may be applied 
in international relations in order to produce an outcome. It analyses the 
efficacy of the application of the instruments in relation to the dispute. 
The demise of the Soviet Union, and an improved condition of regional 
cooperation evident during the 1991 Gulf War, encouraged President Bush to 
launch yet another initiative by the United States to produce a settlement of the 
Arab-Israel dispute. His Administration was not deterred by the failure of 
previous American initiatives, and showed both resolve and diplomatic skill in 
bringing all the concerned parties into negotiation at Madrid in October 1991. 
Critical American interests in the Middle East were at stake. These included 
support for Israel, assurance of oil supply at affordable prices, a desire to curb 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and concern about terrorist 
activity emanating from the region. At the point of intersection of all these 
interests lay contentious issues related to Israel's security and Palestinian self-
determination. If the United States could defuse these issues, it would 
demonstrate America's ability to use its predominance in international 
relations to introduce peaceful change into the society of states. 
A comprehensive settlement of the dispute would require a resolution of 
differences between Israel and respectively Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the 
Palestinians. Clinton and his Administration persisted throughout the eight 
years of his presidency in the pursuit of that objective. They engaged directly 
with the parties, and co-opted the assistance of other regional states and 
international donors. Some progress was made on their watch. A peace treaty 
was concluded between Israel and Jordan, and several agreements were signed 
between Israel and the Palestinians. A settlement between Israel and Syria 
came close to conclusion. A resolution of the core 'Palestinian' element 
proved intractable. 
Although the 'land for peace' proposition on which the peace process was 
based would require Israel to make territorial concessions, peace was not a 
zero sum game. The Americans viewed it as a 'public good' that would lay the 
basis for regional cooperation and recognition of Israel as a legitimate actor in 
regional affairs. Israeli governments were undecided whether to pursue a 
settlement first with Syria or the Palestinians and the Clinton Administration 
failed adequately to address the need for prioritisation. 
The probabl_e shape of an outcome of the negotiation between Israel and the 
Palestinians did not satisfy all of their constituents. Extremists in both 
communities set out to derail the peace process. A growing sense of 
dispossession and humiliation among Palestinians was fostered by Israel's 
practise of building settlements on occupied territory claimed by the 
Vl 
Palestinians. A cycle of Palestinian insurgency and Israeli retribution 
frustrated the negotiation. The nascent Palestinian Authority proved unable or 
unwilling to restrain its extremist element; and Israeli governments refused to 
halt settlement-building. 
The international community had welcomed the landmark signature of a 
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993, and 
international donors contributed toward its realisation. · International 
confidence in the peace process was corroded by the cycle of violence and 
reprisal, and condemnation of Israel's settlement policy was launched in the 
United Nations. Clinton was opposed to Israel's activity, but felt constrained 
to protect the peace process against international criticism because it 
demonstrated that, after years of hostility, negotiation could produce positive 
results. Keeping the negotiation afloat became a major preoccupation of the 
Clinton Administration, and its success in doing so was one of its principal 
achievements. 
This thesis employs a methodology of assessing the efficacy of Clinton's 
application of relevant instruments of statecraft. It assumes that, in order to 
attain its goal, a state will employ the instruments at its disposal in the most 
efficacious manner. · Failure to achieve an objective is presumed to be 
indicative of the limits of the state's power. A post hoc evaluation has shown 
reasons for the failure of the Clinton Administration to achieve its objective. 
They include a reluctance to employ all the instruments at its disposal. 
Principles have emerged from that analysis that would permit a more 
efficacious use in other circumstances of the instruments by which American ' 
power is applied. 
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Introduction 
This thesis analyses the exercise of the power of the United States of 
America in order to achieve a declared objective. The objective was a 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. Pursuit of that goal was 
launched at Madrid in 1991 by President George Bush (1989-93) and carried 
forward by his successor, President Bill Clinton (1993-2001). The 
concentration here on the Clinton Administration necessarily reflects the eight 
years it devoted to the matter. That Clinton was unable to persuade the 
concerned parties to conclude a comprehensive settlement before the expiry of 
his presidency is a matter of fact. 
There are a number of reasons for the adoption of a Middle East 
settlement as a case study of the exercise of American power. Underpinning 
them is the fact that, since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United 
States has enjoyed international predominance, militarily, economically, 
culturally and technologically. 'Never since Rome has one country so nearly 
dominated the world', as Kenneth Waltz put it. 1 The United States' s use of its 
authority to influence global developments was, and continues to be, a matter 
of considerable interest and discussion. There were many people in America 
and elsewhere in the early 1990s that hoped that its power would be used to 
reshape the structure of international relations in favour of a global civil 
society. The possibility of the United States employing force in defence of its 
vital interests was not disputed, but its military and economic pre-eminence 
was, and is, so overwhelming that resort to force was presumed to be an 
activity of last resort. This gave rise to an expectation that the United States 
had a capacity in most situations to influence outcomes in its own favour 
without having to employ force. 
The Bush Administration launched its peace initiative in the context of 
its success in forging a widespread coalition to prosecute the Gulf War over 
Kuwait. There was a widespread hope that the leadership shown then, and in 
1 Waltz, K.N. (2002). The Continuity of International Politics. Worlds in Collision: terror and 
the future of global order. K. Booth and T. Dunne. Basingstoke UK, Palgrave Macmillan 
p.350; Reus-Smit, C. (2003). "The misleading mystique of America's material power." 
Australian Journal of International Affairs Vol.57 No. 3 p.423 
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arranging the Madrid conference, could introduce a benign era of international 
cooperation into the Middle East. 
That background informs, in part, the reason for the choice of the Arab-
Israel dispute as a case study, but it is not the sole determinant. The dispute 
lay at the intersection of a number of important American interests and its 
resolution was a significant objective in its own right. Second, it provided an 
early example of the projection of the United States's political power after 
becoming the world's sole superpower. It might be assumed that, in the 
absence of a powerful rival, the United States was well-placed to achieve its 
objective. Third, it received the sustained attention of the Bush and Clinton 
Administrations for over a decade. Fourth, the fact that the United States was 
unsuccessful in effecting its desired outcome raises questions about the limits 
of American power. Fifth, while care must be exercised about generalising 
from a particular case study, the possibility exists that the study might reveal 
some lessons about the projection of power that could be applicable in other 
circumstances. 
While the objective of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel 
dispute was common to both presidencies, Clinton's participation was a 
consequence of an inheritance. He was elected to office on policies that 
focussed more on domestic issues than international ones, and whose address 
was primarily economic. His foreign policy vision was largely crafted after his 
swearing-in, and its principal features articulated in September/October 1993. 
His vision had no influence on the drafting of the Oslo accord that was signed 
on 13 September. 1993. Attempts were made by the Administration, 
subsequent to the conclusion of that landmark document, to steer the 
negotiation process in directions that were consistent with a realisation of the 
president's global vision, especially his concern to see an enlargement of the 
community of democratic states committed to market economics. This was 
evident in its promotion of regional cooperation, and utilisation of democratic 
processes in relation to the inauguration of the institutions of Palestinian 
governance, although there were limits to which Clinton's global aspirations 
could provide a useful agenda for a Middle East settlement. 
This thesis is about a great power's effort to produce a desired 
outcome. In order to secure its goal, the great power must convince 'others' to 
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acquiesce in its wishes. It does so through the projection of its power, and is 
able to employ a variety of measures to attain its objective. It calculates its 
'cost' in terms of resources, energy and reputation. If it is unable to achieve its 
desired outcome, a possible weakness may have been exposed. For their part, 
the targeted 'others' must weigh the 'cost' to themselves of resisting America's 
efforts. This suggests that in the exercise of its statecraft the United States 
would manipulate its unparalleled resources in order to bring home to targeted 
'others' that accommodating America's objective would be at best beneficial 
to their long-term interests, or at least a less expensive option for them than 
resistance to it. 
A state's decision-makers employ cognitive and other processes in 
identifying national objectives. Their analysis extends to dissection of the 
state's competing agendas and objectives. Such considerations are germane to 
the United States's decision to prosecute a comprehensive settlement of the 
Arab-Israel dispute. The reasons why American Administrations should have 
decided to act in relation to the dispute, and how they came to that decision, 
deserve study in their own right. Four considerations that have a bearing upon 
America's national interests in the Middle East are discussed in chapter 2. 
That discussion provides a foundation for the Bush Administration's decision 
to commit America's power to a resolution of the dispute. The matters 
addressed in that chapter are not, however, the only ones to have determined 
the Administration's course. Sufficient information is provided in chapter 3 to 
illustrate why Bush decided in 1991 that circumstances were conducive to a 
resolution of the dispute; that the parties principal were likely to be receptive to 
American intervention; that the objective could be pursued without detriment 
to other American objectives; and that a settlement of the dispute, if it could be 
achieved, would demonstrate America's capability to produce a 'public good'. 
Although Clinton was not wholly convinced at the outset of his presidency of 
the desirability of American involvement in this matter, an early assessment by 
his secretary of state confirmed regional interest in the United States's 
continuing the search for a settlement of the dispute. This was consistent with 
the Clinton Administration's view that the United States be engaged and 
exercise leadership in the unipolar world. Leadership was not without risk: 
failure could reveal American impotence. 
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In deciding to pursue an objective, decision-makers within a 
democratic and pluralist state, like the United States, must weigh a number of 
factors, some of which may be advanced by special interest groups. There are 
factors intrinsic to those in authority and their immediate cohort, who share a 
common philosophical outlook. Agreement among decision-makers about 
desired ends does not necessarily translate into agreement about means. The 
framing of objectives in broad terms may help bridge differences among them, 
and can also assist in minimising domestic opposition. There are others in the 
community who might support the objectives of the decision-makers, attracted 
by the prospect of material benefit for themselves or an expansion of the 
country's sphere of influence. Given the scope for divergent views, it might be 
thought that the final decision by a great power to project its power would be 
the product of rational debate and policy-making within the government. In 
fact sectional interest, extending to both ends and means, can often inhibit 
rational debate, and influence the decision to exercise power. Ultimately, 
decision-makers are exposed to international criticism and accountable to their 
domestic constituency for the purposes and manner in which the state's power 
has been projected. 
The instruments through which a state's power may be projected are 
identified in chapter 1. If the limits of America's power are ever to be 
established, other than in the context of the use or threat of use of force, it can 
only be through an exhaustive analysis of the efficacy with which the United 
States employed the instruments of statecraft at its disposal. An analysis of 
how they have been employed permits a methodological assessment of their 
efficacy, and a rational appreciation of the effectiveness of the projection of 
American power. It encourages inquiry into a state's commitment to attaining 
its professed objectives, providing a . sounder basis for assessment than 
impression, intuition or conventional wisdom. Assumptions that America's 
Middle East policy is 'all about oil', or 'the influence of the pro-Israel lobby', 
or some variant of the two such as 'America exerts sufficient authority over 
Israel to satisfy Arab oil producers that it is doing something to address 
Palestinian grievances', might be challenged, or sharpened, by a close analysis 
of the United States's use of the instruments of power. Has the most 
efficacious choice of instrument been made; have the chosen instruments been 
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used effectively; if not, why not? What does this inquiry say about the 
motivation of American decision-makers? America's interventions in the 
process of negotiation between Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the 
Palestinians are analysed in these terms. A study of the efficacy of the 
instruments chosen to address particular issues as they arose, and the 
effectiveness with which they were employed, enables a post hoc evaluation to 
be made. The evaluation could be useful in identifying how power might be 
projected more effectively in other situations. 
The study does not purport to be a comprehensive history of the 
negotiation, under the aegis of the United States, between Israel and the other 
four parties. Sufficient narrative has been presented, however, to illustrate 
changing circumstances and to show how the Clinton Administration 
responded by deploying different instruments of power at its disposal in order 
to achieve its objective. Philosophic questions about the rights of the parties 
principal and the rectitude of their causes are relevant to this study only insofar 
as they influenced American Administrations in determining which instrument 
of power might most efficaciously lead to the attainment of a negotiated 
comprehensive settlement of the dispute. 
The negotiation structure devised by Bush's Administration proved 
capable of producing positive results. For a brief period, from 1993 to 1996, it 
seemed as though the American initiative in bringing the concerned parties into 
negotiation to effect a comprehensive settlement would be successful. Bush 
had been able to build upon an unprecedented, though not universal, measure 
of regional participation during the Gulf War of 1991, and a climate of 
superpower cooperation, to bring the parties together at Madrid. As his 
successor, Clinton presided over the signing of the Declaration of Principles on 
Interim Self-Government Arrangements at the White House in September 
1993. The signal achievement of a compact between Israel and the 
Palestinians dressed a communal sore that had been festering since at least the 
Arab Revolt of the 1930s. Signature of the Declaration offered prospect of a 
peaceful settlement with other states that were party to the Arab-Israel dispute; 
and commanded the support of the United Nations (UN). A peace treaty was 
concluded between Israel and Jordan; and several agreements were signed 
between Israel and the Palestinians subsequent to their Declaration. Israel and 
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Syria came close to agreement; and the Middle East and North Africa 
economic summits that were conducted in close association with the peace 
talks demonstrated briefly that Israel could be accepted as a legitimate player 
within the region. 
But the Madrid process might reasonably be determined to have failed 
by the expiry of Clinton's presidency in early 2001. For reasons that will be 
discussed in this thesis, the negotiation with Syria had been terminated in 
March 2000, and the al-Aqsa intifada which began in September of that year 
was jeopardising any possibility of fruitful negotiation between Israel and the 
Palestinians. Nevertheless, Clinton's legacy continues. He advanced 
parameters in December 2000 that remain a basis for discourse on the compass 
of issues between Israel and the Palestinians, including the future of Jerusalem 
and the question of Palestinian refugees, on which some progress has been 
made in informal discussion. His framework has fostered unofficial 
negotiation in Geneva between some Israelis and Palestinians, and produced a 
'model' agreement. The spotlight has, however, fallen on an official roadmap 
proposed by the United States, the European Union (EU), Russia and the 
United Nations, launched in 2003 with the intent of producing a sovereign 
Palestinian state alongside Israel by 2005. 
This analysis of the Administration's efforts to produce a particular 
outcome begins with an exposition of Clinton's global vision. A definition of 
power, including its ideational attribute, is located within that context as 
addressing the means by which an inter-state vision might be realised. That 
discussion then proceeds to identify the instruments by which power may be 
employed by a state in the context of its diplomatic intercourse, and how the 
efficacy of their application might be determined. Chapter 2 analyses the 
United States's principal interests in the Middle East - support for Israel; 
access to oil at 'affordable' prices; a desire to halt the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD) that could threaten Israel's security and wider 
American interests; and the prosecution of counterterrorism in a region that has 
proven a fecund source of international terrorism. The thesis argues that 
linkages exist among them and that the Palestinian cause provides an anti-
Israel rallying point. While a resolution of the question of Palestine would not 
remove all the tensions among regional states and between them and the 
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United States, it would defuse the most probable incendiary issue at the heart 
of the Arab-Israel dispute and could · 1ead to the legitimisation of Israel as a 
regional player. The United States and Israel thus share a common interest in a 
resolution of the dispute. Chapter 3 discusses briefly why the Bush 
Administration decided to engage in the matter and, at greater length, how it 
used America's power to persuade parties with a long history of antipathy 
towards Israel to enter into negotiation with it in the search for a 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. 
The application of American power, principally by the Clinton 
Administration, to produce a settlement of the dispute is the subject of chapters 
4 to 7. Arranged in roughly sequential order, chapter 4 analyses America's 
attempt to influence the negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians from 
1991 to 1996; chapter 5 focuses on Israel and Jordan, and the multilateral 
negotiations conducted within the Madrid framework; chapter 6 looks at Israel 
and Syria; and chapter 7 addresses the negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians from 1996 to 2001. A post hoc evaluation of the application of 
American power to attain its goal is presented in chapter 8, based on an 
analysis of the efficacy of the instruments of power identified in chapter 1. 
The Conclusion draws upon the evaluation and analyses its implications for the 
projection of American power in other situations. It articulates principles that 
might be generally applicable to a more effective projection of American 
power. 
Chapter 1 
Power and diplomacy: the United States's 'unipolar moment' and 
Clinton's global vision 
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The demise of the Soviet Union was seen by President Bush as 
heralding 'a new world order' in which inter-state cooperation, under United 
States leadership, would replace the competition and confrontation that had 
characterised the bipolar era. America's pre-eminence · would be used to 
fashion a post-Cold War inter-state society in accordance with its own vision. 
A resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute would contribute toward the realisation 
of the vision by demonstrating that a 'public good' could be attained through 
the projection of power by means other than force. But what is power; and 
how may it be employed in the conduct of diplomatic relations among states to 
achieve an objective? This chapter will address these fundamental questions, 
drawing upon international relations theory. That discussion will lead to a 
proposition about how the efficacy of the application of power may be 
determined. The procedure advanced in this chapter will provide a 
methodology that will expose the Clinton Administration's effort to produce a 
negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute to proper scrutiny. 
America's global vision 
For almost half a century the contrasting and contradictory ideologies 
of the United States and the Soviet Union provided the foundation for 
confrontation between the two states and/or their so-called 'proxies'. Other 
states polarised around the two superpowers and their ideologies. This bipolar 
system-wide theoretical 'structure' of states1 was fundamentally transformed 
by the demise of the Soviet Union, offering no alternative power pole around 
which opposition might coalesce. The United States found itself in a position 
from 1991 to exercise leadership in a unipolar world. While opposition to 
American leadership and policy would persist in some quarters, America is 
currently in a position to influence the shape of the global society of states not 
enjoyed since the period immediately following World War II. 
1 Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York NY, Random House. Waltz 
argues that definitions of structure must leave aside the characteristics of units. p.79 
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The United States was conscious that, with the demise of bipolarity, its 
dominance in the international system would attract challengers.2 It sought a 
benign environment - a 'new world order' - in which American leadership 
would be exercised through mutual cooperation. Bush made it clear that in 
advancing the notion of 'order' he was not thinking in terms of structural 
theory.3 He, and Clinton after him, envisioned a world order that was not 
dependent on an external threat or an explicit policy of balance of power.4 
Bush anticipated American dominance that would be both legitimate and, to 
some extent, welcomed by the global community.5 American leadership in the 
Gulf War was an expression of collective security in accordance with the UN 
Charter. 
The Clinton Administration's search for an appropriate global role 
reflected uncertainty among both Americans and foreigners as to whether 
unipolarity was unnatural, or unhealthy, or both. William Wohlfarth contested 
the view that 'the distribution of power is unstable and conflict prone' 6 under 
unipolarity. He argued: 
Possessing an undisputed preponderance of power, the United States is 
freer than most states to disregard the international system and its 
incentives. But because the system is built around U.S. power, it 
creates demands for American engagement. The more efficiently 
Washington responds to these incentives and provides order, the more 
long-lived and peaceful the system.7 
2 Christopher, W. (1995). "American Leadership at Stake - 18 May 1995." US Department of 
State Dispatch Vol.6 No.21. That fear was still evident four years after the demise of the 
Soviet Union. Christopher testified before a Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee that 
' there is no other country with the strength or the vision to replace us. But there are plenty of 
forces that would like to exploit the vacuum that we would leave behind'. p.416 
3 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College in Montgomery, 
Alabama, 13 April 1991. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States - President 
Bush, 1991 (hereinafter Public Papers). Washington DC, Office of the Federal Register. The 
president said: 'I am not talking here of a blueprint that will govern the conduct of nations or 
some supernatural structure or institution'. p.366 
4 Ikenberry, G.J. (2002). "America's Imperial Ambition." Foreign Affairs Vol.81 No.5 
(Sep/Oct 2002). pp.44-60 
5 Brilmayer, L. (1994). American Hegemony: political morality in a one-superpower world. 
New Haven CT, Yale University Press. 
6 Wohlforth, W.C. (1999). "The Stability of a Unipolar World." International Security Vol.24 
No.I (Summer 1999) p.7 
7 Ibid. p.8 
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He is backed by Charles Krauthammer, for whom 'unipolarity, managed 
benignly, is far more likely to keep the peace' .8 For Krauthammer, the 'new 
unilateralism', made possible by unipolarity, argues for maintaining 
unipolarity and for sustaining America's unrivalled dominance.9 
Peter Rodman is less interested in the structural dimension than in the 
contribution that the United States might make during the 'unipolar moment'. 
He described this contribution to global stability as 'one of the "public goods" 
we provide. It is in our own geopolitical interest, not simply a favour we do 
for others. Thus we must continue to provide it, even if we find some of its 
beneficiaries ungrateful or even annoying' .10 Joseph Nye echoed this thought: 
'Our historical test will be to develop a consensus on principles and norms that 
will allow us to work with others to create political stability, economic growth, 
and democratic values' .11 Rodman noted, however, that '[t]he world's concept 
· of the requirements of international order may not coincide with Americans''; 
that ' [ c ]entrifugal forces among the major powers are a source of danger for 
the international system'; and that 'America's ability to lead others is turning 
out to be more complicated than one would have expected in the "unipolar" 
era' .12 
While recognising that 'at the heart of American power lies the threat 
or use of military force', 13 the Clinton Administration largely eschewed the 
realist school. It conducted its diplomacy, as a good international citizen, in 
accordance with international legality, which included UN Security Council 
resolutions. 14 Madeleine Albright, then ambassador to the UN, described 
America's perception of its leadership as 'assertive multilateralism' .15 
Rodman commented somewhat ruefully on the apparent paradox confronting 
Clinton 'that resentment of the United States seems to be so high in the time of 
8 Krauthammer, C. (2002). "The Unipolar Moment Revisited." The National Interest No.70 
Winter 2002 p.14 
9 Ibid. p.17 
10 Rodman, P.W. (2000). Uneasy Giant: the challenges to American predominance. 
Washington DC, The Nixon Center. p.53 
11 Nye Jr, J.S. (2002). The Paradox of American Power: why the world's only superpower can't 
f o it alone. New York NY, Oxford University Press. p.xvi 
2 Rodman. Uneasy Giant, p.37 
13 Lake, A. (1994). "American Power and American Diplomacy - 21 October 1994." US 
Department of State Dispatch Vol.5 No.46 p.766 
14 Krauthammer. "The Unipolar Moment Revisited", p.11 
15 Ibid. p.11 
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an Administration so eager to be virtuous, even to the point of apologizing for 
much of America's postwar foreign policy' .16 What concerns the international 
community is that 'all major regional powers ... share one item on their 
political agenda: how to deal with U.S. power. Until these states are capable 
of producing a counterpoise to the United States, the system is unipolar' .17 A 
common political agenda does not, however, imply universal accord on the 
legitimacy of the structure or the United States's singular position within it 
resulting from the implosion of the former Soviet Union. 
At issue here is not the structural dimension, but how the Clinton 
Administration exercised the power of the United States during the unipolar 
moment. Henry Kissinger was critical of the Clinton Administration for 
recoiling from the concept of national interest and distrusting the use of power 
unless it could be presented as being in the service of some 'unselfish' cause. 18 
A settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute was only one of a myriad of issues 
confronting the Clinton Administration as it sought to realise its global vision, 
and its resolution could do little more than make a modest contribution toward 
the vision's realisation. 
Clinton entered office determined to focus on the domestic economy19 
and without a vision for a global order.20 The vision that the Administration 
began articulating some eight months into his presidency had several themes. 
First, the United States intended 'to remain engaged and to lead' 21 because it 
was compelled to do so by its 'interests and ideals' .22 Second, the United 
States would seek an 'enlargement' of the community of democratic nations in 
the world. Third, while reserving the right to act unilaterally where vital 
16 Rodman. Uneasy Giant, p.viii 
17 Wohlfarth. "The Stability of a Unipolar World", p.36 
18 Kissinger, H. (2001). Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a diplomacy for the 
21st century. New York NY, Simon & Schuster. p.29 
19 Albright, M.K. (2003). Madam Secretary: a memoire. Basingstoke UK, Macmillan. p.504 
20 Haass, R.N. (2001). Assessing Bill Clinton's Legacy: how will history remember him?. 
Washington DC, The Brookings Institution, 9 January 2001. 
http://www.brook.edu/comrn/transcripts/20010109a.htm - accessed 11 August 2003; Webster, 
S. (1999). President Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy: a critical assessment, 7 May 1999. The 
James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership, College Park MD, University of Maryland. 
http://www.academy.umd.edu/publications/presidential leadership/Clinton Roundtable.htm -
accessed 11 August 2003 
21 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
in New York City - 27 September 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993, p.1614 
22 Lake, A. (1993). "From Containment to Enlargement - 21 September 1993." US Department 
of State Dispatch Vol.4 No.39 p.659. 
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interests were at stake, the United States would eschew the isolationist policies 
it had practised between the two World Wars and would continue to 'engage' 
cooperatively with the international community. 
On the first of these themes - leadership - America's interests 
demanded that the United States maintain a robust military and diplomatic 
capacity to act unilaterally.23 Anthony Lake claimed that the United States 
would 'not seek to expand the reach of [its] institutions by force, subversion, or 
repression' .24 America would rely 'on diplomacy whenever possible, on force 
when absolutely necessary'. 25 
The second theme was the advancement of democracy and market 
economics. In this, the Clinton Administration drew upon the foundations laid 
by President Bush. These resonated with aspirations enunciated by Woodrow 
Wilson several decades earlier. For Bush, the 'nation's foreign policy has 
always been more than simply an expression of American interests; it's an 
extension of American ideals'. 26 His secretaries of state, James Baker and later 
Lawrence Eagleburger, had identified the Administration's tasks in the new 
world order as 'winning a democratic peace' ,27 and the need to 'strengthen the 
core of democracies which won the Cold War' 28 for fear that 'the inherent 
centrifugal forces of multipolarity' 29 would drive them apart. It would be 
achieved through an enlargement of the community of democratic states, 
especially by extending 'the core of democracies to include the former 
communist world, as well as other nations that have embraced our political and 
economic values' .30 Lake took the matter further: '[t]he successor to a doctrine 
of containment must be a strategy of enlargement - enlargement of the world's 
free community of market democracies'. 31 
23 Bennet Jr, D. (1994). "The United States and the United Nations in the Global Era - 6 
January 1994." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.5 No.4 p.31. 
24 Lake (1993). "From Containment to Enlargement", p.660 
25 Albright, M.K. (1993). "Use of Force in a Post-Cold War World - 23 September 1993." US 
Department of State Dispatch Vol.4 No.39 p.668 
26 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). Remarks at the Yale University Commencement Ceremony in New 
Haven, Connecticut, 27 May 1991. Public Papers - President Bush, 1991, p.567 
27 Baker III, J.A. (1992). "A Summons to Leadership - 21 April 1992." US Department of State 
Dispatch (27 April 1992). p.321 
28 Eagleburger, L.S. (1993). "Charting the Course: US foreign policy in a time of transition - 7 
January 1993." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.4 No.2 p.19 
29 Ibid. p.19 
30 Ibid. p.19 
31 Lake (1993). "From Containment to Enlargement", p.659 
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In seeking the application of 'its domestic values to the world at 
large' ,32 the United States was seizing the unipolar moment to fashion the 
world after its own image. Exemplarism has long been a theme in American 
psychology.33 Clinton acknowledged that there are some who claim 'that 
democracy is simply not applicable to many cultures', 34 although he clearly 
disagreed with that thought. He was attracted to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's view that '[t]he democratic aspiration is no mere recent phase of 
human history. It is human history' .35 A cautionary note had, however, 
already been advanced by Eagleburger, who urged upon Americans the 
practice of 'the art of compromise and, thus, of diplomacy'. 36 
This warning by Eagleburger, the first career diplomat to have been 
promoted to Secretary of State, was set aside in favour of exemplarism, a 
rational expression of the conviction that 'democracies do not make war with 
each other'. This nostrum has been put to study and found to be 'virtually a 
sufficient condition for nonwar' .37 Conversely, the study found that at the 
system level, during the transitional period from autarchy to democracy, 
'democratization was associated with increasing violence between states'. 38 
Until the global structure settled on new-found democratic foundations, the 
envisaged new world order need not be a peaceful one. 
The third theme in Clinton's vision was the need to work with the 
international community in securing American interests. The Administration 
needed to argue the case domestically against the background of a demand for 
a peace dividend, and a growing disenchantment with the United Nations 
especially in respect of its bloated bureaucracy and peacekeeping role. 
32 Kegley Jr., C.W. and E.R. Wittkopf (1996). American Foreign Policy: pattern and process. 
New York NY, St Martin's Press. Citing Kissinger at p.71 
33 Coker, C. (1989). Reflections on American Foreign Policy since 1945. London UK, Pinter 
Publishers. Ch. 1. 
34 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
in New York City - 27 September 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993, p.1614 
35 Ibid, cited at p.1614 
36 Eagleburger. "Charting the Course". He said: 'Our national virtue is that we are 
comfortable only with a foreign policy rooted in the values of our political tradition; 
our national vice is a tendency toward moralism in foreign policy and a kind of moral 
hubris which views the actions of others only through the prism of our own standards 
of conduct'. p.19 
37 Gleditsch, N.P. and H.Hegre (1997). "Peace and Democracy: three levels of analysis." The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.41 No.2 (April 1997). p.307 
38 Ibid. p.307 
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Warren Christopher, Clinton's first secretary of state, was at pains to 
point out that while the United States was prepared to act alone where its vital 
interests were at stake, the opportunity existed to leverage American power 
through alliances and institutions. This offered the prospect of achieving 
'better results at lower cost in human life and national treasure' .39 For 
Clinton's Administration, the debate between proponents of unilateral and 
multilateral action assumed a false choice: '[m]ultilaterism is a means, not an 
end' .40 'Multilateral steps complement bilateral and unilateral efforts: they do 
not substitute for them' .41 
It is not easy to position a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute with 
any precision within Clinton's global vision. He inherited the . Middle East 
peace process from his predecessor. While domestic issues were 'the 
overwhelming focus '42 of Clinton's first presidential campaign, he has 
acknowledged that 'global interdependence was erasing the divide between 
foreign and domestic policy' and that on succeeding to the presidency he 
discovered that the supposed 'new world order' 'was rife with chaos and big, 
unresolved questions' .43 He instanced the future of post-Soviet Union Europe 
and the Balkans as commanding immediate attention. A Middle East 
settlement was not listed among the array of inherited 'unresolved questions'. 
Although a resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute was not initially a 
critical issue for Clinton or his Administration, it was to grow into a major 
preoccupation over the president's two terms in office. Israel's deportation of 
Hamas activists to southern Lebanon in December 1992, and Lebanon's refusal 
to absorb them, created a crisis that the incoming Administration could not 
avoid. The initial disposition of the new secretary of state was to pursue an 
Arab-Israel peace only if openings were to occur: 'he was not going to be 
active in trying to create openings' .44 However, Christopher's early visit to the 
Middle East occasioned by the deportations convinced him that the 
39 Christopher, W. (1995). "Principles and Opportunities for American Foreign Policy - 20 
January 1995." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.6 No.4 p.42 
40 Ibid. p.42 
41 Albright, M.K. (1995)."The United States and the United Nations: confrontation or 
consensus? - 20 January 1995." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.6 No.6 p.80 
42 Clinton, W.J. (2004). My Life. London UK, Hutchinson. p.502 
43 Ibid. p.502 
44 Ross, D.B. (2004 ). The Missing Peace: the inside story of the fight for Middle East peace. 
New York NY, Farrar, Straus and Giroux. p.98 
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constellation of factors then in existence presented an exceptional opportunity 
to promote peace. Without losing sight of other matters to which it accorded 
higher importance, the Administration decided to become engaged in the 
matter. Clinton was to become seized of the possibilities offered by the 
conclusion of a Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Thereafter, his Administration pursued a resolution of the dispute with 
conviction, despite attempts by some actors to frustrate accommodations 
among the parties principal that in turn provoked harmful retaliation. Keeping 
the negotiation alive in the hope of achieving a Middle East settlement became 
an imperative for the Administration: 'if the process lapsed, the potential for 
violence and terror would increase dramatically; absent diplomacy, the 
extremists, especially in the Arab world, would emphasise that armed struggle 
was the only answer' .45 Clinton invested personally in assuring that the 
process did not founder. By the end of his presidency, he had become 
intimately involved in the negotiation between the Israelis and Palestinians and 
submitted his own views on a framework within which a peace solution might 
be found. 
Clinton's growing preoccupation over the course of his presidency with 
a possible Middle East settlement was reflected in the identification of foreign 
priorities for his second term. An issue that was not mentioned among the 
tasks he needed to address when taking office in 1993, ranked high in his post-
1996 agenda. It was pursued seemingly without material cost to his objectives 
and policies in other areas, domestic and international. His autobiography 
focuses heavily on domestic issues and the attention that he devoted to them. 
In relation to international questions, and despite his involvement at various 
times in matters of detail in the negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians, he 
accepted the need to delegate in order to accommodate other calls on his time. 
Famously, he left Camp David during the course of the critical Israel-
Palestinian negotiation in July 2000 to attend a meeting of the Group of 7 in 
Okinawa. 
That a resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute became a major objective 
of the Clinton Administration is clear, reflecting the president' s growing 
45 Ibid. p.78 
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obsession with the subject. What is less clear is the weighting that should be 
given to it in relation to other international issues that commanded the attention 
of the United States. Judged solely in terms of time and effort, it must be 
accorded a position of considerable significance. The next chapter will address 
why a resolution of the dispute should have become an objective of the Bush 
Administration, to be shared later by that of his successor. The following 
chapters will examine in greater detail how the two Administrations exercised 
the power of the United States to effect a settlement. 
Conceptually, the ideal of a negotiated and comprehensive settlement 
concluded with American leadership, were it to be achieved, would be a 
powerful demonstration of the ability of American hegemony to produce a 
'public good', and would provide a tremendous boost to the United States's 
image. As Robert Jervis has observed, images are important in foreign policy 
and success can bring rewards 'by influencing the psychological environments 
and policies of other decision-makers' .46 Though an American Administration 
might wish single-handedly to manage a resolution of the dispute, the circle of 
affected states ranged beyond Israel and its immediate neighbours and the US 
would have to engage cooperatively with members of the international 
community. It is less certain that the Administration could have believed that a 
settlement would lead to an enlargement of the community of democratic 
nations, especially in the Middle East. Whatever outcome might be achieved, 
it was unlikely to spark a 'democratic enlargement' within the region. Clinton 
had advocated democratisation as an issue during his 1992 electoral campaign, 
but had no grand design for its advancement.47 Like Presidents Kennedy, 
Reagan and Bush, he practised what Tony Smith has called 'selective liberal 
democratic internationalism': an expansion of democracy abroad was held to 
be in the United States' s security interest, but America's power to promote 
such reforms was too limited to be used imprudently. 48 
The difficulty of implementing a selective policy is that leaders must 
know when and how to act aggressively to promote democracy abroad 
and when prudentially to remain silent. They must reconcile the 
46 Jervis, R. (1970). The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton NJ, Princeton 
University Press. p.8 
47 Smith, T. (1994). America's Mission: the United States and the worldwide struggle for 
democracy in the twentieth century. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press. p.325 
48 Ibid. p.322 
contradiction that while American security is served by a successful 
liberal agenda, there are definite limits to the American ability to foster 
developments such as democracy abroad.49 
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Having established the setting within which a resolution of the Arab-
Israel dispute was sought, consideration is now given to the means by which it 
might be achieved. The vehicle is the employment of the United States's 
power. Power is the means by which an actor influences others in order to 
secure an objective. It may be projected through political, economic or 
cultural means, and through ideas. It may, of course, be projected by force. 
The use of force was inconsistent with the objective of a negotiated settlement, 
but other means exist for the projection of power to achieve a desired 
outcome. There is a range of instruments at the disposal of a state that may be 
employed in the exercise of its power. How a state manages its interaction 
with other states is the matter of diplomacy. The following two sections 
discuss first the concept of power, and then how power may be applied by a 
state in the context of its diplomatic relations. 
Power 
In his analysis of power, Peter Morriss proposes that power is a 
capacity, at the disposition of the holder, for producing an event.50 As a 
dispositional concept, power is neither a thing (a resource or vehicle) nor an 
event (an exercise of power).51 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff take the definition 
further. They argue that power cannot be reduced to capabilities (resources) 
because it consists of psychological factors as well as situational ones. 52 It is, 
as Hans Morgenthau put it, about 'man's control over the minds and actions of 
other men' .53 Arnold Wolfers shares the perception of power having a 
psychological dimension: it is 'the ability to move others or to get them to do 
49 Ibid. p.326 
50 Morriss, P. (1987). Power: a philosophical analysis. Manchester UK, Manchester University 
Press. p.22 
51 Ibid. p.19 
52 Dougherty, J.E. and R.L. Pfaltzgraff Jr (1990). Contending Theories of International 
Relations: a comprehensive survey. New York NY, Harper Collins Publishers. p.126 
53 Morgenthau, H.J. (1978 (5th edit., rev.). Politics Among Nations: the struggle for power and 
peace. New York NY, Alfred A. Knopf. p.30 
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what one wants them to do and not to do what one does not want them to do' .54 
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff conclude th~t 
[t]he ability to exert influence over another. .. without the actual 
expenditure of capabilities, represents the most effective employment 
of power. In such a conception, it is not the use of power, as in a 
military campaign, that is important but rather the political shadow 
alleged to be cast by its perceived possession. Thus, power becomes 
the 'cutting edge' of diplomacy .55 
As a dispositional property, power may be projected by the holder 
through material means (primarily military or economic), or through ideas, or 
some combination of the two. Its attributes may be existential or ideational.56 
It may be applied directly in order to effect a desired outcome, or it may 
influence the attainment of an objective. The concepts of power and influence 
are frequently conflated, with both described as 'affecting' outcomes. 
American officials customarily talk of exercising influence or influencing 
outcomes in international affairs, perhaps sensitive about transgressing upon 
the sovereignty of independent states. 
While the capacity to produce an event may inhere in both power and 
influence, the two concepts are distinct and it is necessary to distinguish 
between them. Wolfers views 'the first to mean the ability to move others by 
the threat or infliction of deprivations, the latter to mean the ability to do so 
through promises or grants of benefits' .57 Awareness of the attitudes of a 
dominant power and a unilateral disposition by a 'lesser' state not to challenge 
them is an insidious form of influence exerted without recourse to promises or 
grants. It will be argued later in this chapter that 'promises or grants of 
benefits' are resources that may be employed for coercive purposes in order to 
produce a particular outcome, and thus agents for the projection of power 
rather than influence. Such usage is consistent with Klaus Knorr' s preference 
to use the term 'power' only in relation to its coercive capability.58 
54 Wolfers, A. (1962). Discord and Collaboration: essays on international politics. Baltimore 
MD, The Johns Hopkins Press. p.103 
55 Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff. Contending Theories, p.87 
56 Baker III, J.A. (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy: revolution, war and peace 1989-1992. 
New York NY, G.P. Putnam's Sons. The former Secretary of State said that power may take 
many forms: 'economic and military might, group expectations and pressure, and most 
lastingly, through ideas'. p.xv 
57 Wolfers. Discord and Collaboration, p.103 
58 Knorr, K. (1975). The Power of Nations: the political economy of international relations. 
New York NY, Basic Books, Inc. p.4 
19 
'Influence' is defined by Morriss 'as affecting (in a certain way), whilst 
'power' is usually defined as the ability to effect' .59 He instances the fact that 
the work of an artist or philosopher can influence or affect the attitudes of 
others long after the creator's death, demonstrates that influence is not an 
exercise of power. But his interpretation of influence dismisses the pervasive 
affect of widely held attitudes, generated by normative expectations deriving 
from association within certain societies or regimes, or the demonstration 
effect of the achievements of others. Either of these forces could be current 
and direct contemporary behaviour in certain directions. As power and 
influence can proceed in tandem, it may not always be possible to identify · 
precisely the catalytic cause that produced a certain outcome. 
The ability of a state to produce a desired outcome may be a function of 
its statecraft (which will be discussed below), influence, or both. The effect of 
influence on the formulation of state perceptions is most evident in relation to 
structured spheres. They bear some similarity to James Rosenau's regimes60 in 
that they engender expectations of normative behaviour among the regime's 
subscribers. A dominant state may be able to influence the shape or direction 
of a regime, but its control may not be absolute and some expression of 
divergent opinion among the membership may be tolerated. The 
membership's propensity to keep disagreements 'within the family', and 
mutual acquiescence in the patterns of control exercised by the influencing 
power, contribute to international order61 and the attainment of the dominant 
power's objectives. 
The relationship of a lesser state to a dominant power need not be 
structured, and may be motivated by 'prudential' perceptions.62 These may 
include a concern or fear about a dominant power's reaction to certain 
behaviour, even though no overt threat had been made by it; or voluntary 
59 Morriss. Power, p.30. . 
60 Rosenau, J.N. (1990). Turbulence in World Politics: a theory of change and continuity. 
Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press. Rosenau has written about institutional mechanisms 
- often called 'regimes' - that embrace actors in both the state- and multi-centric 
worlds ... which, in subtle ways, may be reducing the force of self-interest and enlarging the 
degree to which worldwide interdependence is founded on common values. pp.421-2 
61 Keal, P. (1983). Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance. Basingstoke UK, The 
Macmillan Press Ltd. pp.200, 204 
62 Ibid. p.8 
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submission to the dominant power in the expectation of some gain, perhaps 
related to physical or economic preferment or security. 
An unstructured projection of influence is inherent in Nye's concept of 
'soft power'. 'Soft power' has an ability to entice and attract, or to set the 
political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of others. 63 · It is 
ideational in form, and its characteristic is essentially influential. It involves 
'getting others to want what you want ... It co-opts people rather than coerces 
them' .64 The reason 'soft power' may be attractive to others is that it is 
underpinned by the holder's attributes, which may be material, intellectual or 
cultural. Power and 'soft power' may coexist as properties of the one holder: a 
trenchant critic of United States policies may nevertheless wish to live or study 
there.65 The line between influencing an 'other' in a way conducive to 
achieving a desired outcome, and effecting that outcome may be a fine one in 
some circumstances. The latter suggests both determination and currency, 
whereas the former is insidious and less insistent. 
Power is a relational concept, involving consideration of its domain 
(which 'others' can be targeted) and scope (which actions are likely to 
contribute to producing the desired outcome ).66 It may be expressed in explicit 
terms of scope and domain, or of capabilities (thus shifting the analytical focus 
from 'actual causes to potential causes').67 The ability to effect outcomes may 
rest on various bases, differing not only from culture to culture, but also within 
a culture from one power structure to another,68 any of which could serve to 
produce an outcome. 
· 
63 Nye (2002). The Paradox of American Power, p.9; Nye Jr, J.S. (2003). "The velvet 
hegemon." Foreign Policy Iss.136 May/June 2003 pp.74-5 
64 Nye (2002). The Paradox of American Power, p.9. This is his description of one of the 
fundamental bases of 'soft power'. 
65 Friedman, T.L. (2003). "Passions and Interests." The New York Times on the Web, 2 
October 2003. 
66 Baldwin, D.A. (1993). Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics. Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism: the contemporary debate. D.A. Baldwin. New York NY, Columbia University 
Press. p.16 
67 Ibid. p.16 
68 Lasswell, H.D. and A. Kaplan (1950). Power and Society: a framework for political inquiry. 
New Haven CO, Yale University Press. p.85, Table 2 p.87; Baldwin, D.A. (1985). Economic 
Statecraft. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press. pp.135-6 
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The relational character of power is among a number of characteristics 
identified by David Baldwin.69 Others are that power may rest on various 
bases, and no one form of power is basic to all the others; power is 
multidimensional, varying in degree with respect to several dimensions, 
. including scope, weight, domain, and cost; and power is not necessarily a zero-
sum game. It is quite possible for two actors to increase their power over one 
another with respect to similar or different aspects of behaviour 
simultaneously. 
While there are many situations 1n which military force is more 
important than other power resources, Baldwin favours examining the bases of 
power in the context of particular cases. Power analysis always requires 
consideration of counterfactual conditions. If power relations involve getting 
'others' to do something they would not otherwise do, the question of what 
would otherwise have been done cannot be ignored. 
There is general acknowledgement that 'power is a means' .70 Within 
its relational context power is, therefore, essentially instrumental.71 The 
efficacy of power is sometimes expressed in direct - causal - terms. Baldwin 
has written that the common conception of power in social science 'treats 
power relations as a type of causal relationship in which the power-wielder 
affects the behaviour, attitudes, beliefs, or propensity to act of another actor' .72 
Such a simple cause/effect dichotomy suggests that the target state acts in 
accordance with the wishes of the wielder of power because it bears the burden 
of 'cost'. Kenneth Waltz has rejected so bald an assumption in favour of one 
implying some measure of 'cost sharing': 'an agent is powerful to the extent 
that he affects others more than they affect him' .73 He has also warned that the 
69 Baldwin (1985). Economic Statecraft, pp.20-2; Baldwin (1993). Neoliberalism, Neorealism 
and World Politics, p.16 
70 Waltz (1979). Theory of International Politics, p.192 
71 Kissinger, H. (1979). The White House Years. London UK, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. He 
has observed that 'a calculus of power. . .is only the beginning of policy; it cannot be its sole 
purpose'. p.130 
72 Baldwin (1993). Neoliberalism, Neorealism and World Politics, p.16 
73 Waltz (1979). Theory of International Politics, p.192 
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outcome of the use of power is necessarily uncertain and that 'powerful agents 
fail to impress their wills on others in just the way they intend to' .74 
· The place of power in international relations is the subject of theoretical 
discourse. 'Realists' such as Morgenthau75 argue that the state is not enjoined 
to observe a common morality because no such universal order exists. The 
task of statesmanship is to protect the insular political order from the anarchic 
seas which surround it through the use of national power.76 Conversely, 
'Rationalists' like Hedley Bull argue that an international society does exist.77 
Bull postulates that if states form an international society, it is because they 
recognise certain common interests and cooperate in their achievement.78 For 
the Rationalists, '[p ]reservation of the bases of international society becomes 
itself a principal task of statesmanship, and customary behaviour allows for the 
development of sufficient trust for genuinely cooperative approaches to 
emerge' .79 A further liberal argument ('Revolutionism' in Martin Wight's 
terminology) is founded on the belief in a world community that goes beyond 
the society of states and whose fundamental constituents are human beings 
rather than the 'contracted' states through which they have contingently given 
political expression to their interests. 'In the centrality which it commits to the 
moral freedom and autonomy of the individual, it is ultimately corrosive of 
inter-state society and envisages its final supercession' .80 This cosmopolitan 
strain commands an active global constituency among non-governmental 
organisations, whose ability to set and pursue an independent international 
agenda is being accommodated by states through some power-sharing 
arrangement. States have not conceded ground, partially harnessing 
community concern about the global environment and human rights, inter alia, 
to the inter-state society through agreements subscribed by them. 
74 Ibid. p.192; Rosenau, J.N. (1968). "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?" 
International Studies Quarterly Vol.12 No.3. Rosenau asserts: 'Foreign policy undertakings 
do have unintended consequences for social, economic, and political life ... ' p.315 
75 Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations, pp.3-15 
76 Clark, I. (1996). Traditions of Thought and Classical Theories of International Relations. 
Classical Theories of International Relations. I. Clark and LB. Neumann. New York NY, St. 
Martin's Press, Inc. pp.1-19 
77 Ibid. p.5 
78 Bull, H. (1977). The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics. Basingstoke UK, 
Macmillan. p.13 
79 Clark. Traditions of Thought, p.5 
80 Ibid. p.6 
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E. H. Carr recognised the interdependence of utopian idealism and 
realism, 81 and foreshadowed a possible blending of realism and idealism in a 
state's conduct of its international relations. He attributed the latter to a 
common feeling among states about what is just and reasonable, but the 
embryonic character of international society was 'the real obstacle in the way 
of an international procedure of peaceful change'. 82 At the time of his writing, 
the elimination of the element of power in the process of peaceful change 
seemed utopian, and states had little option but to conform to the prevailing 
condition that 'the party which is able to bring most power to bear normally 
emerges successful from operations of peaceful change' .83 Nearly fifty years 
later Clinton's principal foreign policy advisers, both of whom entered public 
. 
service from academia, were affirming the mix of realism and liberalism in his 
Administration's approach. 84 
Application of power 
Power is a relative property, not an absolute one. A state's potential 
authority may be inferred from its relative military and/or economic capacity, 
but its power is only realised through its employment. Power is, therefore, an 
attribute to be utilised in the pursuit of an objective, rather than an end in itself. 
The instrumental application of state power is pursued through statecraft in the 
expectation of producing some end, goal, objective or aim, 85 bearing in mind 
the state's range of commitments. States are conscious of their interdependent 
commitments: the credibility of a state's commitment in one area often cannot 
be eroded without affecting the credibility of its commitments in other areas. 86 
81 Carr, E.H. (1948). The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of 
international relations. London UK, Macmillan & Co. Ltd. p.13 
82 Ibid. He wrote that 'if an orderly procedure of peaceful change is ever to be established in 
international relations, some way must be found of basing its operation not on power alone, but 
on that uneasy compromise between power and morality which is the foundation of all political 
life'. p.220 
83 Ibid. p.222 
84 Lake, A. (1994). "The Need for Engagement - 30 November 1994." US Department of State 
Dispatch Vol.5 No.49. He said that '[t]he realists have it right that power matters ... [b]ut 
Wilson had it right that principles matter - that power unhinged from principle will [be] 
rudderless ... ' p.805; Albright (2003). Madam Secretary. In her autobiography Albright 
expresses the hope 'never again to hear foreign policy described as a debate between 
Wilsonian idealists and geopolitical realists. In our era, no President or Secretary of State 
could manage events without combining the two'. p.505 
85 Baldwin (1985). Economic Statecraft, p.16 
86 Ibid. pp.106, 109 
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There may be occasions, however, when a state will seek to pursue its 
objective through expressive behaviour, such as righteous indignation, rather 
than instrumental behaviour. Expressive behaviour may help image creation, a 
field in which the 'manipulation of symbols .. .is unmatched in any other 
political situation' .87 Ephemeral qualities such as good will, prestige, and 
saving face are aspects of a state's image that can contribute to its pursuit of 
other goals. Promoting an image abroad is, however, a mixed motive game in 
which failure in one dimension may be offset by success in another. 
Instrumental and expressive behaviour are not mutually exclusive: a state may 
employ expressive behaviour for instrumental purposes. 
Whichever form of behaviour a state employs 1n pursuit of its 
objective, the objective may be treated either as a goal in its own right, or an 
intermediate goal instrumental in the attainment of its ultimate objective. It 
has been suggested that 'very few foreign policy goals are final ... most goals 
are intermediate' .88 Sometimes a state may find it useful to identify its 
objective with precision; at other times to express it more broadly. In pursuit 
of its objective, a state may need to co-opt the assistance of other states, in 
which case it may judge that prospective partners would be more amenable to 
supporting a broadly-framed objective than in furtherance of a narrowly-
defined goal patently designed to serve the interest of the power-wielding state. 
To summarise: power is a relative concept. It can only be used in 
relation to an 'other'; and is employed by a state in order to attain an objective. 
Its application may be physical, but power is more commonly exercised 
through its psychological dimension with the intent of encouraging or 
influencing the target state to produce an outcome desired by the power-
wielding state. How this may be exercised in the context of a state's 
diplomatic relations is the subject of the following section. 
Diplomacy 
Diplomacy 1s the process of dialogue between states. The word 
'diplomacy' is frequently and incorrectly used as a synonym for the foreign 
policy of a state. Adam Watson draws a distinction between 'foreign policy' 
87 Rosenau (1968). "Comparative Foreign Policy", p.328 
88 Baldwin (1985). Economic Statecraft, pp.62-3 
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as the substance of a state's relations with other powers and agencies and the 
purposes it hopes to achieve by these relations, and 'diplomacy' as the process 
of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations 
and pursue their purposes by means short of war. 89 In the terms of his 
definition, foreign policy embraces the identification of objectives, while 
diplomacy addresses the strategies pursued for their attainment. How a state 
employs the instruments at its disposal, is the matter of statecraft. Craig and 
George have pointed out that the conventional wisdom of statecraft 
incorporates force and threat of force as 'a necessary instrument of 
diplomacy' .90 While force was never threatened or employed in the search for 
a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, Arab states were aware of America's 
ability to project military power into the Middle East and it remained a 
background condition of the negotiation. 
The diplomatic options available to the state may be either 'active' or 
'passive' depending upon the goal to be pursued. Both derive from decisions 
by the state. The 'active' aspect - a decision to do something - is generally 
self-evident, while the 'passive' derives from decisions not to become actively 
engaged. A passive position may enable a state to enjoy the product of the 
work of those who have pursued an outcome - that is, free access to a 'public 
good' acquired through the effort of others. Few dichotomies are absolute: an 
intermediate stage between 'active' and 'passive' is conceivable. The United 
States has not intervened directly in support of Israel's security other than 
when Israel has been under military attack. American assistance has ensured 
that for the most part Israel has been able to assure its own security. American 
Administrations hoped that an indirect contribution would enable them to put 
some distance between United States concern for Israel's security and its other 
Middle Eastern interests - 'active' assistance permitting the adoption of a 
seemingly 'passive' stance. 
The 'active' instruments of diplomacy are those that may be employed 
by a state in the exercise of its power. They are persuasion, financial 
inducements, sanctions and coercion. Sanctions may be either 'positive' or 
89 Watson, A. (1982). Diplomacy: the dialogue between states. London UK, Eyre Methuen 
Ltd. p.11 
9° Craig, G.A. and A.L. George (1995 (3rd edit.)). Force and Statecraft: diplomatic problems 
of our time. New York NY, Oxford University Press, Inc. p.258 
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'negative'. 'Positive' sanctions offer actual or promised rewards, while 
'negative' sanctions employ actual or threatened punishments91 and are usually 
applied with coercive intent. The instruments of diplomacy are discussed 
below. Each of these measures may be employed discretely or in concert. 
Whichever instrument or combination of tools is used, the aim is to achieve 
acceptance of, or support for, a particular objective of the wielding state. 
Persuasion 
The purpose of persuasion 1s to appeal to the target state's 
understanding of its national interest, if necessary by encouraging it to change 
its perception of its national interest. The state seeking to engineer a decision 
in its own interest will suggest that the target state shares with it a common or 
mutual national interest: there could be advantage to both in concurring in a 
certain matter. It does not follow that the target state will share that 
perception. It may have other interests to which it attaches greater importance 
that were not ( or could not be) taken into account by the power-wielder. 
As a negotiation technique, 'persuasion' may be distinguished from 
'bargaining'. The former involves efforts to get the target state to understand 
why the power-wielder's demands are so important to it. 'Bargaining' is 
characterised by concessions, conditional offers, threats, and inducements. It 
may be that one party does not ask more of the other than it thinks reasonable 
and likely to be acceptable (which Craig and George characterise as 
'accommodating'); or that the party or parties pursue maximum gains (which 
they describe as an 'optimising' technique).92 
There are many channels of persuasion. The traditional and most direct 
method between states is through diplomatic contact whether at head of 
government level or through accredited agents. Such contact may be personal 
or through correspondence; and includes debate within international forums. 
What was once the confidential preserve of exchanges between individual 
agents is now frequently the subject of open debate, including in the media and 
academia. In an age of virtually instantaneous communication use is often 
made of communications technology to broadcast an immediate response to 
91 Baldwin (1985). Economic Statecraft, p.20 
92 Craig and George. Force and Statecraft, pp.169-70 
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some development. Television offers a means by which statesmen or their 
spokespersons may seek to reach the leaders of a target state, and public 
opinion within it, in the hope of effecting some change of policy. Press 
briefings by White House, US State Department and Pentagon spokespersons 
are not only an important source of information about American attitudes, they 
can be the means by which American Administrations advocate desired 
objectives and seek to build domestic and/or foreign constituencies for them. 
Formal communication between states may be supplemented through 
public information programmes and public diplomacy. Both tools are designed 
to impress views on target states. Their efficacy can be limited by political 
and/or social conditions within the target state: not every audience is disposed 
to be receptive to the wielder's efforts. An official American description of 
public information is 'the provision of information to the public, press and 
other institutions concerning the goal, policies and activities of the U.S. 
Government' .93 The emphasis is on informing others in the expectation that a 
well-informed public in a target state will understand the goals of the 
projecting state and seek some accommodation with them. It is an appeal to 
logic. The information projected may not, however, be comprehensive. 
Where selective material is projected with intent to mislead, it is called 
disinformation. Propaganda is a 'darker' version due to the deliberate 
manipulation of the projected material to present biased or misleading 
information in order to promote a political cause. 
Although scepticism may be entertained about the United States's use 
of public information programmes, the intent is generally unobjectionable 
unless it involves an attempt to transgress the sovereignty of the target state. It 
is doubtful, however, whether America's official explanation of its 
methodology - 'To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we 
must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that' 94 -
can be taken wholly at face value. 
93 US Information Agency (2002). What is Public Diplomacy? Washington DC, US 
Information Agency. p. l http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/l .htm - accessed 30 August 2002 
94 Ibid. p.3, citing testimony before a congressional committee by a former Director of the 
United States Information Agency. 
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Public diplomacy introduces a more evident intent to influence others.95 
It deals primarily with non-governmental individuals and organisations, but 
does not exclude dealings with governments. The differing views of 
individuals, organisations and governments may be projected by these means. 
It is an avenue for the projection of so-called 'soft power' in that it seeks 'to 
entice and attract. And attraction often leads to acquiescence or imitation' .96 
Positive sanctions 
Positive sanctions may be offered either as an inducement to secure an 
objective or as a reward for a service rendered. In their financial form, they 
may be made in grant or loan form for security, economic, developmental or 
educational and cultural purposes. And they may be made either on a state-to-
state basis, or by international organisations drawing upon resources allocated 
for such purposes principally from the contributions of member states. Both 
bilateral and multilateral aid may take the form of finance or credits, or 
technical assistance, or be in kind. It is within America's capacity to make 
such allocations from within its own resources, and for an American 
Administration to exert influence within the boards of American corporations 
and international organisations to encourage them to make appropriate 
disbursements. For having concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Egypt 
receives an annual allocation of American aid worth about $2 billion.97 No 
such inducement was discussed with Jordan before it concluded its peace treaty 
with Israel in 1994, but Jordanians were well aware of the precedent.98 
How financial inducements may be broken down into grants or loans or 
assistance for various purposes offers scope for the application of power over 
95 Ibid. A Library of Congress study of US international and cultural programs and activities, 
prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate, states that the term 'public 
diplomacy' was first used in 1965 by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts 
University in connection with the establishment at Fletcher of the Edward. R. Murrow Center 
for Public Diplomacy; Djerejian, E.P. (2003). Changing Minds Winning Peace: a new strategic 
direction for U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim world. Presented at: House 
Committee on Appropriations, Washington DC. The submission defines public diplomacy as 
'the promotion of the national interest by informing, engaging, and influencing people around 
the world'. p.13 
96 Nye (2002). The Paradox of American Power, p.9 
97 Mark, C.R. (2002). Egypt-United States Relations. Washington DC, Congressional 
Research Service, The Library of Congress. Tables 1 and 2. 
98 Interview with Mr Marwan Kassim, former adviser to King Hussein of Jordan and former 
foreign minister of Jordan, at Amman on 8 May 2002. 
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. the target state. Constitutionally, legislators in democracies need to be 
satisfied that allocations of taxpayers' funds are for justifiable purposes, and a 
state hoping to attract _aid must demonstrate that it is prepared to meet their 
expectations. In practise few such analyses are attempted, but the threat of 
'exposure' remains. 
Disbursements to member states from the pooled contributions of 
members are made by some international organisations. The United States is 
the major state contributor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank. Its holding of 25 percent of the votes on their governing bodies 
outweighs the voting power of other individual state contributors and places 
the United States in an exceptional position to guide the governors' decisions 
in favour of its preferred outcomes. Its dominance is not absolute: significant 
donor states from Wes tern Europe and Japan may challenge American 
intentions.99 American influence within those institutions extends beneath the 
boardrooms. Many of the economists and other officials working for the 
international financial institutions share an economic philosophy in common 
with that of an American Administration and their advice to the governing 
bodies reflects this. 100 The combination of these 'American' influences has 
resulted in some recipients of IMF assistance being required to move toward 
American principles of economic management and market economics as a 
condition of IMF assistance. 
A financial inducement to a recalcitrant or wavering state to accord 
with a state's objectives may need to be matched by a reward to a well-
disposed one for its continuing friendship or support. The converse is also 
true. The United States decided that it could not afford to continue to sustain 
Israel's qualitative military edge in 1990 without also providing some military 
99 Gilpin, R. (2001). Global Political Economy: understanding the international economic 
order. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press. By custom, selection of the directorship of 
the World Bank has been the prerogative of the United States, while that of the IMF has been 
the prerogative of Western Europe. Japan, as the second-largest donor to the IMF, is unhappy 
about its subordinate role in that institution. It and other East Asians believe that the IMF is 
too much under American influence. pp.384-6 
100 Stevens, P. (1998). Introduction. Strategic Positioning in the Oil Industry: trends and 
options. P. Stevens. Abu Dhabi UAE, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. 
pp.13-4 
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assistance to Saudi Arabia. 101 Failure to do so in either case could impair what 
was regarded as a beneficial relationship. 
Negative sanctions 
Diplomatic practice offers scope for the employment of a number of 
negative sanctions. A particular type of negative sanction is economic 
sanctions. The range of negative sanctions considered here includes denial, 
coercive measures and the threat of force. They are designed to increase the 
'costs' to a target state of continuation of certain policies and, in so doing, to 
f+ h . . 1. . 102 e 1ect a c ange 1n its po 1c1es. Negative sanctions have the effect of 
increasing tension between the two parties, as opposed to tension reduction 
processes through conciliation or positive sanctions.103 They may increase the 
risk of war, which is itself a kind of cost. Like other costs, they may be used to 
add credibility to a signal. 104 
Negative sanctions may address symbols important to the target state, 
their impact being dependent upon the significance attached to its image by the 
target state. Examples could be the denial of a vote for election to the 
governing body of an international institution, the recall of an ambassador for 
'consultations', or the boycott of a national sporting team. Options that would 
cut to the quick of the relationship between the two parties would be a decision 
to downgrade or sever diplomatic relations, or to suspend a state's participation 
in some international body. Yet such a trenchant expression of disapproval -
backed as it is in the case of Iran by domestic American legislation proscribing 
commercial contact - has not halted non-governmental contact between 
citizens of both countries under 'second track' diplomacy, a process that 
facilitates a high-level exploration of views and options without committing 
the governments concerned. 
Where a state judges the policies of another to be inimical to its 
interests, it may conclude that its interest would be served by supporting 
citizens of the target state known to be antipathetic to their government. It may 
101 Bartholomew, R. (1990). "Defense Equipment for Saudi Arabia - 4 October 1990." US 
Department of State Dispatch (8 October 1990). Testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. p.169 
102 
'Cost' is used in the sense of value foregone as a result of a decision. 
103 Baldwin (1985). Economic Statecraft, pp.111-2 
104 Ibid. p.112 
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offer assistance to persons or groups in exile, or to forces operating within the 
target country, with the purpose of helping them to effect a regime change.105 
Such assistance by the state wielding power may encourage the resort to arms, 
or to civil protest. 
It is often claimed that 'sanctions don't work'. One of the most 
prescriptive sets of sanctions ever to have been applied to a country is that 
imposed upon Iraq in 1991 at the conclusion of the Gulf War under UN 
Security Council Resolution 687 .106 The resqlution called for the dismantling 
of Iraq's WMD and long-range missiles and the means to produce them, and it 
established machinery to effect and verify this; and restricted the volume of oil 
permitted to be exported to that necessary to cover the cost of Iraq's food 
import needs. The outcome was mixed, not least because the United States 
kept moving the goal posts in pursuit of securing a change of regime in Iraq. 
Iraq responded to the UN prescriptions, waging what Anthony Cordesman has 
called a 'war of sanctions', through which it frustrated the efforts of UN 
inspection bodies to carry out their mandate; provoked a division among the 
five permanent members of the Security Council; exploited the sympathy of 
the Arab world; and used its oil wealth (some of which was generated through 
'sanctions busting' means such as smuggling) to win foreign support. 107 The 
food-for-oil arrangement could not guarantee that food reached Iraq's most 
needy because its distribution remained largely in the hands of the Iraqi 
regime. An extensive survey of Iraq after the America-led intervention of 
2003 suggested that, while UN inspections had inhibited the development of 
WMD, Iraq retained a capability to develop missiles with a range of up to 1000 
kms, was attempting to obtain ballistic missile technology from North 
105 Tutwiler, M. (1992). "Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi Opposition - 29 July 1992." US 
Department of State Dispatch Vol.3 No.31. After the 1991 Gulf War, the United States 
encouraged the Iraqi National Congress 'to continue its efforts to increase the unity among 
opposition groups' in favour of 'a democratic, pluralistic government in Iraq'. p.611; 
Verstandig, T.G. (1994). "Principal Elements of U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf - 22 March 
1994." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.5 No.14 p.199 
106 Adopted on 3 April 1991 
107 Cordesman, A.H. (1999). Iraq and the War of Sanctions: conventional threats and weapons 
of mass destruction. Westport CT, Praeger Publishers. p.1 
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Korea, 108 and retained a capacity to make the liquid fuel to power the SCUD 
missiles banned under the Security Council resolution. 109 
Economic sanctions 
The most common form of negative sanctions 1s that labelled 
'economic'. Some economic sanctions are a denial, or reduction, in bilateral 
aid; denial of access to capital markets; a freezing of the bank accounts of 
institutions and citizens of the target country; trade boycotts, including denial 
of or tariffs on the entry of goods from the target country, restrictions on 
exports and technology (usually of sophisticated items), and a refusal to supply 
military materiel to the target country; a proscription on investment in the 
target country; and a refusal to entertain the conclusion of a free trade 
agreement with the target country. Production or export subsidies to producers 
of goods in competition with producers in the target state are other forms of 
economic sanctions. Many of these tools may involve costs to the state 
wielding power and will involve implicit, if not explicit, cost/benefit 
judgements by it before their application. 
Coercion 
Where force is threatened, it must be credible, foreshadowing greater 
diversion of resources by, and destruction to, the target state than to the 
threatening state. Coercion may be applied multilaterally under UN collective 
security provisions, or unilaterally. Multilaterally, the United States took a 
leading position within the UN Security Council in the drafting of sanctions 
against Libya for the bombing of flight PA103 over Scotland; against Iraq, 
demanding its withdrawal from Kuwait; and, after the Gulf War, enforcing the 
dismantling of Iraq's WMD capability. The United States has imposed 
sanctions unilaterally on Libya and Iran through domestic legislation for their 
support of terrorism. By executive decision it has proscribed certain financial 
dealings of organisations suspected of international terrorism. Since the 
attacks on the American homeland in 2001, the Administration of President 
108 Risen, J. and J. Miller (2003). Bush's own inspector, David Kay, in official report to 
Congress admits he can't find any WMDs in Iraq, Fair And Balanced Dot US. 
http://www.fairandbalanced.us/docs/Story/ID890.htm - accessed 17 October 2003 
109 Knowlton, B. (2003). "U.S. Inspector Sees Much to Pursue in Iraqi Weapons Search." The 
New York Times on the Web, 5 October 2003. 
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George W. Bush (2001- ) ·has targeted Iraq under a proclaimed policy of pre-
emptive self-defence. Its preparedness to exercise its military superiority 
under such terms has sent a warning to states in the Middle East of America's 
disposition to act unilaterally in accordance with its own perception of its 
national interests . . 
International norms 
It is anticipated that, in exercising the instruments described above, a 
state will conform to general expectations of normative behaviour. The place 
of international norms 110 in influencing state behaviour is a complex one. The 
strength of a norm, and thus the strength of its influence in international 
relations, depends on two properties: on its commonality (how many actors of 
a social system share a value-based expectation of behaviour), and on its 
specificity (how precisely a norm distinguishes appropriate from inappropriate 
behaviour). 111 
Many, but not all, international norms are codified in international 
law. 112 Not all important international norms have been codified or, where 
codified, upheld. The right of a people to self-determination is enshrined in the 
UN Charter113 and other instruments. Despite its 'black letter' expression, its 
normative interpretation in the context of decolonisation has been in relation to 
nations rather than to peoples. Some international instruments, concluded to 
regulate activity in particular fields, contain explicit or implicit standards of 
behaviour and extend, in some cases, to the domestic jurisdiction of 
subscribing states. Those relating to WMD are generally prescriptive. But 
subscription to international instruments, and membership of international 
organisations, may not be comprehensive, even where their compass may be 
global. Other regimes may be regional or subregional in scope. So even 
110 Chayes, A. and A.H. Chayes (1995). The New Sovereignty: compliance with international 
regulatory agreements. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press. They define 'norm' in a 
generic sense as including the concepts of principles, precepts, standards, rules, and the like. 
p.306 (25n) 
111 Boekle, H., V. Rittberger, [et al.] (1999). Norms and Foreign Policy: constructivist foreign 
policy theory. Center for International Relations/Peace and Conflict Studies. p.5 
http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/uni/spi/taps/tap34a.htm - accessed 2 September 2002 
112 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38(1). International law is stated to derive 
from international treaties, customary international law, 'the general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations' and (as 'subsidiary means') judicial decisions and 'teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations'. 
113 United Nations Charter, Art. 1(2) 
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though some regimes may contain provisions that might determine standards 
of behaviour in keeping with international norms, they may not be universally 
applicable. 
Expectations of behaviour in keeping with international norms may 
also be generated by legal acts of international organisations and the 'final 
acts' of international conferences. In respect of the former, it does not matter 
whether the norm contained in such an act is legally binding or not because 
these norms represent expectations that are regarded as standards of 
appropriate behaviour by members of that organisation. The criterion for 
judging their strength is not their legal character but their commonality and 
specificity. 114 The final acts of international conferences are a less precise 
source of international norms. Their usual adoption by consensus would seem 
to suggest that the norms they express contain a high degree of commonality, 
but the emphasis on consensus frequently means that they represent 
compromise formulas with only low specificity. Final acts are more useful as 
an indicator of international norms in combination with other indicators of 
. . 1 115 1nternat1ona norms. 
Normative expectations do not operate mechanically in regulating 
conduct in international relations: 'they are always subject to contestation, 
interpretation, and reinterpretation. But the norms and rules themselves set the 
terms of the interpretive discourse' .116 International and transnational 
interactions are increasing in volume and complexity and induce an 
expectation of predictability, reliability and stability. 117 In this regard, 
international regimes facilitate the cooperative pursuit of states' interests. 118 
Peer pressure is such that questionable action must be explained and 
justified.119 Non-compliance by a state in any single episode may affect future 
relationships. 120 Reputation matters, but is not in itself sufficient guarantee of 
114 Boekle, [et. al.]. Norms and Foreign Policy, p.16 
115 Ibid. p.16 
116 Keohane, R.O. (2002). Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World. London 
UK, Routledge. pp.120-1 
117 Chayes and Chayes. The New Sovereignty, p.124 
118 Keohane, R.O. and J.S. Nye (1989 (2nd edit.)). Power and Interdependence: world politics 
in transition. Boston MA, Little, Brown & Co. p.271 
119 Chayes and Chayes. The New Sovereignty, p.118 
120 Ibid. p.27 
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observance. 121 Institutions can be more effective. Monitoring compliance is 
frequently entrusted to international organisations within the area of their 
jurisdiction.122 Egregious behaviour may also be brought to the attention of the 
world community by other actors, including non-state ones. 
A dominant state may exercise leadership and extend its influence over 
a number of other lesser states around some mutual interest or interests, 
establishing norms of behaviour that the influenced states are expected to 
observe. 123 The obligation to conform does not fall equally, however. Hedley 
Bull has drawn attention to a hegemon's propensity to violate the rights of 
lesser states, justifying its action 'by appeal to some specific overriding 
. . 1 ' 124 pnnc1p e. 
The United States has played a formative role in the creation of many 
global institutions, including the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies. 
The weight of America's commitment, even during the decades of bipolarity, 
was such that it is difficult to envisage the inauguration of the world's most 
significant international organisations in the absence of American support. 125 
The importance of the institutions to the global community ensured their 
survival when the United States's financial contributions came later to be 
withheld or tardily delivered. Among the organs conceived with United States 
participation is the UN Security Council. Its responsibility for peace and 
security, and endowment with distinctive power, accords it a singular place 
among international institutions. It has been used by the United States both to 
prescribe acceptable international behaviour and to frustrate the adoption of 
rules where they depart from American interests. 
Kissinger has written that the test of history will be whether the United 
States can tum its predominant power into international consensus and its own 
121 Keohane (2002). Power and Governance, pp.125-6, 128 
122 Chayes and Chayes. The New Sovereignty, p.125 
123 Ibid. The authors distinguish between an 'enforcement model' of compliance and an 
alternative 'managerial model' in which norms play a part. In this context, norms are defined 
as 'prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of obligation'. p.113. Their 
legitimacy depends upon 'the extent to which the norm (1) emanates from a fair and accepted 
procedure, (2) is applied equally and without invidious discrimination, and (3) does not offend 
minimum substantive standards of fairness and equity'. p.127 
124 Bull. The Anarchical Society, pp.215-6 
125 Keohane and Nye (1989). Power and Interdependence. They note that international 
regimes can be 'valuable to great powers, such as the United States, that want to create, but are 
unable to dictate, the terms of a stable world environment'. p.271 
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principles into widely accepted norms. 126 The Clinton Administration made 
great use of UN Security Council resolutions to advance its interests, a practice 
made possible by the new era of great power cooperation that followed the 
demise of the Soviet Union. Despite a policy of 'assertive multilateralism' , the 
Administration relied on international institutions when it suited American 
purposes, and criticised or ignored them when they did not. 127 It used 
international machinery to promote and secure an indefinite extension of the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) among others, but declined to associate itself with other 
negotiated international arrangements that it assessed as infringing to an 
unacceptable degree upon its sovereignty. 
In short, while states that wish to receive the benefits of some regimes 
must accept restraint on their domestic or international behaviour, this is not 
invariably realised, and states may choose to ignore peer pressure where they 
believe that an overriding interest would be compromised by observance of 
some normative requirement. 
In the light of the foregoing discussion of power and the means of its 
application by a state, the following section will address the extent to which 
the actions of President Clinton and his advisers in seeking to effect a 
settlement of the Middle East dispute may be said to have engaged the 
American state as a whole. 
Legitimacy of US intervention 
Decisions by a state whether and how to exercise power may be 
influenced by domestic and/or international considerations. Domestically, 
Bush and Clinton acted in their search for a settlement of the Arab-Israel 
dispute in accordance with the constitutional responsibility of the President of 
the United States for the conduct of America's foreign policy. The United 
States Constitution provides a role for the Senate in respect of treaties and 
confirmation of appointments of US ambassadors. 128 It leaves the conduct of 
the country, s international relations to the president. In a pluralistic 
126 Kissinger, H. (2000). "Our nearsighted world vision." The Washington Post, 6 January 2000 
127 Walt, S.M. (2000) . "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs Vol.79 No.2 
(Mar/April 2000) pp.63-79 . 
. 
128 The United States Constitution. Art. II 2(2) 
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democratic society there will be citizens who do not share the president's view. 
Within the Congress, contrary views may find expression in the passage of 
prescriptive legislation, the adoption of resolutions, or in criticism expressed in 
congressional committees. Within the government some agencies may acquire 
and seek to advance agendas of their own, vying for influence within the 
Administration. 'Turf warfare' within bureaucracies, particularly competition 
among agencies to gain an ascendant position of influence, is an established 
phenomenon. Non-governmental organisations also struggle to gain influence 
among the Administration's decision-makers. The support of legislators may 
be enlisted by agencies and non-governmental organisations for their cause. 
These less-than-tidy manoeuvrings are inherent in America's democratic 
processes and challenge the president when engaged in the development of a 
policy capable of commanding broad public support. He may adjust his policy 
to accommodate divergent opinion where he deems it in the interest of his 
government to do so. But even where domestic dissent is evident, only the 
president has the constitutional authority to direct the course of the country's 
foreign policy. He may entrust the day-to-day conduct of affairs to officials, 
notably the secretary for state. When a choice is made among the instruments 
to be applied to effect a possible settlement of the Middle East dispute, it is by 
the president - or made in his name with his approval by his designated agents 
- acting for the state. 
The credence of the president qua the state is recognised 
internationally, even among states preferring an alternative foreign policy to 
that advanced by the United States. One or some may seek diplomatically to 
secure some modification of policy that accommodates or is not in direct 
conflict with their own interests; or states may unite in condemnation of some 
aspect of US foreign policy or its application. The president may respond to 
such representations where some modification in approach did not materially 
impair attainment of America's objective. Indeed it is possible that in certain 
cases accommodation could even broaden the constituency for a desired course 
of action by co-opting other states. Whether 'going it alone', or acting in 
concert with other states, there can be no doubt about the legitimacy of the 
actions of a state that conform to international normative expectations. 
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It will be seen that neither those sections of the American community 
for whom Israel held the greatest attraction, nor the leaders of Israel and the 
Palestinians, and the other Arab states involved in the settlement process, 
questioned the right of the president and his advisers to speak for the United 
States and to commit the US to certain courses of action. There were 
occasions, however, on which domestic and international audiences challenged 
the preferred policies of the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Domestically, 
two major institutional constraints were legislative proscriptions against the 
provision of American aid to Syria, and recognition of or negotiation with the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). Bush's announcement in 1989 that 
there should be no new Israeli settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem 
annoyed Israel's American supporters. In 1993, some members of the pro-
Israel lobby protested at the White House against the adoption of the 
Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinians as endangering 
Israel's security, notwithstanding its signature in the presence of Israel's prime 
minister. 129 Internationally, Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir had been 
miffed that the US and Soviet Union should have agreed in early 1991 on 
mutual efforts to promote Arab-Israel peace without proper consultation with 
him. In 1995 the Israeli opposition tried to lobby among their American 
friends for a cessation of US aid to the Palestinians, but the Israeli government 
moved to counter the initiative, believing that such assistance was also in 
Israel's interest. 
Institutionally, conduct of the peace process was entrusted to a select 
group of officials drawn principally from the State Department. They worked 
closely and harmoniously with the president and his White House advisers 
with minimal sign of competition among them for the president's ear. They 
engaged the specialist assistance of other agencies like the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), those agencies charged with the 
implementation of the presidential Executive Orders and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in particular circumstances. Differences were to 
emerge about the degree to which USAID programmes should have a 
developmental focus , but they do not suggest serious disagreement about the 
129 Clinton, W.J. (2004). My Life, p.544 
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provision of aid as a positive sanction coritributing to the attainment of the 
Administration's objective. 
Philosophic differences between the executive and the Republican 
dominated legislature persisted for much of Clinton's term. 130 They 
necessitated an exercise of political skill by the president to secure passage of 
his legislation. Some domestic actors were critical of the direction in which 
the president's leadership was taking the peace process and of the president's 
style, but they did not significantly impair his ability to act in the matter. 
Leadership in the search for a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israel dispute 
rested with the president, and no domestic opposition to it arose of sufficient 
weight to challenge the proposition that he was acting in America's national 
interest. 
Efficacy of power 
The relational nature of power has been discussed, as have the 
instruments of diplomacy that may be employed at the command of a state to 
secure its goal. In K.J. Holsti's view, power comprises the acts by which one 
actor influences another actor; the capabilities utilised for that purpose; and the 
responses solicited. 131 Responses indicate the extent to which the society of 
states believes that the action of the power-wielding state conforms with 
normative expectations. The legitimacy of the wielding state's action may be 
challenged, usually within the UN Security Council although in practice that 
institution's structure and procedures militate against condemnation of the 
great powers. 
The response, or responses, of the targeted state go to the nub of 
Morriss' s definition - the capacity to effect an outcome. 132 A declaration of 
domain and scope, together with an evaluation of the various resources used, is 
fundamental to any assessment of the efficacy of the projection of power. 
Determination of the efficacy of American power must distinguish between the 
'effectiveness' and 'efficiency' of the diplomatic instruments employed. 
130 Ibid. Clinton commented that the 'New Right' believed not only that their ideas were better 
than those of the Democrats, but that their values were better because Democrats were weak on 
family, work, welfare, crime and defence. p.635 
131 Holsti, K.J. (1988). International Politics: a framework for analysis. Englewood Cliffs NJ, 
Prentice Hall. p.142 
132 Morriss. Power, p.38 
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Judgement about 'efficiency' involves consideration of the relationship 
between inputs and outputs, between costs and benefits, and a conclusion about 
net advantages. 'Effectiveness' relates only to outputs or benefits. 133 
Efficacy is the yardstick of this study. Any assessment of efficacy 
needs to address the purpose of employing power and the efficiency of the 
instruments used. A predisposition to exercise power involves choosing 
among alternative courses of action, and an examination of their probable costs 
and benefits. The comparison is between the costs and benefits of the power-
wielder's different policy options, not between costs to the wielder and to the 
target state. Although the ultimate aim of the power-wielding state is to 
increase the cost to the target state, an increase may not be achievable without 
also some increase in cost to the wielder. It is impossible, however, for 
decision-makers to make precise comparisons. At best, their choice involves 
the making of intelligent guesses. Evaluation of the effectiveness of a selected 
instrument involves considering whether some other instrument might not have 
been more efficient. Baldwin assesses the effectiveness of an instrument in 
relation to the situation, rather than in respect to any quality intrinsic to the 
instrument. 134 At the heart of decisions about the projection of power are 
questions about the usual effects of various techniques, and counterfactual ones 
about likely outcomes were power not to be projected. The latter may not 
amount to much more than an educated guess, but such factors have to be 
taken into account by decision-makers. An assessment of efficacy may be 
further complicated by imprecision about the goal of the state wielding power: 
a state may often have a number of objectives, or a general objective 
embracing many subsidiary ones. 
In respect of the case study of this thesis, the objective of a 
comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute encompasses 
many subsidiary issues. The attainment of the overall objective must address, 
and resolve in some form acceptable to the parties principal, fundamental 
questions relating to territory, security, and sovereignty. A resolution of these 
133 Baldwin (1985). Economic Statecraft, p.119 
134 Ibid. p.123. Baldwin also states: 'Information about the utility of a single technique or 
category of techniques has no significance whatever for decision making until it is set in the 
context of explicit or implicit assumptions about the comparative utility of alternative 
techniques' . p.66 
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issues is dependent upon solutions being found to many other critical ones: the 
future of Israeli settlements in occupied territory; the status of Jerusalem; the 
return of Palestinian refugees to some place of permanent resettlement and 
possible compensatory payments to them; the access of Palestinian labour to 
employment in Israel; and access to water by the riparian states of the Jordan 
valley. Effecting satisfactory outcomes for each may require the employment 
in varying degrees of different instruments or mix of instruments and will 
challenge America's statecraft. This thesis will analyse how efficiently the 
Administration used the diplomatic instruments and resources at its disposal to 
effect an outcome of all these issues satisfactory to Israel and its neighbours . 
An assessment of the efficacy of state power must ask whether 
modified behaviour by the target state can be ascribed to the wielder's power. 
Rosenau believes that it can. 135 The task is not likely to be easy. Some 
commentators argue that attainment of objectives is a matter of degree. 136 The 
outcome may not be precisely that sought by decision-makers, and an overall 
assessment may need to conclude that 'near enough may be good enough'. 
Modification of behaviour due to the application of positive or negative 
sanctions may be relatively easy to postulate. The response of the target-state 
or actor to an offer of assistance, or a threat of the imposition of negative 
sanctions, will usually be clearly stated. Less readily identified are the target-
state' s responses to intellectual or psychological influences. Depending upon 
the circumstances, it may be possible to determine with reasonable precision 
that the target has been persuaded to modify its behaviour in response to the 
wielder's intellectual argument, but the extent to which a state or actor may be 
attracted by the wielder's 'soft power' would be virtually undistinguishable. 
Nor need it necessarily be immediately apparent that modified behaviour by 
the target, however encouraged, represented a permanent change of direction, 
for the target could be seeking some tactical advantage through what it 
135 Rosenau (1968). "Comparative Foreign Policy". The responses of the target state provide 
both 'a means of assessing the effectiveness of foreign policy undertakings ... [and can] .. .lead 
the analyst to treat the foreign policy process as dynamic rather than static'. p.321 
136 Simon, H.A. (1957 (2nd edit.)). Administrative Behaviour: a study of decision-making 
processes in administrative organization. New York NY, The Macmillan Company. He 
asserts that 'Attainment of objectives is always a matter of degree '. p.177; Waltz (1979). 
Theory of International Politics. Waltz warns that 'powerful agents fail to impress their wills 
on others in just the way they intend to'. p.192; Baldwin (1985). Economic Statecraft, p.131 
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intended to be a temporary accommodation. Some subjectivity cannot be 
avoided in assessing the target's response, but the objectives of the target may 
become more apparent with the passage of time. So, too, may the strength of 
the wielder's commitment to the objective, for the more protracted the process 
the more likely it is that other issues will arise to compete for the attention of 
the power-wielder's decision-makers. 
An imprecise result does not mean that the task of analysing the 
efficacy of American power should be set aside. The methodology of post hoc 
evaluation is widely practised with the particular intent of identifying 
inefficiencies. It involves recognition of imperfect choices among available 
options, and limitations on the part of the instruments used. The diplomatic 
instruments discussed in this chapter offer a basis for critical analysis that 
should facilitate identification, with some certitude, of areas of strength and 
weakness in American diplomacy in relation to the case study. While some 
assumptions may need to be declared where facts have not been stated, 
employment of these analytical tools offers scope for a disciplined assessment. 
The post hoc evaluative technique to be followed in this study also offers a 
prospect of remediation for the United States in other diplomatic applications. 
Conclusion 
The President of the United States has constitutional responsibility for 
the conduct of his country's foreign relations. The domain and scope of any 
projection of American power is at the disposition of the president, who may 
apply various instruments in pursuit or defence of his country's interests. The 
legitimacy of his action in accordance with normative behaviour is evaluated 
domestically and internationally, and there may be divergence of opinion about 
the policies chosen or the means by which they were prosecuted. 
The essentially theoretical discussion in this chapter about the concept 
of power and its application in international relations has been set against a 
bald statement of the Clinton Administration's Middle East objective. It will 
be necessary to establish why the United States should have sought to effect a 
settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. How deeply committed was the United 
States to a resolution of the Middle East dispute? How would a comprehensive 
settlement enhance US interests either in the Middle East or globally? These 
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matters will be addressed in the next chapter and will give greater substance to 
America's stated aim. 
The unipolar moment has provided the United States with space 1n 
which to exert its dominance substantially free from contestation by another 
great power. The Clinton Administration declared its intention to remain 
engaged and to lead. If it were to effect a resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute, 
it would have to persuade the parties principal that it was in their interest to 
reach accommodations with one another. Its ability to do so would depend 
upon its statecraft and the efficacy with which the available instruments were 
employed. 
The point of departure for such an evaluation must be a clear statement 
of the objective. Negotiation is, however, a dynamic process and objectives 
may be modified in response to changing circumstances. In the case of an 
Arab-Israel settlement, attainment of the overall objective must resolve 
fundamental questions relating to territory, security, and sovereignty of the 
Middle Eastern entities involved. Many critical matters are subsumed under 
these issues, such as the 'right of return' of Palestinian refugees to some place 
of permanent settlement and possible compensatory payments to them. Prior 
identification of all contentious issues would be complex and confusing. The 
Bush and Clinton Administrations preferred to express their objective in 
broader, more general terms. 
Judgement about the effectiveness of the United States's action is the 
substance of post hoc evaluation. -An analysis of the efficacy of the 
instruments employed for the projection of American power will provide the 
basis for an assessment of the limits of American power in relation to this case 
study. It should be possible to observe modification of the target states' and 
Palestinians' behaviour in response to positive or negative American sanctions. 
Their responses to American intellectual or psychological influences may 
prove harder to assess. Some subjectivity cannot be avoided in evaluating the 
effectiveness of the employment of American instruments. Despite these 
qualifications, shortcomings might be identified that could be remedied in 
other American diplomatic applications. 
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Chapter 2 
Interests and linkages: the United States and the Middle East 
The salience of the Arab-Israel dispute among the United States's 
interests in the Middle East argues strongly for its resolution in America's 
national interest. The dispute lies at the intersection of America's principal 
interests in the region, and there are clear linkages among these interests. A 
comprehensive settlement would not remove all regional tensions, but it would 
extract the most probable cause of conflict in the Middle East and the wider 
Islamic world and open the way to enhanced regional cooperation. A 
settlement is, therefore, also in the interest of the disputants. 
The United States' s interests include its support for Israel, 1 desire for 
assured oil supply at 'affordable' prices, concern about the possible 
proliferation of WMD, and prosecution of counterterrorism measures.2 The 
United States' s global strategic interests include the Middle East where 
regional tensions and periodic conflicts have engaged it in military operations 
and/or diplomatic initiatives to negotiate cease-fire agreements. How the skill 
1 It might be argued that support for Israel is a policy, not an interest. America's special 
relationship with Israel, however, is so deeply based within the American community as to 
entitle it to be characterised as an interest. America's Jewish and fundamentalist Christian 
communities share an abiding emotional attachment to Israel and this is reflected in their 
respective political contributions to both the Democratic and Republican parties. Political 
support for Israel is bipartisan. Beyond those communities there are many Americans 
sympathetic to the post-holocaust foundation of the State of Israel and admiring of its 
resilience, especially in the 1967 war, and of its democratic institutions. Fund-raising for 
Israel within non-governmental institutions is significant; and Israel is the beneficiary of 
extensive military, economic and intelligence assistance from the American state. Israel is 
always able to rely on United States support in extremis. Official support for Israel was not 
historically as robust as it has become in more recent times, but it is inconceivable that 
American public opinion would countenance any significant diminution in United States 
support for that country. Differences between Israel and the United States do arise, but they 
are generally handled discreetly. For example, Clinton held to his commitment never publicly 
to criticise Israel. 
2 Hashim, A.S. (2003). Policy Brief' the Sunni insurgency in Iraq. Washington DC, The 
Middle East Institute. He argues that terminology betrays a political bias, and that it may 
determine the solution to the problem. He uses 'insurgency', which refers to 'a violent 
uprising by a population or segment thereof of a given state against their own government or 
foreign power in occupation of their country'. While the generic terms 'terrorism/terrorist' are 
generally used in this thesis interchangeably with 'insurgency', the latter is used where it 
accords with Hashim's definition. http://www.mideasti.org/html/perspective20030814-
hashim.html - accessed 19 August 2003; cf. Albright (2003).Madam Secretary op. cit. She 
acknowledges that the term 'terrorist' is a loaded one, 'especially controversial when applied 
to those struggling on behalf of a nationalist cause', but has concluded that '[t]here is no 
political, historical, religious, economic, or ideological justification for willfully murdering 
innocent people' . p.377 
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of managing competing foreign policy interests and objectives is exercised on 
behalf of the United States depends upon the relative importance attached to 
them by American Administrations. It is a dynamic process: the importance 
of issues varies over time. For example, access to Middle Eastern oil supply 
has been an American interest since before World War II. After the war, the 
question of Jewish settlement in Palestine and the declaration of the State of 
Israel engaged American sympathy and support. The tension between 
America's commitment to the security of the new Jewish state and the 
maintenance of good working relationships with the Arab oil-producing states 
has required careful management, particularly in the context of hostilities 
between Arabs and Israelis. For many years United States Administrations 
worked to depoliticise oil supply, and had been broadly successful in keeping 
that question apart from the issue of Israel's existence. An attempt in 1973 by 
Arab oil producers of the Gulf states to reduce supply in order to provoke the 
United States into mounting an initiative to resolve the Arab-Israel dispute 
produced unforeseen consequences in classical Waltzian terms, which are 
discussed below. · While Gulf producers have since been more circumspect 
about employing 'the oil weapon' for political purposes, American diplomacy 
continues to address the tension between support for Israel and friendship with 
Arab states. 
America's Middle Eastern diplomacy has been complicated by the 
growing resort to insurgency by actors opposed to the existence of Israel and 
America's support for that country. American state and non-state agents have 
become targets, both in the Middle East and beyond; and successive US 
Administrations have been fearful that terrorists may be able to take advantage 
of a growing proliferation of WMD to acquire them for use against American 
interests, including in continental America. 
Former President Jimmy Carter's discussions with Middle Eastern 
leaders in 1983 affirmed the strength of their view that the Arab-Israel dispute 
was the central international relations issue in the Middle East: there can be no 
peace in the Middle East without a resolution of the core Palestinian question.3 
3 Carter, J. (1985). The Blood of Abraham. Boston MA, Houghton Mifflin Company. p.204. 
The centrality of the Arab-Israel dispute was a constant theme in discussions between the 
former President of the United States and leaders in Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and 
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It is not at all clear, however, that a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israel 
dispute - if it could be concluded - would defuse the range of other tensions, 
animosities and issues among regional states or between them and the United 
States. Each state in the Middle East has its own economic and social 
aspirations and perceptions of its security needs apart from those affected by 
disputation over Israel's borders and the future of the Palestinians. But 
resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute might be expected to lower the general 
temperature within the region, offering prospect for negotiated settlement of 
other intra-regional differences. 
Given that Israel's existence and policies are prima f acie critical 
factors that any negotiated settlement must address, this analysis begins with 
the implantation of a Zionist agency into the Middle East. 
The Arab-Israel dispute 
Theodor Herzl and some other prominent Jewish figures in Europe 
decided in the late nineteenth century to seek a homeland for Jews in 
Palestine. They were prompted to do so because of the failure of Jewish 
efforts to become assimilated in European society, an intensification of anti-
Semitism, and a parallel and not unrelated upsurge in nationalism which 
identified Jews as an alien and unwanted minority in the countries in which 
they lived.4 Their decision built upon an emotional attachment to the land of 
Zion - Zion being one of the biblical names for Jerusalem - expressed in 
Jewish prayers ever since the destruction of the city's First Temple in 586 BC. 
They were aware of the existence of a non-Jewish population in Palestine, 
noting 'that there resides in our treasured land an entire people which has 
clung to it for hundreds of years and never considered leaving it' ,5 but had 
confidence in the compatibility of Arab and Jewish interests. The strength of 
Saudi Arabia during Carter's journey to the Middle East in 1983. He had worked with many 
of the leaders during his presidency and was able to build upon his acquaintance with them, 
and upon his peace-making credentials established through his role in the conclusion of the 
Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979. 
4 Shlaim, A. (2000). The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. London UK, Penguin Books. 
p.2 
5 Gorny, Y. (1987). Zionism and The Arabs 1882-1948: a study of ideology. Oxford UK, 
Clarendon Press citing a passage from Yitzhak Epstein's article 'The Hidden Question ' of 
1907. Gorny describes Epstein as recognizing that Palestine belonged in practice to both Jews 
and Arabs, and as being the first to state explicitly that the implementation of Zionism 
depended on Arab consent. p.43 
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Arab nationalism and the weight of its opposition to Zionist aspirations were 
underestimated by almost all the currents of opinion in the Zionist movement. 6 
There was a considerable diversity of view among both Zionists and 
Arabs about the possibility of their coexistence during the period before World 
War I. As Jewish settlement grew, differences of opinion on this question 
developed among the European Zionists and between them and the settler 
community, and within the settler community. They ranged from the notion of 
expulsion of Arabs as necessary for the realisation of Eretz lsrael,7 to a hope 
that economic growth would create conditions favourable to promoting the 
well-being of Arab and Jewish labour. Arab nationalists were also divided. 
As late as 1913 only a small minority of Arabs living outside Palestine was 
opposed to Zionism or held the opinion that it threatened an Arab renaissance. 
There was a school of thought that Jewish immigration would contribute to the 
economic well-being of the country, although this was not the predominant 
view among Palestinian Arabs who were concerned about the progressive 
alienation of their land. 8 
The early Zionists sought the backing of the great powers of their day 
for the establishment of a Jewish homeland, keeping secret their ambition of 
eventual statehood.9 They turned to states with a colonial tradition that were 
not likely to object too strenuously to the implantation of one people into the 
territory of another, and found a receptive audience in Britain. Britain and 
France were keen to divide the Ottoman Middle East between them after the 
Great War and concluded a secret agreement to that effect in 1916. The 
Sykes-Picot agreement was silent about the disposal of the collection of 
Ottoman administrative units within which the Palestinian people lived. 10 
Britain saw advantage in denying 'Palestine' to the French. It sympathised 
6 Tessler, M. (1994). A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington IN, Indiana 
University Press. p.134 
7 Eretz Israel is the Hebrew phrase for the Land of Israel west of the Jordan River whose gift 
to the Israelites, together with an injunction that they settle and live there, is described in 
Deuteronomy 11:31; Noyes, J.H. (1997). "Does Washington really support Israel?" Foreign 
Policy Iss.106 Spring 1997 quotes Menachem Begin's assertion that 'he who does not 
recognize our right to the entire homeland does not recognize our right to any of its parts ' . 
p.152 
8 Tessler. History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Ch.3, especially pp.141-4 
9 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, pp.3, 8 
10 Tessler. History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The composition of 'Palestine' and 
'Transjordan' out of various Ottoman administrative units, and their eventual separation by the 
British, is discussed at pp.159-65 
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with the Jewish aspiration for a homeland; and issued the Balfour Declaration 
in 1917 'favouring the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the 
Jewish people', but with an inherently contradictory caveat that 'nothing shall 
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine'. After Britain had secured a Mandate for the 
administration of Palestine under the League of Nations, the Zionist · 
movement saw an opportunity to press its own interpretation of the Balfour 
Declaration including for international recognition of the Jewish claim to 
Palestine and a Jewish national home that stretched across both banks of the 
Jordan River. 11 
Arab resistance to the continuing immigration of Jewish settlers 
mounted during the period between the two world wars, notably in the form of 
the Arab Revolt (1936-39). The Zionist movement concluded that voluntary 
agreement between themselves and the indigenous Arab population was 
inconceivable and that Jewish settlement should proceed under Jewish military 
protection. As the Mandatory, Britain had sought to balance the interests of 
the two communities, but found itself increasingly the target of attack by both. 
Britain, which had been exhausted by World War II, recognised that under the 
changed circumstances of the post-war period, including demands for self-
determination from its colonial subjects, it could no longer maintain an empire 
'east of Suez'. The strategic value of the mandated territory in providing 
depth abreast the sea route to Britain's Asian colonies was accordingly 
diminished. Widespread international sympathy for the Jewish people because 
of their suffering during the war translated into support for a Jewish homeland. 
Balancing the competing interests of Arabs and Jews became unattractive, the 
more so as the colonial administration came increasingly under fire from 
militant Jewish organisations, and Britain referred the matter to the United 
Nations which decided in November 1947 to partition the country. Jews saw 
in the passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 181 'a tremendous gain of 
international support for the establishment of a Jewish state', 12 while Arab 
states denounced it as illegal and threatened to resist its implementation by 
force. 
11 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.8 
12 Ibid. p.25 
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The threat of force quickly translated into the reality of war. The war 
lasted from November 1947 to 1949, and saw Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Syria in alignment with indigenous Palestinians against the Jewish forces. The 
State of Israel was officially declared during the war and recognised by 
America and the Soviet Union. The Arab inhabitants lost land to the Israelis, 
and some 700,000 Palestinians were driven to seek refuge in neighbouring 
countries. At the end of the war, some 92,000 Arabs remained in Israel 
alongside 716,000 Jews. Armistice lines demarcated Israel from a large parcel 
of land on the West Bank of the Jordan River under Jordanian administration, 
and a smaller strip along the Mediterranean coast at Gaza under Egyptian 
administration. The Jordanian area included East Jerusalem with its Haram al-
Sharifffemple Mount site of religious importance to Muslims and Jews. A 
second major conflict with Arab states occurred in June 1967, in the course of 
which Israel occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and captured the 
Golan Heights from Syria. It also captured the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. A 
further major war took place in October 1973. Between, and after, these 
landmark events Israel was engaged in military activity against various 
neighbours as they contested Israel's acquisition of territory by force, and 
Israel pursued the illusion of security. Israel was involved in the conflict 
against Egypt over the Suez Canal in 1956. The October War was the third 
Syrian-Israeli war and the fifth Egyptian-Israeli war. Israel invaded Lebanon 
in 1982, and conducted large-scale military assaults against that state in 1993 
and 1996. It was the subject of attack by Iraqi missiles during the Gulf War of 
1991. 
American support for Israel 
In the view of Israeli historian A vi Shlaim, the Zionist movement 
displayed during its formative phase 'two features that were to be of 
fundamental and enduring importance in its subsequent history: the 
nonrecognition of a Palestinian national entity, and the quest for an alliance 
with a great power external to the Middle East' .13 After World War II, the 
United States replaced Britain as Zionism's principal external supporter, 
President Truman deciding that he was not bound by President Roosevelt's 
13 Ibid. p.5 
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undertaking to the King of Saudi Arabia 'that Arab interests in Palestine 
would not be sacrificed to Jewish aspirations for nationhood' .14 
Contemporary American support is anchored in its Jewish and fundamentalist 
Christian population, but includes many other elements for whom recall of the 
holocaust inspires a need for atonement, Israel's pioneering spirit and struggle 
for survival amidst a numerically superior and hostile Arab neighbourhood has 
sparked admiration, and shared Judeo-Christian principles and democratic 
values provide a sense of common outlook. Zionism has appeal to American 
Christian fundamentalists as well as to America's Jewish community. 
'Christian Zionists' see the State of Israel as a fulfilment of Biblical 
prophesies, as conferring upon this largely secular state a divine right to the 
land called Israel and Palestine, and as paving the way for the second coming 
of Jesus the Messiah. 15 They entered into a coalition with Israeli lobbyists in 
1978; and the National Unity Coalition for Israel became the lobbying arm of 
Christian Zionism with contacts in Congress and neo-conservative think-tanks 
. w hi 16 1n as ngton. 
There is a popular perception that America's support for Israel is due 
to the influence of its Jewish community. Implicit in this is a belief in some 
form of central direction that enables a relatively small community to 
maximise its influence, but Jews in America are anything but united. Their 
influence is the result of demographics and their use of basic American rights. 
Although constituting only 2.5 per cent of the American population, they vote 
in greater numbers than other Americans: they are nearly twice as likely to 
vote as non-Jews. 17 That still leaves them in the minority. But they are far 
more likely to fund their candidates and political causes, and actively to 
volunteer their time. Demographically, 81 per cent of all American Jews live 
14 Al-Farsy, F. (1996 (rev. edit.)). Modernity and Tradition: the Saudi equation. Guernsey, 
Knight Communications. p.26 
15 Wagner, D.E. (2001). Dying in the La,nd of Promise: Palestine and Palestinian Christianity 
from Pentecost to 2000. London UK, Melisende. He describes Christian Zionists as the most 
conservative wing of America's evangelical community. They make up about 20 per cent of 
the evangelical community, which itself constitutes over 20 per cent of the 225 million 
Christians in the United States. p.18 
16 Fisk, R. (2002). "A strange kind of freedom." The Independent, 9 July 2002. 
17 Goldberg, J.J. (1996). Jewish Power: inside the American Jewish establishment. Reading 
MA, Addison-Wesley. p.30 
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in the nine states that cast 202 of the 535 votes (37 per cent) in the Electoral 
College to choose the President of the United States. 18 
The Jewish vote generally favours the Democrats, core support for the 
Democrats running at about 55 to 60 per cent against about 10 per cent for the 
Republicans. The more numerous Christian fundamentalists tend to support 
the Republicans. 19 A liberal predisposition among Jewish voters has been 
evident since the presidential election of 1800 when Thomas Jefferson and his 
party championed freedom of religion against the rival Federalists who 'feared 
disorder unless the government were a force for morality, and that meant 
Christianity' .20 Jimmy Carter was one of only two Democrat candidates in the 
twentieth century to win the presidency with less than half the Jewish vote. 21 
In the presidential election of 1992, Bill Clinton received 78 per cent of the 
Jewish vote. 22 
Within the Jewish community there is a schematic division of labour, 
although in practice there may well be some blurring at the edges. The 
Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations seeks to 
forge a consensus on Israel from among the diverse views of organised 
American Jewry, which the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 
(AIP AC) then translates into political clout in Washington. AIP AC has few 
registered lobbyists among its staff. Its influence lies in an ability to mobilise 
volunteers at every level of the electoral process. They quiz candidates about 
their views on Israel and circulate them. 23 A further source of AIP AC' s 
influence lies in its provision of well-presented research material to members 
of the Congress and their staffers. The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, formed by Martin Indyk, a past-president of AIP AC, has sought to 
bring an intellectual dimension to the debate in America on the Middle East. 
The United Jewish Appeal, 'the central engine driving all the other parts of the 
18 Ibid. pp.30-1. In the seven states in which Jews are most populous, their percentage of the 
electorate is: New York (18.3 per cent), New Jersey (9.9 per cent), Massachusetts (8.3 per 
cent), Florida (8.2 per cent), Maryland (8.1 per cent), Connecticut (6.2 per cent) and California 
(5.8 per cent). 
19 Buruma, I. (2003). "How to talk about Israel." The New York Times on the Web, 31 August 
2003. 
20 Goldberg. Jewish Power, pp 28-9 
21 Ibid. p.33 
22 Ibid. pp.34-5 
23 Ibid. Ch.8; Melman, Y. and D. Raviv (1994). Friends in Deed: inside the U.S.-Israel 
alliance. New York NY, Hyperion. Ch.16 
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machine called the organised American Jewish community', raises funds for 
Israel. 24 Its contributions to the Jewish Agency for Israel, the largest social-
service provider in that state, form the budgetary core of the Agency.25 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was unhappy with AIP AC' s inhibiting 
influence on the Clinton Administration and decided in 1992 that Israel would 
deal with the United States on a government-to-government basis. At his 
behest the Israel Policy Forum was established to support US involvement at 
the highest levels to advance the peace process. 26 
There are significant differences between the Arab American 
community and the Jewish one in terms of size and political influence. The 
Arab American community is very small, officially estimated at 1.5 million 
people of Arab descent, and is dispersed over all 50 states.27 A claim that it 
could be as large as 3 .5 million, suggests either some hesitation about 
identifying with that community or about association with an organisation 
purporting to advance the community's interests . The Arab Americans claim 
descent principally from Lebanon (56 per cent). There are smaller contingents 
from Syria, Egypt and Palestine. Twenty-two per cent identify their religion as 
Islam, while 70 per cent are members of various Christian denominations.28 
An Arab American Institute, committed to the civic and political 
empowerment of Americans of Arab descent, was founded in 1985. It 
promotes immigrant rights; and lobbies for enhanced American cultural, 
educational, diplomatic, and economic and security ties with Arab countries. It 
supports a viable Palestinian state, the integrity of Lebanon, US assistance to 
advance economic and political development in the Middle East, and a 
balanced American role in promoting regional peace and prosperity. The 
Institute circulates scorecards among its membership indicating how members 
24 Goldberg. Jewish Power, pp.352-3 
25 Ibid. p .353 
26 Rosenberg, M.J. (2003). Middle East and the 2004 Presidential Elections. Presented at: 57th 
Annual Conference. Washington DC, The Middle East Institute. 
http://www.mideasti.org/programs/programs conference transcript. html - accessed 
6 November 2003 
27 Arab American Institute (2004). "U.S. Census." Washington DC, Arab American Institute. 
http://www.aaiusa.org/census.htrn - accessed 10 September 2004 
28 Zogby, J.A. (2000). "The Arab American Vote in the November 2000 Election." 
Washington DC, Arab American Institute. http://www.aaiusa.org/PDF/poll 00.pdf - accessed 
10 September 2004 
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of the Congress have voted on issues of importance to them. 29 A study 
undertaken by the Institute in relation to the 2000 presidential election30 shows 
that about 40 per cent of Arab Americans generally support the Democratic 
Party and 38 per cent the Republican Party. There exists a high percentage of 
swinging voters within the community in addition to the 22 per cent who are 
not affiliated with either party. Clinton was the preferred choice in 1996, 
attracting 54.5 per cent of Arab American votes, but the majority cast their 
votes for Bush in 2000. Almost half of those Democratic Party supporters who 
abandoned the party's presidential candidate did so because of the inclusion of 
Senator Joseph Lieberman on the party's ticket as its nominee for the position 
of Vice-President.31 
A survey has shown that 'a moral obligation to prevent the destruction 
of the state of Israel' is the only international commitment that elicited 
stronger Democrat than Republican support in America.32 Despite the 
Democrat connection, 
[t]he strong U.S.-Israel alliance as we now know it. .. commenced 
under Richard M. Nixon, a Republican president elected with almost 
no Jewish backing. Every president before him had attempted a 
posture of evenhandedness in the Middle East. .. Nixon dropped the 
attempt at balance and declared Israel for the first time to be a 
"strategic asset" in the Cold War. On his watch, the United States 
replaced France as Israel's main arms supplier. American aid to Israel 
sky-rocketed from $300 million to $2.2 billion per year, making Israel 
the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid. U.S.-Israel relations became 
big business. That made Israel's allies important players in 
Washington power politics.33 
While the antecedents of the close relationship between America and 
Israel lay in the politics and military strategy of the Cold War, an outcome was 
the elevation of the Jewish establishment into Washington's hierarchy of 
political activists. Goldberg attributes this, in part, to Israel's victory in 1967, 
'which touched off a wave of nationalist passion among Jews in America and 
29 Arab American Institute (2004). "About AAI." Washington DC, Arab American Institute. 
http://www.aaiusa.org/about us.htm - accessed 10 September 2004 
30 Zogby. "The Arab American Vote." 
31 Ibid. 
32 Holsti, O.R. (1996). Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor MI, 
University of Michigan Press. p.149 
33 Goldberg. Jewish Power, p.14 
54 
around the world' ,34 reinforcing the process of politicisation and 
empowerment. 
Over the eight years of the Clinton presidency US government 
assistance to Israel amounted to $25.8 billion, of which 61 per cent was 
granted for military purposes and 36 per cent for economic purposes.35 In 
1998, and on the initiative of the Israeli Government, agreement was reached 
on a phasing-out of the economic grant over a 10-year period while the 
military grant component would rise from $1.8 billion per annum to 
$2.4 billion per annum. Israel is permitted, under an exception~l arrangement, 
to spend about 25 per cent of its military grant within Israel whereas the 
general practice is that all US foreign military financing is spent in the United 
States.36 The access that the American defence production industry enjoys to 
the residual $1.8 billion each year broadens the compass of the pro-Israel 
lobby to include the elected representatives of the congressional districts in 
which Israeli defence contracts are awarded. The level of defence assistance 
is such as to sustain Israel's qualitative edge over the military capabilities of 
all of its neighbours. America's total official aid package to Israel since 1949 
amounts to $87 .2 billion, 37 almost 30 per cent of which was disbursed during 
the Clinton Administration. To the total amount must be added the voluntary 
contributions and benefactions to Israel from private sources in the United 
States. 
Although support for Israel is deeply-held by American Jews, they 
have been critical of Israel where they have judged it necessary. A major 
difference of opinion arose in relation to a definition of a Jew by Israeli 
Orthodox rabbis in 1988 who challenged the legitimacy of conversions to 
Judaism conducted by Reform and Conservative rabbis in America.38 The 
root of the issue involved questions of religious interpretation, but it was also a 
state matter in that it could affect the right of Jews to immigrate to Israel in 
accordance with one of the country's basic laws. The Israeli government 
34 Ibid. pp.15-6 
35 Mark, C.R. (2001). Israel: U.S. foreign assistance. Washington DC, Congressional Research 
Service, The Library of Congress. pp.12-3,Tables 2 and 3 
36 Ibid. p.3 
37 Ibid. p.12 
38 Melman and Raviv. Friends in Deed, pp.312-3 
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caved in to the protests of American Jews against pressure from the Israeli 
Orthodox 'right'. 
The ability of the pro-Israel lobby to marshal intellectual argument and 
press its case with members of the Congress and with the media has not 
automatically translated into pro-Israel policy by American Administrations, 
partly because of different agendas within the lobby. 39 US Administrations 
have declined to act in conformity with formal congressional decisions when 
they have assessed them as being inimical to other American interests. 
Resistance to expressions of congressional support for the transfer of the 
Embassy of the United States from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, formalised in law in 
November 1995, is an example.40 And on four occasions Administrations 
have informed the Congress that Israel 'may have violated' the provisions of 
the Arms Export Control Act and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. 
The Congressional Research Service has recorded that the United States was 
investigating whether Israel misused US military equipment when Apache 
helicopters were employed to kill Palestinians suspected of insurgency and 
when F-16 aircraft attacked Palestinian facilities. 41 Such investigations have 
rarely resulted in United States condemnation of Israel. 
· Until an evolution in Arab thinking toward acknowledgement of 
Israel's existence began in 1981-82, America's position was in fundamental 
opposition to that of the Palestinians and their Arab supporters. Former 
President Carter summarised Syria's view in terms that he claimed were 'quite 
compatible with those of many other Arabs'. 42 His snapshot, written after a 
visit to the Middle East in 1983, may serve as a template for the Arab position. 
While it requires some modification to take account of subsequent 
developments, it nevertheless captures the heart of the Arabs' grievance. 
39 Siegman, H. (1995). "U.S. Jewish groups abandoned Rabin." The New York Times, 11 
November 1995. He wrote that: 'Opponents of the peace process in the American Jewish 
community, including the Zionist Organisation of America and Orthodox Jewish 
organisations, constitute altogether less than 10 per cent of the American Jewish community. 
Yet they had the field to themselves as they lobbied the United States Congress for the 
adoption of mischievous measures intended to undermine Mr Rabin's efforts [ to implement the 
Oslo accords]'. http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0196/9601088.html - accessed 
17 August 2003 
40 Mark, C.R. (2002). Israeli-United States Relations. Washington DC, Congressional 
Research Service, The Library of Congress. p.7; Clarke, D. (1995) . "Israel's unauthorized arms 
transfers." Foreign Policy Iss.99 Summer 1995 pp.89-109. 
41 Mark (2002). Israeli-United States Relations, p.12 
42 Carter (1985). The Blood of Abraham, p.65 
The Syrians complain that the Israelis consider it the right of every Jew 
in the world, needy or not, to settle in the Arab territories that they 
control by force - the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and parts 
of Israel itself - but that they refuse to allow the homeless and 
suffering Arabs driven out of their country to return to the dwellings 
and lands to which they still maintain legal deeds. They argue that 
while Israel claimed the right to its statehood in Palestine in 1948 
because it was only re-creating a nation demolished in ancient times, it 
rejects the recognition of a Palestinian state in the same area - the very 
place that the Palestinians and their ancestors have inhabited 
continuously for thousands of years ... Syrians say that Israelis claim 
the Jews of the world constitute one people, regardless of obvious 
differences in their identities, languages, customs, and citizenship, but 
deny that the Palestinians constitute a coherent people even though 
they have one national identity, one language, one culture, and one 
history ... [T]he Syrians argue that to ensure security for itself, Israel 
creates excuses to expand, to occupy new lands, and to build 
permanent military outposts that are developed into civilian 
settlements, then creates circumstances to def end the new settlements 
by further expansion, strengthened military forces, and the 
displacement of the Arab inhabitants.43 
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The Arabs' case revolves around questions of Israel's legitimacy and 
Palestinian self-determination. They maintain that Israel's actions had been 
made possible because of America's support - moral, financial and military. 
In their view it was unlikely that Israel would move to accommodate the 
Palestinians unless or until required to do so by the United States, and pan-
Arab orthodoxy precluded resolution of their own differences with Israel 
before then. For an accommodation to be reached there had to be a change in 
America's Middle East policy. 
Having sketched the antecedents of the Arab-Israel dispute, the 
following discussion will show how each of three significant American 
interests in the Middle East is capable of being manipulated by Arab and 
Muslim states to impress upon the United States the need for a resolution of 
the dispute that accommodates Palestinian aspirations. 
'Affordable' oil supply 
The United States' s dependence in the 1970s on petroleum supplies 
from the Gult44 left it vulnerable to manipulation of supply by the Gulf's Arab 
producers in order to effect a change in American policy more sympathetic to 
43 Ibid. pp.65-6 
44 Although its proper name is 'Persian Gulf, the sensitivities of the Arab littoral states are 
such that 'the Gulf is used in this thesis without an adjective. 
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the cause of the Palestinians. Their action 1n 1973-74 brought home to 
Americans the need for diversification of supply. Some 48 per cent of 
America's crude oil imports now derive from states, principally in the Western 
Hemisphere,45 which are not members of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OAPEC). Nevertheless, 29 per cent still comes from 
Middle Eastern producers including Iraq.46 Saudi Arabia remains America's 
largest single supplier at about 17 per cent.47 
The United States's interest in 'affordable' oil supply extends beyond 
its own import needs because of its global economic connections. The Gulf 
oil producers' action in the early 1970s triggered panic and a rapid escalation 
in oil prices. At the macro-economic level, every 1 million barrels per day 
(mbd) reduction in supply can increase prices by $3 to $5 per barrel (pb ).48 
Any such price rise impacts on the economic 'locomotive' role of the 
industrialised economies. Sharp increases in oil prices cause economic crises: 
world GNP growth can fall by up to 1 per cent for every $5 pb increase in oil 
prices,49 but according to Fatih Birol, the International Energy Agency's chief 
economist, the duration of macro-economic impacts of oil price increases ( or 
falls) are primarily limited to two years after the price change. 50 Because its 
own economy is so robust, America is better able than many other countries to 
weather the effect of such factors, but it cannot remain immune. 
The extraordinary events of 1973-74 saw a doubling of the price to 
$10.46 pb, the Iranian revolution took the price to $18 pb, while for the first 
five years of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war the price hovered in the range of 
$28-34 pb. It fell thereafter, and rose again to $22 pb in 1990 as a 
45 US Department of Energy (2000). Annual Energy Review 2000. Washington DC, US 
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. 
46 Centre for Global Energy Studies (2002). "US dependence on oil - the real problem." Global 
Oil Report - Market Watch 9 May 2002 Vol.13 No.3. London UK, Centre for Global Energy 
Studies. 
47 US Department of Energy (2002). Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products into the 
United States by Country of Origin . Washington DC, US Department of Energy, Energy 
Information Administration. 
48 Emerson, S.A. (2000). The Relevance of Caspian Oil for the World Market. Caspian Energy 
Resources: implications for the Arab Gulf. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and 
Research. Abu Dhabi UAE, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. p.176 
49 Krapels, E.N. (1993). "The Commanding Heights: international oil in a changed world." 
International Affairs Vol.69 No.1 (January 1993). p.87 
50 Birol, F. (1999). Oil Price Changes and the Macroeconomy: a brief overview. Paris, OECD, 
International Energy Agency 
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consequence of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.51 The price fell again over the 
following decade to $10 pb in 199852 before rising once more to over $30 pb 
during 2000.53 Price became a matter of considerable domestic political 
importance to the Clinton Administration during 2000 after a cold winter and 
as it prepared Vice-President Gore's candidacy for the presidency. Clinton's 
energy secretary made representations to ministers of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) before their meeting in March 2000 to 
increase supply,54 and the president made personal representations to that 
effect to the Saudi king.55 OPEC agreed to increase production by 800,000 
barrels a day.56 For most of Clinton's tenure oil prices were low and oil was 
not a critical foreign policy issue. The United States intervened when the 
Administration believed it had become necessary to do so. Its representations 
in 2000 focussed on supply, relegating pricing to a mantra that '$10 pb was 
too low, while $30 pb was too high'. Clinton broke with his country's free-
market principles, declaring that oil prices ought to be 'somewhere in the 
neighbourhood of $20 to $25 per barrel' .57 The OPEC ministers concurred. 
The 'oil weapon' 
For much of Israel's formative period, through the wars of 1947-49 
and 1967, the supply of oil from the Gulf states was under the oligopolistic 
control of private American and European companies. An attempt by Arab oil 
producers to exert pressure for the return of the occupied territories through a 
reduction in oil supply in the aftermath of the June 1967 war proved 
51 US Department of Energy (2002). Energy Information Sheets - Crude Oil and Petroleum 
Product Prices. Washington DC, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration. 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/inforsheets/petprices.htm - accessed 8 October 2002 
52 Gause III, F.G. (2000). "Saudi Arabia: over a barrel." Foreign Affairs Vol.79 No.3 (May/Jun 
2000) pp.80-94. 
53 Cambridge Energy Research Associates (2000). Crude Oil Prices: 1865-2000, Cambridge 
MA, Cambridge Energy Research Associates. 
http://users2.ev1.net/~hankw/pfaa/WO pdf.pdf - accessed 8 October 2002 
54 Lopez, J. (2000). US pressure on OPEC meeting to increase oil production, World Socialist 
Web Site. http://www.wsws.org/artic1es/2000/mar2000/opec-m27 prn.shtml - accessed 
25 September 2003 
55 Clinton, W.J. (2004). My Life, p.900 
56 Ibid. p.922 
57 Clinton, W.J. (2000). Remarks on Departure for Phoenix, Arizona, and an Exchange with 
Reporters, 22 June 2000. Public Papers - President Clinton, 2000, p.1433. In a radio address 
on 1 July, Clinton accused the Republican Congress of failing to act on key elements of his 
Administration's strategy to meet America's energy needs in the 21 st Century, including the 
development of alternative energy sources. Ibid. pp.1578-9 
59 
ineffectual, largely because the Shah's regime refused to join the boycott and 
increased Iranian oil production. 58 At that time Wes tern consumers were not 
heavily dependent on Arab oil, and the United States was able to satisfy its 
own needs from. domestic and other sources and to assist those Western 
European countries whose oil supplies were threatened.59 In August 1967, and 
at the request of oil-producing states, an Arab surnrnit agreed to the ending of 
the embargo in return for annual subsidies to Egypt, Jordan and the PLO, the 
cost to be split among Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait.60 
Changed economic circumstances in 1971-73, including America's 
growing dependence on Gulf oil, and appeals from. President Anwar Sadat to 
Saudi Arabia to use the 'oil weapon', persuaded King Faisal to do so. The 
king planned to apply increasing pressure on the United States for an 
appropriate initiative on the Arab-Israel front, failing which Saudi Arabia 
would cut back its output expansion program.me and eventually freeze 
production at the prevailing (early 1973) level of 7 rnbd.61 
Before the plan could be put into effect, the October War between 
Egypt and Syria and Israel had started. 62 For their part, the two Arab states 
sought to effect a change in American Middle East policy by resorting to force 
against Israel. Neither expected a victory, but both hoped to recover some of 
the territory they had lost to Israel in 1967. The day after hostilities began, the 
Egyptian president sent a secret message to the United States making it clear 
to America, and thus to Israel, that his country entertained only limited 
objectives.63 In indicating that Egypt would be prepared to participate in a 
peace conference under UN or other neutral auspices, and to agree to freedom 
of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, previously denied to Israeli shipping, if 
Israel withdrew from all occupied territories captured in 1967, Sadat was 
appealing to the United States to exercise its power to broker a settlement of 
the dispute. 
58 Saikal, A. (1980). The Rise and Fall of the Shah. Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press 
p.107 
59 Tessler. History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.480 
60 Heikal, M. (1996). Secret Channels: the inside story of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. 
London UK, Harper Collins Publishers. p.131 
61 Seymour, I. (1982). OPEC: instrument of change. London UK, Macmillan Press. p.111 
62 The war began on the Jewish Day of Atonement (Yorn Kippur) on 6 October 1973 . The 
fighting ended on 24 October. 
63 Heikal. Secret Channels, pp.181-2 
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The Arab states' early military successes prompted the United States to 
airlift materiel to Israel, to be financed from a special aid allocation of 
$2.2 billion. 64 The American airlift far outweighed Soviet efforts to re-supply 
Arab states for their losses. The oil ministers from nine Arab countries 
responded, deciding to employ the oil weapon in support of the Arab war 
effort.65 This time the Shah's regime supported the embargo.66 Using the 
September 1973 level of oil production as a base, the Arab producers 
announced a cut in production by a minimum of 5 per cent forthwith and 
thereafter by a similar percentage each month. There was to be a total 
embargo on oil sales to the United States, the Netherlands and initially Japan. 
Holland was included because its statements during the war had favoured 
Israel. The initial cut was raised in November to 25 per cent.67 This policy 
only lasted until March 1974. In terms of its primary objective, it proved to be 
a blunt instrument, having little effect on either the war or American support 
for Israel. The principal outcomes were panic in the international oil market, 
and the assertion by OPEC member states of full national sovereignty over 
their natural resources, something they had been pursuing for over a decade. 68 
The application of Arab power did, however, produce a commitment 
by the United States to engage fully and constructively in promoting a political 
process.69 That outcome was obtained in the context of heightened tension 
between the two superpowers, fuelled by the war. Arab states might have 
anticipated that the war would lead to enhanced tension between the 
superpowers: the Soviet Union was as determined to protect its own interests 
through the agency of its Arab friends, as was America to protect its interests, 
including the security of Israel. The Arab actions of October 1973 did, 
however, contribute indirectly to the eventual reclamation by Egypt of 
64 Quandt, W.B. (2001 (rev. edit.)). Peace Process: American diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict since 1967. Washington DC, Brookings Institution Press and University of California 
Press. p.116 
65 Seymour. OPEC: instrument of change, p.116. Iraq went along with the destination 
embargo against the United States and the Netherlands, but it did not support an across-the-
board embargo as this would hurt potentially friendly countries in Europe, Japan and 
elsewhere. p.119 
66 Saikal (1980). Rise and Fall of the Shah, p.124 
67 Seymour. OP EC: instrument of change, p.117 
68 Hartshorn, J.E. (1993). Oil Trade: politics and prospects. Cambridge UK, Cambridge 
University Press. p.5 
69 Heikal. Secret Channels, citing a message to Sadat from President Nixon. p.206 
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territory in the Sinai Peninsula occupied by Israel in 1967, under the terms of a 
peace treaty concluded between the two sides in 1979. Sadat's launching of 
Egyptian forces across the Suez Canal was judged by Israeli analysts to have 
been extremely well planned and executed70 and enhanced his image.71 
Although the tide of battle had soon turned against Egypt, it did not severely 
impair his stature. His new standing gave him the confidence to break ranks 
with the Arab world and to visit Jerusalem in November 1977, opening the 
way to a peace treaty. Negotiations at Camp David in 1978 under Carter, 
which led to an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, also established certain 
principles that were to be carried forward to the Madrid conference of 1991. 
They will be addressed in chapter 3. 
United States oil demand 
The United States' s demand for oil is expected to rise by almost a third 
from an annual average of 19.7 mbd in 2002 to over 26 mbd in 2020,72 and 
Middle East oil supply seems likely to become of increasing importance to 
America. 
The oil weapon had a limited direct effect, and Arab oil producers are 
now constrained by the need for assured income to meet their economic and 
social development programmes. In the boom years of the 1970s and early 
1980s, the Middle Eastern energy producers embarked upon ambitious 
programmes that required the transfer of advanced technology, including 
through a trained workforce, to install and maintain the fabric of their 
ventures. Decades of development have failed to produce either enough 
indigenous technicians or persons willing to commit themselves to certain 
categories of employment. In Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates the 
population of immigrant workers exceeds that of the sons of the soil. 
Elsewhere the situation is complicated by population growth. Saudi Arabia's 
annual population growth rate of over 4 per cent led to a tripling of its 1975 
population to 23 million by 2001.73 Iran is not far behind with its 1975 
70 Tessler. History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, p.479 
71 Ibid. 478 
72 Ibid. 478 
73 United Nations Development Programme (2003). Human Development Report 2003 . New 
York NY, United Nations. 
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty f SAU.html - accessed 29 July 2003 
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population doubling to 67 .2 million in -2001.74 Data are not available for all 
Middle Eastern energy producers, but key suppliers all experienced negative 
GNP per capita annual growth rates over the period 1975-2001 despite 
handsome oil revenues: United Arab Emirates (-3.7 per cent), Saudi Arabia 
(-2.1 per cent), Kuwait (-0.7 per cent), and Iran (-0.6 per cent).75 
The US Energy Information Administration forecasts that America's 
dependence on petroleum imports could grow to 62 per cent by 2020. Over 
the next t:vvo decades, net imports of petroleum are expected to increase by 
more than 6 mbd, with imports of Gulf oil increasing by slightly over 2 mbd. 
In 2001 the Middle East accounted for approximately two-thirds of the world's 
proven oil reserves; 35 per cent of world oil production capacity; 30 per cent 
of world oil production; and about 83 per cent of excess world oil production 
capacity.76 Data show that the countries of the Middle East possess 65.3 per 
cent of the world's proven oil reserves 77 and have an average reserve-to-
production ratio in excess of 86 years, double that of the world average. 78 
Middle Eastern oil also enjoys a comparative advantage with the lowest 
production costs in the world. The capital investment required to increase 
production capacity by 1 barrel per day by a Gulf producer is less than $5,000, 
whereas it is considerably greater for OPEC producers outside the Gulf, 
exceeding $10,000 in some member nations.79 
There have been reports of significant crude oil discoveries in the 
Caspian Sea basin. Because of the underdeveloped nature of the region's oil 
industry, the extent of the reserves has yet to be proven. Reported quantities 
of around 200 billion barrels would, if confirmed, be equivalent to the 
combined reserves of Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, but less than the 
proven reserves of Saudi Arabia. The 200 billion barrel figure has been 
74 Ibid. pp.250-3 http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03 HDI.pdf - accessed 18 December 
2003 
75 Ibid. pp.278-81 
76 Abraham. Testimony. 
77 British Petroleum (2002). BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2002. London UK, 
British Petroleum. p.5 
http://www.bp.com/downloads/1087 /statistical review.pdf - accessed 3 October 2002 
78 Ibid. p.4. If the reserves remaining at the end of any year are divided by the production in 
that year, the reserve-to-production ratio is the length of time that those remaining reserves 
would last if production were to continue at that level. 
79 US Department of Energy (2000). International Energy Outlook 2000. Washington DC, US 
Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. 
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described as 'the product of pure speculation, and geopolitical fanfare', 80 and 
global markets are unlikely to become dependent on Caspian oil in the 
foreseeable future. 81 Proven reserves of the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
amount to 65.4 billion barrels, with a reserve-to-production ratio at the end of 
2001 of only 21 years. 82 The regional share of the states of the FSU in global 
crude oil production fell from 15 per cent in 1973 to 11.9 per cent in 2000. 83 
Exploitation of Caspian Sea basin oil has raised questions about the 
transportation of crude oil to international markets. The most economic 
transportation arrangement would involve Iran. The Congress passed the Iran 
and Libya Sanctions Act in 1966 with the express aims of denying Iran the 
ability to support acts of international terrorism, and to fund the development 
and acquisition of WMD and the means to deliver them, by limiting the 
development of Iran's ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by 
pipeline its petroleum resources. 84 Clinton actively promoted an alternative 
routing for Caspian oil that bypassed Iran in favour of Turkey, an American 
ally and friend of Israel. 85 
Despite a policy of diversification of supply, access to Middle Eastern 
oil seems likely in the longer-term to remain of vital importance to the United 
States, other industrialised states and the countries of the Third World. 86 
Saudi Arabia has the world's largest proven petroleum reserves, a reserve-to-
production ratio in excess of 85 years,87 and one of the world's lowest costs of 
production at less than $1.50 pb. 88 It has an ability quickly to vary production 
levels. These attributes enable it to exercise influence within OPEC on pricing 
8° Christian, A.M.A. (2001). Pipeline Politics: the geopolitical and geostrategic implications of 
exploitation and extraction of energy reserves from the littoral states of the Caspian Sea basin. 
Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, The Faculties. Canberra ACT, The Australian National 
University. p.13 
81 Olcott, M. B. (1998). "The Caspian's false promise." Foreign Policy Iss.111 Summer 1998 
pp 94-113. She assesses that Caspian oil will account for less than 5 per cent of global oil 
consumption in 2010. 
82 British Petroleum. BP Statistical Review, p.4 
83 International Energy Agency (2002). Key World Energy Statistics from the !EA. Paris, 
OECD. p.10 http://www.iea.org - 2 October 2002 
84 Clawson, P. (1997). U.S. Sanctions on Iran. Abu Dhabi UAE, The Emirates Center for 
Strategic Studies and Research. p.20 
85 Mojtahed-Zadeh, P. (2001). "Geopolitics and Reform under Khatami." Global Dialogue 
Vol.3 Nos. 2-3 (Summer 2001) pp.59-60 
86 Krapels. "The Commanding Heights", p.84 
87 British Petroleum. BP Statistical Review, p.4 
88 US Department of Energy (2000). International Energy Outlook 2000, p.33 
64 
and production levels through a general preparedness to raise or lower 
production in order to accommodate particular international or industry crises. 
As a friend of the United States, it has contributed to the ability of the United 
States and other industrialised countries to weather periodic variations in other 
producers' output levels. 
Unless the world is able to hasten the development of other sources of 
relatively cheap energy, including petroleum, the United States will not be 
able in the longer-term to insulate itself from the growing dependence of _ 
world consumers on Middle East oil. That oil will come from a diminishing 
number of Gulf suppliers. They, in turn, may find it unattractive to moderate 
price as they wrestle with their own economic and social development needs. 
The assurance of Middle East oil supply at 'affordable' prices must remain a 
key objective of American foreign policy. It links the United States 
inexorably to countries that champion the cause of the Palestinians. They 
have declared their preparedness to accept Israel as a legitimate regional 
neighbour provided Israel will accommodate Palestinian demands for a viable 
sovereign state. They can be expected to importune the United States if it 
does not press Israel for movement on the Palestinian issue. 
Non-prolif era ti on of WMD and delivery systems 
The United States has been concerned to halt the proliferation of 
WMD and their delivery systems, fearing that they could be used to breach its 
homeland security, or turned against American interests abroad, including the 
security of Israel. Iraq launched missiles against Israel during the 1991 Gulf 
War, but its development of a more accurate missile system was constrained 
by the UN Security Council after the war. Iran is developing a conventional 
missile system that would bring Israel within target range. Its nuclear power 
developments have raised the possibility that Iran could move at a later stage 
toward a nuclear weapon capability, although Iran has denied any such 
intention and has committed to opening its facilities to International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection. A linkage to the Arab-Israel dispute by a 
missile-capable state was made by Saddam Hussain, who appealed to pan-
Arab sentiment in 1990 by pointing to the inconsistency between the United 
States' s use of the Security Council to build an anti-Iraq coalition, and its 
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refusal to pressure Israel to withdraw from occupied territory demanded in 
Security Council resolutions. Iran is a committed supporter of Palestinian and 
Lebanese insurgent groups that have attacked Israel. 
The vulnerability of the American homeland to attack by weapons of 
mass destruction - biological, 89 chemical90 and nuclear - has been a consistent 
thread in commentary since the 1960s. Cordesman,91 and Kupperman and 
Smith,92 are among authors who have devised cataclysmic scenarios around 
the vulnerability of the American population to biological or chemical 
warfare, or terrorism. Also, concern over the spread of advanced military 
capabilities had begun to grow in Pentagon-affiliated think-tanks and the US 
intelligence community by the late 1980s.93 By April 1990, the US Army 
· Chief of Staff was alluding publicly to the growing power of Israel and several 
prominent Third World countries, including Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, 
Pakistan, Syria and the two Koreas. Such states were said to have sought 
nuclear and/or chemical weapons.94 From 1990 on, the general model of a 
'rogue state' ruled by an 'outlaw regime' armed with chemical and nuclear 
weapons had become the standard currency of US national security discourse. 
89 United Nations (1969). Report of the Secretary General on Chemical and Bacteriological 
(Biological) Weapons and the Effects of their Possible Use (A/7575/Rev.l). United Nations 
NY. The report defines biological agents as 'living organisms, whatever their nature, or 
infective material derived from them, which are intended to cause disease or death in man, 
animals or plants, and which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the persons, 
animal or plant attacked'. p.5. Toxins are defined as chemical substances produced by 
biological systems, but which are not themselves living; Roberts , B. (1993). New Challenges 
and New Policy Priorities for the 1990s. Biological Weapons: weapons of the future? B. 
Roberts. Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies. p.69 
90 United Nations (1969). Report of the Secretary General on Chemical and Bacteriological 
(Biological) Weapons, defines chemical agents of warfare as 'chemical substances, whether 
gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on 
man, animals and plants'. p.5. Chemical agents are usually described in terms of the 
physiological effects and are characterised as nerve agents, blister agents (vesicants), choking 
agents, blood agents, toxins, tear and harassing gases, and psycho-chemicals . 
91 Cordesman, A.H. (1999). Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: regional trends, 
national forces, wa,fighting capabilities, delivery options, and weapons effects. Washington 
DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies. pp.88-90 
http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/WMD.html - accessed 5 July 2000 
92 Kupperman, R.H. and D.M. Smith (1993). Coping with Biological Terrorism. Biological 
Weapons: weapons of the future? B. Roberts. Washington DC, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. pp.41-3 
93 Klare, M. (1995). Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America 's search for a new foreign 
policy. New York NY, Hill and Wang. pp.19-21 , citing US Commission on Integrated Long-
Term Strategy: Discriminate Deterrence and Future Security Environment, and Center for 
Strategic and International Studies: Meeting the Mavericks: Regional Challenges for the Next 
President. 
94 Ibid. cited at p.24 
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Iraq, which was believed to be pursuing the clandestine production of WMD, 
and which had used chemical weaponry against its own population and Iran, 
became an outlaw when it invaded Kuwait and placed in jeopardy not just the 
assured supply of oil from Kuwait, but also that from the adjacent oil-
producing region of Saudi Arabia.95 
A presidential statement of the UN Security Council on 31 January 
1992 underlined the need for all member states of the UN 'to prevent the 
proliferation 1n all its aspects of all weapons of mass 
destruction ... [which] ... constitutes a threat to international peace and security. 
The members of the Council commit themselves to working to prevent the 
spread of technology related to the research for or production of such weapons 
and to take appropriate action to that end' .96 The statement addressed nuclear 
proliferation, chemical weapons and conventional armaments. On nuclear 
proliferation, it noted the importance of the decision of many countries to 
adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and emphasised 'the 
integral role in the implementation of that Treaty of fully effective IAEA 
safeguards, as well as the importance of effective export controls. The 
members of the Council will take appropriate measures in the case of any 
violations notified to them by the IAEA'. On chemical weapons the Council 
sought the conclusion, by the end of 1992, of 'a universal convention, 
including a verification regime, to prohibit chemical weapons'. 
In 1994 President Clinton found that the proliferation of nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons and of the means of delivering them 
constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign 
policy, and economy of the United States. He ordered that the United States 
lead and seek multilaterally coordinated efforts with other countries to control 
the proliferation of WMD and the means of delivering them. He ordered also 
95 Bush, G.H.W. (1992). "The Need for an Active Foreign Policy, 11 March 1992." US 
Department of State Dispatch (16 March 1992) p.211. Bush said: 'I am absolutely certain in 
my mind that if we had not moved against Saddam, he would be in Saudi Arabia today'. 
96 United Nations (1992). The Responsibility of the Security Council in the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security (S/23500). United Nations NY. This was the first meeting in 
the history of the United Nations to be convened at the level of Heads of State and 
Government. In accordance with the principle of rotation, the United Kingdom presided, in the 
person of Prime Minister John Major. President Bush participated. The meeting demonstrated 
the spirit of cooperation possible under the 'new world order' . 
67 
that national export controls be applied to items likely to contribute to the 
manufacture of such weaponry and delivery systems.97 
The United States has a number of concerns about WMD: 
• some of the weapons are potentially very lethal and indiscriminate in 
their targeting; 
• some WMD may be manufactured relatively easily and cheaply and 
are within the productive capability of many Third World countries, 
although they may find weaponisation of biological and chemical 
agents difficult. It was in October 1988 that the Speaker of the Iranian 
Majlis made his famous observation that '[c]hemical and biological 
weapons are poor man's atomic bombs and can easily be produced. 
We should at least consider them for our defence ... Although the use 
of such weapons is inhuman, the [Iran-Iraq] war taught us that 
international laws are only drops of ink on paper' .98 An asymmetric 
warfare capability is pursued by some countries 'as a viable means to 
counter overwhelming US conventional military superiority' ;99 
• long-range delivery systems are proliferating. Some 20 states have, or 
are developing, ballistic missile capabilities, and 77 have, or are 
d 1 . . . ·1 100 eve oping, cnnse nnss1 es. The Director of the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), George Tenet, testified in March 2000 that 
American military and civilian targets, already vulnerable to Russian 
and Chinese missile attack, could face ballistic missile threats from 
'North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq ... And while the missile 
arsenals of these countries will be fewer in number, constrained to 
smaller payloads, and less reliable than those of the Russians and 
97 Clinton, W.J. (1994). Executive Order 12938 - Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
14 November 1994. 
98 Spiers, E.M. (1994). Chemical and Biological Weapons: a study of proliferation. 
Basingstoke UK, Macmillan. Cited at p.174 
99 Tenet, G.J. (June 2000). "Weapons of Mass Destruction: a new dimension in U.S. Middle 
East policy." Middle East Review of International Affairs Vol.4 No.2, being an edited 
transcript of his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 21 March 2000. 
http://www/ciaonet.org/ol j/meria/meriaOO teg0l .html - accessed 23 September 2002; Joseph, 
R.G. (1999). Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Deterrence and Defense. Air/Missile Defense, 
Counterproliferation and Security Policy Planning: implications for collaboration between the 
United States and the Gulf Co-operation Council countries. J.K. Davis, C.M. Perry and J.S. 
Al-Suwaidi. Abu Dhabi UAE, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. p.44 
100 Schneider, B.R. (1999). Future War and Counterproliferation: U.S. military responses to 
NBC proliferation threats. Westport CT, Praeger. p.200 
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Chinese, they will still pose a lethal and less predictable threat' .101 He 
added that the long-range missile threat should not overshadow the 
immediacy and seriousness of the threat the US forces, interests, and 
allies already face overseas from short and medium-range missiles, 
whose proliferation is significantly altering strategic balances in the 
Middle East and Asia; and 
• some weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists. Tenet's testimony 
included an . assertion that there are a number of non-state actors, such 
as terrorist groups, seeking to develop or acquire biological, chemical, 
nuclear or radiological weapons; and that there are fewer constraints on 
non-state actors than on state actors. 102 
The proliferation of missiles capable of carrying conventional 
warheads or WMD has given impetus to the search for regulatory measures, 
including through non-proliferation regimes. Predating the Clinton 
presidency, but continued under his Administration, has been the promotion of 
normative regimes through the adoption of international instruments 
embracing nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry and associated missile 
delivery systems. They include the NPT which was concluded in July 1968 
and came into force in March 1970. Its life was extended indefinitely in 1995; 
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction (BWC), which was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into 
force in 1975; the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) of 1993; and the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which was concluded in 1996 but 
would not enter into force until it had been signed and ratified by all 44 
nuclear-capable states, including the United States. The US Senate rejected 
the CTBT in 1999. The various instruments differ markedly, reflecting in part 
the particular characteristics of the various weapons. Their passage charts the 
evolutionary process of confidence-building between the two former 
superpowers, marking progress toward increasingly more rigorous and 
intrusive regimes of inspection and compliance verification. But their 
101 Tenet. "Weapons of Mass Destruction" 
102 Ibid.; Ikenberry (2002). "America's Imperial Ambition". He suggests that while states that 
develop WMD capabilities may be deterred from using them, they might pass them to terrorist 
networks that are not deterred. 
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memberships do not encompass all states presumed to have a production 
capability for the relevant type of weapon. The United States has sought to 
bring associated missile development under a Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR). 103 Although membership of the regime is limited, it 
includes most states that possess the necessary technological base for missile 
production. 
Despite its pursuit of global non-proliferation regimes, America has 
been unsuccessful in persuading Israel to become a party to the NPT, or 
unwilling to do so. In September 1992, the Arab League passed a resolution 
linking an Arab decision to accede to the CWC to Israeli steps toward 
membership in the NPT. Israel's refusal to sign the treaty became a sticking 
point with Egypt in the multilateral arms control negotiations under the 
Madrid conference process, preventing further progress within that group. 
Israel has never acknowledged that it is a nuclear-weapon state. It is said to 
have developed a nuclear stockpile of 60-80 plutonium weapons and that it is 
possible that it has a stockpile of up to 200-300 weapons. 104 The Director of 
the CIA indicated in May 1989 that Israel might be seeking to construct a 
thermonuclear weapon. 105 The United States protested Israeli nuclear activity 
during the presidency of John F. Kennedy in 1963, was sceptical about the 
explanation that it was for .peaceful purposes, and demanded to inspect the 
facility at Dimona. The Americans were shown what has been described as 
dummy installations - denied by the Israelis - and found no evidence of a 
weapons programme. 106 They were unable to secure more that a promise from 
the Israelis that they would not be the first state in the Middle East to test a 
nuclear device; and Israel signed the CTBT in 1996. By the late 1970s Israel 
had become suspicious about Iraq's nuclear programme. It was concerned that 
Iraq's reactor would be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium and 
103 Ozga, D.A. (1994). "A Chronology of the Missile Technology Control Regime. " The 
Nonproliferation Review Vol.1 No.2 (Winter 1994) pp 66-93. The MfCR is an informal, non-
treaty association of states that have an established policy or interest in limiting the spread of missiles 
and missile technology. By 1999, membership had grown from the original seven to 32. A 
state can adopt export controls based on MTCR guidelines and proclaim itself to be an adherent. 
The United States has in the past only recognised adherent status after a bilateral accord has been 
reached. Recognition of adherent status by the US government is particularly critical, as its sanction 
laws are triggered when non-MTCR participants transfer controlled goods to other non-participants. 
104 Cordesman (1999). Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, p .23 
105 Ibid. p.23 
106 Melman and Raviv. Friends in Deed, pp.102-4 
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urged France to lower the quality of the nuclear fuel to be delivered to it. 
Israeli agents destroyed material in France destined for the Iraqi reactor and 
assassinated Baghdad's senior scientist. 107 Then in 1981 Israel bombed the 
Osiraq reactor. 
The US commitment to Israeli security requires it to address Israel's 
vulnerability to missile attack. Iraq demonstrated Israel's susceptibility in 
1991 when its SCUD attacks affected most econormc activity in that 
country. 108 UN Security Council Resolution 687 proscribed Iraq from 
possessing missiles with a range in excess of 150 kms, putting Israel out of 
range. Israel comes within the range of missiles in the possession of, or in 
development by, other Middle Eastern states; and possesses its own offensive 
Jericho ill system with a range of 2,800 kms. 109 The 1991 war revealed 
deficiencies in America's Patriot antimissile system, and the United States has 
worked closely with Israel in the development of the Arrow missile defence 
system, providing $628 million in grants for research and development since 
1988. It has also provided assistance totalling $192 million for two 
· 110 complementary proJects. The partners' aim 1s to anticipate new 
developments in ballistic missile technology before such weapons are 
introduced into the Middle East, and to counter them through improved 
defence technology. 111 
Iraq and Iran have been a particular worry to the Clinton 
Administration, which aspired to constrain them through a policy of 'dual 
107 Tessler. History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.544-5 
108 Tanks, D.R. (1999). Key proliferation trends and their likely impact on the balance of 
power in the Gulf: a focussed evaluation. Air/Missile Defense, Counterproliferation and 
Security Policy Planning: implications for collaboration between the United States and the 
Gulf Co-operation Council Countries. J.K. Davis. C.M. Perry and J.S. Al-Suwaidi. Abu Dhabi 
UAE, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. p.17 
109 Carus, W.S. (1998). Israeli Ballistic Missile Developments. Report of the Commission to 
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Washington DC, U.S. Congress. 
110 Mark (2002). Israel: U.S. foreign assistance, pp.7-8; Jewish Virtual Library (2000). The 
Arrow Missile Program. Chevy Chase MD, Jewish Virtual Library. 
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/US-Israel/Arrow.html - accessed 25 September 2002 
111 Morgan, T.O. (1999). The Potential Value of Missile Defense in the Gulf Context. 
Air/Missile Defense, Counterproliferation, and Security Policy Planning: implications for 
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Davis, C.M. Perry, and J.S. Al-Suwaidi. Abu Dhabi UAE, The Emirates Center for Strategic 
Studies and Research. p.63. The Arrow is designed to intercept medium to short-range missiles 
at altitude and to destroy the warhead sooner and farther from Israeli territory, thus minimising 
fallout over Israel; Gordon, M.R. (2002). "Israel Set to Use New Missile Shield to Counter 
Scuds." The New York Times on the Web, 6 October 2002. 
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containment' .112 UN sanctions assisted materially in hobbling Iraq for some 
years, 113 but by 1998 Saddam Hussain's regime was no longer cooperating 
with the Special Commission (UNSCOM) set up by the UN Security Council 
to disarm his country, and differences had emerged among the Council's 
permanent members about its modus operandi and a continuing need for 
UNSCOM seven years after the Gulf War. The Commission was replaced in 
1999 by another (UNMOVIC)114 that the Security Council hoped would be 
more amenable to the Iraqis. That agency, too, would be unable to complete 
its work before the United States led a 'coalition of the willing' into Iraq in 
2003, ostensibly to destroy Iraq's WMD capability. 
Iran has been able to secure nuclear and missile development materiel 
and/or assistance from a number of sources, including China, North Korea, 
Russia, and earlier Western Europe. The Clinton Administration tried to 
restrain suppliers by encouraging their adherence to non-proliferation regimes, 
and through bilateral measures. They were able to effect some changes among 
supplying states in favour of greater control over export of their technology. 
Although Iran acquiesced in IAEA nuclear inspections in 2003, the United 
States remains concerned about Iran's potential capabilities. The 
Administration sought to buttress its position in the Gulf after the 1991 war, 
building defence cooperation arrangements with the Gulf states. For some of 
them, however, Israel's missile and WMD capabilities provide as much, if not 
a greater rationale for defence collaboration among Gulf Cooperation Council 
members than the activities of their Gulf neighbours. 115 
112 Christopher, W. (1995). "America's Leadership, America's Opportunity." Foreign Policy 
Iss.98 Spring 1995. He states that through the 'dual containment policy' the United States is 
'helping to create the secure environment in which Arab-Israeli peacemaking can succeed'. 
p.21 
113 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary. She records having been told by UN inspectors in late 
1997 that they believed that Iraq's ability to produce weapons-grade uranium had been all but 
destroyed, which would severely limit its ability to build a nuclear bomb unless materials were 
procured abroad. p.278 
114 The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) 
was created by UN Security Council Resolution 1284 of 17 December 1999. UNMOVIC was 
to replace the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with the latter's 
mandate to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological weapons and 
missiles with a range of more than 150 km), and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring 
and verification to check Iraq ' s compliance with its obligations not to acquire the same 
weapons prohibited to it by the Security Council. 
115 Davis, J.K. and C.M. Perry (1999). Overview. Air/Missile Defense, Counterproliferation 
and Security Policy Planning: implications for collaboration between the United States and 
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Were Israel to harbour grave susp1c1ons about Iran's nuclear and 
missile intentions comparable to those it held about the Osiraq reactor, it could 
conceivably launch a pre-emptive strike against Iranian installations. Iran's 
robust assistance to Lebanese Hezbollah116 and more limited help to the 
Palestinians is already a sensitive issue for Israel. Were a pre-emptive attack 
to occur, it could be presumed to impact directly on oil prices whether or not 
Gulf oil supply was affected. 
The threat of the employment of WMD against Israel, or other 
American interests in the Middle East, may well be latent. The United States' s 
predominance depends upon its maintaining a capacity to frustrate 
developments that it regards as inimical to its interests, or effectively to 
neutralise or counter them in the event of their employment. Its commitment 
to Israel's security has extended to ensuring Israel's military supremacy over 
its neighbours. The United States could not accept a shift in the strategic 
balance that would be presaged by the development and deployment of WMD 
by Arab and Muslim states within the region. If a settlement of the Arab-Israel 
dispute could be effected that legitimised Israel's place within the Middle East, 
the possibility of WMD being employed against that state would be largely 
eliminated. 
Terrorism/insurgency 
The link between insurgency and the Arab-Israel dispute is explicit. 
Palestinian extremists and Lebanese Hezbollah have been engaged in attacks 
on Israelis and their American supporters. Both Lebanese and Palestinian 
insurgents have received support from Iran since the Islamic revolution of 
1979;117 and Syria is an important point on the supply route to Lebanon. 118 
the Gulf Co-operation Council Countries. J.K. Davis, C.M. Perry and J.S. Al-Suwaidi. Abu 
Dhabi UAE, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. pp.1-2 
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'the most serious question regarding state-sponsored terrorism today is the degree to which 
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117 US Department of State (2003). Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002. Washington DC, 
Department of State. p.77; Perl, Raphael. (2003). Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign 
Policy. Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. p.3; 
Christopher (1995). "America's Leadership", argues that 'Iran is the world's most significant 
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118 US Department of State (2003). Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p.81 
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Ten Palestinian groups are resident in Syria, but the Syrian regime has 
prevented them from engaging in direct cross-border incursions into Israel. 
The umbrella Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was founded by Arab 
states in 1964 to represent the Palestinians. Arafat's Fatah movement . 
embarked on armed struggle in 1965119 and took over the PLO in 1969 .120 
Both the United States and Israel proscribed official dealings with the PLO 
until 1993. 
The CIA director's fear that terrorists could employ WMD has not yet 
materialised. 121 Terrorists have, however, been able to inflict considerable 
damage using conventional instruments through daring and sophisticated 
planning and the targeting of places of assembly. Globally, the number of 
people killed in international terrorist incidents rose from 163 in 1995,122 to 
233 in 1999, and 405 in 2000,123 peaking at 3,547 in 2001 in consequence of 
the events of 11 September. 124 As the casualty rate has risen, the number of 
terrorist attacks has fallen from 666 in 1987 to 348 in 2001. 125 Approximately 
63 per cent of all terrorist incidents worldwide in 2001 were committed 
against American interests, compared to 23 per cent in 1995. Despite the 
enormity of the number of casualties from the September 2001 attacks on US 
soil, executed mainly by Arabs, almost 90 per cent of terrorist attacks against 
American interests that year occurred in Latin America: the Middle East 
ranked fourth in terms of the number of attacks upon American interests by 
region. 126 Historically there have been relatively few large-scale attacks 
causing 100 or more deaths. Of the twelve incidents during the twentieth 
119 Walker, T. and A. Gowers (2003 (rev. edit.)). Arafat: the biography. London UK, Virgin 
Books. p.xii 
120 Ib.d 1 . p.x 
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century within that category, five involved the bombing of international 
aircraft, one the bombing of the US Marine barrack in Beirut in 1983, and one 
the singular bombing of the US federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995.127 
Insofar as the Arab-Israeli dispute is concerned, in just two years since 
the beginning of the so-called al-Aqsa intifada . in September 2000 in the 
twilight of Clinton's term, there were 1,750 deaths and 20,255 injuries among 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and 613 deaths and 4,425 injuries to 
Israelis. 128 These figures contrast markedly with those of the 282 Israelis 
killed by the PLO in the thirteen years from 1968 to 1981.129 The incidence of 
suicide attacks in Israel has risen, although globally this form of attack 
accounted for only 3 per cent of terrorist incidents from 1980 to 2001. The 
rate of such attacks has increased from 3 per year in the 1980s, to 10 per year 
in the 1990s, to more that 25 in both 2000 and 2001. Robert Pape has 
concluded that 'nearly all suicide terrorist campaigns have in common ... a 
specific secular and strategic goal: to compel liberal democracies to withdraw 
military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their 
homeland' .130 
There 1s a discernible trend: contemporary terrorism 1s carried out 
primarily by loosely-organised, self- or mutually-financed networks with 
cross-national links. 131 Religion is rarely the root cause of suicide attacks, 
although it assists in broadening the appeal of the organising agency and in 
recruitment. 132 Terrorists have been able to demonstrate that, for all its power 
and resources, the United States has been unable effectively to protect its 
properties at home and abroad and the lives of its citizens, including those of 
its official agents. Some angry young Yemenis saw the USS Cole incident as 
127 Falkenrath (1998). "Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism", p.52. His 
data include only conventional terrorist attacks. They do not include large-scale massacres 
carried out by military or guerrilla groups using guns, machetes or other small arms; or acts by 
guerrilla groups animated by a particular ethnic hatred or extreme ideology, such as Bosnian 
Serbs, Algerian Islamic radicals, Rwandan militias and the Vietcong. 
128 The Electronic Intifada (2002). Casualty Statistics: 29 September 2000, 13 September 
2002. 
http ://electronicintifada.net/v2/casualtystats .shtml - accessed 26 September 2002 
129 Herman, E .S. and G. O'Sullivan (1989). The "Terrorism" Industry: the experts and 
institutions that shape our view of terror. New York NY, Pantheon Books. p.30. The data is 
drawn from official Israeli police statistics. 
130 Pape. "Dying to Kill Us." 
131 Perl. Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, Summary. 
132 Pape. "Dying to Kill Us." 
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a metaphor for how their world - mostly poor, mostly Muslim, mostly 
resentful - can strike back at the Western power in whose shadow they live. 133 
Terrorism is an expressive action, 134 possessing a 'spoiler' quality. Although 
employed for instrumental purposes, it is generally unable to effect a 'positive' 
outcome. Whether defined as terrorism, insurgency, or as a liberation 
struggle, the activity has spawned widespread revulsion at the killing of 
civilians, though not necessarily among those who have identified with the 
causes of the terrorists, and generated a stubborn refusal among_ those targeted 
to concede to the perpetrator. 
Debate is entertained about the efficacy of terrorism in achieving 
political ends. Thomas Schelling wrote on the eve of the Madrid conference 
that 'terrorism has proved to be a remarkably ineffectual means of 
accomplishing anything' .135 In relation to the Arab-Israel dispute, he argued 
that 'as a bargaining weapon terrorism was simply not up to the job' .136 The 
Madrid negotiation was to prove him wrong. At its outset both Israel and the 
United States held that there should be no Palestinian state. By late 2000, 
Clinton was talking of Palestinian sovereignty, and within a couple of years 
both his successor and the Israeli government were committed to the 
realisation of an independent Palestine. This can be attributed principally to 
the greater understanding of the Palestinian cause gained during the course of 
the negotiation. Insurgency served to reinforce to the Clinton Administration 
the depth of the Palestinians' sense of humiliation and grievance, and to bring 
it to acknowledge that Israel could never hope to live in a terrorist-free 
environment while the Palestinians were a subjugated people. For so long as 
the Palestinians remained subject to Israel, they would command the support 
of others: Iran rejected the Oslo peace process and has provided material 
assistance to activist Palestinian elements; Syria provides a sanctuary; and Al-
Qaeda lists the Palestinian cause among its anti-Western grievances. 
133 Burns, J.F. (2000). "Cole Struggles to Stay Afloat after a Bulkhead Collapses. " The New 
York Times on the Web, 16 October 2000. 
134 See Ch .1, p. 21 
135 Schelling, T.C. (1991). What purposes can 'international terrorism' serve? Violence, 
terrorism and justice. R.G. Frey and C.W. Morris. New York NY, Cambridge University 
Press. p.21 
136 Ibid. p.29 
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The United States is a member of all 12 multilateral conventions 
determining the responsibilities of states for combating terrorism. The 
instrument most recently adopted by the UN General Assembly, with United 
States support, is the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. 137 It adds to 11 other international conventions or 
protocols dealing with the proscription of terrorism in relation to a range of 
specific questions such as safety of civil aviation, maritime navigation and oil 
platforms. Prior to the adoption of the most recent convention, Clinton had 
issued an Executive Order138 prohibiting transactions with terrorists who 
threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process. It also targeted their 
financing. 
America's attempts to restrain terrorism through international regimes 
have not been smooth. In 1972 the United States sought to persuade members 
of the UN to adopt a draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Certain Acts of International Terrorism. Reflecting the prevailing mood of 
decolonisation and self-determination within the United Nations, Algeria 
argued that national liberation movements must have a free hand; 'that 
governmental actions cause death, so why should the international community 
single out acts of terrorists over any other political actor; that there can be no 
action taken against terrorism until the underlying causes of terrorism are 
eliminated; and that one cannot take action against terrorist groups without 
taking action against state terrorism' .139 A resolution embodying the Algerian 
philosophy was adopted.140 The United States and most of its allies voted 
against it on the ground that it failed to deal directly with the question of 
. . l . 141 measures to prevent 1nternatlona terronsm. 
137 United Nations (1999). UN General Assembly Resolution 54/109, adopted on 9 December 
1999. The United States signed the treaty during the Clinton Administration, and it was 
ratified on 25 June 2002 under the Administration of his successor. 
138 Clinton, W.J. (1995). Executive Order 12947 - Prohibiting transactions with terrorists who 
threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process, 24 January 1995. Washington DC, The 
White House. 
139 Celmer, M.A. (1987) . Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies . London UK, Mansell 
Publishing. p.97 
140 United Nations (1972). UN General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII), adopted 76 (for) 
- 35 (against) - 17 (abstain) on 18 December 1972 
141 Celmer. Terrorism, U.S. Strategy, and Reagan Policies; Levitt, G.M. (1988). Democracies 
Against Terror: the Western response to state-supported terrorism. New York NY, Praeger 
pp.97-8 
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American counterterrorism policy includes isolating and applying 
pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their 
behaviour, and bolstering the counterterrorism capabilities of those countries 
that work with the United States and require assistance. Practical measures 
involve bilateral intelligence exchanges; and the United States has been able to 
co-opt the assistance of 166 countries in freezing more that $121 million in 
. 1 d f. . 1 142 terronst-re ate 1nanc1a assets. Extradition arrangements to bring 
terrorists to trial under the American justice system are more problematic as 
some states refuse to extradite for political or extraterritorial offences, or to 
extradite their nationals. 143 
A balance of US interests in the Middle East 
The previous chapter examined Clinton's global vision and discussed 
the contribution that a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute might make to its 
realisation. It concluded that notwithstanding the difficulty of identifying any 
such settlement as contributing to the vision's realisation, pursuit of a 
settlement grew to become a matter of considerable personal importance to the 
president and a subject to which the Administration applied energy and 
resources without apparent detriment to the prosecution of other American 
objectives. The following paragraphs will establish why the United States 
should have believed it to be in its interest to engage in prosecuting a 
settlement. This is a necessary precursor to discussion later in the thesis about 
how the first President Bush engaged the United States in bringing the parties 
principal into negotiation, and how Clinton used the power of the United 
States to try to effect a resolution of the dispute. 
Attention has been drawn to the United States' s deep attachment to 
Israel and commitment to Israel's security. In addition, three significant 
factors - oil, WMD and terrorism - have been identified and shown to be 
capable of being manipulated in varying degrees by Arab and Muslim states to 
impress upon the United States the need for a resolution of the Arab-Israel 
142 US Department of State (2003). Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002, p.v 
143 Christopher (1995). "America's Leadership." He wrote: 'We make no concessions to 
terrorists; we galvanize international pressure against states that sponsor them; and we .bring 
terrorists to justice. To help achieve those goals, the United States is sharing intelligence and 
coordinating antiterrorist efforts with friends and allies'. p.26; Perl. Terrorism, the Future, and 
U.S. Foreign Policy, p.12 
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· dispute that takes account of Palestinian aspirations. An American national 
interest has been to assure supply of crude oil from the Middle East at 
'affordable' pnces. That interest has both domestic and international 
connotations. Clinton intervened to urge an increase in supply from OPEC 
member states when prices rose above a band that he believed reasonable. The 
United States has been concerned about the potential for proliferation of 
WMD, including within the Middle East, and the possibility that terrorists 
might acquire such weaponry to target American interests. Chemical agents 
were used by Iraq against Iran; and SCUD missiles launched by that country 
against Israel. There was concern that Iraq might use chemical weapons 
against American troops in the 1991 Gulf War, and among governmental 
advisers that Iraq might develop a missile system capable of delivering a 
chemical warhead. The Clinton Administration sought to restrain the 
development and use of WMD, and associated delivery systems, in the 
country's national interest. American property and personnel in the Middle 
East have been casualties of terrorism, as has Israel. Clinton proscribed 
financial assistance to terrorist organisations; and the United States has been an 
active participant in international measures to stamp out terrorism, much of 
which has been undertaken by Middle Eastern actors. The conquest of 
terrorism remains a national interest of the United States. 
A capability by foreign actors to deploy these instruments 1n ways 
detrimental to America's perceived national interests, including in some cases 
an ability to jeopardise Israel's security, does not translate into a continuing 
commitment to do so. The ability of Arab oil producers to direct their 
'weapon' specifically against the United States is tempered by the nature of the 
international oil market and their own developmental requirements. Oil 
producers are sensitive to the needs of both industrialised and developing 
nations and are unlikely to act precipitately. Any disruption in Gulf oil supply 
would be for its shock value rather than to cause longer-term damage to the US 
and global economy. Although Iraq has demonstrated an ability to deploy 
chemical weapons, and to strike into Israel, UN Security Council resolutions 
crafted by Americans have effectively restrained it. American resolve would 
be apparent to Iran, too, were it to develop and consider deploying an offensive 
missile capability. Terrorist attacks have been launched against American and 
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Israeli interests with telling damage, but have not persuaded the government of 
either country to treat with terrorists or to entertain the terrorists' agendas. To 
the contrary, the countries' anti-terrorist resolve has been stiffened. 
Those in a position to employ the 'oil weapon' and terrorism, and 
possibly to develop a . capability to attack Israel by a missile carrying a 
chemical warhead, have sought to pressure the United States to urge Israel to 
offer some redress of Palestinian grievances. The 'levers' rest in differing 
hands and have not been used in concert. There was no reason for the Bush 
Administration to believe either that collusion was sought among those capable 
of exercising the instruments, or that it would be achieved. Of the three, 
chemical warfare was feared while terrorism was the tool most frequently 
employed. Terrorism has usually been carried out by non-state actors, and 
pursued for a variety of purposes, thus blunting its message. Historically, the 
United States has been generally successful in compartmentalising its inter-
state interests, maintaining good relations with Gulf oil producers despite its 
strategic partnership with Israel. This has been possible because various Arab 
states have decided to give precedence to continuing engagement with the 
United States from among their array of conflicting interests. There was 
nothing to suggest to the Bush Administration in 1991 that America's 
continuing ability to address any of its three regional interests discretely would 
be impaired. 
Arab actors have targeted Israel over its policies toward the 
Palestinians, using the 'oil weapon', missiles and terrorism. Arab states 
rejected the creation of a Jewish state in the Middle East when the matter came 
before the UN in 194 7. Its presence and policies have provided a focal point 
among Arabs and Muslims sympathetic to the grievances of dispossessed and 
humiliated Palestinians. With the exception of Egypt, and later Jordan, Middle 
Eastern states have continued to deny legitimacy to the State of Israel. 
American Administrations have, over many years, tried to encourage regional 
states to reconcile themselves to Israel's existence. Recognition of Israel's 
sovereignty would confer legitimacy upon the Jewish state, and open the way 
for it to embark upon the building of friendly relations with its neighbours and 
participation in regional developments. Differences between Arab states and 
Israel might remain, or arise, but these could be addressed through customary 
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diplomatic procedures. If Israel's regional legitimacy were ever to be 
achieved, it could only be through a process of negotiation with its neighbours. 
Bush recognised that Arab and Muslim states could only be enticed into 
negotiation if they were confident that the negotiation sought to resolve the 
conflicting . claims of Israelis and Palestinians to territory under terms 
satisfactory to both parties. The United States thus had a particular interest in 
encouraging a negotiation that addressed the genuine concerns of both Israelis 
and Palestinians. 
The background to the Bush Administration's decision to become 
engaged in this matter is discussed in chapter 3. Suffice it to note at this stage 
that the decision was taken in the context of the proclaimed 'new world order'. 
Cooperation among the great powers would replace confrontation with the 
former Soviet Union, and extend also to lesser states previously reliant on 
Soviet protection. The alliances forged by the United States within the 
compass of the United Nations to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
and the war of the following year to evict Iraq, gave expression to the concept 
of American leadership in a unipolar world and provided tangible evidence of 
the benefit of the new and pervading spirit of international cooperation. The 
willingness of states to coalesce around America in that Middle Eastern 
venture was not achieved without some mutual obligation: the Administration 
undertook to address the wider regional concerns of the Arab states after the 
Kuwait crisis had been resolved. 144 
If United States hegemony were to have currency, America would have 
to continue to manifest its professed desire to be engaged. In addition to 
producing a 'public good', such as the eviction of the Iraqi aggressor from 
Kuwait, it would be expected to honour international commitments. It might 
not always be successful in producing a desired 'good' because of the 
intransigence of other actors or the intrusion of external issues, but the 
normative expectation would remain. 
Bush's decision to launch an America·-led initiative in search of a 
settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, and Clinton's persistence in sustaining it, 
go deeper than being seen to honour a commitment. They suggest a genuine 
144 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.414 
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interest in advancing the United States' s claim to global leadership by 
demonstrating that its power could be employed in the production of a 'public 
good', and a desire to take advantage of the prevailing generally positive 
international attitude toward the United States. A resolution of the Arab-Israel 
dispute - if it could be achieved - could be expected to bring a greater measure 
of stability to the region than had existed for half a century. It would remove 
the most emotional issue from the Middle Eastern agenda by addressing the 
territorial concerns of Israel, some of its neighbours, and the Palestinians; by 
facilitating an accommodation between Israelis and Palestinians on a range of 
matters of contention; and by legitimising Israel as a regional actor. To the 
Bush Administration the circumstances for achieving this result seemed 
propitious in 1991, and the argument for United States intervention 
compelling. 
Conclusion 
The United States's support for the existence of the State of Israel has 
been translated into a guarantee of its security. The Congress has provided for 
this purpose ever since the Nixon presidency, equipping Israel's defence force 
at a level sufficient to ensure that it is greater than the combined military 
strength of its neighbours. That support has been constant, even in the face of 
challenges to other important American interests in the Middle East. 
The specific American interests addressed in this chapter have 
dimensions that extend beyond the region. Crude oil is produced elsewhere, 
and the United States has been successful in reducing its dependence on Gulf 
oil supply in the short to medium-term. Weapons of mass destruction are in 
the armouries of Third World countries in other regions. India and Pakistan 
have tested nuclear devices, and North Korea's nuclear programme has 
worried the Clinton Administration and its successor. Terrorism against 
American citizens and property is greater in Latin America than in the Middle 
East, although the number of Arab-inspired and executed anti-American 
incidents has shown an increase. American Administrations have addressed 
the issues of oil supply and pricing, non-proliferation of WMD and their 
delivery systems, and terrorism in their global context. What gives them a 
particular resonance in the Middle East is that each of these issues has been 
82 
brought to bear against Israel, engaging the United States because of its 
commitment to Israel's security. 
Linkages exist among the issues themselves. Iran's oil revenues 
enable it to undertake nuclear development, ostensibly for peaceful purposes; 
to develop missile technology; and to provide support in differing measure to 
Lebanese and Palestinian insurgents. Iraq has been able to mount military 
campaigns against Iran and Kuwait, disrupting Gulf oil supply; to target Iran 
with WMD; and to attack Israel by missile. The Gulf oil producers were able 
to restrict production, causing panic within industrialised countries and 
distress to Third World importers. Oil market volatility, exacerbated by the 
Iran-Iraq War and later the Gulf War of 1991, resulted in competition among 
Gulf oil producers. Because these issues affect specific American interests, 
successive Administrations have been drawn into them. The United States 
provided intelligence assistance and materiel supplies to Iraq during the Iran-
Iraq War, and led campaigns against Iraq in 1991 and 2003. The Clinton 
Administration sought to constrain the ability of Iran and Iraq to threaten their 
neighbours, and to destabilise the Middle East, through a policy of 'dual 
containment'. It encouraged Saudi Arabia to exercise its considerable 
influence among oil producers to assure supply and to keep prices within an 
'affordable' band width. 
The salience of three of the American concerns discussed in this 
chapter is that each has been employed in support of the Palestinian cause, 
although the professed support of Arab and Muslim states for the Palestinians 
has not always been matched by their contributions. Gulf oil producers tried 
twice to employ the 'oil weapon' to encourage the United States to pressure 
Israel into withdrawing from occupied territories; Iran has supported terrorist 
actions opposed to Israel's occupation of Lebanese and Palestinian soil and 
seems intent on acquiring a missile capability that would put Israel within its 
range; and Iraq appealed to pan-Arabian sentiment in favour of the 
Palestinians in 1990, and followed it up with missile attacks upon Israel. The 
relevance of the Palestinian cause was implicitly acknowledged by President 
Bush when he told Syria's President Hafez al-Assad in November 1990 that he 
would address the wider issues of the Middle East after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis 
had been resolved. It was clear to his Administration that, if Israel's security 
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were to be assured, Israel's place within a Middle Eastern community would 
need to be legitimised. That would not happen so long as the Palestinian 
cause provided an anti-Israel rallying point. Removal of that issue would not 
resolve all the tensions among regional states, or between them and the United 
States, but it would defuse the most probable incendiary issue at the heart of 
the Arab-Israel dispute and could lead to Israel's acceptance as a regional 
player. 
Although a conv1nc1ng argument could be made in favour of the 
United States demonstrating leadership and honouring its commitment, there 
could be no guarantee that it could deliver on it. _Much would depend upon the 
dynamics of the diplomatic process, if it could be successfully launched. 
America's preliminary objective was to get the parties principal into 
negotiation with one another. The next chapter will address this. Were the 
negotiation to fail and the United States to be unsuccessful in attaining its 
overall objective, the Middle East would remain in an unsettled condition. 
America would have to live with the attendant uncertainties of the region in 
the future, as it has had to do in the past. Although not America's desired 
outcome, it could be tolerated. Failure to achieve a comprehensive settlement 
would not necess-arily be attributed by others to the intransigence of the 
principal parties. Some may choose to interpret it as due to either some lack 
of resolve on the part of the American Administration or some deficiency in 
its diplomacy. America's broader interest in engaging with and leading the 
international community toward a realisation of its global vision required that 
the Arab-Israel dispute be addressed conscientiously and pursued with vigour. 
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Chapter 3 
Failures and success: the road to Madrid 
The Americans found the argument for a settlement of the Arab-Israel 
dispute compelling. The Bush Administration having decided in 1989, and 
again two years later, to pursue its resolution by peaceful means, the United 
States employed various instruments of statecraft to persuade the parties 
principal to participate in an international conference at Madrid in October 
1991. The Arabs' agreement to negotiate with Israel marked a significant 
reversal of a long-held position. 
Failures - the background 
President Bush decided in early 1989 to explore a common basis on 
which Israel and the Palestinians could engage because geopolitical 
circumstances in the Middle East were changing markedly. 1 By the end of 1988 
superpower competition was in decline, the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) had conceded to the United States on matters of principle, and Israel was 
under pressure from primarily domestic, not external, forces. In the absence of 
a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, the possibility of Arab states once again 
aligning against Israel on some pretext could not be ruled out, in which case the 
United States would be obliged to juggle support for Israel and the protection of 
its other regional interests. The moment seemed opportune. 
Negotiations for a peaceful resolution of aspects of the Arab-Israel 
dispute had been pursued by American Administrations for many years. They 
were initially rooted in the diplomacy of ceasefire arrangements following the 
1967 and 1973 Arab-Israel wars. The need for a resolution of the dispute had 
gained significance due to Cold War superpower rivalry: the two superpowers 
vied for support within the Arab world, while the United States also supported 
Israel. 
A rehearsal of the history of the various American attempts to broker a 
settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute is unnecessary for the purposes of this 
study. It is sufficient to record some of the perceptions held by prospective 
1 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.118 
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participants in any negotiation, including those of the Bush Administration. The 
parties' perceptions affected their attitudes to the Administration's initiative to 
get them to the negotiation table in 1991. 
A view to which Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was committed 
derived from the position taken by a predecessor from his own Likud Party, 
Menachem Begin, when negotiating the Camp David accords in 1978. 
President Jimmy Carter, and Egypt's President Anwar Sadat, saw that 
agreement as a step in the direction of a comprehensive peace between Israel 
and her neighbours. Begin, took the view that in return for relinquishing the 
Sinai Peninsula to Egypt he had secured Israel's right to retain the West Bank, 
and Shamir held to that position. In Shlaim's view, 'Carter's inability to induce 
the Begin government to honour its commitment to seek a solution to the 
Palestinian problem discredited the Camp David Accords in the eyes of many 
Arabs, isolated Egypt, and undermined America's credibility as a peacemaker'. 2 
From the United States's perspective, important determinants were 
carried forward from the presidency of Ronald Reagan. He advanced the 
proposition of self-government for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza 
'in association with Jordan' .3 Drawing upon the Camp David accords, he 
advocated a transitional period 'to prove to the Palestinians that they can run 
their own affairs and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's 
security' .4 His proposal contained three important qualifications: the United 
States would not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of 
settlements during the transitional period; peace could not be achieved by the 
formation of an independent Palestinian state; and Jerusalem would remain 
undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations. 
Fundamental to the American position was UN Security Council Resolution 
242, adopted after the war of June 1967 and setting the parameters for 'a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East' .5 The key principles of such a peace 
included the withdrawal of Israeli forces 'from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict' and the right of every state in the area 'to live within secure and 
2 Shlaim, A. (1988). "The Impact of U.S. Policy in the Middle East." Journal of Palestine 
Studies Vol.XVII No.2 (Winter 1988) p.20 
3 Reagan, R. (1982). "The Reagan Plan - 1 September 1982." The Middle East and North 
Africa 1999. London UK, Europa Publications Limited p.124 
4 Ibid. p.124 
5 United Nations (1967). UN Security Council Resolution 242 
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recognised boundaries free from threats of force' .6 The Americans held that the 
resolution's terms applied to the West Bank and Gaza, a view clearly at odds 
with the policy of Israel's Likud Party. The Arab response to the Reagan plan 
was more receptive,7 but the plan became a casualty of confusion and 
contradiction within the Reagan Administration on policy questions relating to 
Lebanon and Syria occasioned by Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The 
president adjudicated among his advisers in favour of the alliance with Israel, 
resulting in serious damage to America's broader interests in limiting the 
influence of the Soviet Union and its allies and in expanding its own 
cooperation with moderate Arab states. 8 
The first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, broke out in December 1987. 
By the following month Israelis were acknowledging that they had an 
unprecedented situation on their hands. Their heavy-handed response, seen by 
American viewers on television, contributed to a decline in public support for 
Israel,9 including within America's normally pro-Israel Jewish community. 10 
International coverage of the intifada gave impetus to the suggestion of a peace 
conference under the auspices of the United Nations. The notion was endorsed 
in principle by Jordan's King Hussein and Israel's foreign minister, Shimon 
Peres. The United States was loathe to see an intrusion by the United Nations 
where its ability to influence outcomes would be constrained, and responded in 
1988 with another initiative. The new plan by Secretary of State George Shultz 
was less overtly prescriptive about the possible final outcome than Reagan' s. It 
sought to imbue a negotiation with a sense of commitment and urgency by 
introducing timeframes within which various stages of the process were to be 
completed, telescoping those set out in the Camp David accords. 11 Negotiation 
on transitional autonomy arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza was to be 
completed within six months and would last three years . Seven months after the 
transitional negotiation had begun, final status negotiation would begin with the 
6 Ibid. Operative para. 1 (i) and (ii). 
7 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, p.255 
8 Shlaim (1988). "The Impact of U.S. Policy", p.23 
9 D'Amato, J. V. (1991). "How Regimes Profit by Curbing U.S. Television News." Orbis 
Vol.35 No.3 (Summer 1991) p.356 
10 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, p.274 
11 Europa Publications (1978). "The Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Camp David -
17 September 1978." The Middle East and North Africa 1999. London UK, Europa 
Publications Limited. See Section Al(A) and (C) pp.119-20 
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objective of completing it within one year. Palestinian representation would be 
within a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, confirming America's predilection 
for some form of Palestinian association with Jordan. An international 
conference would be held before the commencement of the bilateral 
negotiations at which all parties would be required to accept UN Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, 12 and to renounce · violence and terrorism.13 
The negotiating parties might, by agreement, report to the international 
conference on progress, but the conference would have no power to impose its 
views or to veto the results of the negotiation. 14 Shultz's plan, too, ran aground. 
Shamir did not support an international conference, and he rejected the secretary 
of state's foreshortening of the Camp David process. The Palestinians, though 
happy that the intifada should have sparked an American initiative, were 
unhappy with their proposed 'associate' status within the Jordanian delegation. 
The whole proposition foundered on 31 July 1988 when King Hussein formally 
relinquished all Jordanian legal and administrative ties to the West Bank, stating 
that henceforth the PLO would be responsible for the Palestinians living there. 
In handing over the Palestine question to the PLO, the king shattered the Israeli 
Labor Party's long-held belief that the West Bank's future lay with Hashemite 
rather than PLO rule, thus avoiding the creation of an unstable third state 
between Israel and Jordan. 15 
These developments had proceeded concurrently with an evolution in 
Palestinian thinking and influenced the PLO' s attitude toward negotiated 
settlement with Israel. UN Security Council Resolution 242 defined the 
Palestinians as refugees, a characterisation that the Palestine National Council 
had been determined to broaden in a revision of the Palestine National Charter 
adopted in July 1968. It emphasised the right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination and sovereignty over their homeland. In November 1981 an Arab 
Summit in effect endorsed a proposition for an Arab state alongside a Jewish 
12 United Nations (1973). UN Security Council Resolution 338. The resolution was adopted in 
the context of the October 1973 war. It calls for 'all parties concerned to start immediately 
after [a] ceasefire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its 
parts '. 
13 Shultz, G.P. (1988). "The Shultz Plan - February 1988." The Middle East and North Africa 
1999. London UK, Europa Publications Limited. p.125 
14 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, p.275 
15 Morris , B. (2001). Righteous Victims: a history of the Zionist-Arab conflict, 1881-2001. New 
York NY, Vintage Books. p.605 
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one in the former territory of Palestine. 16 The Arab states had rejected a two-
state solution when the UN partition plan was adopted under General Assembly 
Resolution 181 in 1947,17 but the idea had been implicitly broached at a meeting 
of the Palestine National Council in 1974. 18 The question of which Arab state 
or body should become heir to any occupied territory to be vacated by Israel 
was addressed in a declaration by the heads of Arab states in 1984. Their 
conference formally acknowledged the right of the Palestinian people to a 
separate homeland, but without specifying that its territory was restricted to the 
West Bank; and it recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the 'sole 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people' .19 Kissinger informed Israel 
that the United States would not recognise or negotiate with the PLO unless and 
until the PLO recognised Israel and accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338. The US Congress codified the pledge into law, and added that the 
PLO must also renounce terrorism. 20 
A confluence of events in 1988 saw a further transformation of the 
PLO' s position. The intifada had brought the Palestinian cause to a wider 
audience and the Palestinian leadership was anxious to capitalise on the 
sympathy generated. It was concerned, however, that the uprising was 
indigenous to the West Bank and Gaza and that it threatened a divergence 
between the Tunis-based leadership and the Palestinians living in the territories, 
exacerbated by the impact that radical Islam was beginning to have on 
Palestinian nationalism under the intifada. Within Israel, opinion was divided 
16 Crown Prince Fahd (1981). "The Fahd Plan - August 1981." The Middle East and North 
Africa 1999 London UK, Europa Publications Limited p.124 
17 United Nations (1947). UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) was adopted on 29 
November 1947 by 33 (for) - 13 (against, including all states with significant Muslim 
populations) - 10 (abstentions). 
18 Muslih, M. (1990). "Towards Coexistence: an analysis of the resolutions of the Palestine 
National Council." Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XIX No.4 (Summer 1990). pp.3-29 
19 The PLO had required a statement from the conference that any Palestinian territory 
liberated by Arab forces would be turned over to the 'Palestinian people' as represented by the 
PLO. Jordan protested, pointing out that recognition on these terms would give the PLO 
sovereignty over half of the population in the East Bank and that in fact the annexation of the 
West Bank by Jordan had been approved by popular vote. A compromise solution was adopted 
that nonetheless favoured PLO interests. The Arab heads of state also called for close 
cooperation between the front-line states and the PLO but prohibited interference by other 
Arab states in Palestinian affairs. Jordan's King Hussein opposed the declaration, although he 
eventually signed it under intense Arab pressure and after the Arab oil-producing states 
~romised to provide Jordan with an annual subsidy of $US 300 million. 
0 Mark, C.R. (2003). Palestinians and the Middle East Peace: issues for the United States. 
Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. p.2 
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on whether to pursue repressive measures or a political solution. There was a 
growing realisation among Israelis that the intifada demonstrated the 'high price 
to be paid for retention of the West Bank and Gaza, not only in terms of 
hostility from the Arab world but also in the form of a threat to Israel's Jewish 
and democratic character, and possibly to its military security as well' .21 The 
Labor Party, which demanded compromise, threatened to quit the coalition 
government in the light of conservative support for the status quo. Elections 
were held in both Israel and the United States that year; and informal 
explorations were in train between the outgoing Reagan Administration and the 
PLO over the terms under which the United States could commence negotiation 
with . that organisation. George Bush, Reagan's Vice-President and the 
President-elect, was eager that the matter be resolved before Reagan left 
ff. 22 o ice. Shultz conveyed through a Swedish intermediary the points that 
would need to be endorsed by the PLO Executive Committee and expressed 
publicly by Arafat before an American Administration would enter into 
substantive discussions with the PLO. Particular sticking points for the 
Americans were that the PLO renounce terrorism, and that while the 
Palestinians had the right to pursue an independent state through negotiation this 
did not amount to acceptance of a Palestinian right of self-determination.23 
After some prevarication Arafat stated publicly in December 1988 'the right of 
all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and 
security .. .including the state of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbours 
according to the resolution 242 and 338 [sic] ... [and] ... that we totally and 
absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and 
state terrorism' .24 America's authority effected the desired outcome because the 
PLO recognised that progress toward attainment of the Palestinian objective 
could not occur without United States intervention. They also assessed that 
Shultz's proposals, while not an identical match with their own, were not 
inimical to their position. 
21 Tessler. History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, pp.726-7 
22 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, p.281 
23 Ibid. pp.277-85 
24 Ibid. pp.284-5; Abbas, M. (1995). Through Secret Channels: the road to Oslo. Reading UK, 
Garnet Publishing Limited. A Palestinian account of these developments may be found at 
pp.27-35 
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It was against this background and an appreciation of the key players' 
perceptions that Bush decided to explore the prospect of negotiation between 
Israelis and Palestinians. His secretary of state, James Baker, chose to start by 
inviting the Likud-led coalition government of Yitzhak Shamir to offer a plan. 
After the failure of so many American initiatives it may have seemed 
worthwhile to begin anew with ideas from one of the key actors. Given Likud' s 
aspiration for the realisation of Eretz Israel, however, it was an unlikely place to 
have begun an exploration, and put the Administration at a disadvantage when 
at a later stage it sought Israel's commitment to an amended formula. Baker 
was influenced by a desire to establish a good rapport with the notoriously 
truculent Shamir at their first meeting. Shamir submitted four points: the need 
for negotiations with Arab states to conclude peace treaties; the importance of 
settling the refugee problem; the necessity for the Camp David partners to 
renew their commitment to the agreements and to peace; and a requirement that 
elections be held in the West Bank and Gaza to select non-PLO Palestinians 
with whom Israel would then negotiate an interim agreement on self-
govemment, according to the Camp David formula. 25 Baker has described the 
four points as 'weak' and 'difficult to sell to the Arabs', but as something 
which, after some diplomatic sleight of hand, he believed he could challenge the 
Palestinians to respond to with 'equal flexibility' .26 It was hardly an auspicious 
beginning by the new Administration. 
Baker then elicited a proposal from the Egyptians, which he understood 
to have benefited from considerable private input from Israelis and members of 
the PLO.27 The Americans boiled down the two sets of proposals to five points 
that they claimed met Shamir's concerns and protected Israel,28 including: that a 
meeting would be convened in Cairo only after Israel had approved a list of 
non-PLO Palestinians with whom they could treat; that all sides would agree to 
accept Shamir' s plan as the basis for negotiations; and that the Palestinians 
would be free to raise their own ideas about elections and the negotiation 
process. As Shamir stalled, Bush reminded him that he was equivocating on his 
25 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, pp.296, 453(n12). There must be some doubt whether 
Shamir' s plan was a genuine contribution toward peace. He let slip at the time that it was 
merely 'an idle fancy'. See Morris (2001). Righteous Victims, p.609 
26 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.120 
27 Ibid. p.124 
28 Ibid. p.125 
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own suggestions, notwithstanding that they had been modified by the 
Americans. During the down time the situation became clouded by the building 
of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. 
Many states contend that Israeli settlement in the occupied territories 
and deportation of Palestinians from occupied territories are illegal under 
international law, specifically the sixth paragraph of Art.49 of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
which states: 'The occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own 
civilian population into territories it occupies' .29 Israel became a party to the 
treaty in 1949. The illegality of Israeli settlements has been affirmed in 
resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, according the 
proposition substantive status in international law. Some American spokesmen 
have. stated formally a United States view that the settlements are illegal.30 
The State Department's legal adviser provided an opinion to the Congress in 
1978 which concluded that Israel's establishment of 'civilian settlements in 
those [occupied] territories is inconsistent with international law' .31 American 
Administrations held to this view until the early 1980s when President Reagan 
declared that settlements were not 'illegal'. All subsequent Administrations 
have opposed settlements as an obstacle to peace. 32 The Israelis deny the 
central proposition that the territories are occupied. They maintain that 
Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1950 was not recognised by the 
international community and was therefore illegal, and that Egypt never 
claimed the Gaza Strip. Moreover, Jordan had relinquished its claim to the 
West Bank in 1988. Israel argues that the two territories thereby rightfully 
29 Government of Switzerland (1949). Convention (JV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949. Chevy Chase MD, Jewish Virtual Library 
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/Human Rights/geneval .html - accessed 
19 November 2002 
30 Mark (2003). Palestinians and Middle East Peace . Statements to that effect were made by 
US Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in 1971 and 1976 and by Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance in 1980. p.9 
31 US Department of State (1978). Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories. Digest of 
United States Practice in International Law. Washington DC, US Department of State, Office 
of the Legal Adviser. p.1578 
32 Foundation for Middle East Peace (2002). Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories: a 
guide. Washington DC, Foundation for Middle East Peace, March 2002. 
http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/sr0203.html - accessed 28 October 2003 
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belong to it: they cannot, therefore, be 'occupied territories' and the provisions 
of the Geneva Convention do not apply to them. 33 
The Bush Administration adopted a firm position on the matter, 
consistent with that articulated by Bush in 1971 when he was accredited to the 
United Nations. Baker had told AIP AC in May 1989 that Israel should lay 
aside its unrealistic vision of a Greater Israel, foreswear annexation and stop 
settlement activity.34 The following March he told a congressional committee 
that the United States would support a request for $400 million . in loan 
guarantees to build housing for Soviet Jewish immigrants provided that Israel 
agree to halt the construction of new settlements in the territories.35 Two days 
later the president confirmed that there should be no new settlements in the 
West Bank or East Jerusalem, the specific mention of Jerusalem provoking an 
outcry from Israel's American supporters. 36 
Detail relating to Palestinian representation under Baker's five-point 
plan was introduced into the Israeli cabinet in this context. Determined not to 
concede any possible basis for a Palestinian claim to any part of Jerusalem, 
Shamir objected to a proposition that it might be possible for a Palestinian who 
had residential addresses in both the West Bank and East Jerusalem to be a 
representative at the proposed conference. The proposition was submitted to the 
cabinet of Israel's coalition government where it was endorsed with Labor 
support. The prime minister and conservative members of the cabinet opposed 
it. Labor then left the coalition and secured a vote of no confidence against the 
government in March. It took Shamir until June to reconstitute a government, 
this time with hard-line right-wing support.37 These developments, and an 
attack on Israel by the Palestine Liberation Front on 30 May contrary to Arafat's 
assurances, ensured that by mid-1990 another America-backed initiative to 
promote a peace settlement was dead. 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and America's forging of an international 
alliance to counter Iraqi aggression saw a revival of the question of a peaceful 
and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. Prior to Iraq's 
33 Mark (2003). Palestinians and Middle East Peace, p.9 
34 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.121 
35 Ibid. p.127 
36 Ibid. p.128 
37 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.610 
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invasion of Kuwait, President Saddam Hussain had sought to promote his pan-
Arab credentials by disparaging America's record in relation to the 
P 1 · · 38 a est1n1ans. Later, he tried to create a linkage between the questions of 
Palestine and Kuwait. In the context of the imposition of UN sanctions against 
Iraq, Baghdad criticised America's passivity in the face of Israel's refusal to 
withdraw from occupied territories in accordance with UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, and demanded that America show the same attention 
to all Security Council resolutions.39 The United States was determined to 
maintain a clear distinction between events in the Gulf region and those in the 
Mediterranean littoral,40 and to ensure that Saddam's attempt to forge a linkage 
between the two issues did not gain currency beyond the Palestinians and, to a 
lesser extent, Jordan.41 
While the United States was successful in preventing a direct linkage, 
there was a growing climate in favour of a Middle East peace settlement, 
including among America's Western allies. The Administration recognised that 
Arab countries' deployment of military forces under US leadership required 
some reciprocal gesture. Baker had promised that the United States would 
address the larger issues of the Middle East after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis had been 
resolved.42 The matter was discussed at Bush's meeting, with President Hafez 
al-Assad in Geneva in November 1990. Prime Minister Shamir visited 
38 The question of the Palestinian intifada was discussed at the Twenty-second Arab Summit in 
Baghdad, 28-30 May 1990. Government of Egypt (2000). A Reading of the Arab Summit 
Chronicles, Egyptian State Information Service, 21 October 2001. 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/online/html3/o211020f.htm - accessed 17 January 2002 
39 Aronson, G. (ed.) (1991). "Documents and Source Material." Journal of Palestine Studies 
Vol.XX No.3 (Spring 1991). Statement by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz at a press 
conference after his meeting with American Secretary of State Baker, in Geneva, 9 January 
1991. p .14 2; Secretary Baker also held a press conference after the meeting at which he 
referred to his personal efforts over 14 months to bring about a dialogue between Palestinians 
and Israelis, and said that he had made it very clear to the Iraqi Foreign Minister that 'there 
would be no linkage ... ofthat issue to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait'. p.163 
40 Bush, G.H.W. (1990). Joint News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and 
an Exchange with Reporters at Cairo, Egypt, 23 November 1990. Public Papers - President 
Bush, 1990. The President said: '.What I am equally determined to do is keep these two 
questions separate. There should not be any linkage. ,Saddam Hussain should not be able to 
hide behind the difficulty in one area so he can continue his aggression and brutality and 
torture in another'. p. 1679 
41 Aronson (1991). "Documents and Source Material." In his last interview on 13 January 
1991, the prominent Palestinian figure, Abu Iyad, said that 'it is important to work for two 
declarations of principle: an Iraqi declaration concerning the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait, and a UN declaration establishing a link between the problems of the Middle East and 
of the Gulf. p.146; Jordan's King Hussein juxtaposed the two issues without making the 
linkage between them explicit. pp.148-9 
42 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.414 
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Washington and met with Bush in December 1990. The US and Israeli leaders 
agreed on the need to try to reinvigorate the peace process after the Gulf crisis 
had been solved.43 A month later, the American and Soviet foreign ministers 
agreed that 'mutual US-Soviet efforts to promote Arab-Israel peace and regional 
stability' 44 be undertaken in the aftermath of the crisis in the Gulf. The Israeli 
prime minister immediately criticised the statement, which dealt with his 
country's affairs, for having been issued without either consultation with, or 
prior notice to, his government. 
The complaint was insufficient, however, to deter the two superpowers 
from continuing to work together toward a peace settlement. It was in 
American's interest to engage the Soviet Union in cooperative endeavour in the 
Middle East, demonstrating the advantages of its proclaimed 'new world order'. 
Their cooperation in relation to the Arab-Israel dispute fostered an illusion of 
continuity with American and Soviet co-sponsorship of the Geneva Conference 
of December 1973. In reality the power lay with the United States, particularly 
as the Soviet Union became increasingly preoccupied with its domestic affairs. 
As early as March 1991, Baker made it clear to the Soviet leadership that the 
price of co-sponsorship would be the Soviet Union's establishment of full 
diplomatic relations with Israel.45 In July, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev 
announced that the United States and the Soviet Union, acting as co-sponsors, 
would work to convene a peace conference in October.46 In preparation for a 
conference - and in accord with the new era of cooperation - the foreign 
ministers of the two countries met in Jerusalem on 18 October. The Soviet 
Union's restoration of full diplomatic relations with Israel, after a break of 24 
years, was pre-emptively announced by America that day, coinciding with the 
43 Aronson (1991). "Documents and Source Material." Briefing on Bush-Shamir Talks - 11 
December 1990 by US Under Secretary of State John Kelly. p.157 
44 lbid. Joint U.S.-Soviet Statement on the Gulf - 29 January 1991. p.137 
45 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.428 
46 US Department of State (1991). "U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement on the Middle East - 31 July 
1991." US Department of State Dispatch (12 August 1991) p.593; Bush, G.H.W. (1990) . Joint 
News Conference of President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, 9 September 
1990. Public Papers - President Bush, 1990. A commonality of purpose between the Soviet 
Union and the United States had been established at a meeting between the two Presidents at 
Helsinki, Finland in September 1990. pp.1204-12 
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formal issuance of invitations by their heads of state to a conference in Madrid 
on 30 October 1991.47 
Success 
How the United States succeeded in bringing all the major actors in the 
Arab-Israel dispute into negotiation is an outstanding example of the efficacy of 
the projection of American power. Ideas were explored, inducements offered, 
coercion exerted, and leverage maximised through the co-optation of third 
parties in order to persuade the parties principal to participate in the negotiation. 
The Bush Administration's analysis of the geopolitical situation in late 
1990/early 1991 suggested that the broad coalition of states forged to contest 
Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the newly emergent pattern of cooperation among 
the permanent members of the Security Council, and America's demonstration 
of leadership in prosecuting the Gulf War, offered prospect that the outcome of 
the war might create conditions conducive to productive negotiations between 
Arabs and Israelis. Syria would recognise that the Soviet Union no longer 
offered an attractive alternative to American leadership. The defeat of Iraq, 
militarily the strongest Arab state, would show the Arabs that a military solution 
to the Arab-Israel conflict was impossible. The Palestinians and Jordanians, 
who had been drawn emotionally to the Iraqi side, would realise that their 
support among the victorious Arab states had been diminished. Appreciating 
the weakness of their situation, they could be expected to respond to overtures 
to participate in diplomatic negotiations. Israel would emerge from the war 
with an enhanced sense of security due to Iraq's defeat and America's provision 
of Patriot missiles, at that time promoted as an effective addition to Israel's 
defensive armoury. In such circumstances, it was hoped that Israel would not 
decline any new American overture. For the United States, the national interest 
in facilitating negotiations toward a resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute was 
concern that hostilities between Israel and some combination of Arab states 
could break out again some time in the future jeopardising American interests in 
the region and, possibly, elsewhere.48 
47 Aronson (1992). "U.S.-Soviet Letter of Invitation to Peace Talks in Madrid, 18 October 
1991." Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XXI No.2 (Winter 1992). pp.120-1 
48 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, pp.303-6 
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A resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute became a formal objective of the 
Administration when Bush addressed a joint session of the Congress on 
6 March 1991, saying: 
We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the 
Arab states - and between Israelis and Palestinians ... A comprehensive 
peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This 
principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and 
recognition and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political 
rights. Anything else would fail the twin test [sic] of fairness and 
security. The time has come to put an end to the Arab-Israel conflict.49 
While his statement focussed on Israel and the Palestinians, he was 
concerned to express the Palestinian question in the context of closing 'the gap 
between Israel and the Arab states'. The plural is instructive, even though the 
states were not specified. The immediate objective was to convince all 
disputants to come together in order that they might proceed to negotiate a 
resolution of their differences. The intermediate objective of convoking a 
conference was not without attendant difficulty because Israel's Arab 
neighbours had never to that point agreed to negotiate with Israel. It was not 
until agreement had been reached on the convoking of an international 
conference to address a resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute that greater 
prec1s1on was given to defining the scope and objectives of the process. 
Bush's contribution during his first presidential term was to bring the parties 
principal together: he would have hoped that a second term would have 
provided the space in which to pursue a comprehensive settlement of the 
dispute. 
Bush sent his secretary of state to the Middle East to explore the 
prospects for an international peace conference. It was a journey Baker was to 
make eight times during 1991 as America exercised its power in order to 
convoke a conference. It had proven impossible to secure Shamir' s 
commitment to enter into negotiation with the Palestinians in 1989-90, even on 
terms based on his own proposals. A new approach would be necessary if 
negotiations were ever to be successfully launched. Baker has revealed that the 
centrepiece of what was to become a new US initiative had been based on a 
49 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of 
the Persian Gulf Conflict, 6 March 1991. Public Papers - President Bush 1991, p.220 
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proposal in September 1990 by a senior aide to the Israeli foreign minister.50 
There should be two tracks, the first leading to an Israel-Palestinian dialogue; 
and the second engaging Israel and the Arab states in a regional conference, 
cosponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, where all the parties 
directly concerned would be represented.51 This would be . in lieu of a 
conference under the aegis of the United Nations, sought by a number of Arab 
and other states but anathema to Israel and the United States because so many 
resolutions adopted by UN agencies went against what they believed to be 
Israel's interests. The hope was that, once the parties had been brought to the 
negotiating table, the dynamic would produce a comprehensive and peaceful 
settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. Four things are apparent from even this 
minimalist description: the Bush Administration's proposed structure would 
draw upon an Israeli concept; the focus would be on the negotiating process 
rather than upon negotiating an outcome related to some desired objective; and 
the negotiating process would accord de facto recognition by Arab states to 
Israel as a Middle Eastern state, thus conferring upon Israel a measure of 
legitimacy denied by Arab states since 1948. The principle of self-
determination for the Palestinian people would be qualified: it would not extend 
to a separate independent state, but application of the principle would not be 
excluded in the context of a confederation with Jordan.52 
Baker knew that in order to convoke a conference it would be essential 
to de1nonstrate to the Arabs and to the Israelis that both sides were prepared to 
be flexible. As neither side would be prepared to move first, parallel reciprocal 
steps would need to be taken.53 A tentative move by one Arab state might be 
sufficient to strengthen the resolve of another, until gradually an Arab 
consensus could be framed around participation in an international conference. 
Baker's tactic was to acquire and apply accumulative authority through 
persuasion and leverage. He began by seeking support in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, before engaging with Shamir and Assad. Egypt, which had been cold-
shouldered by the Arab world after signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, 
enthusiastically supported the American initiative. The Saudis traditionally felt 
50 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.513 
51 Ibid. p.416 
52 Ibid. p.496 
53 Ibid. p.416 
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more secure when occupying the middle ground, but Baker was able to gain 
their commitment to attend the conference under the cloak of representing the 
six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 54 Mubarak and King Fahd were 
asked to help bring Syria on board, and in the meantime to keep the PLO at bay 
because of Arafat's pro-Iraq stance during the Gulf War. 
Syria's primary interest in any eventual settlement of the Arab-Israel 
dispute related to recovery of territory in the Golan Heights occupied by Israel 
under the terms of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. Baker decided to focus 
on that issue. Shamir had shown him a letter from President Ford to the Prime 
Minister of Israel dated September 197 5 pledging that in formulating future 
policy with respect to the terms of a peace settlement, the United States would 
give 'great weight to Israel's position that any peace agreement with Syria must 
be predicated on Israel remaining on the Golan Heights' .55 Baker asked Shamir 
what the position would be if there were American troops stationed there, and 
was told that the situation would then be different. 56 Armed with this hint of 
flexibility, Baker told Assad that he was prepared to explore the concept of a 
formal American pledge guaranteeing the security of the Israeli-Syrian border 
along the Golan Heights, comparable with the Multinational Force and 
Observers on the Israeli-Egyptian border, but that such a commitment could be 
offered only after Israel and Syria had negotiated a full and complete peace. 
Baker said also that he would not explore the question of security guarantees 
with his president unless Assad were willing to drop his insistence that an 
international conference convened as part of the proposed peace process be in 
continuous session with all members of the UN Security Council present.57 
Later Assad was to claim that Baker had promised the return of the Golan to 
Syria and that America was backing away from its offer of guarantees, a charge 
that Baker flatly denied. He reminded Assad that an American security 
guarantee offered the best prospect for gaining Israeli withdrawal from the 
Golan Heights and Syria should not underestimate its importance.58 Baker co-
54 Ibid. p.459 
55 Ibid. p.424 
56 Ibid. p.424 
57 Ibid. pp.455-6 
58 Ibid. p.461 
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opted others, this time Egypt and the Soviet Union, in persuading the Syrians to 
agree. 
The Americans had always anticipated that Israel would have difficulty 
with the form and composition of Palestinian representation, especially after 
Arafat had applauded the Iraqi cause in the Gulf War and Palestinians had 
cheered Iraqi SCUD missile attacks on Israel. The notion of a joint Jordanian-
Palestinian delegation would require some fence-mending. Jordan's king would 
have to assure the United States of his support for its initiative, and the Bush 
Administration would have to reclaim him as an ally after Jordan's opposition 
to America's position in the Gulf War. Both parties were quick to recognise the 
value in terms of their own interests of a resumption of cooperation. King 
Hussein appreciated the importance of Jordan's participation in a regional 
conference, and agreed to exercise his influence to secure the nomination of 
individuals likely to prove acceptable to Israel in their guise as Palestinian 
representatives. That would mean inclusion in the Jordanian delegation of 
Palestinians from the West Bank with no institutional links to the Tunis-based 
PLO leadership and with only nominal association with East Jerusalem. To that 
end, the king pledged to tell the PLO to keep a low profile, 59 and the 
Administration signalled its appreciation by rewarding Jordan with $27 million 
in food aid, despite congressional objections.60 
Israel also had a fundamental problem with the basis for the conference. 
The notion of exchanging territory for peace in accordance with UN Security 
Council resolutions was contrary to Likud' s longer term objective of the 
realisation of Eretz Israel. 61 Begin had succeeded at Camp David in 1978 in 
reaching agreement with Sadat on UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the 
basis for a peace settlement while avoiding explicit reference to the question of 
territorial exchange. 62 Shamir wished to carry the same approach into any new 
negotiation. Baker responded that while the parties could interpret the formula 
however they wished, the Arabs would never agree to language modifying 
59 Ibid. p.451 
60 Ibid. p.465 
61 Quandt (2001). Peace Process. Shamir said on 24 July 1991 : 'I don't believe in territorial 
compromise. Our country is very tiny. The territory is connected to our entire life - to our 
security, water, economy ... Security, territory and homeland are one entity'. p. 309 
62 Europa Publications (1978). "The Framework for Peace", pp.119-22 
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Resolution 242 as the basis for a meeting.63 Further, Shamir had difficulty with 
the notion of inviting a representative of the European Community and an 
observer from the United Nations to the conference, given the expressions of 
sympathy for the positions of the Arabs that had emanated from these two 
institutions over a number of years. A personal letter to Shamir from Bush on 
31 May failed to persuade him to compromise, confirming Baker's suspicion 
that 'Shamir simply was not interested in peace' .64 For Baker, the hope of 
convening a peace conference now lay with Assad. If he could be persuaded to 
compromise, Shamir would be thrust onto the defensive. 65 
Concurrently with his letter to Shamir, Bush had written to the other 
prospective participants. Assad was warned that the peace process would 
proceed with or without him and that the bilateral relationship would suffer if 
Syria was not on board.66 Assad agreed to Syrian participation in the 
negotiation. Having now mustered Arab states' agreement to engaging in direct 
negotiations with Israel, something Israel had sought for forty years, Baker 
calculated that 'neither Shamir nor the Palestinians could possibly remain 
intransigent in these circumstances' .67 Shamir' s suspicions were not easily 
allayed, however, and he remained concerned that the Arab states would find a 
way to bring the United Nations more intimately into the negotiating process. 
In order to gain Shamir' s acquiescence, Bush offered an inducement, 
committing the United States to a serious effort to secure the repeal of UN 
General Assembly Resolution 3349 equating Zionism with racism, which had 
been adopted in 1975. The Administration was not prepared, however, to 
acquiesce in Shamir' s ambit claim for two years of automatic vetoes in the UN 
Security Council on any measure Israel opposed. 68 
As the process of negotiating with the principal parties had proceeded, 
Baker had given certain assurances to each. Assad and Shamir used the 
opportunity presented by discussion on draft letters incorporating their 
63 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.445 
64 Ibid. p.469 
65 Ibid. p.469 
66 Ibid. p.468 
67 Ibid. p.488 
68 Ibid. pp.494-5 
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assurances to secure marginal gains in terms of their respective interests.69 A 
public announcement of the invitation to a peace conference was designed to 
halt such erosion. The Palestinians were the last party to announce that the 
terms of the conference were acceptable. In the face of death threats and the 
opprobrium of PLO headquarters, the 'West Bankers' produced the names of 
fourteen persons who could be accommodated within a joint Jordanian 
delegation. All of them were acceptable to Israel. 
Throughout this exercise of American diplomacy, the Israelis had 
persisted with the building of settlements in the occupied territories.70 This 
could only raise doubt about Israel's preparedness to display flexibility at any 
peace conference. In Shlaim's view: 'Settlement activity was not just 
incompatible with the peace process; it was intended to wreck it' .71 The 
Americans had obtained public assurances from several Arab states that they 
would suspend the Arab League's economic boycott of Israel if settlement 
activity in the occupied territories were halted.72 Through carefully balanced 
policies the Administration sought to deny assistance to Israel for its 
settlements, while continuing to extend support in other areas such as the repeal 
of the 'Zionism/racism' resolution.73 
Six days after the US-led coalition launched its air attack against Iraqi 
forces in Kuwait in January 1991, Israel's finance minister announced that his 
government would ask for $13 billion in additional aid from the United States -
'$10 billion in loan guarantees for settling Soviet Jews, and $3 billion in 
compensation for the damage inflicted on Israeli cities by SCUD attacks' .74 The 
Administration seized the opportunity presented by this request to coerce Israel 
into attending a peace conference. Baker suggested that Israel curtail the 
expansion of settlements in the West Bank as a gesture for peace, but this was 
69 Ibid. p.508. Israel asked for forty-five changes in the draft letter of assurances and letter of 
invitation. 
70 The Israeli government had embarked upon the building of settlements that were designed to 
double the Jewish population in the occupied territories in four years, accommodating some 
Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. 
71 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.486 
72 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). Remarks at the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Church Annual 
Convention, 25 July 1991. Public Papers - President Bush, 1991. Egypt, Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia were mentioned as being among the several Arab states. p.959 
73 Rabil, R. (2001). "The Ineffective Role of the US in the US-Israeli-Syrian Relationship." 
The Middle East Journal Vol.55 No.3 (Summer 2001). pp.423-4. The resolution was revoked 
by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1991. 
74 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.544 
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turned down by Ariel Sharon, then Israel's housing minister.75 Then, against 
the wishes of a powerful domestic lobby group,76 Bush gained the Senate's 
agreement to defer the loan guarantees for 120 days, although it transpired that 
deferral was to continue after the expiry of the designated period. Shamir 
retorted that 'the settlements expansion will continue, and no power in the world 
will prevent this construction' .77 For its part, the United States rejected any idea 
of a compromise short of a settlement freeze: 'we're not going to be financing 
something directly _ or indirectly that American policy has opposed for 25 
years' .78 
The Israeli government eventually caved in to American pressure and 
voted to attend the peace conference. It is possible that the government thought 
that it had little to lose in acquiescing: it could always impede developments 
that threatened its national interests during the conference. Inadvertently, the 
Israeli loan guarantee request and the prime minister's obduracy had played into 
the hands of the Bush Administration, whose response was not wholly 
motivated by concern over Israel's settlement policy. Shamir had been difficult 
to deal with and, by playing the loan guarantee question as it did, the 
Administration contributed in some measure to his electoral defeat in June 
1992.79 
Although the Administration was successful in bringing all relevant 
Arab parties into face-to-face negotiation with Israel through an international 
conference, the prospect of its producing a negotiated settlement of the Arab-
Israel dispute was at best tenuous. Baker's diplomacy had suggested a possible 
75 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall. It was Sharon's intention to create irreversible facts on the 
ground by settling Israelis in the occupied territories in order to preclude territorial 
compromise or Palestinian self-government. Shamir promoted this strategy without 
proclaiming it explicitly. p.486 
76 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). The President's News Conference, 12 September 1991. Public Papers 
- President Bush, 1991. Bush said: 'I heard today there was something like a thousand 
lobbyists on the Hill working the other side of the question. We've got one lonely little guy 
down here doing it'. pp.1140-2 
77 Rabil. "The Ineffective Role", p.422 
78 Ibid. p.422, citing testimony by Secretary of State Baker to the Senate Operations 
Committee in February 1992. 
79 Quandt (2001). Peace Process. The incoming Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, announced 
that more than 6,000 housing units planned for the West Bank would be cancelled, although 
some 10,000 units under construction would be finished. The Congress voted for the $10 
billion in loan guarantees in October 1992, with the president retaining the authority to make 
deductions from the appropriation of amounts that Israel might spend on settlements beyond 
the completion of the 10,000 units already under way. p.314 
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means of resolving the Golan Heights issue, but profound uncertainty had to be 
entertained about any accommodation between Israelis and Palestinians. 
The Madrid conference was ambitiously conceived and was to be 
comprehensive in scope, addressing the vexed questions of Israel's relationships 
with respectively the Palestinians, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria; and multilateral 
issues such as arms control and regional security, water, refugee issues, the 
environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest. 80 
Although linkage among the elements was explicitly denied, the Americans 
expressed a hope that agreement in all negotiations would serve the interests of 
a comprehensive settlement. 81 The withdrawals of Israeli and Syrian forces 
from Lebanon, under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 425 and the 
Taif Agreement of 1989 respectively, were viewed by the American 
Administration as separate issues to be treated independently of any Israeli 
withdrawal from occupied territory in accordance with UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.82 The Administration made explicit its continued 
opposition to Israeli settlement activity in Syrian and other territories occupied 
in 1967 as an obstacle to peace; its refusal to recognise or accept the extension 
of Israeli sovereignty to the Golan Heights; and its opposition to the Israeli 
annexation of East Jerusalem and the extension of Jerusalem's municipal 
boundaries.83 These, and other, undertakings were incorporated in the letters of 
assurances to the parties in lieu of more binding memoranda of understanding 
that had originally been planned. 
While a principal element of the conference would be the question of 
Palestine, a significant omission from the agreed arrangements was any vision 
of the probable outcome of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. The 
Administration expressed a hope that negotiation would lead to 'permanent 
status', and committed the United States to accept any outcome agreed by the 
parties. 84 These expressions were essentially procedural and left the field wide 
open. The sole hint of a possible eventual outcome in the form of confederation 
80 Butler, L. (ed.) (1992). "The Madrid Peace Conference." Journal of Palestine Studies 
Vol.XX! No.2 (Winter 1992). See the Invitation extended on 18 October 1991, p.121 
81 Baker (1991). "US letter of assurances to Syria." Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XX! No.2 
(Winter 1992) p.119 
82 Ibid. "US letter of assurances to Lebanon." p.120 
83 Ibid. "US letters of assurance to the Palestinians and Syria." pp.118-9 
84 Ibid. "US letter of assurances to the Palestinians." p.119 
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with Jordan85 was rejected by Shamir in a letter to Baker.86 Shamir saw no 
difference between such a confederation and an independent Palestinian state; 
Jerusalem would not be up for discussion; Israel was not bound by American 
assurances to the Arab parties; and progress in the bilateral channels would be 
linked to that in the multilateral channels. All that Israel was prepared to 
concede was that the Palestinian question would be tackled according to an 
agreed phased framework comparable to that in the Camp David accords. 
Interim self-governing arrangements should be concluded within one year, and 
last for five years. Beginning during the third year of the period of interim self-
government arrangements, negotiations would take place on permanent status. 
The permanent status negotiation would take place between Israel and the Arab 
states on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 
The United States was not prepared to go beyond a restricted 
interpretation of the principle of self-determination as it related to Palestinian 
aspirations. While the principle is expressed in the first Articles of the UN 
Charter, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by the 
UN General Assembly in 1966, there is no absolute right to national self-
determination. 87 The cosmopolitan strain of contemporary theory endorses a 
right to national self-determination in some circumstances, but 'recognises no 
such general right because it calls into question the vision of a world of nation-
states that the right to national self-determination presupposes'. 88 There is no 
disposition among nation-states to countenance a wholesale devolution of 
sovereignty to minority groups within, or across, existing borders. This could 
pose significant challenges to the sovereignty of many nation-states. 89 The 
principal manifestation of the right has been the transformation of colonial 
85 Ibid. p.119 
86 Ibid. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's letter dated 28 October 1991. p.124 
87 Freeman, M. (1999). "The right to self-determination in international politics: six theories in 
search of a policy." Review of International Studies Vol.25 No.3 p.368 
88 Ibid. p.367; Keal, P. (2003). European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: the 
moral backwardness of international society. Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press. He 
concludes that 'self-determination is a contested concept, the meaning of which is not easy to 
fin down'. p.136 
9 United Nations (1960). UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). Operative paragraph 6 
states: 'Any attempt aimed at partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations'. 
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dependencies into nation-states, commonly within borders established by the 
metropolitan powers and generally recognised internationally. The United 
Nations has offered recognition, status and influence to states and given 
stateless nations an incentive to become nation-states. The post-colonial model 
does not apply to the Palestinian case, a UN plan for the partition of the British 
mandated territory of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states having been rejected 
by Arab and Muslim nations in 1947. 
The international community has not been successful in addressing the 
concept of self-determination of peoples,90 which remains to be clarified.91 It 
appears to have operated on the principle that the best way to resolve a 
contentious claim for self-determination was for the UN to pronounce on its 
validity. Paul Keal has argued that 'indigenous peoples should be recognised, 
by states and international society alike, as "peoples" with the right to self-
determination' ,92 and that self-determination 'should now be understood in a 
way that uncouples it from the state and allows for the self-determination of two 
or more peoples within the territorial boundaries of the state' .93 Michael 
Freeman's argument, based on liberal theory, focuses on the possibility of a 
peoples' secession from an oppressive regime. He has postulated that there is 'a 
right of secession or national self-determination only if there are serious and 
persistent violations of human rights and no solution other than self-
determination is available' .94 
The Palestinians are not seeking self-determination 'within the territorial 
boundaries of the state' or secession from a lawfully constituted regime, but 
separation from a regime whose imposition by military conquest does not enjoy 
international recognition and whose withdrawal from occupied territory has 
been demanded through UN Security Council resolutions. Secession and 
separation are different and the Palestinian demand does not fit Freeman's 
theoretical concept, but the paradigm does provide an analogy. In that Israel is 
almost universally judged to have breached provisions of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, the Palestinian case may be taken as satisfying Freeman's first 
9° Freeman. "The right to self-determination" , p.358 
91 Ibid. p.365 
92 Keal (2003). European Conquest, p.217 
93 Ibid. p.219 
94 Freeman. "The right to self-determination", p.360. Original emphasis. 
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criterion. The second criterion is more problematic because, as Keal has 
postulated, a conceptual alternative exists to self-determination as currently 
interpreted by the United Nations. It would involve self-determination of a 
people within a state, but it is politically unacceptable to both Israelis and 
Palestinians. The extension of Israeli citizenship to Palestinians would 
jeopardise the Jewish character of Israel, and in all probability confine the Arab 
population to second-class citizenship. In practical terms, no solution other than 
self-determination - as an expression of national identity - is available, which 
means that effectively Freeman's second criterion has also been satisfied. 
Another possible self-determination model has been advanced by Ian 
Lustick who has suggested that state contraction, as opposed to the historically 
familiar example of state expansion, 'is a logical requirement of enhanced self-
determination for groups ruled by existing states' .95 As a community 'ruled by' 
an existing state, the Palestinians would qualify for consideration under the 
terms of Lustick' s concept. He contrasts the surgical separation of Algeria from 
metropolitan France with the chronic and persisting problem of a Catholic 
Northern Irish people's desire for separation from the . United Kingdom, 
positioning the question of Israel and the Palestinians in relation to these two 
examples. But Lustick recognises that the concept of state contraction has been 
'virtually ignored by existing theory and by most policymakers' .96 
Significantly, the concept of state contraction is inherently contrary to American 
experience and to Zionism, including especially to the ambitions of Israelis to 
the right of that country's political spectrum. 
As the Palestinian case conforms to neither the post-colonial nor the 
secessionist model, the Palestinians demand distinctive treatment. Their case 
for separation is predicated on the 'special' nature of the conflict with Israel and 
argues that 'sovereignty has a special meaning' in that context.97 They seek the 
recovery of a 'national sovereignty' that had not previously been recognised: 
Sovereignty for the Palestinians should not be seen as a text-book 
principle of national rights but more as a reflection of a national 
95 Lustick, I.S. (2002). Self-Determination and State Contraction: Britain and Ireland, France 
and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank/Gaza. The Self-Determination of Peoples: community, 
nation, and state in an interdependent world. W .F. Danspeckgruber. Boulder CO, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. p.224 
96 Ibid. pp.223-4 
97 Abbas. Through Secret Channels, p.219 
existence that was-not originally recognised. However, the mechanism 
by which the terms of the accord will be implemented will eventually 
give rise to the emergence and crystallisation of many features of 
sovereignty, and this process will go on until complete national 
sovereignty is realised.98 
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Palestinian sovereignty, in these terms, would be accomplished by an Israeli 
withdrawal in accordance with the two UN Security Council resolutions. 
When Mahmoud Abbas, the chief PLO architect of the Oslo accord, 
published those words in 1995, Palestinian thinking was to express such 
'complete national sovereignty' in confederal form: confederation being, as he 
saw it, a contractual agreement between two or more independent entities. The 
goal of independent statehood was, thus, a necessary precursor to 
confederation.99 Later, the Palestinians were to amend their position and to seek 
a sovereign Palestinian state alongside Israel. In constructing the framework of 
the Madrid conference the Administration held to an objective that they shared 
with Israelis for some available solution to the question of Palestine other than 
self-determination, denying the possibility of a 'two-state solution'. A decade 
later both countries were to profess support in principle for an independent 
Palestinian state. 
Conclusion 
If a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute were ever to be achieved, it 
would be necessary for the parties principal to negotiate with one another. An 
essential intermediate objective attained by the United States was the parties ' 
agreement to enter into negotiations. The Madrid conference was 'designed to 
launch a process, not conclude it' .100 The Bush Administration fondly hoped 
that by 'breaking the symbolism of denial - a taboo on direct talks between 
Arabs and Israelis' 101 - the participants might declare their determination to 
make peace and avoid attacking their negotiating partner, Israel. The 
conference succeeded in getting negotiation under way. 
The United States had employed the instruments at its disposition to get 
Israel and its four Arab neighbours to the negotiating table. That had required 
98 Ibid. p.219 
99 Ibid. p.220 
100 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.81 
101 Ibid. p.80 
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its unwavering commitment to its interim objective, a flexible approach, and the 
expenditure of considerable energy. 102 International legitimacy would be 
accorded to the negotiations through participation, in some measure, of the 
United Nations, the European Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council, 103 
and a formula had been devised that allowed for what one observer questionably 
termed 'authentic but non-PLO Palestinian' 104 representation. In the event, 
Israeli acceptance proved to be the hardest to extract, requiring both 
inducements and the application of leverage. Inducements were also broached 
with other states. In essence, the conference had been secured principally 
through persuasion, backed by selective offers of rewards. 
The outcome was, however, an unbalanced one. In adapting an Israeli 
structure and ensuring that negotiations did not transgress upon Israel's bottom 
line, the United States created a framework that formalised the disparity 
between Israelis and Palestinians. On the core issue before the conference, the 
future relationship between Israelis and Palestinians, one party to the 
negotiations was formally separated from its political leadership and denied 
identity as a separate people. The Palestinians, especially the 'West Bankers' 
from among whom many representatives were chosen, could not afford to let 
the opportunity to address the Palestinian cause pass. Circumstances that were 
to restructure to negotiation process fundamentally will be addressed in the next 
chapter. 
For decades the Palestinians had hoped that America's liberalism and 
power could be engaged to their advantage. It is probable that a memorandum 
addressed to the United States in April 1949 was the first appeal by Palestinians 
102 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy. Baker has described the process as 'a rich tale of 
determination, false starts, personal and political courage, blind alleys, perseverance, 
misjudgments, lost tempers, endless negotiations, scores of creative compromises, and both 
good faith and bad. In the end, the courage and determination of the parties themselves to give 
peace a chance - bolstered by the psychological sustenance, credibility, and catalytic creativity 
of the last superpower - somehow prevailed over years of enmity and chaos'. p.488 
103 Aronson (1992) "U.S.-Soviet Letter of Invitation". The United States had been able to 
secure the agreement of the parties principal to the involvement of the president of the 
European Community as representative of that body. The Secretary-General of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council would have a role in relation to multilateral issues, thus formally 
associating oil and gas producing states of the Gulf with the peace process. The United 
Nations would have a token presence through the attendance of an observer representing the 
Secretary General. p.121 
104 Hudson, M.C. (1998 (3rd edit.). The United States and the Middle East. World Security: 
challenges for a new century. M.T. Klare and Y. Chandrani. New York NY, St Martin's Press. 
p.121 
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to a foreign government for help after having been driven from their 
homeland. 105 Forty years on, a 'national' Palestinian delegation had been 
deliberately excluded from a peace conference, one of whose principal issues 
was the future of the Palestinian people. While the United States had declared 
that it would support any outcome achieved through negotiation with Israel, the 
Palestinians knew even before the negotiation began that a right of national self-
determination had been denied. Given Israel's comparative strength, this would 
mean recognition of any outcome based on what Israel was prepared to concede 
to the Palestinians. In his opening address at the Madrid conference, Bush 
spoke about the need for peace to be based on fairness, 'above all to the 
Palestinian people'; 106 and Baker claimed that the United States 'is and will be 
an honest broker' .107 The Palestinian representatives may well have been 
somewhat sceptical about such assurances in view of America's record to that 
point. 
The Palestinians were not the only Middle Eastern party to the 
conference to harbour reservations about the conference. Assad had never been 
enthusiastic; and the right wing government of Shamir accepted it only 
grudgingly and under American pressure. Assad was known, however, to keep 
his word. 108 While Assad might prove to be a tough negotiator, Syria would 
presumably stick to any agreement reached. Doubts were entertained in 
Washington, however, about the strength of the commitment of the Shamir 
government. The most robust support for the launching of the peace process 
105 Sharabi, H. (1998).The Palestinians: fifty years later. Washington DC, The Center for 
Policy Analysis on Palestine. p.2; Gendzier, I. (1989). "Memorandum Submitted to the 
Government of the United States of America by the Jaffa and Districts Inhabitants Council, 
Beirut, 11 April 1949." Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XVIII No.3 (Spring 1989). The 
Memorandum concludes: 'If the United Nations Organization has proved so far so weak as to 
be unable to force the Jews into behaving in accordance with international law, it is enough 
reason for people like us to come to you, the Government of the United States for 
help ... [M]ost of the small countries of the world look to the United States as the all-powerful 
generous nation, which has been and still is prepared to defend the rights of man and the 
freedom of peoples'. pp.108-9 
106 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). Remarks at the Opening Session of the Middle East Peace 
Conference in Madrid, Spain, 30 October 1991. Public Papers - President Bush, 1991, p.1363 
107 Baker III, J.A. (1991). "Remarks at the Royal Palace, Madrid, 1 November 1991." US 
Department of State Dispatch (4 November 1991). Secretary Baker said: 'The United States is 
and will be an honest broker. We have our own positions and views on the peace process, and 
we will not forego our right to state these. But, as an honest broker. . . we . . . know that our 
critical contribution will often be to exert quiet, behind-the-scenes influence and persuasion'. 
p.808 
108 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy, p.425 
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had come from Egypt and Jordan, both of which stood to gain from a successful 
outcome, and Saudi Arabia. For Egypt a comprehensive peace settlement 
would prove the value of its risky undertaking in concluding a peace treaty with 
Israel. Jordan would hope to see a pacification of a troublesome issue on the 
River Jordan's western bank that had spilled over into the demographics and 
politics of the Hashemite Kingdom. The Saudi royal family would be able to 
demonstrate to the Islamic world and to its own people that it was genuinely 
concerned about the fate of the Palestinians. 
These inauspicious beginnings were to influence events during 1992, 
but they were not the only factors to inhibit the negotiation of a comprehensive 
settlement during that year. The Israeli and American electoral cycles 
intervened, and Bush was to recall Baker from his diplomatic duties to act as 
his campaign manager. Without Baker's commitment to the attainment of an 
outcome from the process launched with fanfare at Madrid's Royal Palace, it 
stalled. 
Chapter 4 
Expectation and disappointment: the United States, Israel and the 
Palestinians, 1991-96 
111 
Marked progress was achieved in the negotiation between Israelis and 
Palestinians from 1991 to the election of Netanyahu as Israel's prime minister 
in 1996. Clinton, who was in office for most of that period, committed himself 
to the peace process and mustered international support for it. Early progress 
toward an accommodation between Israelis and Palestinians was, however, to 
be set back by extremists on both sides opposed to the probable outcome of the 
negotiation, and by Israel's continuing construction of settlements on occupied 
territory. The Clinton Administration moved to protect the process, which to 
that point had produced the only substantive agreements between the two 
contestants. 
The Madrid process 
William Jefferson Clinton was sworn-in as President of the United 
States of America on 20 January 1993 and inherited a moribund negotiation 
with his office. The Bush Administration had devised a two-track structure 
under which the negotiation would be pursued, with the bilateral negotiations 
commencing in Madrid in November 1991, and the multilateral negotiations 
being launched in Moscow in January 1992. The intent was that the former 
would 'resolve the core bilateral issues at the heart of the Arab-Israel dispute: 
namely, land, peace, and security' .1 It would be broken down into separate 
bilateral negotiations between Israel and, respectively, the Palestinians, Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon. There would be no binding link among the different 
fronts, which implied that Israel would be free to play one off against another · 
if it were so inclined.2 The multilateral track would 'address functional issues 
on a region-wide basis. · It was designed to foster broader human contact 
between Israelis and Arabs ... [tackling] ... those regional problems that are 
1 Djerejian, E.P. (1993). "The multilateral talks in the Arab-Israeli peace process - 22 
September 1993." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.4 No.41. p.696 
2 Mansour, C. (1993). "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: an overview and 
assessment."Joumal of Palestine Studies Vol XXII No.3 (Spring 1993) p.6 
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- themselves a source of tension and instability'. 3 The multilateral negotiation 
will be discussed in chapter 5. 
The Bush Administration' s intent was to bring parties that had been 
openly antagonistic for decades into face-to-face negotiations. Arab 
expectations that Israeli concessions could simply be delivered by Washington 
had to be disabused. 4 The Arab states would have to develop their own 
• positions and negotiate seriously with Israel before the United States would 
seek to bridge differences with proposals of its own. Every American 
Administration since Lyndon Johnson's had declared that it was the role of the 
parties in conflict to reach a solution, not the job of the United States to impose 
one. 5 The Administration saw its role in the early stages as a facilitator, not a 
negotiator. This meant that its povver directly to effect a peace settlement was 
initially held in reserve. It grew into a negotiating role as the process evolved 
and began then to exercise its power. 
The Madrid conference did not make much progress; nor did subsequent 
bilateral meetings in Washington in December 1991 and during 1992.6 Also, 
Israeli and American elections in 1992, which produced changes of government 
· in both countries, interrupted the process. For the remainder of his term Prime 
Minister Shamir remained uncommitted to the peace process, letting slip that he 
intended to drag out the negotiations without result for at least ten years, but 
claimed later to have been misquoted.7 The Israeli delegation persisted through 
the early part of 1992 with procedural objections to direct negotiation with the 
Palestinian representatives. 8 They restricted negotiation to modalities for 
handing over to the Palestinians certain matters concerning their daily life, 
3 Djerejian (1993). "The multilateral talks" , p.696 
4 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). The President's News Conference with President Mikhail Gorbachev 
of the Soviet Union, 29 October 1991. Public Papers - President Bush, 1991 , p.1356; Quandt 
(2001). Peace Process, p.311; Heikal. Secret Channels, pp.417-8 
5 Savir, U. (1998). The Process: 1,100 days that changed the Middle East. New York NY, 
Random House. p.67 
6 Heikal. Secret Channels, pp.412-25; Mansour. "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations" . 
There was an initial round of discussions between Israel and the Palestinians in Madrid and 
seven rounds in Washington between November 1991 and December 1992. 
7 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.615 
8 Abbas. Through Secret Channels, p.88. The compromise eventually reached was that a 
Palestinian would lead a delegation that included two Jordanians when Palestinian matters 
were under discussion, and a Jordanian would lead two Palestinians when Jordanian interests 
were under discussion. 
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while declining to address the principles underpinning the Palestinian cause.9 
To break this deadlock, the Americans persuaded the Palestinians to engage 
with the Israelis by stating in detail their points of agreement and disagreement 
to every proposition. 10 But the Palestinian delegates were kept on a tight rein by 
Arafat and lacked authority. The whole procedure was characterised by a 
Palestinian delegate as one of 'paralysis and inertia' .11 At one stage the United 
States organised weekly meetings of all delegations in order to keep them at the 
table, but the effort proved futile. 12 It had been within the power of the United 
States to facilitate the process and to bring the parties to the negotiating table: 
how it exercised its power to effect an outcome is the subject of this case study. 
Bush had outlined the proposed framework for the core Israeli-
Palestinian question at the Madrid opening ceremony: 
Negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on 
interim self-government arrangements. We aim to reach agreement 
within one year. And once agreed, interim self-government 
arrangements will last for five years. Beginning the third year, 
negotiations will commence on permanent status ... Nothing agreed to 
now will prejudice permanent status negotiations. To the contrary, 
these subsequent negotiations will be determined on their own merits. 13 
The proposition that the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation should proceed 
by confidence-building stages towards some 'final status' derived from the 
Camp David accords of 1978. The devil was in the principles: Israel wanted to 
focus solely on interim arrangements, while the Palestinians' focus was on 
eventual self-government. The Bush Administration found the Israeli concept 
9 Mansour. "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations" p.16; Parsons, A. (1996). "Reflections 
on the Peace Process and a Durable Settlement: a roundup of views." Journal of Palestine 
Studies Vol. XXVI No.I (Autumn 1996). The former British Ambassador to the United 
Nations said that 'only the United States has influence with Israel, and Washington under 
whichever administration will not pressure any Israeli government into making concessions 
which it would not make of its own accord. To think otherwise is illusory'. p.16 
10 Mansour. "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations." Mansour was an adviser to the 
Palestinian delegation. He said: 'If the Palestinians wanted the United States to intervene, their 
differences with the Israelis had to be expressed in concrete, and therefore, bridgeable, 
proposals'. p.15; Bush, G.H.W. (1992). Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at the 
B'nai B'rith International Convention, 8 September 1992. Public Papers - President Bush, 
1992. When asked about a possible Palestinian state, Bush replied: 'I still oppose a Palestinian 
state. I've been consistent on that for a long, long time'. But he added: 'We shouldn't dictate 
the terms. Let the parties negotiate it out in face-to-face negotiation'. p.1506 
11 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.614. The phrase is attributed to the Palestinian spokesperson, 
Hanan Ashra wi 
12 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.421 
13 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). Remarks at the Opening Session of the Middle East Peace Conference 
in Madrid, Spain, 30 October 1991. Public Papers - President Bush, 1991, p.1363 
114 
of 'interim self-government' fundamentally flawed as Israel seemed reluctant 
to-accept that, by definition, interim self-government was a stage leading to 
full self-government. But, having lost the presidential election in November 
1992, Bush was not in a strong position during the transitional period to 
influence the Israelis. 14 As negotiations progressed it became clear that for 
Israeli Labor, as for the Likud Party, ' interim' was Israeli code for 'limited' .15 
As the Madrid process had produced little beyond getting the principal 
actors onto the same stage during Bush's presidency, Clinton decided upon 
talcing office that an early assessment needed to be made of the prospect of 
success. At this stage, neither he nor his principal advisers were attracted to 
becoming engaged in a resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute. 16 The need for an 
assessment gained urgency from Israel ' s deportation in December 1992 of 400 
Palestinians for allegedly being supporters of the Islamist group, Hamas. 
Clinton worked closely with the Israelis to develop a solution that involved the 
return of 100 of the deportees in 'a timely fashion', with half of the rest to 
return in September 1933 and the remainder in 1994.17 In order to prepare the 
assessment, the president sent Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the 
Middle East. 18 On his return Christopher reported: 'Nearly everyone I spoke 
to ... agreed that there may be now a one-time opportunity to promote peace. 
History tells us that such opportunities may be fleeting, especially in the 
Middle East, and we believe it is now time to re-launch the negotiations' .19 
They resumed in April. 
An American initiative to stimulate the Israel-Palestinian negotiations 
was made in May and June 1993. The Administration submitted a paper 
purporting to be a synthesis of ideas raised by Israeli and Palestinian delegates 
14 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.509 
15 Reich, B. (2002) . "Israel's Quest for Peace. " Mediterranean Quarterly Vol.13 No.2 cites 
Rabin informing the Knesset during ratification of the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 
1995 that: 'The borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond 
the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines' . 
p.92 
16 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, pp.98-9 
17 Rubenberg, C.A. (2001) . "The Clinton Years: U.S. policy toward Israel and Palestine, Part 
One. " Information BriefNo.61 (19 January 2001). Washington DC, Center for Policy 
Analysis on Palestine. p.1 
18 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Statement on Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher' s Trip to the 
Middle East, 4 February 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993, p.44 
19 Christopher, W. (1993). "Resumption of Middle East peace negotiations - 10 March 1993." 
US Department of State Dispatch Vol.4 N o.11. p.141 
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and by American coordinators.20 The document retraced some old ground in 
proposing that the two parties should agree on a declaration of principles to 
guide the negotiations, with the aim of achieving agreement in two phases.21 
Arafat's analysis of the American synthesis identified some 65 per cent as 
having been taken from an Israeli paper and only 7 per cent from Palestinian 
sources and fumed over the United States's lack of even-handedness.22 
Christopher's first essay at peace-making, like those of so many of his 
predecessors, was unsuccessful. Indeed, the Administration's good offices 
were probably unnecessary at the time, for by then a backchannel had been 
established at Oslo. The Administration was aware of this,23 but seems not to 
have enquired about the credence then being given by both parties to it, 
including Israel's official participation in it from 21 May. 
Israel decided to participate in the Oslo negotiations because the Labor 
government, elected in J\,lne 1992, had become disenchanted with the 
Washington talks. Arafat required that everything be referred back to the PLO 
leadership. Uri Savir, Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 
characterised the situation as negotiating with him by fax. 24 In May 1993, the 
foreign minister, Shimon Peres, with the somewhat sceptical backing of Prime 
Minister Rabin, 25 decided that the time had come to test the PLO' s true 
intentions.26 He did so as a member of the first Israeli government to have 
accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 'as applicable to the 
achievement of peace' .27 A secret dialogue between the Israelis and 
Palestinians had begun in December 1992 under Norwegian auspices. The 
20 Djerejian, E.P. (1993). "Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee - 27 July 1993." US Department of State Dispatch 
Vol.4 No.32. p.569 
21 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.448 
22 Ibid. p.449 
23 Former US Ambassador Robert Pelletrau Jr had been the American point of contact with the 
PLO leadership in Tunis, 1988-89. He later served as US Ambassador to Egypt. He first 
learned of the Oslo talks from the Egyptian Foreign Minister and subsequently from Egyptian 
and Palestinian officials. Interview with former Ambassador Robert Pelletrau Jr in 
Washington DC on 26 March 2001 
24 Savir (1998). The Process, p.5. He also said that he and two colleagues had been sent 'a 
collection of reports on the Washington talks with the dates whited out. Because the talks had 
gone around in circles, none of us could put them in order'. p.4 
25 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.443 
26 Savir (1998). The Process, p.5 
27 Clinton, W.J. (1993). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
of Israel, 15 March 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993. Stated by Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin in answer to a question at the press conference. p.307 
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Palestinians were to demand that Israel match the 'ministerial' rank of their 
delegate,28 and Savir attended the May round of negotiation in his official 
capacity. 
Direct Israel-Palestinian negotiations 
It was not intended that the backchannel replace the Washington 
process, but that it help to get it on track.29 The Israelis were insistent that the 
talks in Washington be seen as the main channel of negotiations, partly to 
safeguard the secrecy of the one in Oslo.30 The unofficial exchange of views 
transmuted into official negotiations31 and resulted in the initialling of a 
'Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements' by 
Israeli and Palestinian officials on 20 August 1993. 
The terms of the Declaration were concluded without US input. 
American knowledge of the Oslo talks was very closely held32 and doubt was 
entertained within the Clinton Administration that they would yield concrete 
results. 33 During a visit to the Middle East, Christopher asked Rabin how the 
talks with the Palestinians in Oslo were progressing. Rabin fobbed him off 
with a hand gesture, suggesting 'It's not worth talking about' .34 Mahmoud 
Abbas, who coordinated the Palestinian position from PLO headquarters, 
records that there was agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians that the 
American Administration and the Egyptian Government should be kept 
informed, with Israel assuming responsibility for informing the Americans and 
28 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.619 
29 Waage, H.H. (2002). "Explaining the Oslo Backchannel: Norway 's political past in the 
Middle East." The Middle East Journal Vol.56 No.4 (Autumn 2002). p.608 
30 Savir (1998). The Process, p.24 
31 Abbas. Through Secret Channels, pp.51-2; Beilin, Y. (1999 (trans. Philip Simpson)). 
Touching Peace: from the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement. London UK, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson. p.62 
32 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks on the Israeli-Palestinian agreement and an Exchange with 
Reporters in Cleveland, Ohio, 9 September 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993. 
Clinton said: 'We were made aware in the most general terms of what was happening in 
Norway, but we didn't know a lot of the details'. p.1457 
33 Savir (1998). The Process, p.66 
34 Beilin. Touching Peace. He records: 'Later, when the Americans analysed the conversation, 
they wondered what that gesture at the beginning of August had meant: did Rabin think that 
nothing real could be achieved in Oslo, or was he reluctant at this stage to involve the 
Americans further by telling them more than he believed they already knew? When I asked 
Rabin about this months later, he responded with precisely the same gesture and said: 'What 
does it matter now?" pp.114-5 
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the Palestinians for informing the Egyptians.35 Rabin's apparent dissimulation 
may well have been due to a number of factors: a desire to keep details of 
progress at Oslo secret; the convenience of the Washington track as a cover for 
the discussions in Norway; a disinclination to jeopardise the Washington talks 
because they offered a fall-back position should the Oslo negotiations fail; and 
a prospect that Israel could threaten the Palestinians with a return to 
Washington if the Oslo rounds got stuck. 
The Palestinians confided in the Egyptians, and the Egyptian foreign 
minister informed the US ambassador in Cairo. Washington's reaction was 
such as to discourage any further attempt to pass on information received from 
Egyptian sources.36 The Norwegians also tried to apprise the American 
Administration of developments. Y ossi Beilin states that, when Norway's 
deputy foreign minister, Jan Egland, applied to travel to America to brief the 
State Department on progress, he was asked not to go and contented himself 
with regular conversations with an official in Washington over the American 
Embassy's secure telephone lines.37 The question remains why a country 
which had learned of the backchannel from diverse and friendly sources, and 
which posses a sophisticated intelligence capability, should have been so ill-
prepared for the Oslo outcome. It is possible that Rabin had put Christopher 
off the scent, and that Washington was inclined to view Norwegian advice as 
somewhat self-serving. More weight might be given to America's proprietary 
view of the Madrid process, its attachment to Washington as the locus of 
negotiations, and to the newly-installed Clinton Administration's 
preoccupation with an attempt to reinvigorate the process. 
Although the Clinton Administration had been excluded from the Oslo 
talks, the imprimatur of the world's superpower was highly valued by both 
parties. During the negotiation, the Israelis and Palestinians had discussed the 
possibility of providing the Americans with the text of their Declaration which 
the United States would, in tum, present as a final American proposal to both 
parties at Washington, but the content of the document was published on the 
35 Abbas. Through Secret Channels, p.194 
36 Interview in Washington DC on 26 March 2001 
37 Beilin. Touching Peace, pp.79, 120 
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same day that Christopher was apprised of the Oslo breakthrough. 38 The two 
parties had hoped that such a ploy would ameliorate criticism from within their 
own constituencies.39 In effect, they were seeking to hide behind a fictitious 
display of American power, but the story having been uncovered before the 
scenario could be played out, both sides had to face their critics. 
So remote were the Americans from the detail of the Oslo negotiations 
that Peres was fearful of an adverse reaction when on 29 August 1993 he 
presented Christopher not only with an initialled document but also a proposal 
for mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO.40 The Administration was 
quick to acknowledge the historic significance of the two propositions, and the 
president agreed to host a signing ceremony at the White House. 
Clinton responded promptly to these changed circumstances, which 
required amendment to American diplomatic practice in exchange for certain 
guarantees from the PLO. Reception of the PLO and its chairman, Y asser 
Arafat, at the White House would convey a more formal level of recognition 
than had been conferred by ambassadorial contact in Tunis in 1988-89. Israel 
had acted in early 1993 to end legal sanctions against Israelis who might talk to 
PLO officials. Comparable action would be required from the Americans. An 
imperative precondition imposed by the United States was that Arafat 
disassociate his movement from terrorist groups outside the PLO.41 That was 
achieved on 7 September when the PLO Executive Committee in effect voided 
the provision within the Palestinian National Covenant that had called for 
Israel's extinction; and it opened the way for an exchange of letters between 
the Israeli prime minister and Arafat establishing formal mutual recognition.42 
On 13 September 1993, the Declaration of Principles was executed at the 
38 . Abbas. Through Secret Channels, p.194 
39 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.455 
40 Savir (1998). The Process, pp.66-7 
41 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks on the Israeli-Palestinian agreement and an Exchange with 
Reporters in Cleveland, Ohio, 9 September 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993. 
Clinton said: 'If the PLO's statement today meets the criteria we have repeatedly set down, 
renouncing terrorism, acknowledging Israel's right to exist, those things , then we will resume 
our dialogue with them and then we'll go forward from there'. p.1457 
42 Savir (1998). The Process, cites the reply from Prime Minister Rabin to Chairman Arafat: 
'Mr Chairman, In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, 
in the light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has 
decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence 
negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.' p. 77 
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White House; and President Clinton brought Rabin and Arafat together to pose 
for an historic handshake.43 
Clinton was quick to reposition the United States at the centre of what 
seemed like a winning proposal and to capitalise on the publicity afforded by 
the White House signing. He threw the weight of his Administration behind 
the accord, and mobilised international assistance for the Palestinians, but not 
before extracting further assurances from Arafat. Speaking at the signing 
ceremony, Clinton pledged America's support 'to implement the difficult 
details that will make real the principles '44 contained in the Declaration, 
endorsing in principle the creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority and an elected Council for the Palestinian people. Clinton's 
commitment to 'make real the principles' and determination to help make a 
Palestinian Authority (PA) work was, however, heavily qualified. He made it 
clear to Arafat that he was 
prepared to take a lead in trying to organise the finances necessary to 
carry this through and to try to build the political support for it but tliat 
it was imperative that he [Arafat] honour the commitments made to 
Israel's security, to denouncing terrorism, [and] to assuming 
responsibility within the areas of self-government for maintaining law 
and order.45 
Arafat, basking in the glory of a White House reception, had no reason to 
demur. He had already denounced terrorism under American pressure, his 
executive was no longer committed to the extinction of Israel, and he looked 
forward to Palestinian statehood. 
The president had more in mind than reminding Arafat that financial 
assistance would be dependent upon observance of such factors. He used 
America's undertaking to convey an important message to the Arab and 
Islamic world 'that the United States and all of the nations which help us ... are 
prepared to work with and support Islamic nations as long as they are willing 
to adhere to the international rules governing human rights and peace and 
43 Clinton, H.R. (2003). Living History. New York NY, Simon & Schuster. The media 
handshake was not entirely spontaneous. Mrs Clinton recalls her husband rehearsing it with 
Rabin. p.185 
44 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Israeli-Palestinian 
Declaration of Principles, 13 September 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993, p.1476 
45 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Interview with the Israeli news media on the Middle East peace 
process, 13 September 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993, p.1480 
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democracy' .46 He believed that, in offering the Palestinian people the chance 
of a normal life, the peace process would contribute to the removal of 'one of 
the great causes of fundamentalism and political extremism' .47 
One week after the signing of the Declaration, Christopher announced 
that America and Russia would convene a Conference to Support Middle East 
Peace.48 On 1 October, representatives from some 43 foreign governments, the 
World Bank and other international organisations met at the State Department 
and pledged more than $600 million to meet_ the immediate needs of the 
Palestinians, and over $2 billion over the following five years to help establish 
Palestinian self-government.49 The need for international assistance had been 
foreshadowed, 50 and the World Bank had been commissioned by the European 
Community to estimate the resources that would be required to start the 
building of an economic base in Gaza and the West Bank. The Bank's initial 
estimate was that $3 billion would be needed over ten years. 51 Arafat's 
advisers had estimated that $11 billion would be needed in the first three 
years.52 The participants also agreed to encourage trade and private investment 
through export financing programs and investment incentives. 53 While the 
United States had initially found it difficult to get the Israelis to treat with the 
Palestinians, it was able quickly to mobilise rewards. In the space of 33 days 
since the secretary of state had been informed of the Oslo accord, the former 
46 Ibid. p.1479 
47 Ibid. p.1479 
48 Christopher, W. (1993). "Building peace in the Middle East - 20 September 1993." US 
Department of State Dispatch Vol.4 No.39. p.655 
49 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Middle East peace 
process, 1 October 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993, p.1643; Djerejian, E.P. 
(1993). "War and Peace: the problems and prospects of American diplomacy in the Middle 
East - 30 November 1993." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.4 No.51 p.876; Savir (1998). 
The Process, records the amount pledged as over $3 billion in grants and loans, primarily from 
the United States, the European Union and Japan. p.82 
so Djerejian, E.P. (1993). "Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - 15 
October 1993." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.4 No.43. He attributes the Multilateral 
Steering Group as having anticipated this as early as July 1993 p.746 
51 Christopher (1993). "Building peace in the Middle East", p.655; Clinton, W.J. (1994). 
Interview on CNN's 'Global Forum with President Clinton', 3 May 1994. Public Papers -
President Clinton, 1994. Clinton conceded that it would take more than $2 billion to construct 
a successful economy in Gaza and Jericho. p.827 
52 Heikal. Secret Channels. The World Bank would establish a trust fund to finance technical 
assistance and training for Palestinians, and identify regional infrastructure projects that would 
facilitate the economic integration of the West Bank and Gaza with their neighbours. King 
Fahd reportedly told Arafat that the idea of all aid being channelled through a trust fund was 
Saudi Arabia' s in order to ensure that it was spent appropriately. p.525 
53 US Department of State ( 1993). Statement. Conference to Support Middle East Peace, 
1 October 1993. US Department of State Dispatch Vol.4 No.41 pp.695-6 
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outcast, Y asser Arafat, had been received by the President of the United States 
at the White House, the PLO had been accorded American recognition, and 
much-needed international assistance had been pledged for the benefit of the 
Palestinian people. 
If Clinton envisaged the employment of American power to help realise 
the Declaration, what would this mean in practice?54 The Declaration was 
opaque on a number of significant matters, including two elements that related 
to the occupied territory to be transferred to the Palestinians, and the 
responsibility of the Palestinian police force. The former is stated to 'cover 
West Bank and Gaza territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations' like Jerusalem, settlements, and borders. 55 
Nowhere does the Declaration state the total amount of territory to be 
transferred to the Palestinians or the timetable for further transfers of territory 
beyond an initial disposition of Gaza and Jericho. The provision relating to the 
Palestinian police places upon them the obligation to 'guarantee public order 
and internal security for ... the West Bank and the Gaza Strip'. 56 The 
Palestinian police were, in effect, to be co-opted as an agency of Israel's 
security apparatus, obliged to act as guarantor of Israel's internal security from 
its most vulnerable quarter. 57 There was much else that would be left to 
negotiation under an Interim Agreement. 58 The emotional question of the right 
of return of Palestinian refugees would be deferred to the permanent status 
54 In broad terms it would mean pursuit of a peace settlement according to the timetable set out 
in the Declaration of Principles. By 13 December 1993 an agreement was to be concluded on 
Israel's withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho and the withdrawal begun; the withdrawal should 
be completed by 13 April 1994 when a five-year transitional period should begin. The . 
transitional period would comprise an interim period, and permanent status negotiations must 
commence not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period (i.e. by 13 April 
1996). By 13 July 1994 a Palestinian police force should have been established, the Israel 
Defence Force redeployed in the West Bank and Gaza outside of populated areas, and 
elections held for a Palestinian legislative council. The president's commitment would also 
mean support for the creation of a Palestinian Authority, which would become a principal actor 
in the peace process 
55 
"Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, 13 September 1993" 
Articles IV and V(3). http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00q00 - 5 June 2000 
56 Ibid. Art. VIII 
57 Khalidi, R.I. ( 1996). "Reflections on the Peace Process and a Durable Settlement: a roundup 
of views." Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XXVI No. l (Autumn 1996). Khalidi describes as 
the 'core' of the Oslo process 'a deal whereby the [PLO] got political-military control over the 
Palestinian population centers (except Jerusalem) in exchange for actively assisting the 
preservation of Israel's security'. p.9 
58 
"Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements." Art.VII 
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negotiations, along with that of the future status of Jerusalem. 59 It was 
envisaged that the Palestinian Authority's writ would be limited initially to 
'education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism' .60 
The allocation of responsibility for Palestinian health, education and 
welfare to a Palestinian Authority presented little problem for the United 
States. The Administration seems not to have been particularly concerned 
about the lack of specificity in the Declaration about the more contentious 
issues, 61 apparently content to rest on the Declaration's provision that the two 
parties would address these matters in the permanent status negotiation. Such 
was the general euphoria surrounding the conclusion of the first agreement 
between Israel and the Palestinians, that there was an expectation that the 
parties would have little difficulty in moving to the next stage by 
13 December.62 The step-by-step process that underpinned the whole 
negotiation was designed to foster a sufficient measure of trust and cooperation 
between the parties that a resolution of the more intractable issues could be 
tacked in a more benign atmosphere at the end of the process. Despite Israel's 
settlements policy, the Administration did not act to . forestall developments 
that could adversely affect the process in the interim. Further construction 
would change the situation on the ground and complicate the resolution of the 
question of territory. It would have been possible for the president to have 
expressed a hope that nothing would be done by either party that would make 
more difficult a resolution of the permanent status issues, but he did not do it. 
A crisis in Palestinian fortunes , including the PLO' s deteriorating 
financial situation, 63 had brought it to the negotiating table; and the imbalance 
of power between Israel and the Palestinians had determined the nature of their 
agreement. 64 Arafat had taken a close interest in the drafting of the 
59 Ibid. Art.V(3) 
60 Ibid. Art.VI(2) 
61 Neither Clinton's autobiography, nor Ross 's inside history of the peace making process 
mentions this matter. 
62 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.122 
63 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.463 
64 Ibid. After listening devices were discovered in the residence and office of the PLO' s 
Ambassador to Tunisia, it was clear to the PLO that the Israelis must have known everything 
about the organization's internal splits and the gravity of its financial situation. p.469 
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· Declaration, 65 but seems never really to have understood the implications of 
the Oslo process or the detail. 66 He placed his faith in its leading toward 
recognition of the PLO, which it did, and subsequently toward realisation of a 
vision of Palestinian statehood. As Art.VIII on the Palestinian police shows, 
his understanding of the obligations of statehood was fuzzy.67 With so many 
critical issues left for decision, the Declaration of Principles was little more 
than a signed undertaking to negotiate. It is hard to read more into Clinton's 
commitment to its realisation than a pledge to facilitate those negotiations. 
Post-Oslo negotiations 
The environment during the last quarter of 1993 seemed to the 
Americans, as facilitator, to augur well for success. The Administration was 
encouraged that both the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships had received 
convincing, though not overwhelming, endorsement of the Declaration from 
their respective legislatures.68 Both sides contained a minority that strongly 
rejected its central proposition that an independent Palestinian entity of some 
kind should be created alongside Israel. The leaderships' first task was to give 
effect to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. When Arafat and 
Rabin met to discuss the matter it became clear that the Declaration's 
imprecision provided ground for divergent interpretations. Arafat asked the 
American and Russian governments to intercede with Rabin, but neither was 
prepared to intervene unless requested to do so by both parties. They argued 
that it was natural that disagreements should arise during the process of turning 
a vague agreement into something workable. 69 The Administration shored up 
its position with the Russians, for it was possible that Arafat could have turned 
65 Beilin. Touching Peace. The Israelis had seen Arafat's minutes in the margins of the draft 
Declaration. p. l 02 
66 Some allowance should be made for strained relations between Arafat and Abbas (Abu 
Mazen) at that time. Abbas. Through Secret Channels, describes Arafat as having become 
obsessed with the proposed initial Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. 'He no longer 
paid any attention to the issues of the Declaration' . p.201; Heikal. Secret Channels, says that 
. Abbas was angered by the sudden concessions made by Arafat in the final stages without 
consultation. p.462 
67 Interview with Ambassador Dennis B. Ross in Washington DC on 20 April 2001. This 
conclusion was discussed with Ross, in whose view Arafat had never shown that he 
understood what was meant by a two-state solution. 
68 Beilin. Touching Peace. Sixty per cent of the 107 members of the Palestine National Council 
present supported the Olso Accords p.143; Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall . The Knesset 
approved the Accords by 61 votes to 50, with nine abstentions. p.521 
69 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.472 
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to Russia for support against America's established commitment to Israel, thus 
recreating a Cold War-like divide between the co-sponsors of the peace 
process. As the Israelis and Palestinians sorted out their differences, support 
for the Oslo accord in the occupied territories fell from 68 per cent in 
September 1993 to 44 per cent in January 1994. 70 An agreement on the 
'redeployment' of Israeli troops from Gaza and Jericho was initialled at Cairo 
on 9 February,71 and signed, after further elaboration on 4 May 1994.72 The 
Cairo Agreement started the clock on the five-year transitional period 
envisaged in the Oslo accord and provided for final status talks to begin no 
later than May 1996, with 4 May 1999 as the envisaged end of the transitional 
period.73 
The Administration had to intercede to keep implementation of the 
process moving after an Israeli settler, Baruch Goldstein, tried to derail it by 
massacring Muslim worshippers at Hebron on 25 February. The attempt was 
timed to block the withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, which was planned to 
begin on 17 March, and to inflame religious feeling. 74 An immediate attempt 
to have the UN Security Council condemn the settler's murderous rampage 
was delayed by Washington and not adopted until 18 March. Clinton and 
Christopher telephoned Arafat urging that the assassin not be allowed to stop 
the peace process, Christopher telling Arafat that a Security Council resolution 
would complicate matters. 75 The direct call from the President of the United 
States impressed Arafat and Clinton's influence was evident in a statement 
issued by Arafat's Fatah faction a few hours after the attack: 'The negotiations 
with the Israelis are not suspended: on the contrary these acts demonstrate the 
urgency of peace' .76 It was immediately obvious that PLO headquarters was 
70 Ibid. p.484 
71 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.524 
72 Heikal. Secret Channels, pp.516-7 
73 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, pp.329-30 
74 Heikal. Secret Channels. Baruch Goldstein chose the Mosque of Ibrahim, built over the 
burial place of the religious messenger of monotheism. The site is celebrated in Judaism as the 
Tomb of the Patriarchs. The assailant shot over thirty Muslim worshippers at prayer during the 
holy month of Ramadan. Israeli officials found 39 bodies when they arrived, but some 
casualties had been rushed to hospital beforehand. The Palestinian count was 52 dead and 70 
injured. pp 492-507; UN Security Council Resolution 904 states in its first operative paragraph 
that 'the massacre in Hebron and its aftermath ... took the lives of more than fifty Palestinian 
civilians and injured several hundred others'. 
75 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.497 
76 Ibid. p.495 
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out of step with Arab capitals, which were issuing verbal attacks on Israel. 
Egypt, mediator of the Cairo Agreement, denounced Israel in harsh language 77 
and the PLO Executive Committee reversed Arafat's decision. By the time the 
Security Council acted, nearly three weeks after the massacre, all the Arab 
parties principal had suspended their participation in the Washington talks. 
Agreement was eventually reached on the resumption of negotiations and the 
temporary deployment to Hebron of an observer force from Norway, Denmark 
and Italy.78 
From an American perspective it was paramount that the Oslo process, 
which offered the only prospect of a peaceful settlement, be preserved and that 
negotiations be resumed within its framework. There were three options 
available to the Administration if the UN Security Council were to be 
prevented from adopting a resolution inimical to the peace process. It could 
persuade other members to address the matter in terms acceptable to it, if 
necessary by threatening use · of the US veto to effect changes to any draft 
resolution to ensure that the final document accommodated American interests; 
or persuade members of the . Council to adopt a non-binding presidential 
statement in lieu of a resolution, again possibly by threatening to use its veto; 
or, as a last resort, prevent the adoption of a resolution by the exercise of its 
veto. On this occasion, the United States was able to persuade the Security 
Council to condemn the massacre without holding the Israeli government 
accountable. Chastisement of Israel was confined to the less-weighty 
preambular portion, while the operative paragraphs focussed on a resumption 
of bilateral negotiations. 79 
On 6 April, hours after the completion of the Muslim 40-day period of 
mourning, a Hamas activist from Gaza detonated a suicide bomb in Israel, 
killing eight and injuring 42 people. The Administration demanded that Arafat 
condemn the incident. He agreed to comply on condition that the Israeli 
government condemn any future killings of Palestinians by Israeli settlers. The 
77 Ibid. p.495 
78 Ibid. p.505. The population of Hebron was estimated to include 120,000 Palestinians and 
about 400 Jewish settlers. 
79 UN Security Council Resolution 904 was adopted 18 March 1994 as a whole without a vote, 
following a paragraph-by-paragraph vote. The United States abstained on the first and sixth 
preambular paragraphs, the latter affirming the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
to the territories occupied by Israel in June 1967, 'including Jerusalem'. 
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demand put Arafat in an awkward position, and he hesitated. He knew that the 
bombing would be regarded by Palestinians as justified retribution for the 
massacre at Hebron. The Israeli government responded to his hesitation by 
sealing the routes that Palestinian commuters normally used to travel to their 
regular jobs in Israel.80 The blockade was to become 'an economic fact of life 
in the West Bank and Gaza, a permanent system that ... introduced a host of 
new and intractable problems into an already weakened and structurally 
distorted economy'. 81 
Terrorism/insurgency was one of the major United States interests 
discussed in chapter 2. It was a phenomenon that was to bedevil the peace 
process, affecting relations between Israel and both the Palestinians and Syria. 
For the Palestinians, a culture of terror and violence, developed over the 
preceding decades, was seen as a legitimate tool to force the world to pay 
attention to the Palestinians and to address their grievances. 82 They saw 
themselves as victims ·because Israel 'had taken by force what had been theirs, 
and ... kept them under occupation'. 83 Being victims, they became attracted to 
those who might stand_ up to and threaten Israel or its benefactor.84 The 1987 
intifada was recognised by America's envoy to the Middle East, Dennis 
Ross, 85 as 'an expression of Palestinian frustration and anger ... [T]he 
Palestinians felt degraded and humiliated under occupation. Israeli actions to 
try to prevent Palestinian acts of terror ... deepened Palestinian resentment, and 
fostered their sense of victimisation' .86 For Clinton, terrorism was a global 
scourge that had impacted upon American interests at home and abroad. In his 
concluding days in office the president identified possible collusion among 
terrorists, narco-traffickers and organised criminals 'with smaller and more 
difficult to detect weapons of mass destruction and powerful traditional 
80 · Reik.al. Secret Channels, pp.505-7 
81 Roy, S. (1998). The Palestinian Economy and the Oslo Process: decline and fragmentation. 
Abu Dhabi UAE, The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. p.2 
82 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.38 
83 Ibid. p.42 
84 Ibid. p.42 
85 Dennis B. Ross worked within the Bush and Clinton Administrations on the Arab-Israel 
peace process from 1988 to 2000. He has described himself as ' the architect of our policy 
toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in the first Bush administration and the lead negotiator in the 
Arab-Israeli peace process throughout the Clinton presidency'. Ibid. p.7 
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weapons' 87 as the main security threat to his country in the twenty-first 
century. Throughout his engagement in the search for a resolution of the Arab-
Israel dispute Clinton recognised the capacity of terrorists to frustrate and 
inhibit progress and urged Arafat and Assad to clamp down on terrorist activity 
undertaken or sponsored by actors within their spheres of responsibility. 
Ross has recorded that 
Arafat seemed unwilling or incapable of controlling the extremists who 
were determined to wage terror against the Israelis. When I would 
confront him with the need for him to take action, he sought instead to 
have it both ways, promising to co-opt or divide the groups rather than 
confront them directly. He would whisper that he was succeeding in 
splitting these groups, but there was no sign of their loss or power. 
During the fall of 1994, I took a tougher line with him, making it clear 
that we could not support the PA if it would not fight terror.88 
The Hebron 'exchange' was significant for its violence, and illustrative 
also of the havoc retributive closures were to wreak on the 'Palestinian' 
economy. It_ was only one of many acts initiated by Arab and Jewish 
opponents of the peace process directed at both the other party and the 
leaderships of their own communities. 89 Rabin was to be assassinated by an 
Israeli in November 1995 for his peace policies. Arafat, too, faced a crisis of 
public confidence.90 A significant challenge for Clinton became that of 
encouraging movement toward the objective of an Israel-Palestinian settlement 
in the context of growing public dismay, disillusion, and distrust occasioned by 
terrorist activity and retributive action. Israelis and Palestinians were both at 
fault. Islamist Palestinians played a major part in organising and perpetrating 
Palestinian violence. Israeli retribution caused economic and social hardship 
and discontent in the occupied territories, which aided the recruitment of 
activists and insurgent 'martyrs'. The Administration urged the Israelis to 
87 Clinton, W.J. (2004). My Life, p.890 
88 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.190 
89 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall. Rabin was accused by some Israelis of grovelling before 
foreign statesmen, of having no mandate for his policies because his majority in the parliament 
depended on non-Jewish Knesset members, and Binyamin Netanyahu compared his actions 
with those of Neville Chamberlain in appeasing Hitler. pp.551,521 
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United States in the post-Soviet Union world order, leading to unnecessary retreats. p.511; 
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honour their commitment to an initial transfer of territory to the Palestinians 
and both sides to press ahead with negotiations on the application of the 
principles of the Declaration to other parts of the West Bank. The Palestinian 
leadership shared the Administration's interest in seeing the Declaration 
implemented: it was important that the Oslo formula of 'Gaza first' should not 
be allowed to tum into 'Gaza last' .91 
The Palestinian Authority . 
Congressional authority to participate in Palestinian institution-building 
was conferred by a presidential waiver to the Middle East Peace Facilitation 
Act (MEPF A) of 1993, but was dependent upon the Palestinians honouring 
specified commitments. Prohibition against the use of US funds for assistance 
to the PLO ( and, later, the Palestinian Authority) could be waived if the 
president was satisfied that it was in the national interest to do so, and that the 
PLO was abiding by its undertakings. The State Department was required to 
report to the Congress on Palestinian compliance. The Administration used 
this provision to pressure Arafat to abide by his commitments to Israel.92 
The Administration's concern about Palestinian terrorism necessarily 
transferred to an interest in the development of Palestinian security forces. The 
establishment of 'a strong police force' is one of the provisions of the 
Declaration.93 Although the size of the force is established by various 
agreements between the Israelis and Palestinians, its limits have not been 
observed by the Palestinian Authority, Israel or the Palestinian Authority's 
various international sponsors.94 If America hoped that international 
sponsorship would help create a conventional police force, its hope was 
misplaced. The Palestinian Authority spawned a complex network of 
91 Savir (1998). The Process. He cites a senior Palestinian delegate as expressing Arafat's 
concern on this score. p.158 
92 Peace Now (1995). The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995: policy 
recommendations to the 104th Congress. Peace Now. p. l 
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'anywhere from four to nine PA intelligence forces' ,95 depending on how they 
are classified. The array gave Arafat enormous scope for political patronage. 
The absence of a clear chain of command entrenched power in his hands, and 
the proliferation of forces enabled him to exert authority through any one 
agency while portraying a softer approach through another. The latter facility 
has been especially valuable vis-a-vis the Islamists. Arafat 
cannot ... keep the Islamists in line with his enormous powers of 
financial and political patronage, for the Islamists are not and never 
have been dependent on him. Hamas in particular represents a mass, 
indigenous, and authentic political constituency in the occupied 
territories by virtue of having its own finances, structures, organisation, 
and, above all, ideology. It is because Barnas represents a genuinely 
independent force outside the PA' s sway that it is perceived as the 
main internal threat, the most difficult of all Arafat's internal and 
external oppositions to "tame" .96 
In order to help constrain the violence, Clinton issued Executive Order 
12947 of 23 January 1995 'Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists who 
Threaten to Disrupt the Nliddle East Peace Process', which lists Hamas.97 By 
January 1995 some 95 Israelis had been killed since the Gaza-Jericho 
withdrawals and the Israeli Government was under considerable domestic 
pressure to demonstrate the value of the Oslo process. The majority of Israelis 
now thought that Israel should reinforce its military capabilities rather than 
pursue peace.98 Over the preceding months Rabin had applied punitive 
measures to impress upon the Palestinian leadership the need to restrain the 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants operating from the Gaza Strip.99 The newly 
installed Palestinian police did make arrests and on one occasion used live 
95 Usher (1996). "The Politics of Internal Security" p.23-4; Abu Amr, Z. (2002). Political 
Reform: prospects and obstacles. Reforming the Palestinian Authority: requirements for 
change. D. B. Ross. Washington DC, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Abu Amr 
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ammunition to control rioting, which led to their being compared unfavourably 
with Israeli forces by their own community. 
Unable to prise enough money out of the World Bank trust fund to 
meet the salaries of the nascent Palestinian civil service, 100 and hurt by 
defections from the PLO executive committee, 101 Arafat faced an increasingly 
uncomfortable situation. 102 Between the end of 1992 and the end of 1996, real 
GNP in the Gaza Strip and West Bank fell 18.4 per cent, primarily due to the 
loss of employment in Israel and reduced trade flows that resulted from the 
closure of the border. 103 Talk of civil war was no longer fanciful, and Peres 
had to intercede with Rabin to make some conciliatory gestures. 104 Clinton 
surnrned-up the situation as the toughest · issue he faced between the Israelis 
and the Palestinians. 
When the borders were open, it made Israel more vulnerable to 
terrorism. When innocent people are killed, it undermines support in 
Israel for the peace process and weakens the government's ability to go 
forward. When the borders are closed, the incomes of the Palestinian 
people drop dramatically, and it makes young people more vulnerable 
to the appeals of the terrorists. 105 
Convinced of the ameliorative effect of economic development in the 
Palestinian territories, 106 and of the role of free enterprise as the engine of 
long-term economic development, 107 the Administration made arrangements 
for another international conference to cornrnit additional economic assistance 
to the Palestinians. It also initiated discussion with Israeli and Palestinian 
100 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.532; Brynen, R. (1996). "International Aid to the West Bank and 
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officials about the granting of reciprocal duty-free status for products 
manufactured in the West Bank and Gaza. By August 1995 the House 
International Relations Committee was being given details of expenditure 
under MEPFA on job creation projects, infrastructure development, start-up 
costs for the Palestinian Authority, housing, and industrial zones in Palestinian 
territory to attract new investment and generate rapid job growth. 
The Administration's ability to buttress the peace negotiations with 
economic and technical assistance to the Palestinians was hampered, however, 
by congressional attitudes, and differences between governmental officials. 
The State Department, looking for early results, often complained about the 
slowness of USAID programmes in the territories, while USAID complained 
that the programme was being diverted from meaningful development 
objectives. USAID was constrained by a prohibition on direct US assistance to 
the Palestinian Authority: its projects in the West Bank and Gaza having to be 
contracted out to non-governmental agencies. The subcontractors often 
initially underestimated the political and economic difficulties that lay ahead. 
Congressional suspicion of the Palestinians meant periodic congressional 
review of the assistance programme, making the USAID budget a battleground 
for those critical of foreign aid and the peace process. 108 
Toward an Interim Agreement 
Rabin and Peres met Arafat in Paris in early July 1994 and reached 
agreement to set up three committees: one to deal with problems left over from 
the Cairo Agreement of the previous May; a second to discuss the transfer of 
more powers under an Interim Agreement; and a third to look into refugee 
problems, 109 Israel having sidelined itself from the multilateral working group 
on refugees. Notwithstanding the leaders' agreement, it was evident to the 
Administration that popular support for the Oslo peace process was declining 
and the spirit of the Declaration was dissipating. Israel continued to expand its 
settlements in the occupied territories and increased construction in and around 
East Jerusalem; and it repeatedly halted, in response to Palestinian terrorist 
attacks, the talks on further withdrawals from the West Bank cities to which it 
108 Brynen, R. (1996). "Buying Peace? A critical assessment of international aid to the West 
Bank and Gaza." Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XXV No.3 (Spring 1996). p.80 
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was committed. 110 In order to re-energise the process, Christopher invited his 
Egyptian, Israeli and Jordanian counterparts and the PLO negotiator to 
Washington in March 1995. They reached agreement there on a new target 
date of 1 July 1995 for concluding negotiations on implementation of the 
stalled parts of the Oslo agreement, 111 but that timetable was also to slip. 
When the Israelis and Palestinians were eventually persuaded by 
American prodding to embark on negotiation of the Interim Agreement, they 
intended to do so in secret, hiding behind discussion on other_ aspects of 
disagreement that were being conducted in other places. Consistent with the 
approach that the Administration had pursued to that time - that the terms of 
any agreements were for the parties to decide - the Administration was content 
to stand aside, displaying more interest in proximity than in engagement. A 
'hands off approach would help to disabuse any Arab expectation that the 
United States could deliver Israel. Dennis Ross kept in touch with the Israeli 
and Palestinian negotiators on an almost daily basis and Savir records that 
Ross expressed his appreciation that the Israelis were solving their problems 
without the active intervention of the United States. 112 The Palestinians even 
urged him to reassure Arafat that things were on track. 113 
The Administration interceded when the parties needed America' s help. 
The Israelis refused to declare their final position on the amount of territory 
that they would transfer to the Palestinians. The Palestinians expostulated that 
they were being asked to enter into an agreement without knowing what the 
outcome would be. 114 The Administration urged Peres to ring Arafat to 
express impatience with the lack of progress and to invite him to a meeting to 
resolve the impasse. They were successful: Arafat attended a meeting with 
Peres at Taba on 10 August 1995; and agreement was reached on an Israeli 
proposal for the transfer of further security powers to the Palestinians every six 
months over an 18 month period, without defining the amount of territory 
involved in each of the three phases. At Arafat's insistence, this would be 
subject to the opening of a Palestinian police station in Hebron. His 
110 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.627 
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qualification defused the issue by diverting the discussion from the 
strategically important question of territory to an issue of immediate 
importance to Palestinian opinion. Tension in Hebron was real and the 
predominant Arab community there was insisting that the Israeli Defence 
Force (IDF) be redeployed from Hebron as was happening in other towns to be 
transferred to the Palestinians. Peres secured his government's approval to the 
proposal. 
Not only did Dennis Ross maintain close contact with the negotiating 
teams, but he encouraged his American compatriots to lobby Rabin and Peres. 
From an Israeli perspective '[t]his network of ties was to be of great 
importance in the final, decisive stages of the talks' .115 At that time, Israel's 
Likud opposition was encouraging its own friends within the US Congress and 
the American Jewish community to oppose further aid to the Palestinian 
Authority. 116 To counter that, Rabin and Peres instructed the Embassy of 
Israel in Washington to step up a campaign in the Congress in favour of aid to 
the Palestinians, explaining that aid for the purpose of raising the standard of 
living in Gaza was part of the fight against terrorism. 117 Concurrently, the 
Israeli negotiators used knowledge of the fact that the Congress was planning 
to publish a report on the Palestinian Authority on 1 October 1995 to put 
pressure on the Palestinian negotiators to conclude an agreement by that 
date. 118 Savir suggested to his Palestinian counterpart that Ross be approached 
about a signing of an Interim Agreement in Washington on 22 September. 
That artificial deadline also imposed its own constraints, including a 
requirement that Peres and Arafat resolve some 25 difficult issues that had 
eluded officials. 119 
The principal issue in contention was the allocation of territory to the 
Palestinians. Savir has recalled that a senior Palestinian negotiator had spoken 
of the need to benefit from the experience at Gaza and to fight terrorism in the 
115 Ibid. p.205 
116 Noyes (1997). "Does Washington really support Israel?" op. cit. He records that several 
Likud-supporting groups vigorously questioned U.S. policy on providing aid to the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) and other measures that Rabin and Peres considered vital to the 
peace process. p.146 
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Palestinian interest, not as something done for Israel ' s sake. It was in the 
context of mutual security that Savir · attributed to him a new concept for 
crafting the Interim Agreement. 'He spoke of establishing three security areas 
in the West Bank: one under Palestinian control, one under Israeli control, and 
the third to be patrolled by a joint force ' 120 as part of the transitional process. 
The delegate claimed that the concept had been discussed with Arafat. 121 The 
Israelis only revealed the map showing their proposed allocations to the 
Palestinians 24 hours before the planned conclusion of the talks. 122 Ross, who 
had been in telephone contact with the Israeli delegation every few hours 
during the final stages of the negotiations, 123 must have known of the Israeli 
tactic to produce the map at the very end of the negotiating process. When 
Arafat saw the proposed division, he stormed out of a meeting complaining 
that the Israelis wanted to destroy him by making him accept cantons. 124 
Arafat and Peres both indulged in brinkmanship as they fought for their 
respective interests. They were able eventually to ring Christopher and Ross to 
inform them that the Interim Agreement had been concluded. 125 
The Interim Agreement 
The 'Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip', sometimes called 'Oslo II', was signed in Washington by Rabin 
and Arafat in the presence of President Clinton, Egypt' s President Hosni 
Mubarak and King Hussein of Jordan on 28 September 1995. Among its 
principal provisions are: 
• direct election of a Palestinian Legislative Council of 82 members 
and a ra 'is ( or head) of the executive authority by the Palestinian 
people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.126 The 
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Council and the ra 'is together will constitute the Palestinian Interim 
Self-Government Authority; 127 
• the Israeli civil administration in the West Bank will be dissolved 
. ' 
and the Israeli military government withdrawn, after the 
inauguration of the Council. 128 Special arrangements were made 
for Hebron where IDF withdrawal will take place by 28 March 
1996; 
• the West Bank shall be divided into three types of areas: area A 
consists of Palestinian towns and urban areas; area B consists of 
Palestinian villages and less densely populated parts; and area C 
consists of the lands confiscated by Israel for settlements and roads. 
Area A will be placed under exclusive Palestinian control and area 
C under exclusive Israeli control, and in area B the Palestinians will 
exercise civilian authority while Israel continues to be in charge of 
security; 
• the role of the Palestinian police in support of security is 
reaffirmed, with its location, size, weaponry and responsibilities 
spelled out in some detail ; 129 and 
• within two months of the inauguration of the Council the Palestine 
National Council will formally approve changes to those provisions 
of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist. 130 
The Interim Agreement disappointed many Israelis and Palestinians. 
The Israeli right could see in it the evaporation of their dream of an Eretz 
Israel. The Knesset ratified the agreement by the tight vote of 61 in favour and 
59 against. 131 The Palestinians acted in accordance with the agreement, 
electing the Palestinian Authority's executive and legislature in January 1996, 
and convening a meeting of the PLO ' s National Council in April to remove 
articles from the Palestine National Covenant calling for the elimination of 
Israel. The Council voted 504 to 54 (with 214 abstentions) to amend the 
127 Ibid. Art.ill 
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Covenant, 132 revealing considerable scepticism about the direction of 
Palestinian policy. 
Five weeks after the signing of the agreement, Yitzhak Rabin was 
murdered by a Jewish zealot who confessed that his aim was to derail the 
peace process. Disaffected Palestinians also took direct action. Palestinian 
expectations of a freer and better way of life independent of Israeli authority 
had not been realised. Between 1992 and 1996 real per capita GNP declined 
by 3 7 per cent in the West Bank and Gaza, 133 and the situation was to worsen, 
with 19 .1 per cent of the population of the two areas living under the poverty 
line of $650 per person per annum by early 1997. 134 Palestinian insurgents 
undertook suicide bombings in Ashkelon, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in February 
and March 1996, causing 58 deaths, mostly of civilians. 135 The · incidents 
prompted the Israeli government to postpone the March redeployment from 
Hebron, which was to be again deferred until after the Israeli general election 
scheduled for 29 May 1996. 
Rabin was succeeded as prime minister by Peres, but Peres was never 
able to exert the same authority over the peace process as Rabin. He lacked 
'Rabin's military credentials and charismatic bluntness ' .136 Peres was admired 
for his faith in human nature; and had been at his most successful in exploring 
options under the authority and resolve of Rabin. Clinton backed him, but 
lacking Rabin's strength of purpose, the somewhat idealistic Peres was 
vulnerable. 
Protecting the peace process 
Clinton's pledge in September 1993 to build political support for the 
Olso process took him to the United Nations, where he was able initially to 
tum matters to America' s advantage. The United States's concern to control 
the process launched at Madrid contradicted a UN General Assembly (UNGA) 
decision to convene an international conference on Palestine under UN 
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auspices. 137 The 'Question of Palestine' was a perennial item on UNGA's 
agenda and in 1990, while the Bush Administration was floating the possibility 
of a Middle East peace process under its own auspices, the General Assembly 
directed the UN Secretary-General to continue his efforts to convene a UN 
peace conference. The United States had consistently placed itself in a 
minority opposed to this proposition, believing that the intrusion of those states 
that did not have a direct interest in the matter was unhelpful, especially as 
they were inclined to prescribe the terms_ of any outcome to the detriment of 
Israel. It wanted a monopoly on the peace process, thus guaranteeing Israel's 
protection during any negotiation. 
The Clinton Administration saw an opportunity to muster the weight of 
international opinion behind the Madrid conference and to isolate irredentist 
states opposed to dealing with Israel. It used the United Nations to gamer 
international support for the Madrid process, turning to its advantage the votes 
of an overwhelming majority of the members of the United Nations, including 
especially those of formerly trenchant critics of Israel within the Non-Aligned 
Movement and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. After the signing 
of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, the US and Russian co-sponsors of the 
Madrid process combined with 108 other states in co-sponsoring UNGA 
Resolution 48/58, which expressed full support for the Declaration. It called 
upon 'all Member States to extend economic, financial and technical assistance 
to States in the [Middle East] region and to render support for the peace 
process' .138 Iran, Lebanon and Syria opposed the resolution, viewing its 
emphasis on Israel and Palestine and neglect of their interests as partial, while 
Libya abstained. A similar resolution, broadened to recognise the Israel-
Jordan peace treaty, was adopted in 1995 139 but attracted negative votes from 
these four countries principally because it did not refer to the UN Security 
Council resolutions on which the peace process was based or to the return of 
Palestinians to their country and homes. 140 A positive resolution was also 
adopted in the UN' s Economic and Social Council (ECO SOC) on 29 July 
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138 United Nations (1993). UN General Assembly Resolution 48/58. Operative paragraph 6. 
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1994, welcoming the World Bank' s assistance to the Palestinian people. 141 In 
1995, again at the initiative of the US and Russia and other states, ECOSOC 
welcomed the Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference held in 
Casablanca in 1994 and the second Conference scheduled to be held in 
Amman in October 1995. Only Libya among the ECOSOC membership 
opposed the resolutions. · 
The Administration also tried to capitalise on the moment to create a 
clean slate for the negotiating parties, removing from consideration 
prescriptive formulations adopted by the United Nations, many of which 
favoured the Palestinian cause. Madeleine Albright, then Permanent 
Representative of the United States to the United Nations, wrote to the 
President of the General Assembly on 8 August 1994142 suggesting that 
'contentious resolutions that accentuated political differences without 
prompting solutions should be consolidated, improved, or eliminated ... [ and 
that]. .. resolution language referring to ' final status' issues should be dropped, 
since these issues are now under negotiation by the parties themselves ... These 
include refugees, settlements, territorial sovereignty and the status of 
Jerusalem' .143 The Administration sought to avoid the constraint of established 
UN formulations. It hoped that other states would follow suit, but hardly dared 
expect that this could be achieved through a letter to the presiding officer. 
Were the Administration seriously inclined to bring about a substantial 
revision, it would have introduced a draft resolution to that effect. Its action 
was nevertheless self-serving, enabling it to disencumber itself from the 
language of resolutions on the designated subjects that the United States, and 
probably also Israel, had opposed over many years. 
One matter caught in Albright' s net was UNGA Resolution 194, 
adopted in 1948, whose provisions provide for the return of Palestinian 
refugees to their homes. 144 It was originally supported by the United States, 
141 United Nations (1994). Yearbook of the United Nations 1994, Vol.48 . United Nations NY. 
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but on reflection the Clinton Administration chose to dismiss it because the 
wholesale return of Arab refugees to their former homeland would place the 
Jewish character of Israel in jeopardy. Notwithstanding the hortatory or 
recommendatory nature of General Assembly resolutions, they embody the 
weight of international opinion. Many of those in question, such as Resolution 
194, provide authority and a quasi-legal basis for some Palestinian claims. 
Had the General Assembly supported Albright' s ambit claim, they would have 
diminished, if not destroyed, the bases on which key Palestinian claims rested. 
Albright' s letter mentioned 'settlements', The Bush Administration 
had made explicit in March 1990 that there should be no new Israeli 
settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem. The settlements issue was to 
bedevil the Clinton Administration throughout the peace process because 
Israeli governments, regardless of political colouration, continued building 
them. The issue had been reserved for consideration as a final status matter 
under the Declaration. 
Rabin had promised Bush in August 1992 that, while some 11,000 
units then under construction would be completed, no new construction beyond 
1,000-2,000 housing starts a year to account for 'natural growth' would be 
undertaken. The $10 billion loans guarantee was then approved, and was to 
continue under Clinton. 145 In January 1995 Rabin revealed the fine print: the 
commitment referred only to public monies. 'I explained to the President of 
the United States, George Bush ... that I wouldn't forbid Jews from building 
privately in the area of Judea and Samaria', 146 as the West Bank was known to 
Israelis. He pointed out that the Oslo accord contained 'no explicit 
commitment from us to freeze settlement in the territories'. Further, Rabin 
told Arafat on 19 January that there would be no change in Israel's settlement 
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation 
should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to 
property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the 
Governments or authorities responsible' 
145 Clinton, W.J. (1995). Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee Policy 
Conference, 7 May 1995. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1995. He said that the loan 
guarantees would assist Israel absorb 600,000 emigrants from the former Soviet Union and 
finance infrastructure investment. p.652 
146 Aronson (1995). "Settlement Monitor: quarterly update." Journal of Palestine Studies 
Vol.XXIV No.3 (Spring 1995). p.128 
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programme. 147 Some 3,920 housing units were completed in the West Bank in 
1995; 148 and work was undertaken on a national road grid for the entire West 
Bank whose purpose was to allow 'the army to control all the strategic sites 
and roads [ after redeployment]. According to the plan, vehicles of Palestinian 
residents will not be permitted to travel on the strategic routes' .149 
Even if the UN General Assembly had been disposed to act upon 
Albright' s letter, it could have no direct effect on the body of Security Council 
resolutions. The letter referred to 'the status of Jerusalem'. Prior to Reagan's 
reformulation of US policy on the question of Israeli activity in the occupied 
territories, the United States had supported UN Security Council Resolutions 
267 (1969) and 298 (1971) dealing with the invalidity of Israeli legislative and 
administrative actions to change the status of Jerusalem; and Resolution 465 
(1980) that determined 
that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, 
demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the 
Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including 
Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity and that Israel's 
policy and practices of settling parts of its population and new 
immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to 
achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East.1so 
The Clinton Administration stuck with the Reagan formula that Israeli 
settlement activity in the occupied territories was a problem, rather than an 
issue fundamental to Palestinian concerns, and carried forward the view that 
147 Ibid. p.128 
148 Ibid. Vol.XXV No.l (Autumn 1995). p.138 
149 Ibid. Vol.XXIV No.4 (Summer 1995). p.133; Ibid.Vol. XXV No.4 (Summer 1996). 
'Highway 60 now lies almost entirely in area C, the area to remain under Israeli control until 
the final agreement. This provides an Israeli controlled corridor through the entire length of 
the West Bank. Where the road passes through the centre of the Palestinian towns ... ( and 
therefore through areas A and B), the Jewish-only bypass roads are under construction, 
allowing in most cases for settlers to remain in area C'. p.129 
150 Security Council Resolution 465, adopted unanimously on 1 March 1980, operative 
paragraph 5; Carter, J. (1980). "President Carter's Statement Repudiating US Vote in Support 
of UN Security Council Resolution 465." The Middle East and North Africa 1999. London 
UK, Europa Publications Limited. President Carter issued a statement on 3 March 1980: 'The 
US vote in the UN was approved with the understanding that all references to Jerusalem would 
be deleted. The failure to communicate this clearly resulted in a vote in favour on the 
resolution rather than abstention'. p.123 
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Jerusalem, -having been united under Israeli occupation since 1967, should 
remain undivided. 151 
It is curious that Palestinian negotiators had not insisted on the precepts 
of key instruments such as the Fourth Geneva Convention being incorporated 
into the Declaration of Principles in 1993. Israel was a signatory to the 
Convention, and the PLO had committed itself to it. Earlier, at the third round 
of the Washington talks in January 1992, the Palestinians had presented a 
document to the Israelis demanding an immediate halt to settlement activity 
and the application of the Convention to the occupied territories. 152 Despite 
Israel's view that the West Bank was not occupied territory because Jordan had 
relinquished its claim, its position was logically inconsistent because it had 
entered into the Madrid negotiation on the basis of UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 that called for its withdrawal from occupied territory. During 
the Oslo negotiations the Palestinians had secured Israeli recognition of the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip as forming 'a single territorial unit, whose 
integrity will be preserved' 153 and may have judged this sufficient guarantee 
that the Arab character of the territory would be maintained. Whatever the 
reason for the absence of any specific reference to the Convention, the fact that 
its principles were not expressed in the Declaration enabled the Administration 
to shelter behind the formula that such matters had been reserved for the final 
status negotiations. 
The Administration's use of the United Nations to bolster the peace 
process received a setback as Israel continued building settlements. Opinion 
within the world body became increasingly critical of Israeli action. Some 80-
85 per cent of the settlers were attracted to the occupied territories not by 
ideology but by material incentives such as cheap housing and a better quality 
of life. 154 By 1995, a Palestinian negotiator was complaining to the Israelis 
151 Bush, G.H.W. (1992). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin of Israel, Kennebunkport, 11 August 1992. Public Papers of the Presidents - President 
Bush 1992. Bush said that 'our policy on Jerusalem remains unchanged. It must never be 
divided again, and its final status must be resolved through negotiation' . p.1335; The United 
States 's commitment to the principle of an undivided Jerusalem was expressed in the Reagan 
plan of 1982. 
152 Mansour. "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations", p.12 
153 
"Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements." Art.IV 
154 Shlaim (1995). "Israeli Politics and Middle East Peacemaking." Journal of Palestine 
Studies Vol. XXIV No.4 (Summer 1995) p.24 
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that '[y Jou thicken, add, and create [ settlement] facts during the interim period 
that will create precedents for the final status' .155 The Israeli government 
declared that it would not negotiate on settlements during the interim period. 156 
The question was brought before the UN Security Council in February and 
May 1995 where the Administration. was obliged to address it. In February 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom declared the Israeli activity illegal, 
essentially in terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention, while Russia called for 
restraint from acts that would prejudice an Israel-Palestinian peace settlement. 
The United States representative, too, sought to preserve the integrity of the 
Oslo process: 'it would not be productive or useful for the Council to involve 
itself now in a question that the parties have agreed to cover when they address 
permanent status issues' .157 The February session adjourned without the 
Council taking any action. A member of the US National Security Council 
revealed how little the Administration appreciated Palestinian sensitivity about 
dispossession when he said that 'settlements are a problem ... Terror is a far 
more immediate and a far more real problem with a direct impact on the ability 
of the negotiating process to move forward, but settlements do complicate 
· · , 158 negot1at1ons . 
The Security Council's consideration of May 1995 focussed on Israel's 
planned land expropriations in East Jerusalem. Again America's Western 
allies, including Canada, spoke against the decision of the Israeli government; 
and China declared the draft resolution before the Council 'reasonable and 
appropriate .. .its language moderate ... [ and that] .. .it would have contributed 
greatly to the peace process in the Middle East, not damaged it' .159 All other 
members of the Security Council voted in favour of the draft, but the United 
States vetoed it. The Administration had protected Israel on a matter of 
fundamental purport to the shape of any final outcome. 
Jerusalem provided another complication for the Administration in 
February 1995 when members of the Congress urged the relocation of the 
Embassy of the United States from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Over an 11 year 
155 Aronson (1995). Ibid. Vol. XXIV No. 3 p.127 
156 Ibid. p.127 
157 Ibid. Vol.XXIV No. 4 p.139 
158 Ibid. Attributed to David Satterfield, Director, Near East and South Asia Affairs, National 
Security Council, 9 March 1995 p.140 
159 Ibid. Vol.XXV No.l p.136 
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period both Houses of the Congress had passed four resolutions calling on the 
American government to acknowledge Jerusalem as the capital of the State of 
Israel. 160 The new move urged that planning commence for the embassy's 
transfer at the end of the transitional period, scheduled for May 1999. The 
proponents threatened to deny Clinton any funds to modernise the embassy in 
Tel Aviv. The Administration was able to resist the threat. Martin Indyk 
conveyed the president's view to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
during his nomination hearing on appointment as_ ambassador to Israel, that 
nothing should be done to undermine or pre-empt the final status 
· · 161 negotiations. 
Legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority 
Clinton's pledge to assist the formation of a Palestinian Authority was 
conditional on adherence 'to the international rules governing human rights 
and peace and democracy' .162 In the same speech he had seen the peace 
process as contributing to the removal of 'fundamentalism and political 
extremism'. The legitimacy of the Authority would be critical to the peace 
process, imputing responsibility and accountability to Palestinian institutions. 
American assistance for the creation of a democratic system of governance in 
'Palestine' would contribute to the realisation of Clinton's post-Cold War 
global vision. The Authority was to fall a long-way short of Clinton's 
aspiration for it. 
International assistance for the transformation of the PLO into the 
Palestinian Authority was one of the objectives of the donors' conference 
convened by the United States on 1 October 1993. For its part, the 
Administration felt that the broader the international coalition to help mould 
the new Authority, the better. 163 The European Community assumed the role 
of the Authority's principal 'sponsor' .164 The Palestinians may have welcomed 
160 Ibid. Vol.XXIV No.3 p.133 
161 Ibid. p.132 
162 Clinton W.J. (1993). Interview with the Arab news media on the Middle East peace process, 
13 September 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993, p.1479 
163 Christopher (1995). "Common Strategy for Economic Growth." He said: 'Only a broad-
based, coordinated effort can help the Palestinians succeed. Regional initiatives such as the 
Middle East Development Bank must also play a critical role in building a wider foundation 
for regional prosperity ' . pp 725-6 
164 The European Community was transformed into the European Union on 1 November 1993 
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European involvement as a counter to America's unshakeable commitment to 
Israel, but in time the Europeans' participation was to introduce a complication 
for the Administration. It had to address the Europeans' belief that their status 
as the leading donor entitled them to a larger role in the peace process. 165 
The Administration extended assistance for institution-building in the 
West Bank and Gaza166 and 'political encouragement and critical support' 167 
through non-governmental organisations for the first elections, held on 
20 January 1996. It may have hoped that a newly elected Palestinian Authority 
would contribute toward an enlargement of the world's community of 
democratic nations. The Europeans took the lead in organising international 
election monitors. Former President Carter was the principal American 
observer. Although the monitors reported that the conduct of the elections was 
fair, the scope of their observation was confined to the possibility of coercion 
and ballot rigging. 168 The Administration would have known of pre-election 
irregularities; that the Europeans had expressed reservations about the electoral 
process; 169 and that local observers had called on 25 January for a re-vote 
throughout the . West Bank and Gaza. 170 The success of Arafat's Fatah 
organisation also cast suspicion upon the conduct of the elections. All 
members of the leadership who had returned from Tunis won. 171 The 
Palestinian opposition largely boycotted the elections. 172 
165 Brynen (1996). "Buying Peace?" p.81 
166 Interview with Ms Jennifer Windsor and Ms Lisa Davis, Freedom House, Washington DC, 
12 April 2001. American democracy in government projects depended upon which countries 
USAID had active programmes in, and whether the NGO community through which it worked 
could submit attractive proposals in that field. 
167 Pelletreau Jr, R.H. (1996). "Statement before the House International Relations Committee, 
12 June 1996." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.7 No.26 p.337; The non-governmental 
organisations were the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute 
(affiliated with the major American political parties) and the International Foundation for 
Election Systems. The three institutions conducted a joint pre-election assessment mission in 
the West Bank and Gaza in August 2002 for the Palestinian elections scheduled for 2003, but 
which were unable to be held because of the prevailing political position. 
168 Aburish, S. K. (1998). Arafat:from defender to dictator. London UK, Bloomsbury 
Publishing. p.294 
169 Andoni, L. (1996). "The Palestinian Elections: moving toward democracy or one-party 
rule?" Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XXV No.3 (Spring 1996). p.6 
170 Ibid. p.14 
171 Ibid. Some 70 of the 88 members of the Legislative Council are affiliated with Fatah in one 
way or another, either as fully-fledged members or supporters, or backed by Fatah in the 
elections. pp.14-5 
172 Shikaki, K. (1996)."The Palestinian Elections: an assessment." Journal of Palestine Studies 
Vol.XXV No.3 (Spring 1996). Two Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine candidates 
were elected despite their party's boycott, as were seven Islamists close to Hamas, though only 
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The contest for the presidency also deserves qualification. The exit 
poll conducted by the eminent Palestinian political scientist, Khalil Shikaki, 
showed that 
40 per cent of the voters ... said that they wanted Arafat to have less 
power than the council; another 40 per cent wanted the council and 
Arafat to have equal power; and only 20 per cent thought that Arafat 
should have more power than the council.173 
Notwithstanding these reservations, Shikaki concluded from his 
detailed analysis of the elections that they passed four critical tests of political 
legitimacy. 174 The President of the UN Security Council issued a statement on 
behalf of the members of the Council on 22 January noting that 'the elections 
were an accurate reflection of the wishes of the Palestinian electorate'. 175 Over 
the ensuing years, grave doubts have come to be entertained about the 
Authority's system of governance: power has from the very beginning 
gravitated toward Arafat's executive authority; 176 no senior official has ever 
been held accountable for any violation of the law; 177 and human rights abuses 
have been perpetrated by the Palestinian Authority on its own people. 178 
Arafat has often been umeceptive to the legislators' democratically formulated 
·proposals. Far from the Palestinian Authority contributing to Clinton's global 
vision of a community of democracies, its embryonic electoral processes might 
more appropriately be acknowledged for their contribution to nation-building 
and peacemaking with Israel than as the start of a transition to democracy. 179 
three of them are close to Hamas's political program as opposed to its social agenda. The 
boycotts were more effective in constraining the number of affiliated candidates than in 
reducing the number of voters from among party supporters. An exit poll shows that 
participation by supporters of the nationalist opposition, such as the P&P, was close to the 
national average of 80 per cent, while participation by Hamas supporters reached between 60 
and 70 per cent. pp.18, 20 
173 Ibid. p.21 
174 Ibid. Shikaki assessed the electoral results, largely on the basis of exit polls, against voter 
participation, voter perception of the fairness of the electoral processes, voter perception of the 
role of the council, and whether clan or family loyalties took precedence in the voting over 
political affiliation. p.22 
75 United Nations (1996). Yearbook of the United Nations 1996, Vol.SO. United Nations NY. 
p.380 
176 Schenker, D. (2000). Palestinian Democracy and Governance: an appraisal of the 
Legislative Council. Washington DC, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. p.xiii; 
Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.296; Aburish. Arafat, Ch.10; Robinson, G. E. (1997). 
Building a Palestinian State: the incomplete revolution. Bloomington IN, Indiana University 
Press. Ch.7 
177 Abu Amr. Political Reform, p.17 
178 Human Rights Watch (1997). Palestinian self-rule areas, p.6 
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To what extent could the United States rely upon the Palestinian 
Authority to deliver upon its commitments? Ross has recorded that 
Washington tended to side with Israeli leaders who preferred an authoritarian 
Palestinian regime that could fulfil its security obligations. 180 Israel's concern 
was that the Palestinian Authority fight Islamic militancy and terrorism, 
regardless of its stance on human rights and due process. 181 For his part, 
Arafat preferred that Palestinian extremists focus on Israel, not on him. 182 It 
was not until after the swearing-in of President George W. Bush in 2001 that 
the Americans began in earnest to pressure Arafat to reform his administration. 
As this digression into the creation of the Palestinian Authority shows, 
the Administration was somewhat confused about the means of prosecuting its 
objectives with the Authority; was treating with an imperfect instrument; was 
more concerned with law and order than the realisation of principles of liberal 
and accountable governance; and was reliant upon an unformed and nascent 
'state' to deliver on internationally brokered agreements. That was to remain 
the case for the remainder of Clinton's term of office, and beyond, 
complicating the realisation of a peace agreement. 
Persuasion and pressure remained the Administration's principal means 
of influencing the Palestinian leadership. Arafat was well aware of the United 
States's expectation of him in terms of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act. 
He showed that he was able to crack down on terrorism, on which Israeli and 
Palestinian security forces cooperated; and he responded to bomb explosions in 
Jerusalem and Tel Aviv in March with imprisonments, outlawing several 
Islamic groups and closing some of their schools, orphanages, and charitable 
organisations. 183 He also concurred in Peres's decision to defer withdrawal of 
180 Ross, D. B. (2002). Introduction. Reforming the Palestinian Authority: requirements for 
change. D. Ross. Washington DC, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy . p.1; Abu 
Amr. Political Reform. The author is chairman of the Palestinian Legislative Council's 
political committee. He has written: 'Beginning in 1997 ... when some Palestinians were 
fighting for reform, the United States and Israel turned a blind eye to corruption within the PA. 
As long as security cooperation with Israel was maintained, no one seemed to care about 
political reform'. p.19 
181 Schenker. Palestinian Democracy, p.xiv 
182 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.297 
183 Aburish. Arafat, pp.296-7 
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the IDF from Hebron until after the Israeli election in 1996, 184 hoping that 
cooperation would facilitate Peres' s return to office. 
The efforts of Palestinian insurgents, and of Hezbollah in Israel's self-
declared southern Lebanon security zone, to set back the peace process 
presented particular difficulties to the Americans. In order to bring 
international pressure to bear to restrain, if not halt, the violence, Clinton 
persuaded the Egyptian president to host a meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh in 
March 1996. American diplomacy was successful in bringing 29 leaders to the 
summit, including 13 from Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority, but 
Syria and Lebanon declined to take part. Clinton was an active participant at 
the summit. He secured international condemnation of terrorism, and was able 
to demonstrate to terrorist groups that they were running against the tide of 
regional opinion. He also praised Israel 's efforts to date, promising support in 
its campaign to thwart Islamic violence. 185 While Clinton achieved his 
political objective, it was obtained in the absence of the two states that abetted 
terrorist groups, Iran and Syria, and Lebanon, from which some terrorist 
activity was launched. Moreover, the summit's conclusions lacked material 
substance, and international condemnation did nothing to persuade terrorist 
groups or their state supporters to halt terrorist activity in the region. 
Although the ostensible focus of the conference was terrorism, Clinton 
had an additional objective. He sought regional support for the peace process. 
The best prospect for its continuance lay in a return of an Israeli government 
led by Peres. Peres's principal challenger for the premiership, Binyamin 
N etanyahu, had already signalled his disagreement with the process. A summit 
with such a sub-plot, convened two months out from the Israeli election, might 
be viewed with some cynicism 'as a blatant piece of US electioneering on 
Peres ' s behalf .186 During the two months remaining before that regional 
184 Pelletreau (1996). "Statement, 12 June 1996." p.337 
185 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Shimon Peres 
of Israel in Jerusalem, 14 March 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996. Clinton 
promised $100 million toward combating terrorism. The United States would provide Israel 
with additional equipment and training; would work together to develop new anti-terror 
methods and technologies; would enhance communication and coordination; and would 
increase intelligence sharing and coordination with the assistance of the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency. p.445 
186 Seale, P. and L. Butler (1996). "Asad's Regional Strategy and the Challenge from 
Netanyahu." Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XXVI No.l (Autumn 1996). p.28 
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support could be reflected in an electoral victory, - Lebanon's Hezbollah 
responded vigorously to Israeli shelling into southern Lebanon. Israel 
launched Operation Grapes of Wrath against Lebanese sites on 11 April. Peres 
hoped that the assault would show the Israeli public that while he was deeply 
committed to the peace process, he could be firm where questions of security 
were involved. Public opinion surveys were showing increased support for the 
Arab-Israel peace process, but most supporters of the religious and right-wing 
parties remained opposed _ to, or sceptical about, it. 187 The military adventure 
played indirectly into the hands of the Israeli political right. On election day 
many Arab Israelis abstained from voting because IDF action had caused 
casualties among Lebanese civilians. 188 
Netanyahu had promised that if he attained office on 29 May, he would 
not renege on any of the country's international commitments. He implied, 
however, that he would freeze the Oslo process. 189 He won Israel's first direct 
election for prime minister under new procedures by less than one-half of one 
per cent of the vote. 190 His party actually won fewer Knesset seats than Peres's 
Labor party, but was able to form a governing coalition with minor parties of 
the right. It was hardly a convincing mandate to frustrate the Oslo peace 
process. The United States now had to deal with the third Israeli government, 
and the fourth prime minister, since the negotiation had been launched in 1991. 
How it sought to persuade the new government to effect a peaceful settlement 
with the Palestinians will be discussed in chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
The contrast between the Clinton Administration's restrained use of 
American power during its early period in office, and the Bush 
Administration's robust application or power to bring Israel and the Arab 
parties into face-to-face negotiation, is patent. Baker applied leverage to 
obtain his objective. Christopher inherited an established, if moribund, 
negotiation and interpreted his role as being to 'probe positions, clarify 
187 Shikaki (1996). "The Future of the Peace Process and Palestinian Strategies."Joumal of 
Palestine Studies Vol.XXVI No.1 (Autumn 1996). p.82 
188 Morris. Righteous Victims,. p.640 
189 Shlaim (2001). The Iron Wall, p.568 
190 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, p.338 
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responses, help define common ground, [ and] offer what may be bridging 
ideas' .191 Under Clinton, America's ideational power was relegated to the 
realm of the possible in the light of agendas set by others rather than utilised as 
an instrument for the advancement of discrete American objectives. In 
particular, it was used in support of the peace process in the expectation that 
the parties should arrive at their own compacts as Israel and the Palestinians 
had done at Oslo. In that context American diplomacy effectively marshalled 
international assistance for the Palestinian Authority, and secured almost 
universal approbation of the peace process within the United Nations. Later, 
when the United Nations became seized of Palestinian concerns about an 
expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, American 
diplomacy was employed to protect the process. 
This shift of focus, in response to external pressure, was tactical. For 
Clinton, keeping the peace process afloat became imperative if the overall 
strategic objective were ever to be realised. Christopher's behaviour during 
the early part of the period under review was in accordance with his original 
interpretation of his role and was apparent in the Administration's effort to 
keep the parties engaged and in trying to get them to understand and address 
each other's fundamental concerns. The Americans strayed beyond it when 
they concluded that a determined effort had to be made to protect the peace 
process from the intrusion of elements that they perceived to be inimical to it. 
Such was the importance given to protection that the Administration 
almost came to view the process as an end in itself, rather than the means 
toward an end. They believed that its progress could easily be disrupted and 
that it needed to be preserved at almost any cost. With the benefit of hindsight, 
Ross has concluded: 
By never holding either side accountable, by never being prepared to 
disrupt the process and put it on hold, we contributed to an 
environment in which commitments were rarely taken seriously by 
either side, knowing there would never be any real consequence. In 
the future, there must be a consequence for nonperformance - and to 
have real meaning, it must be publicly seen. When all sides have to 
explain publicly why a particular step has been taken, why they are 
191 Migdalovitz, C. (2002). The Middle East Peace Talks. Washington DC, Congressional 
Research Service, The Library of Congress. p.2 
being blamed, why they have not acted 1n accordance with an 
obligation, they will feel the consequence. 192 
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This argument does not satisfactorily address the need to prevent, or minimise, 
disruption to the peace process. A public American charge of nonperformance 
by one party would almost inevitably have produced allegations that the fault 
lay in the other party's provocation. Once the airwaves had become saturated 
with accusations and counter-accusations, negotiation would have become 
more difficult. The United States chose to employ its power carefully, seeking 
to persuade Israel and the Palestinians to exercise restraint while protecting the 
peace process and its own role within it from external elements. 
The unbalanced nature of the structure launched at Madrid was 
presented in the previous chapter. A fundamental shift in favour of a more 
balanced approach occurred when Israel began negotiating directly with the 
PLO, the two parties concluded their Declaration at Oslo, and the United States 
undertook to 'make real' its principles. American activity subsequent to the 
Declaration's signing showed an Administration concerned to protect the 
Declaration's processes, unchanged in support for Israel, and critical of Arafat 
for not honouring his commitment to restrain, if not prevent, Palestinian 
terrorism. against Israel. Why did Arafat initially commit his movement to a 
structure that formalised Israel's supremacy over Palestinians; and then, and 
later, place his trust for remediation in the hands of Israel's most fervent 
supporter? Therein lies the paradox that Israel's receptiveness to an exchange 
of land for peace depends upon the United States' s unwavering commitment to 
its security. The United States is the only external power possessing the 
necessary authority to effect some change in Israeli perceptions. The Arabs 
had perforce to acknowledge this: none of the PLO's former supporters had 
been able to urge Israel to accommodate Palestinian grievances. Although not 
an ideal situation for the Palestinians, reliance upon the United States was not 
without som.e countervailing advantages. Personal contact with the president 
flattered Arafat's vanity, a toehold had been created that offered prospect of a 
Palestinian state, and America had encouraged foreign assistance for his 
people. Arafat remained vulnerable to American threats for his temporisation 
in Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.771 
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on terrorism but proven survivor that he was, he undoubtedly hoped that his 
skills of manipulation would carry him through. 
The Administration's concentration on protection and preservation of 
the process meant that it failed to answer fundamental questions about the 
nature of any future Palestinian entity dotted with Israeli settlements; how the 
continuing construction of settlements might complicate the controversial issue 
of Palestinian statehood; how an undivided Jerusalem could satisfy the 
contradictory aspirations of Israelis and Palestinians to locate · their capitals 
there; and, above all, how to handle such matters as they arose during the 
transition to final status negotiations. Its apparent disinclination to address and 
resolve the last of these questions led to a gradual erosion of Palestinian 
confidence in an America-designed process whose tactical objective was to 
proceed to a negotiated settlement through confidence-building stages. 
An option available to the Administration, consistent with that 
objective, would have been to insist that settlement activity be halted pending 
the outcome of the final status negotiations. The 1993 Declaration does not 
prescribe a halt to settlement-building, but there are many precedents in 
international relations for freezing contentious issues pending their resolution. 
If the Administration had determined the relevance of these precedents to the 
settlements question, it could have exerted pressure on the Israeli government 
to conform. It chose the softer option of leaving the matter to the two parties 
to resolve, notwithstanding that by the time they addressed the matter the 
situation on the ground would have been altered, probably irrevocably. 
A further shortcoming on questions of principle was revealed in 1994 
when the Administration tested the receptivity of the UN General Assembly to 
the creation of a clean slate for Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. Jerusalem, 
refugees and, again, settlements were among the matters whose UN 
prescriptions the Administration sought to excise. Clinton did not at any time 
exert pressure over Israel's settlement activity comparable to that of his 
predecessor. He was not prepared either to take the domestic political risk that 
Bush had taken when refusing Israel ' s loan guarantee request, or to risk a re-
opening, with probable attendant unravelling, of the Oslo process. The 
Administration came to realise the cost of its not having addressed the 
settlements question from the outset. Israel ' s settlements activity was to 
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become a major cause of contention between Israelis and Palestinians. 
Clinton's subsequent effort to persuade the Israeli government to desist proved 
unsuccessful, as will be shown in chapter 7. 
The Administration was somewhat constrained in its dealings with 
Israel and the Palestinians by congressional attitudes, but was able to tum some 
congressional requirements to its advantage. This was particularly so in 
respect of the Palestinians, for whom the threat of negative American sanctions 
outweighed the positive sanctions that were extended. Clinton imposed 
conditions on the PLO when his Administration entered into formal relations 
with it in September 1993; and the Administration reported quarterly to the 
Con.gress on PLO activity. 193 Its threat of negative sanctions, coupled with the 
provision of external assistance to the Palestinians, was used to effect the 
removal from the Palestinian National Covenant of clauses that called for 
Israel's extinction. But with an annual pledge to the Palestinians amounting to 
just 3 .3 per cent of the $3 billion allocated to Israel each year, any authority the 
Administration might hope to exercise over them through positive sanctions 
was limited. 
The United States could reasonably expect that there would be some 
opposition to the Oslo accords among Israelis and Palestinians. It could not 
have anticipated the cycle of violence and retributive action that eventuated, or 
the murder of an Israeli premier. It responded to these unintended 
consequences, which threatened the peace process. Clinton secured significant 
regional condemnation of terrorism, although some key states that facilitated, 
if not actually supported terrorism, were not party to the condemnation. He 
also strongly encouraged the Palestinians to restrain terrorist activity; and he 
issued an Executive Order that proscribed assistance to Hamas. 
Clinton had explicitly conditioned support for a Palestinian self-
governing agency on its ability to maintain law and order within its jurisdiction 
and was able to use the congressional scrutiny offered by MEPF A for this. 
Arafat showed that he was able to restrain his opponents when it suited him, as 
he did in helping to create a climate conducive to Peres ' s election to the 
premiership. But Clinton was reliant on an individual who was disinclined 
193 Mark (2003). Palestinians and Middle East Peace, p.5 
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always to exercise restraint. When Arafat did so, it was in ways that were 
often contrary to international human rights norms. The Palestinian Authority 
was not alone in this: breaches of customary international law affecting human 
rights were committed by both Israelis and Palestinians. 194 These might be 
presumed to have troubled a president who was championing global 
observance of human rights and democratisation and who had explicitly denied 
particularism in human rights. 195 But priority was accorded to security, 
without which the peace process was stymied. 
Progress had been made in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation during the 
tenure of Israel's Labor government, but it was tentative. Much of the address 
of Clinton's Administration had perforce been the protection of a process 
whose vulnerability had been exposed by extremists opposed to the 
accommodations that were being concluded. 
194 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace. When Arafat arrested a number of operatives from 
the Hamas military wing in 1995 and created 'security courts' to try them, Rabin urged the US 
not to pressure Arafat on the human rights questions raised by these courts. p.193 
195 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul, 10 July 1993. 
Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993. Clinton said that 'democracy and human rights are 
not Wes tern imports. They flow from the internal spirit of human beings because they reflect 
universal aspirations'. p.1056 
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Chapter 5 
Progress and regional cooperation: the United States, Israel and Jordan; 
and the multilateral negotiations, 1992-97 
President Clinton's peace objective in the Middle East included a 
requirement that 'peace must be comprehensive ... [ with the expectation 
that] ... the wider Arab and Muslim worlds ... [would] ... normalise their relations 
with Israel' .1 The Administration wished to engage Israel's Arab neighbours 
in a constructive partnership with Israel that would assure Israel's legitimacy 
as a Middle Eastern state. Significant steps along that route had been taken by 
Egypt (1979) and the Palestinians (1993). A peace treaty was to be concluded 
between Israel and Jordan in 1994; and the Administration used the 
multilateral channel established under the Madrid conference, and regional 
economic conferences, to help secure Israel's peaceful integration into the 
region. 
The United States, Israel and Jordan 
Clinton received King Hussein in June 1993 and obtained a firm 
undertaking of his intent to pursue peace with Israel. A week later the king 
wrote to the president describing his vision of peace, and Clinton passed a 
copy of the letter to Israel. Soon afterwards, and in recognition of Jordan's 
rehabilitation as a helpful associate in the search for a comprehensive peace 
settlement, Clinton asked the Congress to resume military and economic 
assistance to Jordan.2 Jordan's agenda for peace had been ready since October 
1992, but King Hussein had preferred to wait until some progress had been 
made between the Israelis and Palestinians.3 He had also overseen the 
composition of a Jordanian Parliament likely to be receptive to a peace treaty 
with Israel. The path had thereby been cleared for Jordan to move quickly 
once there were clear indications of movement on the Palestinian side. 
1 Clinton, W.J. (1994). Teleconference Remarks with B'nai B'rith, 24 August 1994. Public 
Papers - President Clinton, 1994, p.1497 
2 Segev, S. (1998). Crossing the Jordan: Israel's hard road to peace. New York NY, St 
Martin's Press. p.299; Mr Marwan Kassim, former foreign minister of Jordan, said in an 
interview in Amman, on 8 May 2002 that it was Israel that had first hinted to the Jordanians of 
American debt forgiveness or military assistance if a peace treaty were to be concluded with 
Israel. 
3 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.538 
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The Israel-Palestinian breakthrough in 1993 opened the way. While in 
Washington for the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the Israelis and 
Jordanians initialled a substantive agenda for their own negotiation. Then, 
during a further visit for the pledging conference for the peace process held at 
the State Department on 1 October, Crown Prince Hassan and Shimon Peres 
announced the creation of a joint economic committee. The Administration 
linked this to the changed Israel-Palestinian circumstances, creating a trilateral 
US-Israeli-Jordanian working group to look at the next steps for economic 
development in the two Middle Eastern countries and how they would work 
with the Palestinians in Gaza and Jericho.4 
The antecedence of the Israel-Jordan agenda of September 1993 lay in 
many years of discreet, informal contact between the two parties. Despite the 
hostile character, at times, of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship, King Hussein 
and Prime Minister Rabin revealed to Clinton that they had known each other 
for some 20 years.5 The king's contact with other Israeli leaders dated from 
the late 1960s.6 The king and Peres, also then Israel's foreign minister, had 
drafted an agreement in London in 1987 on a framework for formal negotiation 
between their states, but it was to founder on suspicion and tension between 
Peres and his then prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir. Anticipating a deceptive 
ploy that was considered again in relation to the Oslo Declaration, the two 
parties had hoped that their draft could be presented as an American addendum 
to the Reagan plan of 1982.7 Secretary of State Shultz was initially well-
disposed toward it, and was prepared to visit the Middle East to see how the 
matter could be taken forward, but was discouraged from doing so by Shamir. 8 
All was not lost, however: some of the draft's provisions were later to 
influence part of the structure of the Madrid conference.9 But the king was to 
remain somewhat distrustful of Peres's ability to 'deliver' in view of his 
4 Djerejian, E.P. (1993). "Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - 15 
October 1993", p.745; Djerejian (1993). "War and Peace, 30 November 1993", p.877 5 Heikal. Secret Channels, p.526; Segev, S. (1998). Crossing the Jordan, p.298 6 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.630 
7 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall. The author cites an interview with King Hussein. p.448 8 Ibid. p.446; Peres, S. (1993) . The New Middle East. New York NY, Henry Holt and 
Company, Inc. p.56 
9 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall. The draft agreement provided for an international conference, 
participation in which would be based upon the parties ' acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 
338; negotiations in independent bilateral committees; and Palestinian representation through a 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. p.445 
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experience in 1987, and had greater confidence in Rabin 10 with whom he chose 
to work on the political negotiations, leaving the economic dimension largely 
in the hands of Peres and the Crown Prince. I I 
Consistent with his commitment to Clinton, the king proceeded with 
negotiations with Rabin. Less than a week after the October pledging 
conference, King Hussein and Rabin met secretly to discuss a peace agreement 
between their two countries. The king was conscious of the inconclusive 
nature of the Palestinian Declaration, and insisted that every issue between 
Israel and Jordan be resolved before he would agree to sign a peace treaty. In a 
critical reference to the Palestinian Declaration, King Hussein characterised to 
the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee as 'an unstable surrender treaty' 
any declaration that left major issues for resolution at a later date. I2 He sought 
the Israeli prime minister's endorsement of several principles: Israel's 
guarantee of his 'preferred status' in the Muslim shrines in East Jerusalem 
deriving from his direct descent from the Prophet Mohammad; Israel's 
withdrawal from a stretch of land that the Israeli army had captured during the 
1948 and 1967 wars; and a more generous division of the water of the Y armuk 
River between Israel and Jordan. 13 He achieved all of these objectives, 
although the area of land returned to Jordan was slightly less than that claimed. 
When the king met again with Clinton on 22 June 1994 and briefed him 
on progress, the president suggested that he make public his secret meetings 
with Rabin, adding that the Congress would be more receptive to the idea of 
granting Jordan the economic assistance that it needed were that to occur. The 
king responded positively, suggesting a public meeting with Rabin in October, 
but later advanced the date to 25 July 1994. A sense of urgency had been 
imparted by the conclusion of the Palestinians' Cairo Agreement on 4 May. 
The Palestinians had set the pace, but the Jordanians were concerned not to 
lose touch with the front runners. They were also apprehensive that Israel 
would conclude a separate agreement with Syria, and that there would be very 
10 Ibid. pp.539-40 
11 Ibid. p.540 
12 Segev, S. (1998). Crossing the Jordan. The author cites a report of a closed meeting of King 
Hussein with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 14 February 1994. p.302 
13 Ibid. p.300 
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little left for J ordan. 14 Accordingly, Jordan and Israel raced against the clock 
to complete their Declaration of Principles (known as the Washington 
Declaration, distinguishing it from the Palestinians') in time for a signing 
ceremony at the White House. Although the American Administration had 
been apprised of developments from time to time, a copy of the final draft was 
only made available to it on the day before its execution. And, indicative of an 
uneasy truce between Rabin and Peres, Rabin told the press that Peres had 
been totally excluded from the secret initiative with J ordan. 15 
Clinton, who had already had to address Assad's concerns about 
Israel's negotiating priorities, did not want the Israel-Jordan agreement to 
complicate the tentative negotiation under way between Israel and Syria. King 
Hussein was also concerned about Syria's possible reaction to the Washington 
Declaration. Its signature represented a breach of Jordan's commitment to 
keep its formal relations with Israel within an Arab consensus. Clinton 
telephoned Assad on the eve of its signature to assure him that the United 
States would continue to mediate a peace agreement between Israel and Syria 
and that he would accordingly be sending Christopher back to the Middle 
East. 16 Later, after the signing of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty on 26 October 
1994, the Syrians were to complain that relations between the two countries 
were too warm. The king was determined, however, that Jordan's peace with 
Israel would not be like the 'cold peace' between Egypt and Israel. 17 
The US contribution to the conclusion of the peace treaty was an 
indirect one. It was not a participant in the negotiations, but it had established 
the framework within which they were able to take place. That involved a 
reassessment of America's interests in Jordan, and the re-establishment of 
friendly relations with it. The Bush Administration had presided over the 
14 Interviews with Senator Zeid Rifai, former prime minister of Jordan, Amman, 12 May 2002, 
and Dr Munther J. Haddadin, former minister of water and irrigation, Amman, 9 May 2002 15 Segev, S. (1998). Crossing thelordan, p.304 
16 Clinton, W.J. (1994). The President's News Conference with King Hussein of Jordan and 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel, 26 July 1994. Public Papers - President Clinton, 
1994, p .13 11 
17 Segev, S. (1998). Crossing the Jordan. Substance was given to the peace treaty through 
fifteen agreements concluded between February 1995 and January 1996 covering matters such 
as energy, sanitation, police, environment, commerce, agriculture, transportation (including 
aviation), science and technology, communications and tourism. The most meaningful dealt 
with security cooperation. It brought into the open the existence of the numerous 'informal 
understandings' that had been reached between the two countries in the past forty years. 
pp.310-1 
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change in American policy, and the Clinton Administration built upon it, 
urging the parties to continue their negotiations , and encouraging King Hussein 
to believe that American aid would be forthcoming. 
The Clinton Administration used Jordan's economic difficulties to its 
advantage. The Congress's suspension of aid to Jordan in 1991 18 had 
contributed to Jordan's problems, but the kingdom's economic woes were of 
longer-standing. 19 By 1990, because of unmet financial pledges from the Gulf 
states, Jordan had been forced to reschedule its external debt and resort to 
revenue extraction from domestic sources in its quest to balance the budget. 20 
The Administration wanted the Jordanian government to be able to 
demonstrate that the peace treaty was of benefit to the people of that country. 
Jordan has a population with significant links to the Palestinians, which is 
sympathetic to their condition. American economic assistance might not be 
sufficient to ensure their support for the peace process, but tangible benefits 
might moderate opposition to it. 
From their first official meeting in June 1993, Clinton was to find King 
Hussein a committed partner of the United States in the search for an Arab-
Israel peace settlement. The president was to call upon the king's assistance a 
number of times in his dealings with the Palestinians, and in his attempts to 
build a regional consensus against terrorism. The king proved to be an active 
and helpful ally. Clinton's gratitude was evident in his promise to King 
Hussein in mid-1994 to seek forgiveness of Jordan 's debt to the United States, 
which at that time amounted to $702.3 million (including $309.9 million in 
military loans).21 The Administration also urged Jordan's other creditors to 
forgive Jordan's debt, but they were largely unwilling to do so and at the tum 
18 Prados , A.B. (200 1). Jordan: U.S. relations and bilateral issues. Washington DC, 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. The Congress required that the 
President certify that aid to Jordan was in the US national interest, that Jordan supported the 
Arab-Israel peace process, that Jordan was in compliance with UN sanctions against Iraq, and 
that special congressional notification be applied to expenditure of aid funds for Jordan. p.9 19 Brand , L.A. (1994). "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's relations with Syria and 
Iraq, 1975-81."International Journal of Middle East Studies Vol.26 No.~ (August 1994). 
Although various regional factors, particularly developments in the Arab-Israel conflict, have 
long been used to explain Jordan's relations with Iraq and Syria, Laurie Brand has shown that 
the timing and nature of Jordanian behaviour during the period 1975-81 is best explained in 
terms of the drive to ensure state-revenue sources. p.409 
20 Ibid. p.410 
21 Prados (2001). Jordan. An additional $27 million was eventually required because of 
changing interest rates. p.12 
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of the twenty-first century Jordan's indebtedness remained at over $7 billion.22 
After the signing of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, the Administration 
reinstated economic and military assistance to Jordan at about $220 million a 
year and, as a special dispensation in recognition of King Hussein's 
contribution to the Wye River negotiations of October 1998, Clinton sought an 
additional $300 million appropriation to be spread over three years.23 Jordan 
also earned America's favour for hosting one of the four economic summits, 
complementary to the peace process. 
The level of American aid to Jordan has not been large, especially 
when compared to the volume of US assistance to Israel and Egypt. The 
Administration offered Jordan an economic benefit in another form. In 
October 2000 Clinton and the new monarch of Jordan, King Abdullah II, 
witnessed the signing of a US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement.24 Clinton 
explicitly linked conclusion of this treaty to the peace process.25 The treaty' s 
relatively early conclusion was a signal development for, until the 1990s, the 
United States had concluded only two free trade agreements (with Israel in 
1985 and Canada in 1989).26 The agreement with Jordan had its provenance in 
the agreement with Israel. In 1996, in recognition of developments in the 
Middle East, the agreement with Israel was extended to cover goods produced 
or manufactured in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus providing Palestinian 
exporters with duty-free access to the American market; and to cover products 
from qualifying industrial zones between Israel and Jordan, and Israel and 
Egypt. Ten Jordanian industrial zones qualified under this provision by 2001 . 
Egypt has not registered its industrial zones under the provision, preferring to 
await the conclusion of a comprehensive regional peace.27 The possibility of a 
22 Ibid. p.2 
23 Ibid . p.11 
24 Ibid. It was signed into law by President George W . Bush on 28 September 2001. pp.11 -12 25 Clinton, W .J. (2000). Remarks on Signing the Jordan-United States Trade Agreement, 24 
October 2000. Public Papers - President Clinton, 2000. He said: 'Nowhere are the benefits of 
trade more critically needed than in the Middle East. By opening markets, we can help to ease 
poverty that makes peace hard to achieve and harder still to sustain '. p.2609 26 Cooper, W.H. (2002). Free Trade Agreements: impact on U.S. trade and implications for 
U.S. trade policy. Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. 
p . l ; Albright, M.K. (1 997). "Building a Bipartisan Foreign Policy - 7 February 1997." US 
Department of State Dispatch (February 1977). The Clinton Administration had negotiated 
more than 200 trade agreements since 1993. p.19 
27 Ruebner, J. (2001 ). U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. Washington DC, Congressional 
Research Service, The Library of Congress. pp.2, 3, 5 
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bilateral American free trade agreement with Egypt has also been considered. 
Clinton received representations from 26 senators in August 2000 urging him 
to negotiate a free trade agreement with Egypt that would form the basis for a 
Middle East free trade region embracing all of the places mentioned above. 
Egypt is sensitive to the fact that Jordan, which stood apart from the Gulf War 
coalition, has an agreement while Egypt does not. The US position is that 
Egypt is not in a position economically to satisfy the requirement for an 
agreement;28 while the more ambitious regional free trade zone proposal is 
unlikely to prove politically feasible before a settlement of the Arab-Israel 
dispute. 
Multilateral negotiations 
America's objective of expanding the number of Arab and Muslim 
countries to engage with Israel was pursued through Madrid's multilateral 
channel. By encouraging closer functional links among all regional states, the 
United States sought to foster broader social and political understandings and 
to encourage adaptation to a new perception of shared concems.29 Further, the 
Administrations of both Bush and Clinton saw the well-being of their country 
linked to an expansion of the world's free market. James Baker, the architect 
of the Madrid framework, said in another context: 'the free markets ... will 
support global - and American - prosperity'. 3° Clinton's Administration 
advanced a global vision of democracy underpinned by free market forces. An 
easing of political tension in the Middle East could facilitate the opening of 
markets, thus encouraging the movement of foreign capital and enterprise and 
promote nationally-sponsored or internationally-assisted econorruc 
development, which in tum could lead to a normalisation of relations among 
28 Interview with Mr Gene Cretz, US Embassy, Cairo, 5 May 2002 29 In the functionalist view, a society has an underlying tendency to be in equilibrium (balance). Functionalism tends to emphasize consensus among the members of society on 
basic values, social order and stability in the social system. The term dysfunction is used to 
refer to negative social consequences. On occasion some element may disrupt the social 
balance, being functional in one respect and dysfunctional in another. Silver, M.L. 
"Functionalist Theory." Hempstead NY, Hofstra University. 
http://people.hofstra.edu/faculty/Marc L Silver/S%20185/Functionalisttheory.htm - accessed 
22 January 2003 
30 Baker (1992). "Summons to Leadership", p.322 
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regional countries.31 Israel's involvement in this circular process would assure 
its legitimacy as a regional partner. A Middle East regional development bank 
was postulated,32 which could provide technical expertise and finance. And 
American business would be a direct beneficiary. 
The Americans had other reasons for instituting the multilateral 
channel. It was designed to draw in the international community, which had 
been largely excluded from the Madrid conference, and to send a powerful 
signal that all the participants, regional and non-regional, were fully committed . 
to the ending of the Arab-Israel dispute. 33 Also, the Administration had 
concluded that the United States 'could not afford to shoulder the entire 
promise and obligation of peace as it had done at Camp David' .34 Some 
sharing of the financial burden would be necessary, and the chairmanships of 
the working groups established under the rubric of the multilateral channel 
would be distributed essentially among the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) states committed to the peace process 
and deemed likely to contribute financially toward its realisation.35 
Madrid's multilateral working groups 
Bush had been content that the multilateral channel be launched in 
Moscow, given that the critical bilateral negotiations were being conducted in 
Washington. This occurred in January 1992. Most of the 36 participants 
initially took part in order to go along with the United States.36 The 11 Middle 
Eastern and North African states widened by seven the number of Arab states 
prepared to work alongside Israel within the Madrid framework, but key Arab 
31 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Middle East Peace 
Process, 1 October 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993. Clinton said that 'the 
region can grow more rapidly when all its partners can trade with one another and invest in one 
another'. p.1644 
32 Baker (1995). The Politics of Diplomacy. The idea of a Middle East Development Bank was 
advanced by Secretary Baker in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 
7 February 1991. p.413 
33 Peters, J. (1994). Building Bridges: the Arab-Israeli multilateral talks. London UK, The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. p.4 
34 Djerejian (1993). "The multilateral talks", p .697 
35 Ibid. The chairmanships were: steering group (United States of America and Russia), arms 
control and regional security (United States of America and Russia), economic development (European Community), environment (Japan), refugees (Canada) and water resources (United 
States of America). pp.697-8. The United Nations was represented in all the working groups. 36 Landau, E. (2001). Egypt and Israel in ACRS: bilateral concerns in a regional arms control 
process. Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv University p.10 
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states were not as enthusiastic about the multilateral track as they were about 
bilateral negotiations. Lebanon and Syria refused to participate in the working 
groups, without giving reasons, and tried to enlist Arab support for their 
position.37 Later, they said that they would not participate until there was more 
progress in the bilateral negotiations.38 
The framework devised by the Bush Administration had been so 
constructed that the working groups would remain a bit behind the pace of the 
bilateral negotiations where real progress had to be achieved. This perception 
was shared, to some extent, by regional participants who were wary of letting 
Israel gain too much in terms of improved regional relations before it had made 
substantive progress in negotiations with the Palestinians and Syria in 
particular. 39 The US architects hoped that developments within the groups 
would have a positive effect on the bilateral negotiations through a 'pre-
negotiation process' of defining and redefining their conflictual relationship, 
moving from problem recognition to problem solving,40 and reaching 
agreement on confidence-building measures. 
The working groups covered water, economic development, refugees, 
the environment, and regional security and arms control41 and were linked 
through a Steering Group under US and Russian joint chairmanship.42 The 
contributions of the various working groups differ, as does the import of the 
matters under discussion. During Clinton's presidency contentious matters 
were raised in the groups on arms control and regional security, and refugees, 
and in connection with the group on regional economic development. The 
non-participation of Lebanon and Syria precluded discussion of the Jordan 
River basin in the working group on water. 
37 Abbas. Through Secret Channels, p.97 
38 Djerejian (1993). "Statement, 27 July 1993", p.570 
39 Landau. Egypt and Israel, pp.7, 10 
40 Zartman, I.W. (1989). Prenegotiation: phases and functions. Getting to the Table: the 
processes of international prenegotiation. J. G. Stein. Baltimore MD, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
41 Djerejian, E.P. (1992). "Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee - 17 March 1992." US Department of State Dispatch (23 March 1992) p.218 
42 Membership of the Steering Group comprised the United States of America and Russia, 
Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia (representing the Gulf states), Tunisia 
(representing the Maghreb), Japan, Canada and the European Union. 
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The United States co-chaired the arms control and regional security 
(ARCS) working group. All issues related to the arms control debate were on 
its agenda. In a region in which the asymmetrical power balance lay in Israel's 
favour, it was inevitable that the Clinton Administration and Israel would have 
to find some way to deal with questioning of Israel's assumed nuclear 
capability when confronted with the argument that it was no longer acceptable 
for one Middle Eastern country to remain exempt from the international arms 
control regime that applied to all other regional states. America's 
chairmanship facilitated a separation of issues before the group into two 
'baskets', which deflected discussion for some time from the nuclear question 
by encouraging the group's focus on matters in an 'operational basket' where 
significant progress was achieved.43 Egypt was concerned, however, that a 
comprehensive peace settlement would result in a challenge by Israel for 
regional hegemony in view of its technological and nuclear supremacy. In 
Egypt's self-view, its identity as the leader of the Arab world was at stake. In 
the first half of 1995, and as the NPT Review and Extension Conference 
approached, Egypt used the ACRS forum to demand that Israel sign the NPT 
as the price of Egypt's support for an indefinite extension of the treaty. The 
Administration was investing heavily in an extension of the treaty and asked 
Israel to find some means of addressing Egypt's concerns. Israel suggested 
embarking on discussion of a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle 
East two years after having signed peace agreements with all regional states, 
including Iran and Iraq. It would then consider joining the NPT. Egypt 
countered with demands for the opening of discussion of a NWFZ in the 
Middle East before the NPT conference, and Israel's commitment to sign the 
NPT within two years of signing peace agreements with Lebanon and Syria. 
Signature of the NPT would, of course, require Israel to open its nuclear 
facilities to IAEA inspection, which it was loathe to do. 
Egypt tactically targeted the United States on the question of Israel's 
assumed nuclear capability. The United States had greater influence with 
Israel than any other country. President Kennedy had pushed for inspection of 
Israel's nuclear facility; and President Carter had proven an effective 
43 Landau. Egypt and Israel, pp.17-8 
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intermediary at Camp David in 1978. Perhaps Clinton, in the Democratic 
succession, might be able to effect some change in the Israeli position. By 
1995, European organisations had advanced their own set of initiatives to 
establish regional security partnerships between countries in Europe and the 
Mediterranean. This involved some Middle Eastern and North African 
countries.44 They adopted the Barcelona Declaration in November of that year, 
acknowledging the complementarities of the Madrid and Barcelona 
processes.45 But Egypt did not insist on a specific clause in the Barcelona 
Declaration requiring all parties to adhere to the NPT in the near future. 
Israel's assumed nuclear capability presented a particular difficulty for 
the United States. Such a capability guaranteed Israel's security, but ran 
counter to Clinton's identification of non-proliferation of WMD as a high 
foreign policy priority. The United States had helped to forge the international 
non-proliferation regime and was committed to securing its universal 
acceptance. This included accession to the NPT and its accompanying CTBT. 
In the context of nuclear developments in South Asia, Clinton invited attention 
to America's and India's shared interest in the CTBT and an end to the 
production of fissile materials. He was challenged about preparedness to 
pressure India to conform with non-proliferation norms while not doing so to 
Israel. He responded that 'the fewer countries who become nuclear powers, 
the better off we're all going to be' .46 The president's objective was 'to keep 
the number of people in the nuclear club as small as possible and then reduce 
the nuclear arsenals that they have, including our own' .47 In his view, it ought 
to be possible for nations to guarantee their security in other ways and it was 
up to America to assist in that process. This longer-term vision has attraction, 
but it did not address immediate questions relating to constraining states 
44 Among the regional participants in the bilateral and multilateral negotiations within the 
Madrid framework, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia and the Palestinian 
Authority are members of Euro-Mediterranean partnership. European Union (1995). The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. EU Directorate-General External Relations. 
http://www.euromed.int/comm/external relations/euromed/ - accessed 22 April 2002 45 European Union (2001). The EU and the Middle East Peace Process - the Union's position 
and role. EU Directorate-General External Relations. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/mepp/index.htm - accessed 27 December 2001 46 Clinton, W.J. (1994). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha 
Rao of India, 19 May 1994. Public Papers - President Clinton, J 994, p.955 47 Ibid. p.956 
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outside the regime that possess a nuclear capability, or the value of norms that 
are not uniformly applied or upheld by one of their principal proponents . 
The Administration had to weigh which would better serve its interests 
- the peace process, or Israel's subscription to the NPT? It rated preservation 
of the peace process as important and the more likely of the alternatives to be 
achieved. Clinton was later to put in writing: 'From the beginning of my 
administration, one factor has guided me: to take no action that I judged would 
harm the peace process'. 48 A number of reasons may be adduced for the 
prioritisation. First, President Kennedy's Administration had failed to 
uncover evidence of Israel's development of nuclear weaponry, and America 
would not wish to place itself in a similar position again. Second, Israel had 
honoured its commitment to Kennedy that it would not be the first state in the 
Middle East to test a nuclear weapon, and Israel signed the CTBT in 1996. 
Third, accordingly there is no publicly available evidence that Israel possesses 
a nuclear capacity. Fourth, the NPT and the non-proliferation regime had 
shown a robust ability to survive without Israel's signature. Fifth, Clinton 
would not have wished to press a matter that could alienate his Jewish 
supporters a year out from his re-election for a second term. And finally, the 
ambiguity that surrounds the question of whether Israel possesses nuclear 
weaponry suited the broader purposes of both Israel and the United States in 
the Middle East. They found it convenient that other states believed that Israel 
had such a capability and that they factor this into their own foreign policy 
equations without the necessity of Israel declaring it. Convinced that no 
accommodation was possible between Israel and Egypt on this issue, the 
United States suspended the ACRS talks indefinitely in order that they not 
adversely affect the peace process or Israel-Egypt relations in general.49 
The working group on refugees became a forum for the iteration of 
matters germane to any bilateral settlement between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. No other community of refugees was discussed. 'Refugees' 
having been reserved under the 1993 Declaration for consideration in relation 
to final status negotiations, doubt could be entertained about progress being 
48 Clinton, W.J. (2000). Written Responses to Questions Submitted by the Arabic-language 
Newspaper Al Hayat, 10 August 2000. Public Papers - President Clinton, 2000, p.1855 49 Landau. Egypt and Israel, pp.19-20 
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achieved within this working group. Such progress as was achieved tended to 
be 'technical'. The group decided to seek reliable data on the Palestinian 
population, especially in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon; and Israel agreed to 
increase four-fold to 2,000 the number of family reunion applications it would 
process annually. 
American hegemony over the Madrid process was challenged within 
the regional economic development working group (REDWG). This group, 
more than any other, was predicated on the functionalist thesis that the 
'adaptive' role performed by the economy would drive and strengthen the 
foundations for political agreement. It was convened by the European Union, 
whose predecessor institution had tasked the World Bank to produce a report 
on the economy of the occupied Palestinian territories and to draw up a list of 
priority projects to overcome the infrastructural constraints on economic 
cooperation in the region. The Bank's report provided the basis for directing 
the aid pledged in Washington in October 1993. America's pre-emptive 
calling of that donors' conference, and its subsequent desire to remove 
economic development of the occupied territories from the remit of REDWG, 
was seen by the Europeans as diminishing their role in the peace process. 
They suspected Washington of seeking to marginalise them as 'payers, not 
players'. 50 A compromise was devised, after what has been described as 
'intense discussions', 51 whereby the World Bank's Paris office would provide 
the operational headquarters for aid to the Palestinians, monitored by an ad hoc 
liaison committee that would report to both REDWG, and the Steering 
Committee on which the United States was joint chairman. 
During the course of their brief life-span, the working groups were 
successful in realising one of America's objectives. They initiated acceptance 
of Israel as a partner in regional affairs. Official Israeli delegations were 
received at meetings with delegations from Arab and Muslim states, including 
in Egypt, Morocco, Oman, Qatar and Tunisia. With the exception of Egypt, 
none had diplomatic relations with Israel, but several were to open 'liaison' 
offices in the Jewish state. One of the criticisms levelled at Arafat by 
50 Brackman, N. (2000). "The Multilaterals : status and prospects." Peace Watch No.244 (28 
January 2000). Washington DC, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. p.2. 
http://www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/brn03.html - accessed 21 January 2003 
51 Peters. Building Bridges, p.28 
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Palestinians was that the Oslo accords had opened the way for the 
normalisation of relations with Israel by a number of countries normally 
supportive of their cause, including China. The process of legitimating Israel 
was set back by Netanyahu's uncompromising attitude toward the Palestinians 
and abruptly halted after a botched attempt by Israeli agents to assassinate a 
senior Hamas official in Amman in September 1997.52 The United States had 
to pressure Qatar to go ahead with its previous decision to host the fourth 
Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit in November 1997 with 
Israeli participation. Most Arab countries boycotted the conference,53 
dramatising the deterioration in the peace process.54 Such was the dynamic 
between the bilateral and multilateral negotiations that when implementation of 
the Oslo process stalled, the working groups ceased to meet. They are unlikely 
to be revived unless substantial progress is achieved in bilateral negotiations. 
The Middle East and North Africa Economic Summits 
After the demise of the Soviet Union, American Administrations 
espoused the view that democratisation, backed by market economics, would 
contribute to international stability. Clinton's Administration had 'made clear 
its view that supporting American business overseas would be at the heart of 
[its] foreign policy interests' .55 Secondary and tertiary boycotts had been 
imposed by the Arab League on American and other foreign-owned companies 
that traded with Israel. For Clinton, such discriminatory arrangements had to 
be removed in the context of normalising Israel's relations with Arab states, 
52 Morris. Righteous Victims. Three Mossad agents were arrested by the Jordanian police. 
King Hussein secured the release of the Barnas leader, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, and other gaoled 
terrorists in exchange for the Mossad operatives. p.645; Albright (2003) . Madam Secretary, 
records that the Sheikh was one of 70 Palestinians held as terrorists that Netanyahu had to 
release as part of the exchange, negating the pressure she had been putting on Arafat to arrest 
terrorists. p.298 
53 Segev, S. (1998). Crossing the Jordan, p. I; Telhami, S. and M. Barnett (2002). Introduction. 
Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East. S. Telhami and M. Barnett. Ithaca NY, Cornell 
University Press p.21 
54 Morocco and Tunisia froze their normalisation process and Morocco turned down requests 
by ministers of the Netanyahu government to visit Rabat. Oman and Qatar adhered to an Arab 
summit decision to freeze normalisation, and Oman closed its 'liaison' office in Israel. 
55 Pelletreau Jr, R.H. (1994). "The Growing Role of Economics in the Middle East Peace 
Mosaic, 17 November 1994." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.5 No.48 p.795 
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and the Administration applied itself to securing that objective.56 Clinton had 
initially seemed prepared to accept that the peace process may have to be· 
finished first,57 but his position was to firm in favour of an early lifting of the 
boycott.58 Saudi Arabia was receptive to the argument for the ending of the 
boycott, and under its leadership the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) declared that they would no longer enforce the secondary and tertiary 
aspects of the economic boycott and that they would support a move in the 
Arab League to end the primary boycott of Israel. 59 Qatar began supplying 
natural gas to Israel. 
With arrangements 1n train for the removal of this obstruction, the 
Administration engaged the attention of the American and international 
business community in the commercial prospect offered by a Middle East 
peace. It concurred in a proposal broached by Peres with the World Economic 
Forum of Davos, Switzerland, that the Forum and the New York-based 
Council on Foreign Relations sponsor a Middle East and North Africa 
Economic Conference at Casablanca in 1994. 60 The participants at that 
conference agreed: to establish a Middle East and North Africa Development 
Bank, and called for a group of experts to examine different options for 
funding mechanisms; to establish a Regional Tourist Board; to encourage the 
private sector to create a Regional Chamber of Commerce and Business 
Council; and to institutionalise the process through a Steering Committee and 
56 Baker had raised this matter unsuccessfully with Arab foreign ministers attending the 1992 
UN General Assembly, and pledged to work for an ending of the boycott in his letter of 
assurances to Israel on the eve of the Madrid Conference. 
57 Clinton, W.J. (1993). Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on the Middle East peace 
process, 1 October 1993. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1993, p.1644 
58 Clinton, W.J. (1994). Teleconference Remarks with B'nai B'rith, 24 August 1994. Public 
Papers - President Clinton, 1994. He expressed a desire to bring the boycott of Israel to an 
immediate end: 'the boycott harms American companies, and it has no place in the peace 
process'. p.1498 
59 Clinton, W.J. (1994). Remarks Welcoming Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Foreign 
Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, 3 October 1994. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1994, 
p.1679; US Department of State (1995). "Joint Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the 
Gulf Cooperation Council and U.S. Secretary of State, Jeddah, 12 March 1995." US 
Department of State Dispatch Vol.6 No.14. The GCC's decision to terminate the secondary 
and tertiary aspects of the boycott was announced on 30 September 1994. p.264 
60 Savir (1998). The Process, pp.84-5. The summits had their genesis in a meeting in Jordan 
between Peres and King Hussein in November 1993. Representatives from 61 countries 
attended, together with more than 1,100 businessmen and the senior executives of various 
international organisations. A declaration adopted by the conference recognised the 
achievements made in the peace process and stressed that they needed to be reinforced by solid 
economic growth and a palpable improvement of the life and security of the peoples of the 
reg10n. 
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Executive Secretariat in Rabat, Morocco. Israel's institutional links to the 
regional community seemed to have been affirmed and expanded. 
After the success of the first conference, the Administration decided to 
incorporate economic summits into its overall strategy for the attainment of a 
comprehensive peace settlement. The State and Commerce Departments 
assumed the American role in organising the meetings in association with their 
European partner. Subsequent conferences were held in Amman (October 
1995), Cairo (November 1996) and Doha (November 1997).61 Because the 
Israel-Palestinian negotiations had stalled by late 1997, no progress was made 
on the implementation of the various proposed instruments of regional 
economic cooperation, and no decision was taken to hold a fifth conference. 
The United States had seen the conferences as offering a substantive 
inducement to Israel. Normalisation of relations with Israel by regional states 
would bring a 'peace dividend' to Israel that would compensate it for expected 
territorial concessions in the bilateral negotiations with the Palestinians and 
Syria. This precept reflects some of Peres' s ideas. 62 For him, security was not 
just a military phenomenon: it also had political, psychological and economic 
components. He believed strongly in the economic dimension of peace-
making. Arab states found Peres' s vision disturbing for it seemed to 
foreshadow Israeli economic hegemony in the region. The fear that Egypt had 
expressed in the ACRS working group about Israel's emergence as the 
dominant regional power also had an econormc dimension. The 
Administration's support for a regional development bank located in Cairo was 
intended to assuage Arab concern that direct foreign investment, encouraged 
into the region by an improvement in political relations, would be channelled 
preferentially to Israel where socio-economic conditions were receptive, 
enabling it to build upon an already strong economic base. A development 
bank would channel investment capital into approved projects in Arab 
developing countries. 
61 All commanded the attendance of large numbers of states and businessmen, as well as 
officials of relevant international organisations. Even the Doha summit, the least successful of 
the set and which was boycotted by Arab states, attracted 2,000 people including official 
delegations from 66 countries. 
62 Peres (1993). New Middle East. 
Despite American hopes that multilateral diplomacy would result in 
a broadening of ties among the countries in the region, the record shows 
that, with few exceptions, the relationship between Israel and its Arab and 
Muslim neighbours remained conditional and dependent on political 
factors. 63 
Conclusion 
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Despite the failure of the multilateral negotiations, the Madrid 
framework that Clinton inherited from his predecessor was not fundamentally 
flawed. That the bilateral channel produced movement between the Israelis 
and Palestinians, and the conclusion of a peace treaty in October 1994 between 
Israel and Jordan, showed that it provided an appropriate setting for the 
attainment of a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. 
Although the Israel-Jordan peace treaty was achieved without direct US 
intervention, it was pursued in the context of America's power to dispense 
positive sanctions. The Administration was aware that Jordan's economic 
difficulties had been compounded by the cessation of US aid. Clinton 
encouraged the king's predisposition to resolve his country's differences with 
Israel, and held out the prospect of assistance to his country. Jordan's debt to 
the United States was forgiven. Signature of the peace treaty brought a 
resumption of American aid to Jordan; a supplementary allocation to Jordan in 
gratitude for the king's personal contribution toward an agreement at Wye in 
1988; and a US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement in 2000. The United States 
continues to back the Israel-Jordan peace treaty, as it has the peace treaty 
between Israel and Egypt concluded in 1979, finding assistance to Egypt and 
Jordan less expensive than the cost of war were hostilities to break out among 
the parties once again.64 Both treaties survive, despite the evident tensions 
between Israelis and Palestinians and elsewhere in the Middle East. 
The multilateral channel fostered the development of links among all 
regional states and supported the bilateral negotiations by clarifying some 
issues that transcended Israel's borders. The engagement of the community of 
states interested in working through such matters with Israel, legitimated Israel 
63 Brackman. "The Multilaterals", p.1. 
64 Interview with Mr Gene Cretz, US Embassy, Cairo, 5 May 2002 
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as a regional actor. The Administration's principal achievement was a 
broadening acceptance of Israel, which was received as a regional partner at 
meetings in some Arab and Islamic countries. Concern began to be expressed, 
however, by some Arab states which felt threatened by a process that seemed 
to be moving inexorably toward enshrining Israel as the dominant regional 
nuclear and economic power. America was not particularly successful in 
assuaging these concerns. The working group on arms control was closed 
down, under challenge from Egypt over Israel's refusal to subscribe to the 
NPT, in order to protect the peace process and the broader Israel-Egypt 
relationship; and a proposed regional bank to assist the development of Arab 
countries did not get off the ground. 
For a brief period, from 1992 to 1997, the multilateral channel had 
seemed productive and America's engagement in the overall peace process 
looked like producing a favourable political and economic outcome. The 
prospect of a Middle East peace settlement had attracted global attention, and 
the convening of economic summits complementary to the Madrid process had 
commanded considerable interest among governments, international 
organisations and the business community. The Administration failed to 
achieve its objective because the prospective economic outcome was 
dependent upon the political one. Neither Arab nor Muslim states, nor some 
other participating states, would commit themselves to an 'adaptive' 
functionalist role when confronted with evidence of a continuing conflictual 
relationship between the Israelis and Palestinians. Because that core issue was 
stalemated, the process had become dysfunctional. 65 An attempt by Israel to 
assassinate a Palestinian leader in the capital of a country with which it had 
concluded a peace treaty barely two years earlier brought to the surface deep-
seated suspicions of Israel among regional states, and the whole multilateral 
process to an abrupt halt. It is unlikely that the United States will feel 
sufficiently confident to resume the process before a significant 
accommodation is reached between Israel and the Palestinians. 
65 See p.160 n29 
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Chapter 6 
Advance and retreat: the United States, Israel and Syria; and Lebanon 
When Bush met Assad in 1990, his Administration's attempt to foster a 
resolution of the Palestinian question was already a matter of record. The two 
leaders discussed the importance of moving ahead on a peaceful resolution of 
the Middle East dispute in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338. 1 For the Americans, Arab acceptance of these resolutions as the 
basis of any negotiation was fundamental because it conveyed acceptance of 
Israel's existence. In 1991 the Bush Administration successfully persuaded 
Syria to attend an international conference, and was able to use Syria's 
agreement to pressure Israel into doing so too, thus bringing the Madrid 
conference to fruition. 
The United States, Israel and Syria 
The United States facilitated negotiation between the Israelis and 
Syrians in Washington in 1992. It became the go-between in their dialogue 
because Assad refused to extend the recognition to Israel that would have been 
implicit in direct negotiation. For Syria, it was one thing to participate in an 
international conference attended by an Israeli delegation, another to deal with 
Israel bilaterally on the basis of sovereign equality while Israel remained in 
occupation on Syrian soil. America began the negotiation process as a 
facilitator, later becoming a mediator2 and a full participant,3 accepting that to 
pursue its objective of a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute it 
had to become fully engaged in the Israel-Syria dialogue. This was accepted 
more readily by the Syrians than the Israelis.4 
1 Muslih, M. (1994). "Dateline Damascus: Asad is ready." Foreign Policy Iss.96 Fall 1994. In 
the context of the 1974 Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Agreement, both sides had declared that 
the disengagement of forces was only a step toward a just and durable peace based on UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. President Assad also made verbal commitments 
not to allow guerrilla raids from the Syrian side of the disengagement line. pp.145-6 
2 Rabinovich, I. (1998). The Brink of Peace: the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Princeton NJ, 
Princeton University Press. p.203; Cobban, H. (1999). The Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks: 1991-
96 and beyond. Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace Press. p.103 
3 Cob ban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.103 
4 Ibid. pp.129-30 
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The Rabin government's ambassador to the United States and principal 
Israeli negotiator with the Syrians, Itamar Rabinovich, described the early 
rounds of bilateral meetings in Washington as 'defined by reluctance, 
scepticism, and suspicion' 5 on both sides. The two countries assumed that the 
negotiations were likely to fail. 6 As the intermediary, the Bush Administration 
found itself retailing diametrically opposed points of departure. Assad sought 
Israel's 'full withdrawal' from the Golan Heights, although in the negotiations 
with Baker leading to the convening of the Madrid conference he had 
entertained the possibility of some international peace-keeping force being 
stationed in the Golan Heights upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Assad's 
objective was irreconcilable with Shamir' s view that Israel had met the 
requirement of UN Security Council Resolution 242 when it had returned the 
Sinai to Egypt.7 
Whatever outcome was reached in respect of the Golan would be 
measured against the return of the Sinai to Egypt. Egypt's recovery of the 
peninsula was, in part, a function of Anwar Sadat's penchant for the grand 
gesture, such as his visit to Jerusalem. His public diplomacy had helped to 
establish his credentials among Israelis. Assad had an entirely different 
personality; both Baker and Rabinovich attest to his formalistic and legalistic 
negotiating style, 'a meticulous tactician' .8 His call for a 'dignified 
comprehensive peace that will be acceptable to our peoples, that would entail 
5 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, p.40 
6 Ibid. p.41. Personal relations among the delegates were ostentatiously avoided on the Syrian 
side, while formal exchanges between delegates were often acrimonious. Such was the 
atmosphere between the two delegations that attempts by American officials to bring the 
leaders of the two delegations together privately were also unproductive; Arabic News (2000). 
"On the tripartite meeting in Shepherdstown." Arabic News, 11 January 2000. At the 
Shepherdstown meeting eight years later the Israeli Prime Minister and the Syrian Foreign 
Minister did not shake hands. 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/000106/2000010614.html - accessed 11 
February 2003 
7 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. Notwithstanding Shamir's interpretation of UN Security 
Council Resolution 242, which he sustained during eight rounds of Washington talks, he had 
secretly conveyed to the Syrians through a back channel in 1992 that his government did not 
rule out the possibility of some territorial concessions in the Golan as part of an Israeli-Syrian 
settlement. It seems unlikely that the American were aware of this at the time, because Israel's 
negotiators in Washington were still projecting the formal Israeli position. pp.41-3 
8 Ibid. p.250; Seale and Butler. "Asad's Regional Strategy." They said: 'Syria has made little 
effort to explain itself to the world either because it imagined the rightness of its cause was 
self-evident or because Israel 's influence over international opinion was judged too great to be 
worth challenging or simply because the Syrians failed to grasp the supreme importance of 
image-building and of the need for a systematic exposition of their policies' . p.41 
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no retraction of any of our national rights and would not hurt in any way the 
pride and dignity of our nation ... [a] peace of the brave' ,9 lacked public appeal. 
The Americans tried to get him to meet personally with the Israeli leadership, 
as did the Egyptians, French and Israelis, but he declined their overtures. 
While a summit probably could not have produced a major breakthrough, its 
convening would have carried an important signal of the earnest of the two 
parties to negotiate a settlement that must inevitably address the future of the 
Golan region. Assad held tenaciously to his requirement that an Israeli 
commitment to withdraw from occupied Syrian territory was a precondition for 
negotiation, whose purpose would be confined to the modalities of the 
withdrawal. 10 
Any · Syrian expectation that the Golan region could be returned in 
much the same way as the Sinai was returned to Egypt was questionable. The 
Golan area had been annexed to Israel, whereas the Sinai had not; and the act 
of annexing the Golan in 1981, after the return of the Sinai, was an 
unambiguous Israeli declaration that no further occupied territory would be 
ceded. America's position on Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights had 
been put in a letter to Rabin by President Ford in 1975. Baker explicitly 
reconfirmed Ford's commitment to give 'great weight to Israel's position that 
any peace agreement with Syria must be predicated on Israel remaining on the 
Golan Heights' 11 in his letter of assurances to Israel on the eve of the Madrid 
conference. 12 He also affirmed the applicability of the 'land for peace' 
principle to the Golan Heights; asserted that the United States would continue 
to oppose Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories; and stated that 
the United States did not intend to recognise any unilateral extension of Israeli 
9 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, cited at p.78. Assad seems consciously to have adopted the 
phrase 'peace of the brave', which was used by Clinton at the signing ceremony of the Israeli-
Palestinian Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993. 
10 Having failed to recover the Golan territory in the October War of 1973, Assad announced 
Syria's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in 1974; and in discussion 
with such US officials as Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Jimmy 
Carter, reiterated his commitment to ending military conflict and gradually moving toward a 
full peace settlement with Israel. He envisaged a phased process, with eventual normalisation 
of diplomatic and economic relations after Israel's complete withdrawal from the Golan and 
agreement with the Palestinians. 
11 Ford, G.R. (1975). Letter from President Ford to Prime Minister Rabin, 1 September 1975. 
Washington DC, The Brookings Institution. 
http ://www.brookings .edu/dybdocroot/press/appendix/appem c.htm - accessed 19 February 
2003 
12 Baker (1992). "U.S. letter of assurances to Israel", p.120 
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laws, sovereignty or administration to the Golan Heights. 13 The apparent 
contradiction provided, at the very least, sufficient ambiguity for the Clinton 
Administration to be able to mediate on the Golan question when it took office. 
In attempting to effect a deal on this matter, the Americans had to 
address conflicting interpretations of the area of land in question. The 
territory, like that of the West Bank, was susceptible of differing claims. Israel 
regards the boundary as the international border established in 1923 between 
what was then the British-mandated territory of Palestine and the French-
mandated territory of Syria. Syria believes it should be the line where Syrian 
and Israeli forces were deployed on the eve of the June 1967 war. 14 That line 
would give Syria access to the north-eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee. 15 
A popular belief among American officials was that there could be no 
peace in the Middle East without Syria. 16 To achieve it, the Administration 
would need to establish a relationship of trust with Syria. Members of the 
Administration thought that Syria might find this attractive in the light of the 
demise of the Soviet Union, its former supporter; America's enhanced role in 
the post-Cold War world; and America's ability to constrain Syria's eastern 
neighbour. In seeking a cooperative relationship with Syria, the Clinton 
Administration was at odds with prevailing sentiment in the Congress. Even 
before either Clinton or his predecessor had assumed office, the International 
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 197 6, and the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 required the secretaries of commerce and state to 
notify the Congress before licensing goods and technologies to countries that 
support acts of international terrorism. A by-product of the two laws was the 
13 Ibid. pp.119-20 
14 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace. The border had been set by the British ten metres east of 
the shoreline of the Sea of Galilee. The 1948 war ended with Syria in control of some 
territories west of the international border, only to lose them to Israel in 1967. pp.141-2; Slater, 
J. (2002). "Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Israel and Syria, 1948-
2001." International Security Vol.27 No. l. There is a history of customary Syrian usage of the 
Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias). Both Britain and France allowed the Syrian government to 
have a pier on the lake, and Syrian villagers to use the lake for fishing, to feed their cattle, and 
for drinking water. The legitimacy of the Israeli claim is confused by its insistence on the one 
hand that the armistice lines must reflect the military outcome of the 1948 war, which resulted 
in Israeli territorial gains going well beyond the UN partition plan boundaries, while on the 
other demanding that Syria withdraw to the 1923 international boundary. pp .84-6 
15 Prados. A.B. (2002). Syria: U.S. relations and bilateral issues. Washington DC, 
Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress. pp .3-4 
16 The aphorism expressed by American officials is: 'You can't have war in the Middle East 
without Egypt, or peace without Syria'. 
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so-called 'terrorism list', prepared annually by the State Department. The list 
identifies those countries that have repeatedly provided support for acts of 
international terrorism. Syria has appeared on it ever since it was first 
prepared in 1979, 17 although it has not been implicated in a terrorist incident 
since 1986.18 No American aid had been provided to Syria since 1981.19 
US legislation also required that normal relations with Syria be 
contingent upon improvements in its human rights record; a clear renunciation 
of terrorism and narcotics trafficking; and a reversal of other policies deemed 
inimical to American interests. Adherents to this view fear that 
Administrations may have made promises to ease sanctions (for example, 
removing Syria from the terrorism list) in order to obtain Syrian cooperation in 
regional affairs.20 Specifically, they view Syria's alignment with the Gulf War 
coalition and participation in the Madrid process as tactical moves that offer 
Syria an end to regional isolation, a free hand in Lebanon, and access to 
financial support from the Gulf states. They believe that Syria will remain a 
threat to regional stability. An alternative view, advanced by both the Bush 
and Clinton Administrations, is that a better relationship with Syria could 
enhance prospects for achieving American objectives. The proponents of this 
view do not advocate the immediate termination of sanctions without further 
action on Syria's part. Rather, they support wider contacts between diplomatic 
and security officials of the two countries and the conclusion of a series of 
small, reciprocal steps that could lead to a warmer relationship over time. 
Assad had observed the terms of the 197 4 Disengagement Agreement in the 
17 Prados (2002). Syria. Syria interprets Hezbollah's resistance to Israel's military presence in 
southern Lebanon and the Palestinians' pursuit of armed struggle in the Israeli occupied 
territories as legitimate resistance activity, not terrorism. pp.9, 11-12; Katzman (2002), 
Terrorism. The United States avers that Syria supports terrorist groups by providing safe haven 
to several Palestinian groups; and that transit of Damascus airport was used for the re-supply 
of Hezbollah, during the period in which it conducted raids against Israeli forces in southern 
Lebanon and sometimes against northern Israel. The State Department has noted that Syria 
has effectively proscribed attacks launched from its territory or against Western targets. For its 
part, Syria states that it is prepared to expel militant Palestinian and other groups if provided 
with direct evidence of their involvement in terrorist activity. p.31 
18 Seale and Butler. "Asad' s Regional Strategy", p.29 
19 Prados (2002). Syria, p.11 
20 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, is satisfied that the removal of Syria from the terrorism list 
as a means of encouraging movement in Syria' s negotiation with Israel was contemplated by 
officials during the transition from the Bush to the Clinton Administration, but not pursued. 
p.83 
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region; and the future course of US-Syrian relations could affect significantly 
the outlook for regional security and lasting peace in the Middle East. 2 1 
The 'pre-negotiation process' 
Bush's meeting with Assad in 1990 marked the beginning of America's 
move to build a relationship with Syria based upon cooperation. But even 
during the period of heightened expectation of a 'new world order' at the end 
of the Gulf War, the Congress retained doubts about Syria. In March 1991, 68 
senators released a letter to Syria expressing gratitude for Syrian participation 
in the Gulf War, but one-third of the membership of the Senate did not 
associate themselves with it; and a House resolution was introduced in 
Congress that placed several restrictions on Syria. The conditions laid down 
by Congress heavily intruded into the domestic politics of Syria.22 This could 
have made it extremely difficult for American Administrations to work for 
improved relations between the two countries, but it seems not to have 
disturbed the Syrians unduly. During the ensuing negotiation with Israel, 
Rabinovich described the Syrians as being at times more interested in their 
dialogue with Washington than in their bargaining with Israel.23 Implicit in his 
observation is the thought that Syria may have been receptive to the 
application of pressure by the Americans in the hope that the future would 
bring American rewards. 
Clinton gambled upon an eventual relaxation of congressional attitudes 
if a peace agreement were to be concluded between Israel and Syria. In the 
meantime, and unable to offer immediate inducements to Syria, his 
Administration explored Syria's position for any hint of flexibility: 
Christopher visited Damascus on his first tour of the Middle East in February 
1993; and the assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, Edward 
Djerejian, followed in April, ostensibly to brief Assad on Rabin's initial 
meeting with Clinton in March. Clinton had made clear to Rabin his view of 
the centrality of peace with Syria. He told Rabin that 'he saw peace with Syria 
as the key to an Israeli-Arab settlement and to a new geopolitical order in the 
21 Prados (2002). Syria, pp.15-16 
22 Rabil. "The Ineffective Role of the US in the US-Israeli-Syrian Relationship", p.425 
23 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, pp.252-3 
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region' .24 The prime minister remained sceptical that Assad would move, and 
reserved about Israeli domestic opinion were an agreement to be concluded on 
the basis of withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The subject had not formed 
part of his election platform and withdrawal would need to be put to the Israeli 
public at a referendum. Djerejian, a former US ambassador to Syria, carried a 
letter to Assad from Clinton seeking clarification of Syria's concept of peace; 
whether Assad was prepared to engage in public diplomacy; and whether Syria 
was prepared to participate in a back channel, apart from the Washington _talks, 
that could improve communication with Israel. 25 The response to the overture 
was negative. In respect of any discrete channel, Assad said that the way to 
move forward was for the United States to serve as 'a repository' of the two 
parties' positions.26 
Christopher was prepared to act as a 'special channel' between Rabin 
and Assad. The Israelis were pleased to endorse his role as go-between, 
particularly in view of his success in working with the Syrians to obtain a 
cease-fire agreement with the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, effected on 31 
July 1993.27 Rabin posed three questions that he asked Christopher to put to 
Assad when they met in Damascus on 4 August. Predicated on a hypothetical 
'assumption' that Israel would return the Golan in exchange for peace and 
security, they were: whether Syria would be willing to sign a peace treaty with 
Israel without linkage to the pace of progress with others; whether Syria was 
ready for a real peace including normalisation, diplomatic relations, and the 
other paraphernalia of real peace; and whether Syria was ready to offer 
elements of peace before the completion of withdrawal from the Golan ?28 
Christopher returned to Israel on 5 August, briefed Rabin on Assad's response, 
and then flew back to Damascus to convey Rabin's reaction. The Americans 
were encouraged by the general tenor of the exchange and believed that Assad 
24 Ibid. p.92 
25 Ibid. p.93 
26 Butler, L. (ed.) (1997). "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: an interview 
with Ambassador Walid Al-Mousalem." Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XXVI No.2 (Winter 
1997). Al-Mousalem offered a meaning of 'repository' when he described how the negotiating 
process eventually worked: 'All three delegations take their own minutes. In addition, we 
formally deposit with the Americans any subject on which the Syrians and Israelis have 
agreed ... Then these points ... are to be transferred to a specialized committee for drafting' . 
pp.83-4 
27 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, pp.103-4 
28 Ibid. pp.104-5 
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had accepted the basic equation of peace in return for withdrawal. 29 They 
thought that the Syrian response was worth pursuing further, but Rabin felt that 
Assad had attached too many conditions to his hypothetical 'offer' .30 He also 
had to take into account Israel's concurrent secret negotiation with the 
Palestinians at Oslo. While Christopher knew that Israel was participating in 
the Olso talks, the Administration was unaware that a breakthrough on that 
front was imminent. 
Rabin sensed that the Israeli public would have great difficulty in 
accepting agreements that postulated roughly simultaneous withdrawals from 
the Gaza Strip, Jericho and the Golan region, should the Palestinian and Syrian 
tracks be concluded at about the same time. Indeed, Clinton acknowledged 
that he had urged the prime minister to prepare the Israeli public for the need to 
make sizeable concessions. 31 Rabin told Christopher that in the event of an 
agreement with Syria, the agreement with the Palestinians would have to be 
limited to 'Gaza first', but that if the first agreement were to be made with the 
Palestinians, both Gaza and Jericho would be included.32 He seems to have 
concluded privately in early August that the Palestinian track offered the better 
immediate prospect. Peres pressed ahead and wrapped it up later that month, 
thus effectively putting the Syrian track on hold. 
On learning of the breakthrough with the Palestinians, Clinton ensured 
that the tenuous sense of trust thus far established with Assad was not lost. He 
rang Assad on 9 September to reassure him that the United States remained 
committed to a Syria-Israel agreement, and to ask him to send a representative 
to the signing of the Palestinian Declaration of Principles on 13 September 
1993. Assad reportedly sought reassurance of Clinton's commitment to 
continue with the Syrian track, leading Clinton to conclude that Syria did not 
want to be 'abandoned' .33 While welcoming this, Rabin told Clinton that he 
needed time for the Israeli public to digest developments with the Palestinians 
and asked for the president's help in persuading Assad to wait until the end of 
the year. Rabin's preferred tactic was to 'effect a real change on the ground, 
29 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.533 
30 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, p.60 
31 Cobban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.60 
32 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, p.105 
33 Ibid. Citing a New York Times report of an interview given by Clinton, 11 September 1993. 
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let the Israeli public digest it and appreciate the accruing benefits, and then 
move on to the next agreement' .34 So Clinton called Assad again, reassured 
Assad of his and Rabin's commitment to move forward with Syria in a few 
months, and asked him specifically to restrain the 'rejectionist' Palestinian 
leaders residing in Damascus35 who vilified Arafat for selling out through the 
Oslo accords.36 Despite the American and Israeli commitment, Assad 
remained aggrieved at Arafat's pre-emption. His concern about being 
marginalised may have been due to the Administration not having provided 
sufficiently robust assurances of the importance attached to an Israel-Syria 
agreement. Rabinovich attributes this diplomatic glitch to the Americans not 
having wholly accepted Rabin's decision in favour of the Palestinian track. 37 
What the Administration did not know at the time was that Rabin was 
becoming uncomfortable with America's intermediary role. He feared that the 
Administration, which had found Assad's responses in early August 
encouraging, would pressure him to make concessions in the interest of 
concluding an agreement with Syria. Ross had visited him in October 1993 
conveying Christopher's view that agreement had actually been reached in 
August, and that Christopher 'preferred to move with Syria for a whole host of 
reasons, including the fact that his own credibility was at stake' .38 The 
reference to 'credibility' suggests that Christopher may have imbued his 
presentations to Assad with the authority of the US Administration, but Assad 
could hardly have been expected to receive the secretary of state's 
. h . 39 representations ot erw1se. By the time Rabin met Clinton again on 
12 November, the Jordanian track had also begun to show some prospect and 
Rabin told the president that his priorities were now to implement the Oslo 
accords and to move forward with Jordan. Discrete negotiations with the 
34 Ibid.p.118 
35 Strindberg, A. (2003). "Syria's Palestinians under Fire." Middle East International No.707 
(22 August 2003). Damascus became the exile headquarters for the Alliance of Palestinian 
Forces, a cross-factional umbrella organisation established in order to reject the Oslo process 
and challenge Arafat's leadership. p.27 
36 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, p.119 
37 Ibid. p.119 
38 Ibid. p.125 
39 Cobban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.74. During the author's interview with Dennis 
B. Ross he acknowledged that Christopher and he conveyed the messages of the Israeli 
government and their own interpretations of them, drawing a distinction between the two. 
Assad may well have concluded that the Americans would be able to persuade the Israelis to 
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Palestinians and Jordan had proven effective and, in what may well have been 
an oblique criticism of Christopher's well-intentioned mediation, he stressed 
the importance he continued to attach to the opening of a direct channel with 
the Syrians. 
For the Americans, it was important to clarify whether Assad's interest 
in a settlement with Israel went beyond a general expression. Clinton decided 
to meet him in Geneva in January 1994, and Christopher visited Damascus to 
prepare for the meeting. As some public gesture by Assad would be helpful in 
Israel and could foster a more benign congressional attitude towards Syria, 
Christopher persuaded the Syrians to receive a delegation of staffers working 
for the congressional Committee on International Relations to seek information 
on the fate of Israeli servicemen missing in action, and exit authority for 800 
Syrian Jews.4° Christopher also sought, but unsuccessfully, to persuade the 
Syrians to establish a discrete channel between Israeli and Syrian generals to 
discuss questions of security in some detail.41 In the absence of such a facility, 
security matters continued to be discussed at a more superficial level within the 
Washington forum. 42 
Clinton's meeting with Assad convinced him of Assad's sincerity in 
seeking peace.43 At their joint press conference on 16 January, Assad said: 
'Syria seeks a just and comprehensive peace with Israel as a strategic choice 
that secures Arab rights, ends the Israeli occupation, and enables all peoples in 
the region to live 1n peace, security, and dignity' .44 Clinton stated his view of 
Syria as 'the key to the achievement of an enduring and comprehensive 
peace' .45 He said that he had discussed with Assad the possibility of American 
troops being deployed in the Golan Heights in the context of any peace 
agreement, but that no commitment could be made in the absence of an 
expressed decision by Israel and Syria, and that the matter would need to be 
40 Prados (2002). Syria. Syria's Jewish community was estimated at 3,770 in early 1992. By 
early 1997 only a few hundred remained in Syria, travel permits having been issued to all Jews 
wishing them. p.11 
41 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, pp.127-8 
42 Morris. Righteous Victims, pp.632-3 
43 Clinton, W.J. (1994). Interview with Reporters aboard Air Force Once, 16 January 1994. 
Public Papers - President Clinton, 1994, p.86 
44 Clinton, W .J. (1994). The President's News Conference with President Hafiz al-Asad of 
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discussed with the Congress.46 He acknowledged the need to address problems 
in the US-Syria bilateral relationship and said that the two foreign ministers 
had been instructed to do so 'in detail and openly' .47 The two leaders had also 
discussed the question of Lebanon and the application of the Taif agreement to 
that country, which America supported. Assad had 'agreed that there should 
be a successful conclusion of the peace process which left Lebanon free and 
. d d . ' 48 1n epen ent as a nation . 
Rabin, who had watched the press conference live on television, was 
briefed on the content of the meeting by American officials immediately after 
the summit. He was disappointed with the outcome, feeling that Clinton had 
tilted too far in Assad's favour, and was concerned about the impact that would 
have on Israeli opinion. Assad's general commitment to 'peace' was an 
insufficient guarantee. America's welcoming of the principle was seen as 
a classic instance of the stark difference between the perspective of a 
small state holding on to every square inch of land and any iota of 
dignity and that of a vast superpower seeking compromise and 
agreement and treating the petty concerns of the local parties with a 
mixture of impatience and condescension.49 
Rabin was to tell the Administration that, when America's 'self-
interest, goodwill, friendly persuasion, and gentlemanly mediation' 50 failed to 
produce results with the Syrians, recourse to more persuasive diplomatic 
instruments might be necessary. There was never a serious discussion of 
resorting to that alternative and Rabinovich understood that the Administration 
was not attracted to the option.51 For its part, the Administration was 
conscious that its role in the negotiating process was changing. As Christopher 
and Ross shuttled between Washington, Damascus and Jerusalem, they became 
fully-fledged partners in the negotiation. Such discomfiture as the Israelis felt 
about this was related to timing as well as to role-change. While Rabin 
46 Clinton, W.J. (1994). Interview with Reporters aboard Air Force One, 16 January 1994. 
Public Papers - President Clinton, 1994, p.89 
47 Clinton, W.J. (1994). The President's News Conference with President Hafiz al-Asad of 
Syria in Geneva, 16 January 1994. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1994, p.82; Satloff, R. 
(1995). "The Path to Peace." Foreign Policy Iss.100 Fall 1995, records that the mechanism 
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48 Clinton, W.J. (1994). The President's New Conference with President Hafiz al-Asad of 
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. accepted that the United States would make its own judgements, he did not 
want it to play a mediatory role prematurely: America's authority ought to be 
reserved to assist in resolving difficult issues at the end of the process.52 
Clinton's reference to the possibility of US troops being stationed in 
the Golan region provoked an orchestrated campaign within the United States 
against such an eventuality, fanned by those members of the pro-Israel lobby 
who favoured Israel's opposition Likud Party.53 It began in May 1994, but 
gained greater significance when the Republicans took charge of both houses 
of Congress and all committee chairs after the mid-term elections in 
November.54 American forces participated in the Multinational Force and 
Observers (MFO), established in 1982 to monitor the peace between Israel and 
Egypt in the Sinai Peninsula. The MFO worked well, but those Americans 
opposed to the creation of a comparable force for the Golan Heights were not 
persuaded by its example and conducted a particularly dirty campaign.55 The 
subject was dropped. Six years later, Clinton recalled having discussed the 
matter with Rabin, saying 'it was clear to me, even then, that both sides were 
looking for a way to resolve this that would not require an international force 
including American troops there' .56 
If Clinton was encountering domestic difficulties, so was Rabin, whose 
political support declined as the peace process progressed. The Golan was not 
just a matter of security. If it were returned to Syria, what would be the future 
of some 12,000 Israeli settlers in the territory? Unlike the settlers in the West 
Bank, those in the Golan region were predominantly Labor supporters who had 
52 Ibid. p.134 
53 Cobban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.81; Noyes. "Does Washington Really Support 
Israel?" The American Jewish organisations opposed to the peace process, and in particular to 
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been encouraged to establish themselves in occupied territory by the party that, 
under Rabin, was now entertaining the question of withdrawal.57 The religious 
party of Sephardic Israelis (Shas) withdrew from the coalition government, 
resulting in a reduction of the government's majority to five Knesset seats . In 
1994 an effort was made in the Knesset to pass a 'Golan entrenchment law' 
that would have made cession of that territory extremely difficult. It was 
defeated, and another attempt was made to adopt it in 1995, by which time two 
members of the 'Golan lobby' were talking of leaving the Labor party. A vote 
on 26 July 1995 ended in a draw, which meant that the motion failed to pass.58 
Assad, too, was under some constraint, though of a very different order. 
He adhered to the Arab position of the 1970s, which included: no negotiations 
with Israel before its withdrawal from occupied territory; no face-to-face 
negotiations with Israel; and no separate deals.59 He was critical of Sadat, 
Arafat and, later, King Hussein for their accommodations with Israel. It was 
important to his self-image as an Arab nationalist60 that he demonstrate an 
ability to recover Syrian territory without compromise or impairment of Syrian 
'dignity'. He had shown every indication since 197 4 of a preparedness to hold 
out until he got back what he believed was rightfully Syrian, and seems to have 
hoped that Christopher's mediation signalled that the United States could 
eventually persuade Israel to meet his demands. Assad also had a domestic 
constituency to satisfy. The 100,000 Syrians expelled from the Golan area in 
1967, and their descendents, now numbered over 400,000 due to natural 
• 61 increase. 
After being briefed on the Clinton-Assad summit by Ross, Rabin co-
opted him to tell the media in Jerusalem that Assad was ready for peace and 
57 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, pp.73, 81; Cobban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.71 
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that Assad had demanded full withdrawal from Golan 1n return. 
Simultaneously, the Israeli deputy defence minister was instructed to inform 
the Knesset that, if an agreement involving 'significant territorial concessions' 
was envisaged, the government would submit it to a popular referendum. By 
bringing the notion of a referendum into the open in January 1994, Rabin 
sought both to calm down the Israeli political system and, while underlining· to 
the Americans and Syrians the seriousness of the negotiation with Syria, to 
confront Assad with the need to appreciate that an Israeli government would 
require endorsement by referendum of so significant a matter. 62 
Although the Administration was aware of Israel's concerns, it may not 
have appreciated the strength with which they were held. When Israeli and 
Syrian ambassadors in Washington returned to their bilateral negotiations in 
February 1994, Christopher invited them to his office. He heard a reiteration 
of their well-worn positions, but saw no sign of movement. Three days later, 
an 'angry and bitter' secretary of state called in the Israeli ambassador.63 
Rabinovich reported on the encounter. Rabin was not impressed by it: these 
were existential issues for Israel, not a matter of 'credibility'. Rabin would 
insist on his position even at the risk of derailing the whole Israeli-Syrian 
track. 64 In the light of this, the Americans decided to change tack: if prodding 
was not working, perhaps enticement might be worth a try. They sought to 
redress Rabin's grievances during his visit to the White House in March 1994. 
Clinton asked him to put together two packages: one addressing the timetable, 
phasing, and security issues that the Americans could convey to the Syrians; 
and the other covering the bilateral security aid that Israel might seek from 
America in the event of an Israel-Syria agreement.65 The implication that 
America would meet Israel's shopping list could not, however, address Israeli 
susceptibilities. Israel's insecurity was not solely an externally induced 
phenomenon that could be assuaged by the provision of hardware and peace-
keepers. All that Clinton could do was to try to ameliorate Israeli concerns by 
holding out the prospect of meeting Israel's tangible needs. Rabin ceded to 
American persuasion, providing the Administration with a statement of Israel's 
62 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, p.130 
63 Ibid. p.133 
64 Ibid. p.134 
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position that could be put to the Syrians. He suspected, however, that Assad 
would probably respond with a lower counter-offer that the Americans would 
then try to bridge. 
Armed with Rabin's package, Christopher returned to Damascus.66 
During the course of that meeting Assad made explicit his demand that 'full 
withdrawal' meant to the line of 4 June 1967. The Israelis felt that Assad had 
indulged in a sleight of hand in declining, until then, to define his objective, 
but given the extremely small area of territory in question, Christopher was not 
greatly impressed by either the Israeli or Syrian claim to it.67 After digesting 
Assad's claim, Rabin agreed to Christopher discussing the matter during his 
next meeting with Assad on 21 July 1994, on the basis that it was 
Christopher's 'impression' that Israel would be prepared to consider the 4 June 
line in the context of the hypothetical 'assumption' floated the previous 
August. Assad responded more sympathetically this time, clearly delighted 
that the Israeli government was signalling its preparedness to negotiate on the 
basis of all occupied Syrian territory, and perhaps also jolted by the imminent 
signing of the Israel-Jordan Washington Declaration on 25 July. He told 
Christopher that he was prepared to proceed to negotiation on the basis of this 
'clarification'; and that he was willing to have any deal implemented over two 
phases of six months each, a faster timetable than that envisaged by the 
Israelis. But he wanted to defer the establishment of diplomatic relations until 
after the conclusion of a comprehensive settlement. A further significant 
change in his position was that he now agreed to direct negotiation through the 
countries' ambassadors in Washington. Secret talks began on 29 July 1994 
and continued for about a year, the parties' leaders often meeting at Dennis 
Ross's home.68 When the negotiation ran into difficulties, the Administration 
urged Rabin and Assad to make new decisions and to move forward during the 
course of visits to the region by either Christopher (twice) of Ross ( once ).69 
While the ambassadorial negotiation was in progress, substantive 
movement toward a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute was 
66 The journey was to coincide with Christopher's attendance at the signing of the Gaza-
Jericho Agreement in Cairo on 4 May 1994. 
67 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, pp.143-4 
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in train elsewhere. The Washington Declaration was quickly followed by the 
Israel-Jordan peace treaty on 26 October, and the first Middle East and North 
Africa Economic Conference in Morocco on 30 October 1994. The Israelis 
and Palestinians were moving haltingly toward an Interim Agreement, and it 
was clear that Syria was becoming marginalised. The Americans hoped that in 
the context of these developments Assad would become receptive to reaching 
some accommodation with Israel, but he showed no sign of moderating his 
demands. The Clinton Administration attached importance to Syria catching 
the tide. There would be general elections in Israel and the United States in 
1996 and if the substance of the Israeli-Syrian negotiation was not to become 
caught up in the two countries' electoral processes, agreement ought to be 
reached during 1995. The Americans pressed the Syrians for some gesture that 
would engage the Israeli people, but despite incremental movement on matters 
such as the timetable for any withdrawal, there was still nothing from the 
Syrian side to reassure the Israeli public. The Americans did gain approval for 
interviews with the Syrian foreign minister in Washington by Jewish leaders 
and journalists, but Rabinovich assessed the performance as stilted and has 
said that it did not achieve the desired impact. 70 
America tried again to encourage Syria to engage in public diplomacy 
in October 1994 when Clinton visited the Middle East to attend the signing of 
the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. To assuage Americans who opposed his also 
visiting a place on their country's terrorism list, it was agreed that Clinton 
would travel to Damascus on the condition that Assad would employ, at their 
joint press conference, previously agreed language taking exception to 
terrorism. Assad did not do so and, again, failed to make any impact with 
Israelis on an issue that was at least as significant to them as to American 
opinion.71 He did, however, spell out Syria's commitment to peace and the 
establishment of normal relations with Israel 'in return for Israel's full 
withdrawal from the Golan to the line of June 4, 1967, and from the south of 
Lebanon' ;72 and in their private discussion Assad offered Clinton some sign of 
flexibility on points of detail. One reporter at the joint press conference 
70 Ibid. pp.159-60 
71 Ibid. p.161 
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pointedly questioned Assad on the genuineness of his commitment to peace, 
drawing attention to the fact that Assad had not visited Israel, had never met 
Rabin, and that · Syria supported Hezbollah and the rejectionist groups in 
Damascus. This elicited the viduous response: 'There's nothing we have that 
proves our desire for peace except our saying that we want peace' .73 
During Christopher's visit to Damascus preparatory to that of his 
president, Christopher obtained Assad's agreement to another procedural 
milestone, a meeting . between Israeli and Syrian high-ranking military 
officers.74 The chiefs of staff of the two countries visited Washington 
separately in November 1994, and met together there in December. By 
agreement, Ross prepared a record of the aims and principles explored by the 
two sides at the meeting, which was designed to provide a framework for 
ensuing discussions.75 A further meeting of the military chiefs in June 1995 
addressed such questions as the demilitarisation of zones on either side of any 
agreed border; and the placement, or retention, of early warning stations. 
Although the negotiation among the military advisers was limited, significant 
agreement seems to have been reached. Ross prepared a summary record of 
the discussion but, unlike the aims and principles document, its text did not 
prove acceptable to either the Israeli or Syrian leaderships.76 
The widening circle of Israeli participants in negotiation with the 
Syrians, and the concomitant preparation of position papers, led to a leak at the 
Israeli end of the aims and principles paper and criticism of it. Syria responded 
to the leak with Radio Damascus broadcasting a commentary that carried a 
Syrian view of the negotiation. 77 These developments sparked the fears of the 
'Golan lobby' and prompted the proposed 'Golan entrenchment law'. 
The Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement had been signed 1n 
September 1995, and the Americans believed that with the passing of that 
marker an opportunity now existed to focus on the Syrian track. They 
interpreted an expression of resentment by Assad of Israel's growing 
73 Ibid. pp.1883-4 
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acceptance in the Arab world78 as indicating a fear of isolation. Assad had, 
however, said to an interviewer that 'peace is our strategic choice, but not at 
any price' .79 Christopher had been told by Rabin that his own electoral 
timetable required that any agreement be completed by April 1996. 80 His 
assassination in November 1995 required that it be rethought. Clinton 
informed Peres ·at Rabin's funeral that, from an American perspective, he 
would be available to help with negotiations until July 1996.81 But the issue 
was not so clear-cut for Peres who had to decide whether to seek an immediate 
mandate as Rabin's successor; to hold elections on the due date on 29 October; 
or to test his mandate in May after six months in the premiership. He decided 
to give the negotiation with Syria a chance before naming a date for the 
elections, settling on this course after learning of the progress that had been 
made. 
Peres floated an idea with the Americans that very considerably 
embellished any prospective settlement with the Syrians. In December 1995 
he proposed that any such settlement be integrated into a larger scheme that 
would include a bilateral American-Israeli treaty and a regional security pact. 
Clinton reacted cautiously: the relationship between the United States and 
Israel was accepted within the Arab world as a fact of life, but its formalisation 
in a treaty could only be seen by Arab states as provocative. It would impair 
America's ability to lead the peace process. 82 For the time being, the 
Administration preferred to proceed along already established lines; and 
Christopher resumed his shuttle in mid-December. On this occasion he carried 
a message from Peres warning Assad that, notwithstanding Peres' s disposition 
to go 'fast or slow, broad or narrow' according to Assad's preference, the 
situation in south Lebanon and Syria's support for Hezbollah was unacceptable 
to Israel and that Peres would have to react forcefully if violence continued. 83 
Rabinovich detected no willingness on Assad's part to invest in 'curbing the 
violence in south Lebanon, so as to expand the base of public support in Israel 
78 Ibid. p.193 
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for the policies of a new prime minister who was willing to transform the 
negotiation with Syria'. 84 
Formal negotiations 
Christopher was able, however, to persuade Assad to show flexibility 
on a number of issues of importance in the context of the ongoing negotiation. 
The Administration was sufficiently encouraged by this to invite the Israelis 
and Syrians to a conference at the Wye River Plantation, where detailed 
negotiations were undertaken in December 1995 and January and February 
1996. 85 The agreed cyclical framework was that discussion would be held over 
two weeks, after which Christopher would travel to Israel and Syria to 
encourage movement on 'sticky' issues.86 The delegations at Wye seemed to 
have been genuinely seeking agreement. At the conclusion of the first round, 
Ross declared that 'more was accomplished during these six days than in the 
previous four years of negotiation'. 87 His summary of the discussion was 
endorsed by both parties and served as the agenda for Christopher's journey. 
The United States was now to face another timing problem. During 
Christopher's visit to Jerusalem in January 1996, he was told that the Israeli 
political calendar required that Peres had to decide by early February whether 
- to go for a May election. The second round of Wye talks began on 24 January, 
but even before its scheduled ending Peres had decided to seek a mandate in 
May. The Americans had hoped that Peres would opt for the October date; and 
it is probable that Assad's negotiating tactic was predicated on America 
pressuring Israel to conclude an agreement by October. The announcement of 
an early election, and the conclusion in February 1996 of a defence 
cooperation agreement between Israel and Turkey, complicated Syria's 
position. Nevertheless, the Administration continued to press ahead: a third 
round of negotiations began on 28 February. As that round opened, the 
Palestinians launched a series of bomb attacks in Ashkelon, Jerusalem and Tel 
84 Ibid. p.208 
85 There was a change in the leadership of the Israeli team at the Wye talks . Peres charged Uri 
Savir, who had negotiated the two Oslo accords on Israel's behalf, with the task while 
retaining Rabinovich in an advisory role. 
86 Christopher, W. (1996). "Opening Statement by Secretary Christopher at a Press Conference 
Following a Meeting with Syrian President Asad, Damascus, Syria, 12 January 1996." US 
Department of State Dispatch Vol.7 Nos 1-3 p.3 
87 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, p.210 
191 
Aviv designed to frustrate the whole peace process. The attacks put Peres on 
the defensive politically, Syria did not denounce them, and Peres suspended 
the Wye negotiations on 4 March. 
With the peace process stymied on both the Palestinian and Syrian 
fronts, the Administration had to employ counter-measures to arrest its further 
decline. It was powerless to prevent sporadic terrorist attacks, but it could 
marshal international condemnation of them. The Americans obtained the 
assistance of Egypt in organising a summit at Sharm el-Sheikh on 13-14 March 
to enhance the peace process, to promote security, and to combat terror. 88 Its 
secondary objective may have been to enhance the prospects of Peres' s re-
election. Netanyahu, his principal challenger, had already signalled his 
disagreement with the peace process, with implications for Syria no less than 
for the Palestinians. Syria and Lebanon did not attend the meeting. 
Iran was a particular subject of overt criticism at the summit for its 
assistance to the two actors whose activities had proven the most threatening to 
the peace process, Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. 89 Clinton was 
careful to draw a distinction between the policies of Syria and Iran.90 This did 
not mollify the Syrians, who saw the prospect of concluding a peace treaty in 
1996 slipping away from them. They had been able while negotiating with the 
Israelis at the Wye River Plantation, and without publicity, to restrain 
Hezbollah's activity in Lebanon. Israel's suspension of the Wye talks, and the 
carefully stage-managed criticism voiced at Sharm el-Sheikh, gave the Syrians 
an excuse to look the other way while Hezbollah undertook resurgent activity. 
Having conveyed Peres' s warning to the Syrians, Christopher was well aware 
that incidents in southern Lebanon could jeopardise any future discussion 
88 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt, 13 March 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996, p.439; cf. Cobban (1999). 
Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.154. She argues that the United States and Israel wanted to put 
the emphasis on fighting terrorism, while the Arab delegations wanted the focus placed _on 
supporting the peace efforts. 
89 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Shimon Peres 
of Israel in Jerusalem, 14 March 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996. Clinton 
acknowledged that in 1995 most European leaders had opposed America's policy of 
containment of Iran. He went on to say that: 'based on my private conversations [ on the 
subject of Iranian support for terrorism at Sharm el-Sheikh], I did believe that there was a 
change in attitude and direction in the minds of some of the European leaders with whom I 
met'. p.450 
90 Ibid. p.449. Clinton said: 'Syria does not call today, like Iran does, for the destruction of 
Israel. Syria is negotiating with Israel to look for a peace, which Iran refuses completely'. 
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between Israel and Syria. Conversely, the Administration was also aware that 
the impact of Hezbollah's activity upon Israeli citizens in the north of the 
country was clearly marginal. 91 The impact was borne principally by the 
quisling South Lebanon Army, and to a lesser extent by the IDF, operating in 
the Israel-imposed security zone within southern Lebanon. No occupying 
force could expect to be totally immune from attack by activists of a host 
nation. 
The Administration advised Peres to avoid a military operation in south 
Lebanon, and urged Assad to do what he could to restore calm.92 These 
representations proved ineffectual. Peres was determined to demonstrate to the 
Israeli electorate that he could be tough when necessary. Israel launched 
Operation Grapes of Wrath against southern Lebanon on 11 April 1996. Israeli 
shells struck a UN compound at Qana where hundreds of Lebanese villagers 
had taken refuge. The incident provoked international condemnation; and 
caused many Arab Israelis to withhold their support for Peres in the general 
1 . . M 93 e ect1on 1n ay. Once again, Christopher found himself negotiating the 
terms of a cease-fire agreement94 rather than pursuing a peace settlement. 
Following Netanyahu' s electoral victory in May, the United States had 
to deal with an Israeli leader who was implacably opposed to withdrawal from 
Syrian territory. Not only had he criticized Rabin's and Peres's policies, he 
had contributed materially to the building of the 'Golan lobby' that had sought 
to pass the 'Golan entrenchment law' in 1994 and 1995. A third attempt to 
adopt such a law was made in July 1997 .95 Later, the Knesset passed a law 
91 Seale and Butler. "Asad's Regional Strategy", p.29. From 1982 to 1996, a period that 
included the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, not more than ten Israeli civilians in northern Israel 
were killed by Arab attacks. Only one Israeli civilian was seriously wounded during Operation 
Grapes of Wrath, while several dozen suffered minor cuts or were 'treated for shock'; Luft, G. 
(2000). "Israel's Security Zone in Lebanon - a tragedy?" Middle East Quarterly Vol.VII No.3 
(September 2000), states that more than 4,000 Katyusha rockets landed in the Galilee in the 
years 1985-2000, but remarkably, only seven civilians were killed by this weapon. 
92 Cobban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.157 
93 Morris. Righteous Victims, pp.639-40 
94 The cease-fire agreement went into effect on 26 April. It provided for a monitoring 
mechanism; and, at Assad's insistence, introduced France as a counterweight to Israel's special 
relationship with the United States. The monitoring arrangements were not concluded before 
the Israeli election, and were finalised by Netanyahu on 12 July during his first visit to 
Washington as prime minister. Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, pp.233-4 
95 Ibid. Netanyahu cast a vote in favour of it despite his cabinet having decided to oppose it. 
Although it passed by a slender majority of 43 to 40, 'it was subsequently explained that this 
was the first of three readings, and the vote as such had no operative significance'. p.262 
193 
requiring a 61-member affirmative vote, and a national referendum, to approve 
the return of any part of the Golan Heights to Syria. 96 For Assad the signs 
ofFsraeli obstinacy were clear, and it was important that he move to protect) 
what he believed he had already won. He asserted publicly that he had secured 
an Israeli commitment to the return of territory to the 4 June 1967 line, and an 
American endorsement of the commitment, and demanded that negotiations be 
resumed at the point at which they had been interrupted. Netanyahu rejected 
the claim and was not prepared to do other than resume negotiation without 
prior conditions.97 
Nevertheless, Clinton explored with Netanyahu the question of how to 
revive negotiations between Israel and Syria, and how to deal with Lebanon.98 
Netanyahu expressed a willingness to discuss an Israeli withdrawal from 
southern Lebanon with the Lebanese and Syrian authorities on the basis that 
'somebody dismantle the Hezbollah military capacity' .99 When asked whether 
it would be possible to reach a settlement in Lebanon without first reaching an 
overall settlement with Syria, Clinton responded that it would be a lot easier to 
do if there were also an agreement with Syria. 100 Netanyahu's preference for 
pursuing peace with Lebanon before Syria, were it achievable, might honour 
the spirit, but not the letter, of UN Security Council Resolution 425 of 1978 
which called for Israel's immediate withdrawal of its forces from Lebanese 
territory. 101 His proposition made no reference to the Golan; and Syria was not 
disposed to acquiesce in negotiations over Lebanon without its own major 
territorial claim being addressed. 102 It was evident to the Administration from 
Netanyahu' s position, and also from complications between Israelis and 
96 Migdalovitz. The Middle East Peace Talks, p.10. The law was adopted on 26 January 1999. 
Sixty-one members would be a simple majority if all 120 members of the Knesset were present 
and voting. . 
97 Seale and Butler. "Asad's Regional Strategy", p.37. Netanyahu advanced a concept of 'sub-
arrangements' aimed at gradual normalisation of relations with Syria without any Israeli 
withdrawal from the Golan. One such 'sub-arrangement' postulated was that Syria dismantle 
the Hezbollah operation in south Lebanon and the Palestinian organisations operating out of 
Damascus in return for Israeli influence in removing Syria from America's terrorism list! 
98 Clinton, W.J. (1997). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu of Israel , 13 February 1997. Public Papers-President Clinton, 1997, p.152 
99 Ibid . p.154 
100 Ibid. pp.154-5 
101 UN Security Council Resolution 425, adopted on 19 March 1978. Operative para. 2: 'Calls 
upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and 
withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory'. 
102 Seale and Butler. "Asad's Regional Strategy", p.39 
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Palestinians, that conditions for movement toward a peace · agreement with 
Syria were not propitious. Rather than risk an unwinding of the informal 
understandings tentatively reached between the Israelis and Syrians, the 
Administration decided to wait it out. 
If, as Assad claimed with some justification, his fundamental objective 
of securing 'full withdrawal' had been attained, 103 why was American 
engagement in the negotiation unable to produce a settlement prior to 
Netanyahu's premiership? Christopher believed that despite the advances 
made, notably at Wye, there was no real possibility of concluding an 
agreement during Peres' s brief tenure. Rabinovich on the Israeli side, and 
Assad's biographer, Patrick Seale, agreed. It would be difficult to convince 
Israeli public opinion of the advantages of peace with Syria, particularly in the 
context of Palestinian terrorism. The timing was tight, whether the Israeli 
election was to be held in May or October 1996; and the United States saw the 
need to keep the negotiation from becoming entangled in the politics of an 
Israeli election campaign. For Clinton, the substance of the negotiation with 
Syria was less of a consideration as he campaigned for re-election in 
November. Although a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement still 
proved elusive, he could point to Israel's agreements with the Palestinians and 
with Jordan, and to the Middle East and North Africa Economic Conferences, 
as achievements of his first term. Not only was the timing tight, there were 
still important differences to be overcome. Syria's concept of 'total peace for 
total withdrawal' was still susceptible of varying interpretations, despite the 
Administration's probing. The Israelis found the imprecision disturbing. For 
their part, the Syrians saw in Peres' s vision of economic integration flowing 
from a peace, a threat to Syria's and the Arab world's socio-economic 
fabric. 104 There was a fundamental dissonance between Assad's inclination 'to 
103 Butler, L. (1997). "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations."; Cobban, (1999). 
Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.73; Sontag, D. (2000). "Rabin vowed to pull back from 
Golan, Barak says." The New York Times on the Web, 28 February 2000. 
104 Hinnebusch. "Does Syria Want Peace?", p.51. Syria's Vice-President Khaddam declared 
that the idea of a Middle East market aimed to give Israel control of Arab resources and 'finish 
the Arabs off as a force'. For him, the Arab world was a distinct nation, homogeneous in 
culture, values, and interests. Israel could no more be assimilated into it than Morocco or 
Turkey into the European Union.; Israel's gross national product is larger than that of all of its 
immediate neighbours combined. Alpher, J. (1995). "Israel: the challenges of peace." Foreign 
Policy Iss.101 Winter 1995-1996. 
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shrink [Israel's] influence to more modest and less aggressive proportions, 
which the Arab players in the Middle East could accept and live with' and 
Israel's ambition for 'peace as a means to extend its influence to every comer 
of the Arab world' .105 
This profound conceptual difference went to the nub of American 
objectives. Peres's view of an increasingly interconnected global economy 
resonated with Clinton's vision for the advancement of democracy and market 
economics. While an Israel-Syria settlement might contribute to its.realisation, 
were American ideals including democracy, human rights and market 
economics ever to be incorporated into the Syrian polity, it would probably be 
through an extended process that would flow, at some remove, from Syria's 
acceptance as a cooperative member of the international community after 
conclusion of a settlement with Israel. 106 There is little doubt that the 
Administration saw attainment of its liberal agenda as sequential to the 
immediate peace objective. Syria's identification of the conceptual difference 
highlighted a tactical consideration. For so long as the broader strategic 
dimension remained in the background, the Administration need not prosecute 
it while the two parties addressed tactical issues related to land and security 
and normalisation of relations. The Syrians knew, however, that no American 
Administration could be enlisted to help 'shrink' the ambitions of the only 
country in the region that broadly shared its democratic and human rights 
values. In the event, they were not sufficiently disturbed by the implications of 
Israeli regional economic expansion to decline American overtures to negotiate 
further with the Israelis. 
Resumption of negotiations 
The Administration saw an opportunity to resume its attempt to effect a 
peace settlement after Netanyahu's electoral defeat by Ehud Barak in May 
105 Seale and Butler. "Asad's Regional Strategy", pp.36-7; Pelletreau said: 'In the past three 
years, Jordan has joined Egypt in signing a peace treaty with Israel, Israelis and Palestinians 
have signed three landmark agreements, two Arab-Israel economic summits have been held, 
eight Arab League members have made official visits to Israel, all but three Arab states have 
participated in some aspect of the peace process, and Israel has exchanged diplomatic offices 
with Morocco and Tunisia and commercial offices with Qatar and Oman' . Pelletreau (1996). 
"Statement, 12 June 1996", p.336 
106 Savir (1998). The Process, interpreted the Syrian dilemma as 'seeking aid without influence 
and peace without engagement'. p.271 
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1999. In June, Barak and Assad exchanged compliments through a British 
writer, Patrick Seale; 107 in July, Vice-President Khaddam told radical 
Palestinian groups to end their armed struggle against Israel; and Syria 
prevented Hezbollah from firing rockets into Israel, but not from targeting 
Israeli forces in the security zone. 108 Encouraged by this atmospheric change, 
the Administration once again facilitated intensive negotiation between the two 
parties, 109 bringing Barak and the Syrian foreign minister together in 
Washington in December 1999, and in Shepherdstown in January 2000. This 
was the first time that the two countries' senior officials had engaged directly. 
Clinton paid a number of visits to Shepherdstown during the negotiation and 
was an active participant. 110 This seems to have engendered an expectation 
within both parties that the president would intervene to force concessions 
111 
upon the other. During the meeting the Administration presented a 
summary of points of accord and discord. 112 An Israeli newspaper, working 
from a leaked copy of the document, said that it revealed Israel's apparent 
success in delaying discussion of borders while winning concessions on 
security that Syria was supposedly willing to make. 113 This second 
embarrassing leakage, and the newspaper's characterisation of the document, 
angered the Syrians; and the talks were postponed indefinitely. 114 
Despite this setback, the Administration remained determined to 
reverse the situation. Clinton announced that he would be meeting Assad on 
26 March 2000 in Geneva. His announcement was made in the context of 
Barak's having endorsed Rabin's 'commitment' of July 1994 provided Israel's 
107 Delaney, B. (1999). "Syrian expert: Assad ready to offer Israel peace for land." CNN.com, 
16 June 1999. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/9906/16/syria.israel/ - accessed 24 
December 2003 
108 Migdalovitz. The Middle East Peace Process, p.10 
109 Clinton, W.J. (1997). The President's News Conference, 8 December 1999. Public Papers 
- President Clinton, 1999, p.2538 
110 Arabic News (2000). "Clinton intervenes for the third time in fourth day of Syrian-Israeli 
negotiations." Arabic News, 7 January 2000 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/000107/2000010719.html. - accessed 11 
February 2003 
111 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.479 
112 Migdalovitz. The Middle East Peace Process, p.1 O; Sanger, D.E. (2000). "Clinton Offers 
Israel and Syria 'Working Paper' to Study Golan Heights control." The New York Times on the 
Web, 8 January 2000 
113 Perlez, J. (2000). "U.S. Draft of Israel-Syria Treaty Reported in Israeli Newspaper." The 
New York Times on the Web, 13 January 2000; Sontag (2000). "Rabin vowed to pull back." 
114 Migdalovitz. The Middle East Peace Process, p.10 
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security needs were met. 115 Barak told his cabinet that Rabin had given 
guarantees that Israel would fully withdraw from the Golan Heights in 
exchange for a security commitment by Syria; and that he would not 'erase the 
past'. Barak had come to the conclusion that demilitarisation of the Golan 
Heights would offer sufficient security to Israel. In that context, it made little 
difference to him whether Syrian sovereignty extended to the Sea of Galilee or 
to a few metres to its east. 116 
The border was not solely a question of security, however. Access to 
water was also a factor. Some fifty years earlier the Syrian government had 
offered on two separate occasions to make peace with Israel on the basis that 
Israel agree to half of the Sea of Galilee being ceded to Syria in exchange for 
peace. 117 This was declined because the Sea provides about 40 per cent of 
Israel's water supply. Syria was prepared to agree not to draw drinking water 
from the Sea in exchange for Barak' s acceptance of the 4 June line, 118 while 
the United States undertook to explore the possibility of Syria's water supply 
being met from Turkey. 119 Syria's commitment would seem to be credible, 
given its responsible behaviour in relation to the Sea during the 19 years that it 
had enjoyed access to the waterfront. Also, Syria would be well aware of its 
vulnerability to Israel if it were ever to renege on such an undertaking. 
Population pressure, drought and poor water management had turned the 
Galilee/I ordan basin into a rapidly wasting asset, and the future needs of the 
riparian peoples might more effectively be met by building desalination plants, 
a thought that the United States was prepared to entertain. 120 
115 Sontag (2000) . "Rabin vowed to pull back." It was the first time that an Israeli prime 
minister had ever admitted that Israel had agreed, conditionally, to complete withdrawal. 
Barak' s briefing of his cabinet was widely reported in the Israeli press. 
116 Slater (2002). "Lost Opportunities." Israeli General Staff officers were willing to assent to 
an Israeli withdrawal from the shoreline of the Sea of Galilee. Moreover, there was an 
expectation among the Israeli negotiators that an agreement was possible within a very short 
space of time. pp.97-100 
117 Ma'oz, M. (2003). Policy Brief Israel and Syria - from water to peace. Washington DC, 
The Middle East Institute. Assurance of water supply was one of the factors in the 1967 war. 
Israel responded with force to Syrian water diversions, and with diversions of its own from the 
Jordan River into the Negev. 
118 Slater (2002). "Lost Opportunities", p.96 
119 Savir (1998). The Process, p.279 
120 Slater (2002). "Lost Opportunities" , p.103; Clinton pledged to work with Israel 'to promote 
the development of new and additional sources of water, including desalinisation'. Clinton, 
W.J. (1999). Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, 19 July 
1999. Public Papers -President Clinton, 1999, p.1414; The United States and Oman 
committed $3 million each to establish a water research centre in Oman. The project was a 
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Security and water are emotional public issues and Barak was facing 
continuing domestic resistance to withdrawal from the 'Golan lobby' while 
simultaneously addressing the question of a more extensive withdrawal from 
the West Bank and Gaza. Three of the six parties in Barak' s coalition 
government joined forces with the opposition to approve a preliminary bill that 
would make a future referendum on peace with Syria extremely difficult to 
pass. 121 Barak was unwilling to risk putting more or less concurrent 
withdrawals on both fronts to the test of Israeli public opinion. 122 He briefed 
Clinton to tell Assad that he wished to retain the Sea's entire waterfront in 
Israeli hands, 123 but in compensation for the strip along the waterfront Israel 
would exchange a parcel of inland territory that had not previously been in 
S . h d 124 ynan an s. 
By the time of Clinton's meeting with the Syrian president, Assad was 
clearly terminally ill. 125 His preparedness to meet with Clinton may be read as 
indicative of an interest in concluding an agreement. It would be Clinton's 
final opportunity to secure an agreement before a change of Syrian leadership. 
No incoming leader would inherit Assad's authority: if acquired, it would need 
to be earned over a period of time. Barak provided Clinton with a script for his 
meeting, insisting the 'the description of Israel's needs had to be recited word 
for word' .126 Albright records that the president was prepared to work from 
Barak' s script for several reasons 
He had more hope than the rest of us that the initiative would succeed, 
and certainly Barak' s offer was more forthcoming than any other the 
Syrians were likely to receive. The President had also promised to 
support those in the Middle East who were willing to run risks for 
peace; astute diplomatic strategist or not, Barak led the region in this 
product of the multilateral working group on water. US Department of State (1995). "U.S.-
Oman support for Middle East Desalination Research Center." US Department of State 
Dispatch Vol.6 No.24. p.502 
121 The bill would have required that a referendum pass by a simple majority of the electorate, 
not a simple majority of those present and voting. As voter turnout is about 80 per cent, the 
government would have to win about 65 per cent of the votes cast in order to satisfy the 
requirement. Sontag (2000). "Israeli Bill May Hobble Barak Efforts with Syria." The New York 
Times on the Web, 2 March 2000 
122 Slater (2002). "Lost Opportunities", p.99 
123 Hof, F.C. (2001). "A Practical Line: the line of withdrawal from Lebanon and its potential 
application to the Golan Heights." The Middle East Journal Vol.55 No.1 (Winter 2001) p.39 
124 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.480 
125 He died less than three months later, on 10 June. 
126 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.480; Clinton rang Barak on 26 March, prior to and 
following his meeting with Assad . Clinton, W.J. (2000). Appendix A. Public Papers -
President Clinton, 2000. 
category. Finally, the President' s inherent optimism encouraged him to 
believe that a concentrated push couldn't help but produce 
movement. 127 
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The reservations held by the president's advisers may have been due to their 
knowledge that he had sent a message to Assad in June 1995 assuring him that 
'he had in his pocket a commitment from Rabin that Israel was ready to 
withdraw to the 4 June 1967 borders' 128 on which he would now have to 
resile. 
Assad would not admit to Israeli sovereignty over what he considered 
to be Syrian territory. 129 Clinton's public comments make it clear that he 
chose to put the onus on _Assad to respond to Barak' s position. 130 In doing so 
he seems to have hoped to deflect criticism of Barak for any breakdown in the 
negotiation. Clinton's failure even to keep the door ajar sealed its fate. Barak 
has been blamed for having failed to seize the moment, 131 but Clinton was 
complicit. 
Hafez Al-Assad was succeeded by his son, Bashar, who announced 
that he would continue his father's policy of seeking reclamation of all of the 
Golan territory from Israel in return for peace. 132 But Bashar' s first priority 
was to consolidate his rule. This, and the failure of the summit in Geneva to 
produce a breakthrough, meant that in effect the US-mediated negotiation 
between Israel and Syria was ended. 133 The al-Aqsa intifada broke out in 
September 2000, further discouraging Israelis from possible accommodation 
with their Arab neighbours. Then Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister of 
Israel in February 2001 and vowed to retain the Golan Heights. 
127 Ibid. p.480 
128 Sid-Ahmed, M. (1999). "2000: the year of a settlement." Letter from Cairo No.359. Al 
Ahram Weekly, 19-22 December 1999. http://www.sis.gov.eg/public/1etter/html/text359.htm -
accessed 24 December 2003 
129 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.481 
13° Clinton said that if Assad disagreed with Israel's 'territorial proposal, which is quite 
significant, then there should be some other proposal. .. coming from the Syrians about how 
their concerns could be handled'. Clinton, W.J. (2000). The President's News Conference, 29 
March 2000. Public Papers - President Clinton, 2000, p.648 
131 Slater (2002). "Lost Opportunities", pp.99-100; Interview with Ambassador Dennis B . Ross 
in Washington DC on 20 April 2001. 
132 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.658 
133 Malley, R. (2001). "The Logic of Historic Reconciliation will Prevail." Middle East Insight 
Vol.XVI No.5 . http://www.mideastinsight.org/l l 01/malley3.html - accessed 13 February 
2003 
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Lebanon 
The United States had, on several occasions, to broker cease-fire 
agreements between Israel and Lebanon. Lebanese territory provided a base 
for the launching of Arab attacks against Israel. Because of this, sites in 
Lebanon became targets for the IDF. Israel seized control of southern 
Lebanon for the first time in 1978. Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, and 
decided to create a security zone in Lebanese territory immediately to the 
north of the common border in 1985 .134 Complementary to the cease-fire 
arrangements, the UN Security Council repeatedly called for Israel's 
withdrawal from all Lebanese territory. Islamist extremists were never much 
of a factor in Lebanon before 1982, but the more moderate Islamist groups 
were destroyed during Israel's invasion, creating a vacuum that came to be 
filled by Hezbollah. Hezbollah did not exist when Israel began the occupation 
and bombardment of southern Lebanon, 135 but it grew to become a major 
irritant to Israel's security. Conflict made Lebanon an important element in 
the Arab-Israel dispute, and America's search for a comprehensive settlement 
of the dispute had to include a settlement between Israel and Lebanon. 
Syria exercises considerable influence over Lebanon. It maintains a 
large military presence in the country. No settlement between Israel and 
Lebanon can be effected without Syrian concurrence. Israel and Lebanon had 
agreed to a peace settlement in May 1983, but Lebanon later abrogated it 
under Syrian pressure. 136 The Clinton Administration's expressed 
commitment to Lebanon's unity, sovereignty, independence, territorial 
integrity, and continued adherence to democratic principles 137 reflected its 
desire to diminish Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. It sought an end to the 
targeting of Israel by Islamist militias and the support extended to them by, or 
134 Luft (2000). "Israel's Security Zone." Although Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the 
decision to create a security zone was not taken until 1985. The zone was patrolled by the 
Israeli Defence Force and the South Lebanese Army, a militia controlled, trained and paid by 
Israel. 
135 Zunes, S. (2000). Israeli Occupation of Lebanon and the Formation of Hezbollah. 
Information BriefNo.46 (1 September 2000). Washington DC, Center for Policy Analysis on 
Palestine p. l 
http://www. geoci ties .com/Capi tolHill/Senate/7 8 9 /zunes hezbollah 0900 .html - accessed 
14 March 2003 
136 Mark, C.R. (2002). Lebanon. Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, The 
Library of Congress. p.1 
137 Ibid. Citing State Department testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 25 
September 1996, p.3 
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through, Syria. The United States has generally seen Syria as controlling and 
supporting Hezbollah, with assistance from Iran, but Stephen Zunes claims 
that American officials have greatly exaggerated Syria's role: 'Syria has 
historically backed the rival Amal militia' .138 While the extent of militias' 
dependence on Syria may be disputed, there is no doubting that they have 
received support from their eastern neighbour. If a comprehensive peace were 
to be concluded, the Administration would have to persuade Israel to withdraw 
from southern Lebanon, and Syria to exercise such influence as it could over 
Hezbollah, in particular, to stop it from cross-border attacks on Israel. 
While engaged in the task of bringing Middle Eastern states to the 
conference table at Madrid, Baker addressed the question of getting both 
Israeli and Syrian forces out of Lebanon. His letter of assurances to Lebanon 
on the eve of the Madrid conference recognised that although the withdrawal 
of Israeli troops and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon were 
separate issues, both were covered by legal instruments. UN Security Council 
Resolution 425 applied to Israeli forces only, but the Taif agreement of 
October 1989 calls for the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from 
Lebanon. 139 Baker also drew an explicit distinction between Resolution 425, 
which calls for Israel's withdrawal from 'all Lebanese territory', and the less-
precise terminology of Resolution 242 on withdrawal from 'territory'. 
Although Lebanon participated in the Madrid conference, Washington 
'understood that Lebanon and Israel would not sign a peace agreement unless 
and until Syria and Israel had resolved their differences' .140 Despite this 
perception, American Administrations were careful not to ignore Lebanon as 
the peace process proceeded. Baker visited Lebanon in July 1992 and 
discussed a resumption of Lebanon's peace negotiations with Israel. 
Christopher visited the country on his initial tour of the Middle East in 
February 1993, and again in April 1996 to negotiate the 'Grapes of Wrath' 
cease-fire agreement. These contacts by Clinton's secretary of state were 
followed by meetings in the United States between the president and Prime 
138 Zunes (2000). Israeli Occupation. p.1. Amal is a Lebanese resistance movement. Like 
Hezbollah, its membership is Shi ' i. It has close ties with Iran, as does Hezbollah. Amal favours 
a close relationship between Lebanon and Syria, whereas Hezbollah claims a more 
independent position. 
139 Baker (1992). "U.S . letter of assurances to Lebanon", p.120 
140 Mark (2002). Lebanon, p.1 
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Minister Hariri in September 1993 and October 1996. Madeleine Albright 
also visited Lebanon twice, in September 1997 and September 1999, in 
connection with the peace process. Politesse notwithstanding, the United 
States could achieve little of substance while Syria exercised influence in 
Lebanon and its troops continued to occupy parts of that country. As part of 
the Taif agreement, Syria was committed to begin discussion on possible troop 
withdrawals from Beirut to the al-Biqa' Valley within two years of its 
signature. This did not happen and the US Senate passed a motion in July 
1993 declaring that Syria had violated the agreement. 141 Some forces were 
withdrawn from Beirut in June 2001, but about 20,000 Syrian troops remained 
in northern and eastern Lebanon in mid-2002. 142 
In negotiating the cease-fire arrangements that brought Operation 
Grapes of Wrath to an end, Christopher was able to secure the United States a 
place in the monitoring group to observe the cease-fire, thus ensuring a 
continuing presence in relation to Lebanon. The US aid programme also 
provided access to the Lebanese government. Christopher pledged that the 
United States would increase assistance to Lebanon, expand the flow of goods 
and services to that country and bolster its training of Lebanese military 
officers and law enforcement officers. 143 The Administration would have 
expected that, at an appropriate time, these contributions might dispose a 
Lebanese government to look favourably upon any American effort to broker 
a peace settlement between Lebanon and Israel. 
Barak' s election to government in 1999 introduced a significant 
change of circumstance. A survey had shown that the majority of Israelis 
believed that Israel should pull out of Lebanon unconditionally. 144 The 
expected gain would be an indirect one: by withdrawing from southern 
Lebanon, the cause of Hezbollah resistance would be removed and so would 
Syria's need to assist that group. In office, Barak repeated a campaign pledge 
that within a year Israeli troops would be out of the south Lebanon security 
141 Ibid. p.4 
142 Ibid. pp.9-10 
143 Christopher, W. (1996). "International community commits to Lebanese reconstruction, 16 
December 1996." US Department of State Dispatch Vol.7 No.52. p.622 
144 Zunes (2000). "Israeli Occupation of Lebanon", p.2 
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zone.
145 Albright believed that he wanted to have an agreement with Syria in 
place to ensure an orderly withdrawal and secure aftermath, 146 and the 
Americans clearly hoped that Israel's intention to withdraw could be traded 
for some significant gain in relation to Syria. 147 
The withdrawal was completed in May 2000 from all save a small area 
known as the Shaba farms. 148 Israel's decision to withdraw was known to 
both Assad and Clinton, but Barak' s brief for their meeting in March did not 
offer Clinton scope to use Israel's proposed withdrawal as a bargaining chip 
with Syria. 149 The expectation of a cessation of hostilities along the northern 
border was not to be realised. Significant though the withdrawal was, it was 
not sufficient to sever the organic link that Syria had forged with Lebanon. 
Conclusion 
Clinton viewed a peace agreement between Israel and Syria as the key 
to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute and to a new 
geopolitical order in the Middle East. He engaged personally in the search for 
a peaceful settlement between Israel and Syria. In addition to the ready access 
enjoyed by American presidents and Israeli prime ministers to each other, 
Clinton established personal contact with his Syrian counterpart and his senior 
officials shuttled between Washington, Damascus and Jerusalem. 
Notwithstanding these communication channels, the Administration 
145 Luft (2000). "Israel's Security Zone." 
146 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.480 
147 Zunes (2000). "Israeli Occupation of Lebanon." The US ambassador to Israel, Martin 
Indyk, had publicly encouraged Israel to remain in Lebanon, in contradiction to UN Security 
Council Resolution 425. p.1 · 
148 Eldar, A. (2002). "During the French Mandate, Shaba was Lebanese." Ha'aretz, 27 June 
2002. The Lebanese claim that the area belongs to Lebanon, while Israel contends that it is 
Syrian territory and subject to whatever agreement may be reached between Israel and Syria. 
An official of the French mandatory noted in 1920 that the demarcated border between 
Lebanon and Syria on an Ottoman map did not correspond to customary usage. While the 
Shaba farms were shown as Syrian territory, persons living in the area were under Lebanese 
regulation and paid Lebanese taxes. He characterised the situation as a Lebanese enclave 
within Syrian territory. Syria took over the area in 1950 and its population was counted in the 
Syrian census of 1960. The United Nations, through its Secretary General , supports the 
Lebanese claim to the territory, a strip of 14 kms long and 2 kms wide, on the basis of modern 
maps. 
149 To the contrary, Clinton welcomed the withdrawal as creating 'new challenges and new 
opportunities'. Clinton, W.J. (2000). The President's News Conference with European Union 
leaders in Lisbon, 31 May 2000. Public Papers - President Clinton, 2000, p.1255 
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underestimated Assad's suspicion of the America-Israel alliance and was slow 
to offer reassurance when it would have been appropriate to do so. 150 
The Congress was not only sceptical about Syrian intentions, but 
concerned to restrain the Administration's links with that country. Neither the 
Administration nor the Congress would entertain the provision of US aid to 
Syria during the 1990s, although Syria seems to have harboured an 
expectation that it might become eligible for American aid if a settlement with 
Israel could be concluded. The only incentive that the Clinton Administration 
dangled before both the Israelis and Syrians, as did the Bush Administration 
before it, was the possibility of an international force being stationed on the 
Golan Heights in the event of an Israeli withdrawal from the area. This 
option, however, provoked a spirited campaign within the United States 
against American participation in any such peace-keeping force and the 
Administration dropped it. 
How effectively did the Administration employ the instruments 
available to it in order to achieve an Israel-Syria settlement? Clinton's 
philosophic approach toward all parties in prosecuting a comprehensive 
settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute was to persuade through argument and the 
offer of incentives, not to coerce or punish. Positive sanctions having been 
proscribed, the Administration's ability to effect a desired result was therefore 
severely circumscribed. Perforce, the Administration drew heavily upon its 
ability to persuade the Syrians that some accommodation of the Israeli position 
was in their national interest. Assad's refusal to enter into direct negotiation 
with Israel prior to December 1999 enabled the Americans to become the 
intermediary and, in time, a full participant in the negotiation. Circumstances 
placed the Administration in an exceptional position from which to exercise its 
influence. Why, then was it unable to effect a settlement? 
There were a number of reasons for this. First, America' s lack of 
leverage over Syria and Assad's obduracy complicated the Administration's 
task. Assad's inflexibility on the question of direct negotiation, his ineptitude 
in public diplomacy, and the lack of trust between Israel and Syria on 
territorial questions, inevitably made it very difficult for the Americans to 
15° Cobban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, p.150 
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persuade him to present his commitment to peace and terms for a settlement in 
ways that might generate some understanding within an Israeli or American 
audience. 151 
Second, and also from an Arab perspective, the efforts of Palestinian 
insurgents, and of Hezbollah in the southern Lebanon security zone, to set 
back the peace process presented difficulties for the Americans. The 
Administration responded to the terrorists' challenge by mobilising 
international pressure through the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in March 1996. 
Clinton secured condemnation of terrorism, and was able to proclaim to 
terrorist groups that they were acting contrary to regional opinion that 
supported the peace process. The positive aspects of the summit must be 
qualified: regional condemnation of terrorism was obtained in the absence of 
Iran and Syria, the two states that abetted terrorist groups, and Lebanon from 
which some terrorist activity was mounted; and the summit's conclusions 
lacked material substance. International condemnation did nothing to 
influence terrorist groups or their state supporters to halt terrorist activity in 
the region. 
Third, and from an Israeli perspective, although Clinton urged Rabin to 
start preparing Israelis for the need to make concessions in order to achieve 
peace, he stopped short of encouraging the Israelis to determine an order of 
priority. The consequence of not prioritising the process was that Rabin 
appeared undecided in August 1993 whether to back the American preference 
for the Syrian track, or the Palestinian one. His eventual opting for 'Oslo' was 
taken not on an analysis of which track would make the more important 
contribution to a comprehensive settlement, but on the basis that one offered a 
more immediate prospect than the other. Such a decision need not, in itself, 
prevent the achievement of a comprehensive settlement, but it threw up the 
conundrum of how to handle a demand for concurrent withdrawals from the 
Golan Heights, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Another opportunity to 
address prioritisation arose in 1999 when Barak announced an intention to 
151 Muslih (1994). "Dateline Damascus", records Syrian officials as having indicated Assad's 
preparedness to engage in public diplomacy and to prepare his people for peaceful relations 
with Israel once Rabin committed himself to a return to the 4 June 1967 line. 
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move forward 'simultaneously on all tracks' ,152 but Clinton seems again not to 
have taken it up. 
Finally, neither Peres nor Barak felt sufficiently secure politically to 
make the necessary accommodations to bring about a settlement with Syria, 
and Clinton declined to pressure them into doing so. He would generally defer 
to the judgement of Israeli premiers, especially after Rabin's assassination, 
which had affected him greatly. 153 Despite having encouraged Assad to 
believe that Israel would be prepared to withdraw to the 4 June 1967 line, and 
Barak having briefed his cabinet in those terms, Clinton carried a brief to his 
meeting with Assad in March 2000 that contained important Israeli 
qualifications. Barak had decided that it would be too difficult to get the 
necessary legislative and public approvals for a return of Syrian territory. The 
offer that Clinton was authorised to convey was designed to ensure Israel's 
continued sovereignty over the waters of the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan 
River, and accordingly the border line should not touch either. The frail 
President of Syria was either unable to summon the energy to contest the 
Israeli position or unwilling to do so. He rejected it flatly. 154 After his 
meeting with Assad, Clinton chose tactically to put the onus on Syria to move 
on the border issue in an attempt to protect Barak from charges of having 
aborted the negotiation. 
What is less clear is why Clinton should have agreed to carry Barak' s 
brief without requiring that some concession be extracted from Syria in return 
for Israel's preparedness to withdraw from southern Lebanon. Neither Clinton 
nor Barak seems to have been concerned to maximise the leverage inherent in 
the IDF' s withdrawal. 155 From an American perspective, the explanation 
152 The Prime Minister said: 'It is our intention to move the process forward simultaneously on 
all tracks - bilateral, the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Lebanese, as well as the 
multilateral'. Clinton, W.J. (1999). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak of Israel, 19 July 1999. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1999, p.1407 
153 Cobban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks. Drawing on her interviews with Dennis B. 
Ross, Cobban states that the 'tendency to defer to the Israeli leaders' views on questions of 
strategy and timing became ... reinforced after the ... Oslo Accords, and then even more so after 
Rabin's assassination'. pp.193-4 
154 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, pp.583-7 
155 Muslih (1994 ). "Dateline Damascus." As early as 1994, Muslih postulated that: 'The fate of 
Lebanon will be largely shaped by Israeli-Syrian relations ... Once an Israeli-Syrian agreement 
is reached, a tradeoff regarding Lebanon will be possible'. He records having been told by 
Syrian officials 'that their government will not hesitate to restrain, even disarm, Hezbollah 
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seems to lie in Clinton's attraction to Israel, 156 his tendency to defer to the 
Israeli leadership, and his expectations of Barak157 in relation to the 
Palestinians. Perhaps, by then, he had also come to share Uri Savir' s 
impression that both sides 'could go on living without peace', 158 given that 
they had existed in a state of dormant hostility since 197 4. 
Constrained in the use of positive sanctions, and unwilling to employ 
negative ones, the Administration's ability to effect its desired outcome in the 
negotiation between Israel and Syria depended upon its persuasive skills. 
These were insufficient to overcome the entrenched positions of the two 
parties. 
("Party of God") in Lebanon' and that Syria would be able to manage the implications this will 
have for its bilateral relationship with Iran. pp.145-163 
156 Clinton W.J. (1998). Remarks at a Dinner Hosted by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu 
of Israel in Jerusalem, 13 December 1998. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1998. Clinton 
recounted a story in which his pastor had said to him in the 1980s: 'You might be President 
one day. You will make mistakes, and God will forgive you. But God will never forgive you 
if you forget the State of Israel'. p.2172; Clinton, W.J. (1999). The President's News 
Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, 1 July 1999. Public Papers - President 
Clinton, 1999. Clinton was reminded by a reporter that when running for the presidency he 
made a pledge never to criticise Israel publicly. p.1238 
157 Clinton, W.J. (1999). Remarks at a Democratic National Committee Dinner in Coral 
Gables, Florida, 13 July 1999. Public Papers -President Clinton, 1999. Clinton said: 'I'm 
eager as a kid with a new toy for the meeting I'm going to have with the new Israeli Prime 
Minister this weekend, in the hope that we can begin to energize the peace process in the 
Middle East on terms that are just and fair and will guarantee genuine security for Israel and a 
way of living for the Palestinians that will bring reconciliation, and a resolution of all these 
issues with Syria so that there can be peace in the Middle East'. p 1203 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/pubpapers/search.htrnl - accessed 6 May 2003 
158 Savir (1998). The Process, p.271 
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Chapter 7 
Frustration and failure: the United States, Israel and the Palestinians, 
1996-2001 
During the second phase of negotiation between Israelis and 
Palestinians, from 1996 until the expiration of Clinton's presidency in 2001, 
the Clinton Administration made serious endeavours to secure a resolution of 
the parties' differences, but was unable to effect a peace settlement. 
1996 was a significant year for the Administration. It had to adjust to 
the transformation of the PLO into the Palestinian Authority in January 1996 
and the defeat of Peres by Netanyahu in May; and Clinton had to secure his 
own re-election in November. His second-term agenda accorded primacy to a 
need 'to build the first undivided democratic Europe in history', 1 reflecting 
American concern to create a new European architecture following the Cold 
War. On his agenda, the search for peace in the Middle East occupied second 
place, followed by the need to meet the threat of terrorism. A resolution of the 
Arab-Israel dispute was thus juxtaposed with the factor most likely to frustrate 
its attainment. When asked whether he was willing to encourage Israel to take 
more tangible steps towards the peace process, Clinton referred to his hope to 
influence 'the outcome of events'. 2 The Administration intervened more 
actively in the prosecution of a settlement during this period than was the case 
before 1996, with the president advancing his own proposals in his final weeks 
in office. 
The Likud approach 
Clinton received Netanyahu on his first visit to Washington as prime 
minister in July 1996. Netanyahu's disenchantment with the peace process 
was public knowledge. The Likud Party platform for the election offered little 
encouragement to Palestinians and others who sought an accommodation 
1 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference, 8 November 1996. Public Papers -
President Clinton, 1996, p.2104 
2 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt, 30 July 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996. Clinton said that 'it's very 
important that we do the best we can to exercise influence, that is, to affect the outcome of 
events', cautioning that 'sometimes what may seem most satisfying in a public statement is not 
what is most likely to affect the outcome of events'. p.1229 
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between Israelis and Palestinians. The party's assertion of the right of the 
Jewish people to the Land of Israel as 'an eternal right, not subject to dispute' 3 
was reinforced by a declaration that Israel's permanent eastern border lay 
along the Jordan River. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state 
was explicitly opposed; and institutions of the Palestinian Authority in 
Jerusalem such as Orient House, an important symbol of the Palestinian 
presence in the city, were to be closed because it was claimed that they 
undermined the status of Jerusalem as the united and undivided capital of the 
State of Israel. Settlement activity would be strengthened; and 'Jewish 
settlement, security areas, water resources, state land and road intersections in 
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip shall remain under full Israeli control' .4 
The Palestinians would be enabled 'to manage their lives freely, within the 
framework of self-government. .. [but] ... foreign affairs and defence ... [ would] 
... remain the responsibility of the State of Israel' .5 The possibility of some 
form of partnership between Palestinian self-government areas and Jordan was 
not ruled out, 6 although its form was not specified. 
Clinton found some encouragement in Netanyahu's statement that he 
would work closely with the Palestinian Authority on full implementation by 
both parties of the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement, and on 
easing economic conditions on the Palestinians.7 Netanyahu believed that the 
United States, Russia and the European Union should play only a limited role 
in the negotiations between the Arabs and Israel: only the parties that bore the 
consequences had the right to decide. 8 Clinton could draw limited satisfaction 
from hearing him say: 'We inherited two agreements, Oslo I and Oslo II, not to 
our liking ... But I inherited them as prime minister. And governments keep 
agreements' .9 In Netanyahu's view the obligation was on the Palestinian 
Authority to fulfil its commitments first, which would then put the Authority in 
3 Jewish Virtual Library (1996). 1996 Likud Party Platform, Chapter 1, Preamble. Chevy 
Chase MD, Jewish Virtual Library. 
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Politics/likud.html - accessed 29 December 2003 
4 Ibid. Chapter 1, para 5. 
5 Ibid. Chapter 1, para 3. 
6 Ibid. Chapter 1, para 8. 
7 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu of Israel, 9 July 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996, p.1089 
8 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.572 
9 Clinton, W .J. (1996). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu of Israel, 9 July 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996, p.1093 
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a 'moral position to ask us to fulfil the remaining of our obligations' .10 He 
instanced two matters that he had promised during the election campaign to 
prosecute if elected and that he looked to the Palestinian Authority to 
undertake. These were that the Palestinian Authority desist from maintaining 
an official presence, including that of security personnel, in Jerusalem; and that 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad be disarmed. He acknowledged that the Palestinian 
Authority had shown a capacity to curb terrorist activity during the Israeli 
election campaign, and encouraged the Authority to continue doing so_ I I 
Violence erupted in September 1996, provoked by Israel's desire to 
renegotiate the terms of redeployment from Hebron, Israel's easing of 
restrictions on settlement building in the West Bank, and its plans to open a 
tunnel in Jerusalem that bordered the Dome of the Rock. 12 Clinton responded, 
inviting Netanyahu and Arafat to attend a meeting in Washington with King 
Hussein and himself. Egypt's President Mubarak was also invited, but was 
unable to attend. By its nature a two-day meeting might not resolve 
contentious issues between the Israelis and Palestinians. Its objective was to 
clarify points of difference and to lower the temperature between the two 
parties. This limited objective was consistent with what Clinton described as 
America's 'pivotal role in bringing Arabs and Israelis together to work out 
their differences in peace' .13 He secured an important commitment from 
Arafat and Netanyahu 'not to renegotiate agreements by which both sides are 
bound, but instead to talk about the ... steps necessary to implement those 
agreements' .14 Implementation of the Hebron agreement, deferred by Peres 
and Arafat until after the Israeli election, would be top priority, backed by 
recognition of the need to improve cooperation between the two sides' security 
forces. 15 Negotiation on these matters would resume in Israel in October, with 
Ross as a participant. 16 On 14 January 1997 the president announced that 
10 Ibid. p. l 093 
11 Ibid. p.1094 
12 Aburish. Arafat, p.299 
13 Clinton, W.J. (1996). Remarks Announcing the White House Middle East Summit and an 
Exchange with Reporters, 29 September 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996, 
p.1726 
14 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference with Middle Eastern Leaders, 2 
October 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996, p.1739 
15 Ibid. p.1738 
16 Ibid. p.1738 
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agreement had been reached on the Hebron redeployment and a roadmap for 
further redeployment by Israel over the period to mid-1998, and that this 
brought his Washington summit to a successful conclusion. 17 
Clinton had co-opted the assistance of King Hussein in securing this 
outcome. 18 The Hebron agreement was not achieved without difficulty, and 
Ross had been about to give up when the king intervened and persuaded Arafat · 
and N etanyahu to accept a compromise date for the completion of a three-stage 
redeployment that Ross had been pushing all along. 19 The original agreement 
with Peres had allocated the Palestinians about 88 per cent of the city.20 The 
'Netanyahu agreement' divided Hebron into a Palestinian zone, covering 80 
per cent of the city, and an Israeli one whose 20 percent included the town's 
commercial centre. The Jewish settlers, who constituted only 0.3 per cent of 
the town's population, were favourably endowed under it.21 Netanyahu was 
also insisting on 'reciprocity' by the Palestinians as a condition for further 
concessions. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians were in full compliance with all 
of the detail of the Oslo accords, but only Israel would gain from using that 
term to justify any suspension of negotiations. The term was employed in 
Ross' s Note for the Record prepared in connection with the new Hebron 
agreement. Christopher, who in a letter to Netanyahu22 accepted his insistence 
on 'reciprocity', expressed a 'belief' that Israel would proceed with the three-
stage withdrawal plan, rather than an assertion of it as an Israeli commitment. 
He accepted that Israel would decide the extent and location of further 
withdrawals, which would not be subject to negotiation with the Palestinians. 
And he employed the language of Israeli hawks in referring to Israel's 
entitlement to 'secure and defensible' borders, which was a significant 
variation of the UN Security Council Resolution 242 formula of 'secure and 
17 Clinton, W.J. (1997). Remarks on the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Hebron and an 
Exchange with Reporters, 14 January 1997. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1997, p.36 
18 Clinton, W.J. (1997). Remarks Prior to Discussions with King Hussein I of Jordan and an 
Exchange with Reporters, 1 April 1997. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1997, p.365 
19 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.643; Mortimer Zuckerman, publisher of US News and World 
Report, credits Ross with having negotiated the Hebron agreement. The Arab-Israeli Peace 
Process: reassessing the fundamentals. Soref Symposium 21-22 May 1997. Washington DC, 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. p.16 
20 Aburish. Arafat, expresses the 'Peres allocation' as seven-eighths of the city. p.300 
21 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, pp.579-80 
22 Christopher wrote to Arafat and Netanyahu after the conclusion of the Hebron agreement. 
Only the letter to Netanyahu has been made public. 
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recognised boundaries' on which the peace process was based.23 The 
Administration achieved an agreement, but at considerable cost to the 
Palestinians. 
The complication of Israeli settlements 
Even as the Israelis and Palestinians were negotiating IDF 
redeployments, the Israeli government was expanding its holding in parts of 
the West Bank through settlement- and road-building. Clinton's initial 
response was to view matters in sequential terms.24 He underestimated the 
depth of Arab resentment, despite an Arab summit having been held in Cairo 
in June 1996 that sent a clear message to the United States and Israel that 
unless Israel honoured the ground rule of land for peace on which the peace 
process was predicated, it would collapse. 25 He realised his mistake, and was 
more focussed on the matter by the time Arab states brought it before the 
United Nations in March 1997. He said then that he wished that the Israeli 
government had not decided to go ahead with the construction of settlements 
as it 'builds mistrust' .26 
The Clinton Administration had to decide, once again, how to handle 
the settlements question within the United Nations when Israel's decision to 
open an entrance to the Hasmonean tunnel under the western wall of the al-
Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem, and the shooting of Palestinians 
demonstrating against that action, was brought before the Security Council in 
September 1996. For a brief period in 1993-94 the United States had been able 
to muster support in the United Nations for the Oslo process. It had to move 
into damage-control when Arab states brought the settlements question before 
the UN Security Council in May 1995. The Administration concluded then 
that the peace process should be protected from external influence and that the 
23 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, pp.345-7 
24 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference with European Union Leaders, 16 
December 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996. Clinton said: 'we need to get the 
Hebron agreement over and behind us and go on to other issues'. p.2214 
25 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.573 
26 Clinton, W.J. (1997). Remarks prior to Discussions with Chairman Yasser Arafat of the 
Palestinian Authority and an Exchange with Reporters, 3 March 1997. Public Papers -
President Clinton, 1997, p.227 
213 
Council ought not to intrude into the matter,27 a view that was fully shared by 
Israel. In the view of the Palestinian Observer at the United Nations, the 
opening of the tunnel in 1996 had touched off a conflagration that had been 
simmering for some time due to the policies of the Netanyahu government. 
The US Administration was able to persuade the Council not to criticise Israel 
by name and abstained. 28 
The next such issue before the Security Council flowed from Israel's 
decision in March 1997 to build a settlement in Jebel Abu Ghneim/Har Homa. 
Clinton has recorded that '[e]very time Netanyahu took a step forward, as with 
the Hebron agreement, his governing coalition made him do something that 
drove a wedge between Israel and the Palestinians'. 29 The housing settlement 
would isolate Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem from the rest of 
the West Bank, and was viewed by Arabs as a continuation of an Israeli policy 
of 'Judaisation' of Jerusalem. Other grievances subsumed in this matter 
included charges by the Palestinians of the withdrawal of the identity cards of 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem, and of lengthy delays to shiprnents of 
food and medical supplies at international crossing points and in the ports. 
Also, European companies were prevented from starting work on the 
construction of the Gaza seaport, to be financed mainly from French and Dutch 
aid. In addressing this matter, the United States was confronted by a cleavage 
within the Security Council between itself and the Council's other Western 
European members. Britain and France co-sponsored an ill-fated draft 
resolution with Portugal and Sweden that would have called on Israel to refrain 
from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which altered the 
facts on the ground. 30 The Clinton Administration held to the position 
subscribed to by American Administrations ever since Reagan characterised 
27 Ambassador Albright said that the Declaration of Principles 'reflects the pragmatic view of 
the parties that there is a logical sequence for dealing with the issues which would involve 
covering the most sensitive ones at a later stage of the negotiations' and that 'the only path to 
achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is direct talks between the 
parties ... [P]rogress towards peace in the Middle East depends not on what the United Nations 
does, but on what the parties agree to'. Albright, M.K. (1997). Explanation of vote on 
S/1995/398. Presented at: 3538th meeting of UN Security Council, United Nations NY. p.6 
28 United Nations (1996). UN Security Council Resolution 1073, adopted on 28 September 
1996, calls for 'the immediate cessation and reversal of all acts ... which have negative 
implications for the Middle East peace process'. 
29 Clinton, W.J. (2004). My Life, p.752 
30 United Nations (1997). Document S/1997/199, 7 March 1997. The draft resolution was 
defeated: 14 - 1 (United States of America) 
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Israeli activity in the occupied territories as an obstacle to peace, and had 
argued strongly with Netanyahu against the project.31 The United States would 
have preferred that there be no draft resolution, and tried to have the Security 
Council issue a strong presidential statement instead, but failed. Nor was it 
able to persuade the co-sponsors to employ language that would enable an 
abstention. The United States vetoed it. Questioned about the veto, Clinton 
and President Mubarak, who was visiting Washington at the time, made clear 
that they had registered with the Israelis their concerns about the Har Homa 
project. They had been unable to persuade Netanyahu to stop it. Explaining 
the veto, Clinton said that peace can never be achieved through UN Security 
Council resolutions; that the draft contained language that the United States 
had vetoed in the past; and that the matter should properly be part of the final 
· · 32 status negotiations. 
The exercise of the United States's veto power did not end 
consideration of this matter within the United Nations . Frustrated by it, Arab 
states and other members of the Non-Aligned Movement requested a meeting 
of the UN General Assembly to consider the settlement question. On 
13 March the General Assembly adopted a resolution that called for Israel to 
refrain from all actions or measures that pre-empted the final status 
negotiations, and to abide by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the 
Fourth Geneva Convention. It was opposed by the United States and Israel.33 
The Palestinians were to complain to the Secretary General that Israel 
had reaffirmed its decision to proceed with construction of the Har Homa 
project less than 24 hours after the resolution's passage. Accordingly, the 
Arab members of the Security Council took the matter back to the Council on 
21 March. Once again, the United States vetoed a draft resolution, explaining 
that controversy over the project would not be resolved by interference from 
the Security Council or the General Assembly, and should be left to the parties 
concerned, which had demonstrated since the Madrid conference that they 
could overcome the problems and differences that separated them. Russia, 
31 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.329 
32 Clinton, W.J. (1997). The President's News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt, 10 March 1997. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1997, pp.270-3 
33 United Nations (1997). Yearbook of the United Nations 1997 Vol.51. United Nations NY. 
UNGA Resolution 51/223 was adopted by recorded vote: 130 - 2 (Israel, United States of 
America) - 2 (Marshall Islands, Micronesia) p.390 
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which voted for the draft, was unequivocal: the situation had continued to 
deteriorate and was becoming increasingly confrontational because of Israel's 
acts of provocation. The Palestinians found it difficult to accept either that the 
US veto had been employed to protect the peace process or that bilateral 
negotiations offered prospect of a solution when one of the parties was 
changing the demography of Jerusalem by settling some 20,000 Jews on land 
that the Palestinians claimed. 
The Arab states were irritated by America's action and decided once 
again to circumvent the Security Council. They mustered a majority in support 
of the convening of an emergency special session of the UN General 
Assembly. It met in April, July and November 1997. The proponents 
focussed on the Israeli settlement project, which they addressed in terms of the 
principles of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Their intent was to apply the 
pressure of international opinion to the United States as much as to Israel, 
knowing that the United States would be unable either to persuade the General 
Assembly to its position or to shield Israel from the force of international 
criticism. Because the General Assembly lacked mandatory authority, the 
Administration could tolerate the international community's venting of steam. 
It was unlikely to have other than an atmospheric affect on the peace process. 
At its April meeting the special session recommended that the High 
Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, which include Israel, 
'take measures, on a national or regional level, in fulfilment of their 
obligations under. .. the Convention' .34 This resolution was endorsed by an 
overwhelming majority, with only Israel, Micronesia and the United States 
voting against it. The American representative at the special session said that 
the United States shared the concern expressed by other representatives about 
Israel's decision to begin construction of the project, but then diverted to 
address jurisdictional matters.35 The Secretary General, who had been 
authorised to monitor the situation, reported to the UN membership in June 
that Israel had imposed unacceptable restrictions on a proposed on-the-ground 
34 United Nations (1997). UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/2 was adopted by recorded 
vote: 134 - 3 (Israel, Micronesia, United States of America) - 11 
35 United Nations (1997). Yearbook, 1997. The delegate referred to the General Assembly's 
'infringing on the Security Council's authority and ... [the] ... dangerous precedent. .. [set 
by] ... the Assembly endorsing collective action against one of its Members'. p.397 
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investigation into the building project by his Special Envoy; and that Israel had 
·not accepted de Jure applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to all 
occupied territories. This provoked a tougher resolution from the special 
session in July. The new resolution recommended that the High Contracting 
Parties 'convene a conference on measures to enforce the Convention in the 
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem' .36 It attracted the same 
three negative votes. The United States objected that a conference of the 
c_ontracting parties to the Convention was not the proper forum to address the 
situation, and was troubled by the ostensible goal of such a conference 'to 
· enforce the Convention' .37 Russia, which had voted in favour of the April 
resolution, shared this concern and abstained. What enforcement agency 
would be used, and how would enforcement be effected? 
The General Assembly's action did little to ease tension between 
Israelis and Palestinians.38 The Administration would have read the report of 
the Israeli human rights organisation, B'tselem,39 which recorded that between 
the beginning of the intifada on 9 December 1987 and 30 November 1997 
some 1,479 Palestinians had been killed by the IDF, security forces and 
settlers, and 383 Israelis had been killed by Palestinians. While Israel was 
proceeding with settlement construction, during the decade covered by this 
study some 447 Palestinians' houses had been demolished and 294 sealed off 
as punishment for violent offences committed by a suspected or convicted 
family member, some 106 demolished by artillery fire, and another 1,800 
demolished on the ground that they were built without a permit. Security and 
settlements were therefore high on Madeleine Albright' s agenda when she 
visited Israel on 10 September 1997. She tried to persuade Netanyahu to 
commit to limiting settlement construction if the Palestinian Authority were 
36 United Nations (1997). UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/3 was adopted by recorded 
vote: 131 - 3 (Israel, Micronesia, United States of America) - 14 
37 United Nations (1997). Yearbook, 1997, pp.403-4 
38 On 30 July Palestinians launched terrorist attacks in West Jerusalem that resulted in 13 
Israeli deaths and injuries to more than 150 persons . Israel responded, imposing a land and 
sea blockade on Palestinian territory. Palestinians undertook a triple bombing in Jerusalem in 
early September. 
39 Kadman, N. (1998). 1987-1997: a decade of human rights violations. Jerusalem, B'Tselem. 
http://www.btselem.org - accessed 30 March 2003 
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able to win its battle against Palestinian terrorist elements, suggesting 'time-
out' on the building programme, but he refused to comply.40 
The Israelis went ahead with their programme, announcing on 
24 September that they would put up a further 300 housing units at another site 
south of Bethlehem. The Administration called again for a freeze on 
settlement expansion in the West Bank. Netanyahu rejected it on 
26 September. The Administration's efforts were backed from an unlikely 
source: Sheikh Ahmad Y assin, the founder of Hamas, told reporters on 
7 October that Hamas would stop targeting Israeli civilians if Israel stopped 
killing Palestinians, confiscating land, demolishing houses and building 
settlements.41 Undaunted by the Administration's appeals, the Israelis 
presented maps to the United States on 19 November outlining Israel's security 
and settlement concerns in a final status agreement with the Palestinians. This 
was followed a few days later by a denial by the prime minister's spokesman 
of a report that Netanyahu had promised a freeze on settlement building to 
Clinton or anyone else. And on 27 November Netanyahu produced a new map 
of Israel which showed the Jordan Valley, the coastline of the Gaza Strip, 
Jerusalem (within its enlarged municipal boundaries), and a narrow 'security 
zone' east of the 4 June 1967 line as falling within Israeli territory.42 
Although the General Assembly was unaware of this detail, it remained 
concerned about Israel's continuing practices in the occupied territories. It 
requested Switzerland, depository of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to assist 
in convening a Conference of its High Contracting Parties.43 The United States 
was unable to prevent the Conference from reaffirming the normative value of 
the Convention and declaring its applicability to occupied Palestinian territory, 
including East Jerusalem. In a direct reference to Israeli practices, the 
participating Parties recalled that no Contracting Party 'shall be allowed to 
absolve itself of any liability incurred by itself in respect to ... wilful killing, 
torture, unlawful deportation, wilful depriving of the rights of fair and regular 
40 United Nations (1997). Yearbook, 1997, p.411 
41 Ibid. p.411 
42 Ibid. p.412 
43 United Nations (1997). UN General Assembly Resolution ES-10/4 . was adopted by recorded 
vote: 139 - 3 (Israel, Micronesia, United States of America) - 13 
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trial, extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly' .44 
Clinton understood that Netanyahu's settlements policy was inimical to 
the peace process and tried to persuade him to drop it. Albright was later to 
conclude that the United States should have pushed harder to halt the 
expansion of settlements.45 But the Administration refrained from exercising 
leverage to prevent construction. None of America's principal actors - the 
president, secretary of state or Clinton's Middle East envoy - have given any 
indication of having considered the possible application of negative sanctions 
to reinforce their argument that settlement construction be halted. They relied 
on the strength of their verbal presentations. Clinton, who was not attracted to 
punitive or coercive measures, may have calculated that their employment 
would have alienated Netanyahu, whose interest in the Oslo process was 
tenuous. Nothing could be gained if Netanyahu broke with the process, and 
Clinton would not wish to provide him with an excuse to resile from his 
commitment to 'keep agreements'. Alternatively, some progress might be 
possible if channels could be kept open to him. Netanyahu was later to explain 
to Clinton the political imperative of his proceeding with the Har Homa 
project, and the president understood the prime minister's needs.46 In one 
sense, Clinton was exceptionally well-placed to exert leverage had he wished 
to do so. He had been re-elected in November 1996 with the backing of 
American Jewry,47 and for at least the next twelve months need not be unduly 
concerned about Netanyahu appealing to an American constituency over his 
head. 
A re-elected president usually enjoys a measure of independence at the 
beginning of his second term. But Clinton faced constraints of a different 
order. The Republicans had pursued him throughout his presidency about 
alleged personal indiscretions, some of which pre-dated his election to that 
44 Government of Switzerland (2001). Declaration. Conference of High Contracting Parties to 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, 5 December 2001. 
http://domino.un.org/UNISP AL.NSF/85255a0a0010ae82852555340060479d/8fc4 f064b9be5b 
ad85256c1400722951 !OpenDocument- accessed 28 April 2003 
45 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.507 
46 Ross, D.B . (2004). The Missing Peace, p.452 
47 Quandt (2001). Peace Process. Jewish voters overwhelmingly supported Clinton, who was 
introduced at campaign rallies as the best friend Israel had ever had. p.344 
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office. Eleven possible grounds of impeachment were advanced in a report 
lodged with the House Judiciary Committee in September 1998. He would 
need the help of his congressional supporters if the Congress were to proceed 
with impeachment, and he was careful not to alienate them. Also, his wife had 
been approached about standing for the Senate in the interest of the State of 
New York48 and would be courting the vote of its influential Jewish 
community. Moreover, he had pledged when first running for the presidency 
never to criticise Israel publicly.49 When questioned whether this pledge may 
have influenced his actions in relation to the settlements issue, Clinton replied: 
'We don't believe that unilateral actions by any parties, including other 
interested parties like the United States, which compromise the capacity of the 
parties to the Oslo accord to reach agreement on final status issues, should be 
taken. And that includes provocative settlement actions. We have made that 
clear and unambiguous' .50 The fact remains that, while prepared to try to 
persuade the Israelis in private, the Clinton Administration did not publicly 
criticise Israel. To the contrary, its posture on the world stage was consistently 
one of public protection for Israel and preservation of the Oslo process,51 
leading many in the Arab world and beyond to question America's professed 
role in the peace process as an honest broker. 
Clinton hoped that some amelioration in the level of violence would 
encourage Netanyahu to advance the peace process. He proscribed access by 
designated Middle Eastern terrorist organisations to sources of financial 
support in the United States through an Executive Order in January 1995;52 and 
announced in March 1996 the stationing of American specialists in Israel to 
work with and to improve antiterrorism cooperation among Israeli, Palestinian 
and regional governments. The commitment was backed by a two-year $100 
48 Clinton, H.R. Living History. The question of her candidature was first raised in December 
1995. It gathered momentum when Democrat Senator Moynihan announced in November 
1998 that he would not be seeking a further term. p.483 
49 Clinton, W.J. (1999). The President's News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt, 1 July 1999. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1999, p.1238 
50 Ibid. p.1238 
51 Clinton, W.J. (2000). Written Responses to Questions Submitted by the Arabic-language 
Newspaper Al Hayat, 10 August 2000. Public Papers - President Clinton, 2000. Clinton said: 
'From the beginning of my administration, one factor has guided me: to take no action that I 
judged would harm the peace process'. p.1855 
52 Clinton, W.J. (1997). Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Terrorists who Threaten 
to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, 28 January 1997. Public Papers - President Clinton, 
1997, p.95; Executive Order 12947, 24 January 1995 
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million programme for Israel, supplemented by intelligence sharing 
arrangeme~ts with the CIA.53 He reviewed progress under the programme 
with Netanyahu in February 1997 and announced that delivery would begin 
that year of F-15-1 fighters to strengthen Israel's air defences.54 But he was 
dealing with a prime minister who had rejected the assessment of his General 
Security Service and his director of military intelligence 'that Arafat had no 
incentive to cooperate with Israel in the fight against Islamic terror as long as 
he believed that Israel was not complying with the Oslo accords'. 55 
By mid-1997 it was clear that the peace process had stalled.56 Clinton 
was challenged about avoiding the implications of Netanyahu's refusal to 
bargain land for Palestinian peace and asked whether he preferred to minimise 
short-run frictions with the Israeli government or reach for a long-term 
peace?57 The president defended his position, stating that 'there is no foreign 
policy problem to which I have given more of my personal time since I became 
president in 1993'. 58 He added that 'until the parties trust each other and until 
the Israelis believe that the Palestinian Authority is making 100 per cent effort, 
which is different from 100 per cent results ... it is impossible for peace to 
proceed'. 
Reinvigorating the peace process 
During her first six months as secretary of state, Albright concentrated 
on European affairs, a reflection of Clinton's second-term priorities. She 
53 Clinton, W.J. (1996). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Shimon Peres 
of Israel in Jerusalem, 14 March 1996. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1996. Clinton 
recognised that there could be no absolute protection against terrorism, but said that more 
could be done 'to identify the sources of support, to try to dry up money, [and] to develop 
better technical and other means' of prevention. pp.445-6 
54 Clinton, W.J. (1997). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu of Israel, 13 February 1997. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1997, p.152 
55 Shlaim (2000). The Iron Wall, p.584 
56 Denver Summit of the Eight (1997). Communique. Para 84: 'The Peace Process faces a 
crisis, and we are determined to reinject momentum into it. Restoring the sense of security and 
confidence among Israelis and Palestinians is essential. We shall do our utmost to reinvigorate 
implementation of the Oslo Accords and to uphold the principles of Madrid, including the 
exchange of land for peace. All the problems need to be addressed peacefully through serious 
and credible negotiations. Both sides must refrain from actions that impede the peace process 
by preempting permanent status negotiations.' 
http://usinfo .state.gov/topical/econ/group8/summit97 /document.htm - accessed 31 March 
2003 
57 Clinton, W.J. (1997). The President's News Conference, 6 August 1997. Public Papers -
President Clinton, 1997, p.1062 
58 Ibid. p.1063 
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believed that Christopher had squandered time and political capital in visiting 
the Middle East two dozen times in his four years, often to no apparent effect. 
Also, it was her appreciation that the gaps between the Israelis and Palestinians 
were too wide to be bridged from the top and that a useful tactical approach 
might be to encourage lower-level contacts on technical issues, thus narrowing 
the gaps from the bottom up.59 
By August 1997 she had decided that if the peace process were to be 
reactivated, a more energetic American role was necessary,60 and she changed 
her mind about the appropriate approach. She suggested that, instead of using 
the gradual confidence-building approach of the Oslo accords, momentum 
might be restored by getting the parties to focus on their ultimate goal. 
Netanyahu had made a similar proposal in April, but it had been rejected by 
Arafat and other Arab leaders. The final status negotiations had been opened 
ceremonially just before Netanyahu's election in May 1996, but had not since 
been resumed. The Administration's new proposal included the presence of 
American officials at the negotiating table. It was hoped that this would give 
Arafat confidence in a US-backed strategy. 
Although reinvigoration of the peace process was the ostensible reason 
for Albright' s involvement, there was a strong sense of its being an exercise in 
damage control. She reminded both parties of their mutual responsibilities, 
conscious in doing so that she was working against a preference in the 
Congress that her message should be confined solely to a denunciation of 
Palestinian terrorism. Arafat found her appeal to mutual responsibility more 
persuasive than Netanyahu, and offered some new and encouraging 
counterterrorism initiatives.61 This had prompted her to advance her 
unsuccessful 'time-out' proposal. 
Albright met Netanyahu again in London and Arafat in Bern in 
November, where she discussed ideas that the Administration believed were 
necessary to get the two parties started on accelerated negotiations leading to 
59 Lippman, T. W. (2000). Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy. Boulder 
CO, Westview Press. p.190 
60 Erlanger, S. (1997). "U.S. shifts stand on Mideast talk, to Israeli plan ." The New York Times 
on the Web, 7 August 1997. 
61 Lippman. Madeleine Albright, cites aides close to Netanyahu as saying that he never 
believed that the Palestinians were committed to peaceful coexistence with Israel and that 
Palestinian terrorism gave him the tool he needed to avoid ever getting to that point. p.195 
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permanent status,62 but Albright was irritated by Netanyahu' s now apparent 
disinterest in faster movement.63 At the Middle East and North Africa 
Economic Conference in Doha, itself an embarrassment because Arab states 
had decided not to participate, 64 she stated bluntly that the peace process was 
'in danger ... because leaders have failed to take the actions required to realise 
the possibilities of peace' 65 and that 'there will be no peace if the leaders of 
[the] region sit on the sidelines and wait for others to take the risks'. She told 
the assembly that the economy in the West Bank and Gaza was in a dire 
condition due largely to the impact of security-related closures, and as a 
consequence the Administration was encouraging Israel to undertake economic 
confidence-building measures for the Palestinians. The United States was also 
helping to develop initiatives such as the Gaza industrial estate to promote 
economic opportunity and growth; and she exhorted Arab states to meet their 
responsibilities. Exasperation with the unravelling process was evident: the 
secretary had other urgent matters to worry about and she threatened that she 
was not inclined to return to the Middle East unless there was enough 
happening for her participation to make a difference.66 
Notwithstanding her frustration, the Administration continued to 
explore the prospect of moving negotiations more quickly into the final status 
stage. When Netanyahu had originally advanced this, he had expressed 
concern that a lot of the issues to be resolved were highly contentious and it 
would ease his domestic difficulties to put them all into the one package and to 
have as few ratification votes as possible.67 Subsequent American diplomacy 
helped the parties to agree on an agenda. 68 The Administration worked with 
both sides in accordance with the agenda and planned that its efforts would 
62 Clinton, W.J. (1998). Remarks to the Mayors Conference on Public Schools, 7 May 1998. 
Public Papers - President Clinton; 1998, p.711 
63 Erlanger, S. (1997). "Albright expresses irritation after talks with Netanyahu." The New York 
Times on the Web, 15 November 1997. 
64 Lippman. Madeleine Albright, p.125 
65 Albright, M.K. (1997). "U.S. Efforts to Increase Regional Economic Cooperation, 16 
November 1997." US Department of State Dispatch (December 1997) pp 7-8 
66 Lippman. Madeleine Albright, p.203 
67 Clinton, W.J. (1998). Remarks Following Discussions With Chancellor Helmut Kohl of 
Germany and an Exchange With Reporters in Potsdam, Germany, 13 May 1998. Public Papers 
- President Clinton, 1998, p.747 
68
· It provided for accelerated permanent status talks ; security with emphasis on pre-empting 
and fighting terror; further redeployment of Israeli forces ; and a time-out on unhelpful 
unilateral steps. 
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result in the final status talks being launched in Washington on 11 May 1998, 
but the gap between the two parties' positions remained too wide to offer 
prospect of movement. Arafat was seeking a transfer of a further 30 per cent 
of the remaining territory to the Palestinian Authority, while Netanyahu had 
intimated to Clinton that he might be able to go as high as 11 per cent. 69 
Clinton was obliged to issue a statement that day saying that the meeting 
would not take place. 70 
In the course of its dialogue with the Israelis and Palestinians, the 
Administration developed its own appreciation of the parties' positions and of 
a possible way forward. Albright articulated this on 12 May. She stressed the 
urgency of launching the permanent status talks because the interim period 
under the Oslo accords was due to expire in a year's time, on 4 May 1999. She 
suggested that the only way of achieving a settlement by that date was if Israel 
were to undertake a further force redeployment. Albright was, of course, 
aware that her predecessor had written to Netanyahu in 1997 saying that the 
extent and location of any further withdrawal was a matter for Israel alone, but 
she argued that it was 'in the nature of partnership that Israel should take 
Palestinian concerns into account, while following the terms of its 
agreement' .71 While she did not define the area from which Israel should 
redeploy, it was known that the Americans were thinking of withdrawal from 
about a further 13 per cent of West Bank and Gaza territory. Although less 
than Arafat's ambit claim, this was acceptable to him.72 Albright' s biographer 
described her speech 'as one of the most forthright challenges to Israel offered 
by any senior-level American official since James Baker. .. confronted the 
Jewish state over the issue of settlements in the West Bank' .73 Neither 
Netanyahu nor some American friends of Israel were enamoured of Albright' s 
proposal.74 
69 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.302 
7° Clinton, W.J. (1998). Statement on the Middle East Peace Process , 11 May 1998. Public 
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71 Albright, M.K. (1998). The Middle East Peace Process, 12 May 1998, U.S. Department of 
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72 Clinton, W.J. (1998). The President's News Conference with Prime Minister Romano Prodi 
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Albright did not resile from it because there was little prospect of going 
directly to the final status negotiations without an Israeli redeployment. She 
explored with Netanyahu and Arafat separately the possibility of ·their 
accepting such an arrangement, and whether they might meet each other when 
they visited New York in September 1998 for the UN General Assembly 
meeting. She brought the two leaders together and left them alone. That was 
sufficient to break the ice after more than a year's estrangement.75 The 
president met with them on 28 September and announced after their meeting 
that there had been 'a significant narrowing of the gaps between the two parties 
across a wide range of issues that were in the American initiative that we've 
been working on for months' .76 
The president tasked Albright to gauge the prospect for success if he 
were to invite the two leaders to a detailed negotiating conference. She was 
concerned that any summit should succeed because failure would leave 
American looking impotent.77 She visited Gaza in October and reported that a 
new spirit pervaded the resumed Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. Clinton then 
invited the parties to the Wye River Plantation later that month. With only 
months remaining to May 1999, the final status deadline would be impossible 
to meet, but to walk away from it without at least the appearance of an effort 
was to invite a new cycle of despair, extremism, and violence.78 Netanyahu 
accepted the logic, conscious that participation in negotiations did not commit 
him in advance to any particular outcome. Throughout the discussions leading 
to his attendance, Albright had maintained pressure on him to acquiesce in her 
interpretation of the way forward. She enjoyed Clinton 's backing in this. The 
Administration's task at Wye would be to convince Netanyahu to concede 
without breaching the tradition of American support for Israel. 
75 Ibid. pp .203-4 
76 Clinton, W.J. (1998). Remarks Following Discussions with Prime Minister Binyamin 
Netanyahu of Israel and Chairman Y asser Arafat of the Palestinian Authority and an Exchange 
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Wye River Plantation negotiation 
The negotiation79 appeared to meet the Administration's objective in 
opening the way toward further progress. An agreed Memorandum provided 
for the transfer of land to the Palestinians in two tranches - 13 per cent in the 
first and 14.2 per cent in the second - and the establishment of a committee to 
consider any subsequent tranche. To assist the economic development of the 
Palestinian Authority, the timely opening of the Gaza industrial estate and port 
were agreed. Israel's security concerns were addressed, with the United States 
agreeing to be a full partner with the Palestinians in 'the systematic and 
effective combat of terrorist organisations and their infrastructure' ,80 for which 
purpose they would meet biweekly. Concurrently, a US-Palestinian-Israel 
committee would be established to enhance cooperation to prevent arms 
smuggling and 'to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror', 81 
and 'a high-ranking US-Palestinian-Israel committee will meet. .. not less than 
biweekly to assess current threats, deal with any impediments to effective 
security cooperation and address the steps being taken to combat terror and 
terrorist organisations'. 82 These provisions were drafted with the assistance of 
the CIA and based upon its experience with the Israelis and Palestinians. In a 
further concession, as important to American domestic opinion as to Israeli 
sensibilities, the Palestine National Council would, at a meeting of the Council 
to be attended by President Clinton, reaffirm the nullification of those 
provisions of the Palestine National Charter that were inconsistent with the 
peace process, and reaffirm its support for the peace process. 83 Finally, the 
two sides agreed to negotiate continuously and without interruption on 
permanent status issues with a view to reaching an agreement by 
4 May 1999.84 
Clinton participated intermittently in the negotiations until it became 
clear that they were stalemated, when he threw himself into the endgame. The 
79 The Wye River Plantation talks began on 15 October and concluded with the signing of a 
memorandum on 23 October 1998; Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, contains an extensive 
record of the trials and atmospherics of the negotiation at Ch.19. 
8
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83 Ibid. Art. II C 2 
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Administration was strongly opposed to the Har Homa project, for which 
tenders were about to be called, seeing it as 'preempting the negotiations on 
permanent status with new facts on the ground' ,85 and told Netanyahu so. 
Perhaps international criticism of the project in 1997 had stiffened its resolve. 
Netanyahu made it clear to the Americans that politically he had no choice but 
to proceed with it. Clinton used this admission to extract agreement on the 
transfer of land to the Palestinians. Having achieved that, and Arafat not 
having challenged the trade-off when Clinton explained the situation to him, 
the president did not feel that he could fight Netanyahu further over the 
project. 86 Once again, King Hussein assisted in the conclusion of a deal 
between the Israelis and Palestinians. But within a week of the 
Memorandum's signing Clinton had to address what the United States could 
do to prevent its unravelling. 87 . Netanyahu had run into difficulties with his 
government: the right fearing that Netanyahu would implement Wye, handing 
over territory to the Palestinians, while the left feared that he would halt 
implementation of the agreement as soon as possible on one pretext or 
another. 88 And a Palestinian suicide bomber launched an attack on 29 October. 
Eight members of the Israeli cabinet approved the agreement, four voted 
against it and five ministers abstained. 89 The uncertainty within the cabinet did 
not reflect Israeli public opinion. A newspaper poll showed that 7 4 per cent of 
Israelis supported the terms of the Wye River Memorandum. 90 The Knesset 
overwhelmingly approved the agreement by 75 votes to 19, with 9 
abstentions.91 Clinton saw his task during his visit to Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority as the consolidation of public support for implementation 
of the agreement. In order to give sceptical Israelis some reassurance, he 
concluded an agreement with Netanyahu on the potential threat to Israel posed 
by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and WMD in the region, 92 and 
85 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.329 
86 Ibid. pp.450-2, 467 
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foreshadowed additional aid to Israel. 93 To convince Palestinians of the value 
of the agreement, Albright convened a pledging conference at the State 
Department on 30 November. She brought Arafat together with the European 
Union, Norway and the World Bank. Clinton addressed that meeting, noting 
that the Palestinians' '[p]er capita income is down. Unemployment is too high. 
Living conditions are extremely difficult' .94 The European Union made 
significant additional pledges of economic assistance to the West Bank and 
Gaza.95 
Netanyahu greeted Clinton on his arrival in Israel on 13 December 
1998, complaining that the Palestinians were saying they would unilaterally 
declare statehood, with East Jerusalem as their capital, on 4 May 1999. 96 
Clinton responded in an address to the people of Israel, reassuring them that 
'Palestinian leaders must. .. avoid the impression that unilateral actions can 
replace agreed-upon negotiations' .97 He stressed the importance of the Wye 
agreement and explained that the prime minister had 'succeeded in obtaining a 
set of systematic Palestinian security commitments and a structure for carrying 
them out'. 98 It was vital that Israelis 'recognise the validity of this agreement 
and work to sustain it and all other aspects of the peace process'. 99 And he 
challenged Israelis to define their vision for the future, pointing out that Israelis 
planning committee would be established to formulate recommendations on upgrading the 
framework of U.S.-Israeli strategic and military relationships, as well as technical cooperation. 
p.1940 
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and Palestinians are 'bound to be neighbours. The question is not whether you 
will live side by side, but how you will live side by side' .100 
The next day he attended a meeting of the Palestine National Council 
and witnessed the vote to amend the Palestine National Charter. He applauded 
the Council's rejection of the passages of the Charter calling for the destruction 
of Israel and said that it sent 'a powerful message not to the Government but to 
the people of Israel' .101 While enjoining Palestinians to 'recognise the right of 
Israel and its people to live safe and secure lives today, tomorrow, and 
forever', he said that 'Israel must recognise the right of Palestinians to aspire to 
live free, today, tomorrow, and forever' .102 The president acknowledged the 
Palestinians' high unemployment level; grief as a result of losses from violence 
and the separation of families; hardship due to restrictions on the movement of 
people and goods; and concerns about settlement activity, land confiscation 
and home demolitions. 103 His empathy was well received by his audience, but 
less favourably so in Israel. 104 
The Administration's expectations from the signing of the Wye 
memorandum were rapidly confounded. Although the Knesset had endorsed 
the agreement, Netanyahu' s government continued to find it highly divisive. 
He suspended the Wye process on 20 December, and in doing so broke his 
own commitment to observe all of his country's agreements. The reason for 
his doing so are unclear: perhaps divisions within his cabinet made progress 
impossible; perhaps he could not bring it upon himself to surrender any part of 
Eretz Israel to which he was ideologically committed; or perhaps he never 
really believed in it, having signed it under American pressure. Three days 
later the Knesset decided to dissolve itself and to hold new elections for the 
parliament and premiership. A date was chosen in May 1999, significantly 
later than the 4 May date postulated in various accords for completion of 
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arrangements for Palestinian self-government. This also gave the major parties 
time to contest a possible challenge from an embryonic centre party. 105 
Netanyahu' s premiership had not only set back the development of 
constructive relations with the Palestinians, it had eroded hard-won recognition 
of Israel within the Arab world and North Africa. The Clinton Administration 
had found him an exasperating 'partner' .106 The Administration's achievement 
in keeping the peace process afloat during Netanyahu's term in office was a 
considerable one. During most of the Netanyahu years the president was 
preoccupied with other issues, including from January 1998 with domestic 
difficulties flowing from his dalliance with a White House intern. 107 Counsel 
with connections to the Republican Party inquired into his conduct. Netanyahu 
may well have concluded that the president's authority was on the wane, and 
that the Israeli government need only make minimal concessions to him until 
such time as his star was eclipsed. Despite Clinton's preoccupations, he and 
his Middle East negotiators had been able to preserve for the longer-term the 
intimate character of the United States relationship with Israel, while 
contending with Israeli policies to which they were clearly opposed, and to 
retain a working relationship with the Palestinians. They were clearly 
frustrated by Netanyahu's flagrant breach of agreements and his 'unhelpful' 
policy of building Jewish settlements in the vicinity of Jerusalem. 
Netanyahu' s policies contributed to a · lowering of living standards in 
Palestinian territory and resulted in a growing attraction among Palestinian 
youth for direct action against Israelis. Unable to persuade Netanyahu to desist 
from policies that fuelled anti-Israeli behaviour, the United States brokered 
agreement at Wye on measures that might restrain Palestinian rejectionists. 
But Netanyahu declined to give these measures a chance to prove their 
effectiveness, notwithstanding public support for them. His actions suggest 
105 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.649 
106 Ross. D.B. (1999) . The Middle East Peace Process in the Wake of Ehud Barak's Victory. 
Presented at: The Barak Victory: Implications for Israel, the Peace Process, and US Policy. 
Soref Symposium 17-18 June 1999. Washington DC, The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy. p.3 
107 News reports of her husband's affair with Monica Lewinsky appeared on 21 January 1998. 
Lewinsky had worked at the White House two years earlier. Clinton, H.R. (2003). Living 
History, pp.440-1 
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that he believed that he could ignore American importuning and inducement, 
and that Israel could impose its own settlement terms on the Palestinians. 108 
Israel's return to Labor 
The United States faced a new situation in Israel after the election of 
17 May 1999, offering both possibilities and problems. The election produced 
a decisive victory for Ehud Barak, who won 56 per cent of the votes for the 
premiership. But in the concurrent parliamentary vote, the electorate presented 
Barak with 'a political dead end' .109 Not only did support for his Labor Party 
decline, but the centrist parties together could only muster 50 seats in the 120-
seat Knesset. He put together a coalition, adding the 27 seats of the three 
religious factions to his centrist core. Barak had pledged to the electorate that 
he would implement the Wye River accord and resume negotiations with the 
Palestinian Authority, but that Israel would not withdraw to the 1967 'border' 
or from large blocs of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
Israel would control all of Jerusalem. One commentator has described the 
difference between Barak and Netanyahu as that between a tough negotiator 
and a non-negotiator. 110 The Palestinians were not certain how to view this 
change of guard. While N etanyahu' s departure was a relief, his policies had 
produced 'a gradual cooling of America's relations with Israel and a 
concomitant warming of its relations with the Palestinian Authority' .111 
Clinton saw Barak as a helpful actor, and one who would enable a 
different approach to be taken. 112 Barak met a number of Middle East leaders 
before visiting Washington in July. He said that he had assured them that 
108 Hermann, M.G. and J.D. Hagan (1998). "International Decision Making: leadership 
matters." Foreign Policy Iss.110 Spring 1998. The authors attribute Netanyahu's 'resistance to 
international pressure for greater Israeli cooperation in the peace process ... [to] ... not only his 
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dependence on cabinet hardliners holding key ministries, and, more generally, the realignment 
of Israeli party politics in the 1990s'. p.133 
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Israel would work with them in a spirit of mutual trust; and that Israel would 
abide by all previous agreements, including the Wye accords. 113 Barak had his 
own perception of an appropriate American role in the peace process: he was 
looking to the United States 'to contribute to the process more as facilitator 
than as a kind of policeman, judge and arbitrator' .114 Clinton agreed. 115 But 
Barak seemed less certain whether to focus on the Palestinian or Syrian tracks 
and, in relation to the Palestinian one, how to subsume the previously agreed 
phased withdrawals into final status issues. 116 On the matter of Israeli 
settlements, he declared that he was not going to build new ones, but neither 
was he going to dismantle any of them. He envisioned the permanent status 
negotiation resulting in an Israel that incorporated 'a strong block of 
settlements that will include most of the settlers in Judeo-Samaria and the Gaza 
St · , 117 np. 
Clinton was satisfied that Barak was sincere in pressing ahead with the 
peace process. Suggestive of their having agreed to test first the receptiveness 
of the Palestinians, Clinton rang Arafat after Barak' s visit and urged him to 
meet with the prime minister and to hear him out. 118 And to shore up Barak' s 
support, inducements were offered that ranged well beyond the assistance 
promised for implementation of the Wye River accord. By mutual agreement, 
the United States would increase incrementally its annual military aid to Israel 
over the next decade to a level of $2.4 billion, while phasing out economic aid 
over a comparable period, 119 and the Administration pledged to work with 
113 Clinton, W.J. (1999). Remarks Prior to Discussions With Prime Minister Ehud Barak of 
Israel and an Exchange with Reporters, 15 July 1999. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1999, 
p.1378 
114 Ibid . p.1378 
115 Ibid. p.1378. Clinton said: 'I thought that the peace process worked best when we were 
essentially facilitating direct contacts between the parties and helping to make sure that there 
was a clear understanding ... We took a more active role, in effect, as a mediator when the 
bonds of trust and the lines of communication had become so frayed that we were in danger of 
losing the peace process '. 
116 Ibid . p.1380 
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118 Clinton, W.J. (1999). The President's News Conference, 21 July 1999. Public Papers -
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Minister Barak's proposals or to advocate or not advocate, but simply to say that [he] was 
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revitalised and whatever they [Arafat and Barak] did from here on out is something that they 
would do together'. p.1443 
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Israel and regional partners 1n two areas addressed by the multinational 
working groups - tourism and water. In respect of the latter, the 
Administration would promote the development of new and additional sources 
of water, including desalination, and examine ways to transfer water to arid 
lands. 120 
Clinton had evidently convinced Arafat to treat with Barak. A decision 
to integrate the Wye commitments with final status negotiations was expressed 
in a memorandum concluded by Arafat and Barak at Sharm el-Sheikh on 
4 September 1999, witnessed by President Mubarak, King Abdullah and 
Albright. 121 The memorandum provided for a determined effort to conclude a 
Framework Agreement on all permanent status issues within five months, and 
the conclusion of a comprehensive settlement within one year from the 
resumption of the permanent status negotiations on the basis of Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Further territory would be transferred to the 
Palestinian Authority in three bites in September and November 1999 and 
January 2000; Palestinian prisoners who had committed offences prior to the 
signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 would be released; and work 
would begin on safe passage for the movement of persons, vehicles and goods 
between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 122 After the first withdrawal and 
the release of the prisoners, arguments erupted over how much and which 
territory was to be handed over to the Palestinians in the second stage in 
November. 123 Barak' s policy of permitting the expansion of existing 
settlements led the Palestinians to suspend negotiations in December; and 
destroyed any prospect of the conclusion of a Framework Agreement by the 
agreed February 2000 deadline. 
the latter, the United States would provide funding for Israel's acquisition of a third Arrow 
anti-missile battery and work with Israel to develop new anti-ballistic missile technology. 
Also, there would be enhanced cooperation between NASA and the Israel Space Agency with 
a view to putting an Israeli astronaut into space. 
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4 September 1999. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1999. Clinton paid tribute to his 
Administration for helping the parties to 'bridge their final gaps and reach consensus' and to 
Mubarak for his 'critical role in facilitating this agreement'. p.1692 
122 US Department of State (1999). "The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation 
Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of 
Permanent Status Negotiations, 4 September 1999." 
http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/sharm0999.html - accessed 23 September 2002 
123 Morris. Righteous Victims, pp.653-4 
233 
Concurrent with these developments, Barak had been making overtures 
to the Syrians. In mid-December 1999, the Administration judged the prospect 
of movement between the Israelis and Syrians as sufficiently attractive to 
warrant the convening of meetings at Shepherdstown. David Makovsky, a 
former executive director of The Jerusalem Post, has recorded that 'Barak 
figured that his best chance to get the Palestinians to compromise while 
neutralising the last military threat on Israel's borders was to cut a separate 
deal with Syria' .124 The failure of negotiations on the Syrian track has been 
discussed in chapter 6, as has Barak' s unilateral withdrawal of forces from the 
Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon. American and Israeli 
preoccupations with those matters effectively constrained further development 
on the Palestinian track for some months. Negotiation of a Palestinian final 
status agreement was resumed in March 2000. 
The Israelis agreed to transfer land around Jericho, Ramallah and Jenin 
to the Palestinians, and President Clinton was mandated by Barak to tell Arafat 
that three Arab villages in the neighbourhood of East Jerusalem would also be 
transferred to the Palestinian Authority. But the fragile nature of Barak' s 
coalition was exposed when its right-wing members prevented his transferring 
the Arab villages. Clinton was furious at having been made out to be a 'false 
prophet' to a foreign leader. 125 Ministers from three of the coalition parties 
resigned in July; and the Knesset voted 54 to 52 in favour of a no-confidence 
motion that fell short of the 61 votes needed by law to topple a govemment. 126 
Barak claimed with some justification that the party structure of the Knesset no 
longer reflected the popular will, which was in favour of peace and supported 
. . h. . 121 
maJor concessions to ac 1eve 1t. 
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Despite this setback, Clinton continued to explore prospects of 
movement between the Israelis and Palestinians with key actors. 128 He 
suggested the creation of a fund that would deal with the financial burdens of 
the displaced refugees, including those in Jordan, 129 an idea that he was to 
recycle in December 2000. Barak' s domestic difficulties suggested to him that 
if he were to secure agreement to the terms of any settlement, all concessions 
and all rewards would have to be presented to a national referendum in one 
comprehensive package. 130 . In coming to this conclusion he was, in fact, 
building upon an idea first floated by Netanyahu in 1997, rejected at that time 
by Arafat, and later investigated by Albright. 
Barak insisted on the holding of a summit, judging that without it he 
would be unable to hold his government together. From America's 
perspective, Barak' s determination to reach a final deal and the risks he was 
prepared to take to get there contrasted favourably with Arafat's perceived 
inflexibility and disposition to hang onto what he had gained in interim 
commitments, notwithstanding the fact that it must have been apparent to 
Arafat that the longer the negotiating process was stretched out, the more Israel 
took advantage of its unconstrained power to pre-empt the outcome by creating 
new facts on the ground. 131 Consequently, Clinton acquiesced in Barak's 
request for a summit against the advice of Arabs, Europeans, and 
Palestinians. 132 Arafat had expressed his reservations directly to Clinton at 
their meeting on 15 June. 133 He was also talking about unilaterally declaring 
statehood on 13 September 2000, seven years from the signing of the 
Declaration of Principles. The Administration viewed this as unhelpful to the 
128 The President received Arafat in Washington in April 2000 and met Barak in Lisbon in 
May. King Abdullah called on him in June, and Arafat did so again later that month. 
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peace process, and decided that the convening of an early summit might 
forestall it. · 
Any summit had to be out of the way before the Democratic National 
Convention met to select its candidate for the 2000 presidential election. Vice-
President Al Gore was a candidate, and the White House· did not want to see 
meetings at Camp David at a time when the focus should be on the Convention 
and Clinton's former running-mate. While Ross was not in favour of a 
meeting as early as July, he decided nevertheless to recommend that the 
summit be held on the ground that a meeting was preferable to no meeting. 134 
Arafat had asked for more time to prepare for a meeting. The Administration 
shared his perception of the need for adequate preparation, but was constrained 
by the domestic political timetable. 
Arafat posed several conditions for agreeing to participate, 135 seeking 
additional preparatory talks to ensure that Camp David would not fail, and that 
the third Israeli redeployment be implemented before any summit. The latter 
request was clearly incompatible with the purposes of a summit to resolve all 
permanent status issues and was turned down by the Administration. Arafat 
modified it, seeking a safety net in the form of an American guarantee that the 
third withdrawal would take place even if Camp David did not yield an 
agreement. Clinton extracted Barak' s agreement to this, and thus secured 
Arafat's participation. US officials believed that the Palestinians' reservations 
would evaporate in the face of an appealing final deal; and officials having 
accepted Barak's argument for a final status summit, 'chose to use their 
leverage with the Israelis to obtain movement on the issues that had to be dealt 
with in a permanent agreement than expend it on interim ones' .136 On the eve 
of the summit Clinton also volunteered that the United States would remain 
neutral in the event that it failed and that Arafat would not be blamed, 137 but 
the United States proceeded to disregard each of these undertakings. 
134 Interview with Ambassador Dennis B. Ross at Washington DC on 20 April 2001 
135 Arafat is reported to have preferred not to clash with the U.S . on a procedural matter such 
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David Papers", p.84 
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The Camp David summit 
The summit was held in July 2000 in a hermetically-sealed 
environment: there were no formal drafting or position papers in circulation, 
no party was bound by any proposal discussed at the summit, and nothing was 
to be taken as agreed until everything was agreed. Glimpses of what transpired 
have been provided through an exchange between two members of the 
American delegation and a member of the Palestinian one, 138 each of whom 
has his own partial interpretation. 
Despite having sought the meeting, Barak refused to negotiate directly 
with Arafat at Camp David. The Americans became the intermediary, 
proposing 'ideas, suggestions, even language' .139 Barak' s strategy was that 
Israel ought not to reveal its final positions, not even to the United States. 140 
He feared that if he put forward concessions he would have to pay the price 
domestically; that the Palestinians would use any concession as a point of 
departure for further concessions; and that the Americans would reveal his 
positions to the Palestinians. He therefore conveyed his positions through the 
Americans as 'immovable', asking the United States to present the Palestinians 
with a choice between propositions that he judged would be sufficiently 
attractive to command their support and unattractive alternatives, only to 
modify them when rejected. Not only were the propositions conveyed orally, 
but they were generally presented as US concepts, not Israeli ones. 141 Barak 
and the Americans insisted that Arafat accept the propositions as general 
'bases for negotiations' before launching into detailed discussion. 
The lack of progress was disturbing to the Administration, and Albright 
decided to present an American paper that would deal with all issues except 
Jerusalem, which would be addressed later. This was unacceptable to the 
Palestinians, and she amended her paper to include Jerusalem. When she 
138 See Malley, R. (2001). "Fictions About the Failure at Camp David." The New York Times 
on the Web, 8 July 2001; Malley and Agha (2001). "Camp David: the tragedy of errors."; Ross, 
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presented it, the Palestinians claimed that it 'distorted the Palestinian positions 
and contradicted not only the terms of reference of the peace process but the 
United States' s own position on Jerusalem' .142 It was left to the president to 
tell Arafat that the paper was null and void. 
The role of go-between was not a comfortable one for the Americans. 
Clinton found himself in an untenable position as Barak shifted his ground. 
[I]n an extraordinary moment at Camp David, when Barak retracted 
some of his positions, the President confronted him, expressing all his 
accumulated frustrations. 'I can't go see Arafat with a retrenchment! 
You can sell it; there is no way I can. This is not real. This is not 
serious. I went to Shepherdstown [for the Israeli-Syrian negotiations] 
and was told nothing by you for four days. I went to Geneva [for the 
summit with Assad] and felt like a wooden Indian doing your bidding. 
I will not let it happen here!' 143 
The Palestinians, too, were unaccommodating. Unaware of what the Israelis 
would present to him, Arafat had little opportunity to prepare a considered 
response. Worse, his delegation lacked coordination. This may suggest why 
the Palestinians did not advance propositions of their own. 
Toward the end of the summit, an irate Clinton would tell Arafat: 'If 
the Israelis can make compromises and you can't, I should go home. 
You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything. These 
things have consequences; failure will mean the end of the peace 
process ... Let's let hell break loose and live with the consequences' .144 
Some of the matters introduced at Camp David had been explored 
secretly and unofficially between some Israelis and Palestinians in Stockholm 
in 1995. Their outline was rejected by Peres when it was presented to him 
shortly after Rabin's death. Stockholm had again been used as a venue for 
discreet discussions until a leak of the substance of the talks in mid-May 2000, 
and Israel's push for an official summit, led to the closure of that channel. 
'Israelis and Palestinians who took part say ... that the discussions were 
groundbreaking ... They made progress on the issues of territory, borders, 
security, and even refugees, although there were both advances and retreats on 
every issue' .145 Refugees and Jerusalem were highly emotional topics which, 
142 Ibid. p.87 
143 Malley and Agha. "Camp David: the tragedy of errors." 
144 Ibid. 
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· because of their sensitivity to both sides, had been conspicuously left to the 
end of the Oslo process when it was hoped that sufficient trust would have 
been developed to facilitate their peaceful resolution. Barak' s introduction of 
these issues at Camp David without comprehensive exploration lent credence 
to Arafat's expressed concern about the need for adequate preparation. Both 
the Oslo agreements were the product of protracted negotiations., conducted 
away from the glare of publicity. An initiative by Barak on Jerusalem caught 
the Palestinians off-guard. There was no possibility that Arafat could cede 
sovereignty over East Jerusalem, the site of the third most significant Islamic 
shrine, to Israel. This was not solely a Palestinian matter: it affected the whole 
Muslim world and Arafat had no mandate to negotiate on its behalf. The 
refugee issue, too, involved the interests of other governments on which they 
ought properly to be given an opportunity to have their say. 
The Administration was dealing with a Palestinian leader who seemed 
more anxious to survive the Camp David summit than to benefit from it. 146 It 
dangled various inducements before him in order to secure agreement. 
Statehood, involving recognition by the United States, Israel and the 
international community, was one prospect; another was financial assistance 
from the world's major industrial countries. Clinton would be leaving Camp 
David to attend a Group of Eight summit at Okinawa and would talk to the 
other participants about further assistance for the Palestinians. Arafat 
acknowledged the Palestinians' need for aid, but said that he would not 
exchange Jerusalem for a state. 147 Clinton then rang Arab leaders and urged 
them to advise Arafat to accept the offers under discussion or, failing that, to 
encourage him to sign an agreement postponing the Jerusalem issue. But 
Arafat had taken care to keep Arab and international leaders regularly 
informed about developments, and few responded to the president's appeal. 148 
Another line taken by the American team was that a solution for Jerusalem 
would open the doors to solving all the other issues, but Arafat held to his 
critical question of its western border had not been addressed and was one of the matters that 
informed the Palestinian view that any summit needed further preparation. 
146 Malley and Agha. "Camp David: the tragedy of errors." 
147 Hanieh. "The Camp David Papers", p.89 
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position that he would not 'sell' Jerusalem. 149 Some days later, Clinton 
employed the threat of a congressional freeze on aid to the Palestinian 
· Authority. Arafat was unfazed. A new tack was tried, with Clinton suggesting 
that a 'sovereign presidential compound' be established for the ra 'is and his 
state adjacent to the al-Aqsa Mosque. Arafat envisioned the situation - not so 
much a Holy See within the Italian capital as a small island surrounded by 
Israeli soldiers who controlled the entrances - and again demanded full 
Palestinian sovereignty over the territory of Jerusalem occupied in 1967 .150 
Finally, Clinton set forth four points that he said was the final offer on 
Jerusalem: a committee made up of the UN Security Council and Morocco 
would grant the Palestinian state 'sovereign custody' of the Haram, while 
Israel would retain 'residual sovereignty'; the Muslim and Christian quarters of 
the Old City would come under Palestinian sovereignty, while the Jewish and 
Armenian quarters would fall under Israeli sovereignty; the Palestinians would 
have functional jurisdiction over some 'inner' neighbourhoods; Jerusalem's 
'outer' neighbourhoods would be under Palestinian sovereignty. If the 'inner' 
neighbourhoods were also to come under Palestinian sovereignty, a special 
regime would have to be agreed upon that would apply to the Old City. 151 The 
Palestinians responded that the proposals on Jerusalem were in contradiction 
with international law, which had to be the basis for any agreement. 152 With 
that, the summit ended. 
Robert Malley has drawn attention to the complex and often 
contradictory roles of the United States at Camp David: as principal broker of 
the putative peace deal; as guardian of the peace process; as Israel's strategic 
ally; and as its cultural and political partner. He believed that America's 
ability to be an effective broker was hamstrung by its political and cultural 
affinity with Israel and its strategic relationship with that country. Such was 
the cultural affinity between the United States and Israel that members of the 
American delegation were taken aback when Barak indicated that he could 
accept a division of the Old City of Jerusalem and they wondered whether he 
149 Ibid. p.90 
150 Ibid. p.95 
151 Ibid. p.96 
152 Ibid. Hanieh's record of this exchange states: 'It was now clear that the Americans had fully 
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could sell such a proposal to his people. The question was rarely, if ever, 
asked about Arafat's ability to sell accommodations to the Palestinians. The 
strategic relationship was governed by a broad interpretation of Kissinger's 
'no-surprise rule' under which America had committed to share in advance 
each of its ideas with Israel, but Barak felt under no compunction to behave 
correspondingly. The more corrosive effect of America's multiple roles, 
including that of go-between, was that they hid from the Palestinians Clinton's 
many attempts to persuade Barak 
to accept what until then he had refused - among them the principle of 
land swaps, Palestinian sovereignty over at least part of East 
Jerusalem ... as well as a significantly reduced area of Israeli 
annexation. This led Barak to comment to the president that, on 
matters of substance, the US was much closer to the Palestinians' 
position than to Israel's. This was only one reflection of a far wider 
pattern of divergence between Israeli and American positions - yet one 
that has systematically been ignored by Palestinians and other Arabs 
alike. 153 
Barak' s reported comment about the president being closer to the 
Palestinian position than to Israel's demolishes much of Malley' s argument 
that America's strategic partnership with Israel impaired its effectiveness as a 
peace broker. The strength, and at times the emotion, with which the 
Administration argued with the Israelis in private in support of some 
accommodation with the Palestinians is a reflection both of its appreciation of 
various Palestinian positions and of the close and indissoluble relationship 
between the United States and Israel, which could take the strain without 
irreparable damage. Arab and Muslim states were well aware of America's 
cultural and strategic relationship with Israel, and saw this paradoxically as 
providing a necessary reassurance to Israel in relation to its security concerns 
were it ever to be persuaded to relinquish occupied territory. They could be in 
no doubt about America's sustained effort to keep the parties engaged in 
negotiation, albeit in its self-designated role as broker and guardian of the 
peace process. Malley' s reference to the political partnership is telling. 
Clinton's predisposition neither to coerce Israel nor to criticise it publicly has 
been addressed earlier. His willingness to convey an Israeli brief at his final 
meeting with Assad has also been discussed. At Camp David he again agreed 
153 Malley and Agha. "Camp David: the tragedy of errors." 
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to become the conduit, allowing Israel to hide behind the fiction of its 
proposals being presented as 'American'. The United States's proprietorial 
attitude toward the whole process since its inception in 1991 denied a 
significant managerial and intellectual role to other states. There is no telling 
whether external influences might have helped reshape and advance the peace 
process. A different constellation of forces might have produced an alternative 
approach. The relevance of such speculation is questionable. 
After the summit, Clinton did an interview on Israeli television in 
which he praised Barak' s courage. 154 He countered leaks that Barak had 
offered up part of Jerusalem, challenging any thought that Barak may have 
compromised 'the vital interest of the people of Israel and Jerusalem'. He also 
said that in the light of the outcome at Camp David he would review the 
question of moving the United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and 
would take a decision on that before the end of the year. 155 In praising Caesar, 
Clinton effectively buried Arafat. 156 A mythology has developed that Arafat 
turned down the best offer any Israeli government had ever made. In fact, 
because of the manner in which ideas were advanced orally through American 
mediation, possibly later to be amended, there never was an Israeli 'offer', as 
such, on the table. The myth also conveniently skirts the fact that Arafat had 
no mandate from third parties to negotiate accommodations that affected their 
interests. 
Post-Camp David negotiations and Clinton's 'plan' 
Although disappointed by the failure at Camp David, Clinton remained 
determined to press for a peace settlement. Palestinian negotiators began 
talking about the need for the United States to be an honest broker and to put 
forward compromise proposals of its own, not just re-worked Israeli ideas, 157 
while Barak spoke of the need for American proposals if there was to be a final 
154 Clinton, W.J. (2000). Interview with Israeli Television, 27 July 2000. Public Papers -
President Clinton, 2000, pp.1709-15 
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agreement. This represented · a reversal of the position he had advanced in 
1999 when he asked America to restrict its role to that of a facilitator. Clinton 
agreed to present ideas, but only if the parties resumed talks and made initial 
headway on their own. 158 Israeli and Palestinian negotiators conducted more 
than 50 negotiating sessions in August and September, and produced two draft 
chapters of a permanent peace agreement that were kept secret froni all but the 
leaders. Toward the end of September, there seemed to be a glimmer of hope 
that the negotiation might get back on track. Barak and Arafat came together 
for what both sides described as an unusually cordial meeting.159 
The Administration began preparation of an American proposal during 
August and September.160 While work was in progress, fear resurfaced that the 
Palestinians would proceed to declare statehood on 13 September. Clinton 
made it clear that he was opposed to a unilateral declaration of statehood and 
threatened that he would review the entire relationship with the Palestinians 
were they to make one. 161 Clinton impressed on others the need to prevent its 
occurrence. He manned the phones with the intent of having a positive 
impact, 162 and met with Barak twice, and Arafat and King Abdullah prior to 
13 September. He also met Peres on 18 September. 
Any hope that . Clinton's diplomatic activity and the informal 
negotiations between the two parties might presage progress towards a final 
settlement received a major setback when on 28 September 2000, the leader of 
the opposition Likud Party, Ariel Sharon, visited the Haram al-Sharif/Temple 
Mount area on which the al-Aqsa Mosque stands. Sharon, who owns a 
residence in the Old City, probably staged the event to pressure Barak not to 
compromise on Jerusalem. The provocative nature of such a visit was clearly 
foreseen by the Israeli government, which had provided a large security escort. 
Although Sharon stayed clear of Islamic places of worship, Muslims 
interpreted the visit as a flaunting of Israel's claim to authority over the holy 
158 Ibid. p.368 
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sites. After noon prayers the next day, large numbers of young Muslims 
poured out of the mosques and began throwing stones at Jews praying at the 
Western Wall below the compound. The Jews had gathered in some numbers 
on the eve of their New Year. The Israeli police fired at the Palestinian crowd, 
killing several and wounding many others. By 10 October, some 90 
Palestinians had been killed and some 2,000 injured in the ensuing 
conflagration. There were only a handful of Israeli casualties. 163 On 
12 October two Israeli soldiers were seized and murdered at a police station at 
Ramallah and the body of one was paraded through the streets. 164 The UN 
Security Council condemned the violence, 'especially the excessive use of 
force against Palestinians', 165 and again called upon Israel to abide by its legal 
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The United States abstained. 
The Administration recognised that a truce would have to be arranged 
if the peace process were again to be rescued. Albright met Barak and Arafat 
in Paris to try to secure it. Arafat was reluctant to issue a call for an end to the 
fighting unless Israel agreed to an international inquiry into the origins of the 
clashes. 166 Clinton, too, interceded in the matter. He telephoned Arafat and 
Barak on 30 September and 10 October; and persuaded them to accept an 
invitation from President Mubarak, whose services he had again co-opted, to 
attend another meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh. 167 The agreement reached there on 
an early redeployment of Israeli forces, and a lifting of the blockade imposed 
on the Palestinians, including a reopening of entry ports and crossing points 'in 
163 Morris. Righteous Victims, p.665; Reinhart, T. (2002). Israel/Palestine: how to end the war 
of 1948. Crows Nest NSW, Allen & Unwin. 'More than seven thousand Palestinians were 
reported injured in the first five weeks of the uprising, many in the head, legs, or knees by 
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volatility of the environment in which they were trying to broker a peace. 
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order to ·pacify the Palestinian streets and bring matters back to normal', 168 
owed much to Clinton's personal efforts. The United States undertook to work 
with the Israelis, Palestinians and the UN on establishing the facts of the 
al-Aqsa incident; and Clinton secured the agreement of Barak and Arafat to 
consult with the Administration over the next two weeks on how to move 
forward. 169 During that period he spoke with the two leaders several times a 
week in an effort to have the violence halted. 170 His interventions, however, 
had little impact upon the al-Aqsa intifada. The president believed that Arafat 
was in a position to reduce the violence, but conceded that 'nobody has 100 per 
cent control of any situation' .171 He found it somewhat ironic that the violence 
should have unfolded in the aftermath of the first serious discussion on the 
difficult final status issues of the Oslo agreement. 172 
While doing what he could to encourage a cessation of violence, 
Clinton worked over the proposal that he would submit to the two parties. He 
announced on 28 November that he had 'put some ideas on the table. They go 
beyond where we were at Camp David; they meet the fundamental needs that 
both sides expressed at Camp David. And the Israelis said that they would 
agree to try to close the remaining gaps within the parameters of the ideas I put 
forward if the Palestinians will agree' .173 The Administration had talked to all 
, 
the Arab leaders, and assumed that Arafat would have done so too, given the 
significance of Jerusalem to the Islamic world. Over the following weeks, the 
Administration sought to convince the Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate 
within Clinton's parameters. The president was certain that if a peace 
agreement were possible, it would be within the context of his initiative, and 
that if it could be achieved at all, it could be resolved within a matter of weeks. 
0 
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Circumstances were unlikely to get better: 1n all probability they would 
become more difficult. 174 
That remark was prescient. By the end of 2000 the three principals 
were virtually hors de combat. Al Gore had won the popular vote for the US 
presidency, seemingly assuring a Democratic succession, but the Electoral 
College vote came down to a contest for the Floridian vote that was resolved in 
the courts, resulting in the swearing-in as president on 20 January 2001 of 
George Walker Bush, the son of former President Bush. Barak's shaky 
government was on the verge of collapse and he decided to pre-empt his rivals 
by forcing new elections for the premiership on 6 February 2001. Arafat's 
position at the time was also uncertain because he could not gain control over 
the al-Aqsa intifada. Israel's withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon encouraged 
some Palestinians to believe that they could eventually force Israel to offer 
more accommodating terms than those advanced at Camp David. 175 They had 
seen the Palestinian leadership commit to negotiation with Israel in 1993. 
Seven years of negotiation had resulted in the recovery of limited territory 
while daily humiliation persisted. Hezbollah' s armed confrontation in 
southern Lebanon had resulted in the return of occupied territory to the state. 
Jerome Slater has concluded, however, that 'there is no evidence and no Israeli 
intelligence consensus on whether Arafat ordered, acquiesced in, or was 
powerless to control the ... wave of Palestinian bombings inside Israel' 176 at the 
time. 'The most plausible interpretation is that the al-Aqsa intifada began as a 
largely spontaneous eruption, but one over which Arafat and the Palestinian 
Authority ... gained some but by no means complete control' .177 
Clinton was motivated to press on, partly because his place in history 
would be assured if he were able to effect a peace between Israelis and 
Palestinians. He brought the negotiators together again at the White House 
on 23 December where he advanced five parameters for negotiation. 178 They 
were that: 
174 Ibid. p.3208 
175 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, records a view among Palestinians 'that Hamas was 
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176 Slater (2001). "What Went Wrong?", p.191 
177 Ibid. p.191; Quandt (2001). Peace Process, p.371 
178 Ross, D.B. (2002). "Yasir Arafat." Foreign Policy Iss.131 Jul/Aug 2002. The President 
presented his proposal orally. Ross ensured that both sides had recorded each word accurately. 
246 
• there could be no genuine resolution to the conflict without a 
sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that accommodated Israel's 
security requirements and the demographic realities. That 
suggested Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and the vast majority 
of the West Bank, and the incorporation into Israel of settlement 
blocks with the goal of maximising the number of Jewish settlers in 
Israel while minimising the area of annexed land. To be viable, 
Palestine would need to be a geographically contiguous state, and 
the land annexed into Israeli settlement blocks should include as 
few Palestinians as possible consistent with the logic of two 
separate homelands. To make the agreement durable, there would 
have to be some territorial swaps and other arrangements; 
• a solution would have to be found for the Palestinian refugees that 
allowed them to return to a Palestinian state. All refugees should 
receive compensation from the international community for their 
losses and assistance in building new lives. Israel could not be 
expected to acknowledge an unlimited right of return as that would 
threaten the very foundation of the State of Israel; 
• there will be no peace and no peace agreement unless the Israeli 
people have lasting security guarantees. These need not come at 
the expense of Palestinian sovereignty. An international presence 
could be positioned in Palestine to provide border security along the 
Jordan Valley and to monitor implementation of a final agreement; 
• Jerusalem should be an open and undivided city with assured 
freedom of access and worship for all. What is Arab should be 
Palestinian, and what is Jewish should be Israeli; and 
• any agreement would have to mark the decision to end the 
conflict. 179 
179 Clinton, W.J. (2001). Remarks at an Israel Policy Forum Dinner in New York City, 7 
January 2001. Public Papers - President Clinton, 2001, pp.33-4; Ross, D.B. (2002). "Yasir 
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Clinton knew that the plan was tough, his parameters non-negotiable. His 
resolve, fuelled by exasperation, was clear: 'it was time - past time - to put up 
or shut up' .180 He had concluded that unless the United States 'narrowed the 
range of debate, in effect forcing the big compromises up front, there could 
never be an agreement' .181 
After presenting his proposal, Clinton called the leaders of Egypt, 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia and, later, of Morocco and Tunisia, and asked them to 
press Arafat to accept the plan. They were initially supportive, but backed off 
when Arafat told them that there were questions that needed answering. 182 
Clinton's first point was the nearest any American president had come 
to endorsing a two-state solution. The immediate reaction of the Palestinians 
to his ideas was that the proposal divided a Palestinian state into three separate 
cantons connected and divided by Israeli-only roads that jeopardised the state's 
viability; divided Palestinian Jerusalem into a number of unconnected islands 
separate from each other and from the rest of Palestine; and obliged Palestinian 
refugees to surrender their right of return. 183 As no map had been presented, it 
was difficult to determine the extent of the territorial exchanges envisaged, but 
the parameters seemed to suggest that Israel would annex 4 to 6 per cent of the 
West Bank with the Palestinians being compensated through a land swap of 
1 to 3 per cent. A particular concern for the Palestinians was that the United 
States had adopted the Israeli practice of excluding the areas of East Jerusalem, 
'no-man's land' and the Dead Sea from the base figure from which the transfer 
percentages were calculated. 
On the vexed question of the right of return of refugees, Clinton had 
proposed to Arafat at Camp David that as he knew that all Palestinians in the 
diaspora could not be resettled in Israel, he should acknowledge this. 184 Israel 
could not be expected to accept an unrestricted right of return and the most 
realistic option for refugees would be return to the new state of Palestine, not 
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their original homes. 185 This was contrary to a prov1s1on of UN General 
Assembly Resolution 194,186 whose relevance to final status issues Albright 
had sought to expunge through her letter of 8 August 1994.187 It was an issue 
on which there was also a clear cleavage between the pragmatic 
accommodations entered into by the PLO/PA, and the refugees who perceived 
the Olso accords 'as detrimental to their legal, national, and human rights, 
reinforcing their sense of dispossession and disenfranchisement' .188 Ross 
worked with the Israelis to find a possible formula to cover the refugee 
question. Even if the Palestinian Authority discouraged Palestinians from 
exercising any right of return, the Israelis were concerned that acceptance of a 
'right' would be open-ended in its time frame and would expose them to 
claims for compensation. Ross had sought to reframe the issue in terms of a 
'right of application'. Again, the Israelis were concerned that it put the onus 
on them. 189 
Barak won his government's acceptance of Clinton's proposals, 
conditional on Arafat accepting them as the basis for negotiations. Barak was 
gambling on the hope that an agreement would ensure his re-election on 
6 February 2001. Arafat accepted them, with qualifications, as a basis for 
negotiation after meeting with Clinton on 2 January, following which officials 
from the two sides met at Taba, without their leaders and without the 
Americans. The Americans were effectively 'disempowered' during the 
transition from Clinton's Administration to that of the President-elect. 
The Palestinians claim that tangible steps were taken at Taba toward a 
final agreement, notably on territory, Palestinian sovereignty over all Arab 
neighbourhoods in Jerusalem, and the evolution of an 'agreed narrative' that 
185 Quandt (2001). Peace Process, pp.371-2 
186 United Nations (1948). UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), 11 December 1948. 
Operative para. 11 'Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at 
peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and 
that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss 
of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be 
made good by the Governments or authorities responsible '. 
187 Bowker, R. (2003). Palestinian Refugees: mythology, identity, and the search for peace. 
Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers argues that the relevance of UNGA Resolution 194 
was effectively diluted by the 'the silence of the Madrid process and the Oslo Accords on the 
principles that would apply to resolving the refugee issue' . p.159 
188 Ibid . p.160 
189 Interview with Ambassador Dennis B. Ross at Washington DC on 20 April 2001. 
249 
would defuse the refugee issue and protect the Jewish identity of Israel. 190 
Once again progress was halted when violence in the West Bank resulted in the 
deaths of Israelis. Barak said that the talks would be resumed after the 
elections, but was not in any position after the polls to honour the pledge. 
Arafat's position was that he did not want to be forced by artificial deadlines to 
make fateful decisions. He knew that Clinton would not be around after 
19 January to assist with the remaining difficult negotiation before a final 
agreement could be reached, and may also have been hoping that the incoming 
president, with his well-known connections to the oil industry, would be more 
sympathetic to Arab concerns. 191 Clinton found himself at the end of his term 
with both parties reluctantly accepting his general framework, but without time 
to push for full agreement. The Palestinian negotiator N abil Shaath summed 
up the situation: 'If Camp David was too little, Taba was too late' .192 
Postlude 
Neither the critical Israeli-Palestinian relationship nor the wider Arab-
Israel dispute had been resolved by the expiry of Clinton's presidency. This 
brief postlude will take the narrative of America's attempt to effect a 
settlement of the Palestinian track to 2003 when a new initiative was 
announced and new complications arose to inhibit its progress. 
President George W. Bush had no intention of emulating Clinton and 
involving himself in the details of a possible resolution of the conflict. Despite 
his disposition, he could not walk away from an issue of signal importance, or 
from a process that had been launched by his father. His Administration would 
persist with policies undertaken by that of President Clinton. It responded to 
the unfolding al-Aqsa intifada conceding that if any accommodation were to be 
found it would have to be within a two-state solution, taking the first of 
Clinton's parameters and formalising it as an objective of American policy. 193 
Also, the new Bush Administration signalled its preparedness to work through 
the existing framework; and recognised the continuing importance of an 
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expansion of economic opportunity in the region and the need to find regional 
solutions to security challenges. Like its predecessor, it insisted that the 
Palestinians must accept that their goals could only be achieved through 
negotiation, while going further than its predecessor and demanding of the 
Israelis that 'settlement activity must stop' .194 
Militants from a newly constituted Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, an 
agency of Arafat's Fatah movement, had joined Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
insurgents in the al-Aqsa intifada after 2000. Each provocation by Palestinian 
insurgents and suicide bombers brought harsh retaliation by the Israelis, who 
targeted activist leaders and destroyed the homes of the families of the 
bombers. Attempts were made by Bush's Administration to negotiate a cease-
fire and to establish calm as a prelude to a possible resumption of the peace 
process. Former US Senator George Mitchell headed the commission 
mandated at the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in October 2000 to investigate the 
cause of the intifada. The commission postulated that the greatest danger was 
that the culture of peace, nurtured . over the previous decade, was being 
shattered; and suggested a list of confidence-building measures, most of which 
had already been the subject of agreements between Israel and the 
Palestinians. 195 The commission's efforts failed to take root. The Director of 
the CIA, George Tenet, was tasked in June 2001 to draft a cease-fire plan, 
which sought an agreed schedule for the complete redeployment of IDF forces 
to positions held before 28 September 2000, 196 but violence continued on both 
sides. It was only after the terrorist attacks on American soil of 11 September 
2001, when Al-Qaeda included the Palestinian cause among its rhetoric, that 
the Bush Administration began articulating its vision of an Israeli-Palestinian 
settlement. Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the outline on 
19 November, which included the creation of a viable Palestinian state. The 
Palestinians were challenged to make 'a 100 percent effort to end violence and 
to end terror' 197 and to 'prepare their people for the hard compromises ahead'. 
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Israel was called upon to stop building settlements · in the West Bank. 198 A 
retired Marine Corps General, Anthony Zinni, was appointed to try to bring 
about a cessation of hostilities, based on the Tenet plan. Arafat and Ariel 
Sharon, who had defeated Barak at the polls in February 2001, confirmed to 
Powell their preparedness to work through senior-level committees on 'the 
negotiation and implementation of a cease-fire and what follows from that' .199 
Israelis read a sequential argument into Powell's statement: negotiations could 
begin after Palestinian violence had ceased. 
The Administration was unable to persuade the parties to halt the 
violence. Any doubt whether the Palestinian Authority was encouraging 
Palestinian terrorism had to be set aside in January 2002 when a Palestinian 
ship, carrying arms supplies from Iran, was intercepted by the Israeli 
authorities. Arafat denied knowledge of the operation.200 While it is 
conceivable that the order may have been commissioned without his 
know ledge, his highly centralised management style and control of the purse 
strings leaves little doubt about the question of his knowledge. The 
Administration was dealing with two protagonists, in Arafat and Sharon, with 
a history of personal enmity. The Oslo peace process crumbled as the 
combatants reduced the contest between Israelis and the Palestinians to the 
level of a personal duel in which the IDF was used to demonstrate Arafat's 
'irrelevance'. Bush also contributed to the process's demise. He sidelined 
Arafat by refusing to meet him, and later called for his removal from the 
Palestinian leadership. 
Having failed to determine the situation on the ground through its own 
efforts, the Bush Administration turned to the international community for 
help. The Administration keenly embraced a Saudi Arabian promise of 'full 
normalisation' of relations with Israel by all Arab countries if Israel withdrew 
completely from the West Bank and Gaza.201 Despite its endorsement by an 
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Arab League summit, the initiative was not to become a circuit-breaker. 
Israelis were confused by the move, which offered the attraction of Arab 
recognition of the State of Israel within the 4 June · 1967 borders in exchange 
for Israel's withdrawal from all territory occupied after that date. The price 
was unacceptable to the Israeli right, and Sharon temporised.202 Later in 2002, 
the United States engaged with Russia, the European Union and the United 
Nations in crafting 'a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear 
phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks' 203 aimed at producing a two-
state solution by 2005. The removal of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussain by 
a United States-led coalition expunged from the Middle East the one actor that 
had launched a missile strike against Israel and that was in a position to 
threaten Israel's security. The changed geopolitical circumstances, engineered 
principally by the United States, might ameliorate Israeli security concerns and 
offer prospect for some accommodation with the Palestinians. It would 
improve the prospect of the Administration exercising leverage over Israel 
should the president chose to employ such means, although the dominant neo-
conservative element within his Administration has a pro-Israel agenda. 
Before any leverage could be employed, Sharon had skilfully conflated the 
Palestinian insurgency with Bush's 'war on terrorism', making it difficult for 
the Americans to distinguish between the two. The president will no doubt 
have in mind that getting tough with Israel did not help his father when seeking 
a second term and that any attempt to exert pressure on Israel might preferably 
be deferred until after the November 2004 election. 
The influence of Clinton's parameters has extended beyond the Bush 
Administration. An unofficial Israeli and Palestinian 'peace group' that 
included former ministers of the Palestinian Authority and Israel's Labor 
government and retired high-ranking officers of the IDF, as well as current 
members of the two legislatures, drafted a peace agreement in Geneva in 
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October 2003,204 and comparable discussions are under way elsewhere.205 The 
Geneva 'accord' addresses such issues as the border between the two sovereign 
states, Israel's responsibility for resettling Israelis residing in Palestinian 
sovereign territory, security, compensation to refugees for refugeehood and 
loss of property, remuneration to states that have hosted refugees, recognition 
of Israeli and Palestinian sovereignty over different parts of Jerusalem, and 
transfer of the Haram al-Sharifffemple Mount compound to Palestinian 
sovereignty. Neither Sharon nor Arafat has endorsed the draft, but the United 
States has paid attention to it. Its crafting shows that a negotiated peace 
agreement that addresses contentious issues is possible. 
Conclusion 
It became evident within months of Clinton entering his second term 
that the Oslo process was stalled, if not in danger. Clinton's disposition, 
evident since 1993, to encourage the Israelis and Palestinians to work through 
their differences themselves became a recipe for failure as the two parties 
contributed to an erosion of the letter and spirit of the Oslo accords. The 
United States would have to become proactive if its peace settlement objective 
were to be realised. It exercised its power in a number of ways. 
Its overriding concern was that the Oslo process be protected and 
sustained because the process, despite its shortcomings, offered the best 
prospect for achievement of a settlement of the core 'Palestinian' element of 
the Arab-Israel dispute. Its ideational power was invested heavily in 
( , 
preventing a collapse of the process. In doing so, a higher premium was 
attached to maintenance of the process than to normative behaviour. This was 
particularly evident in the Administration's handling of Israel's settlement 
activity. Clinton objected to Israel's policy and urged Netanyahu to desist, but 
the United States declined either to join other states in seeking to bring Israel 
to account for its breach of the Fourth Geneva Convention or unilaterally to 
impose sanctions. He did not want to provide Netanyahu with an excuse to 
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walk away from commitments entered into under the Oslo accords by the 
previous Israeli government. 
Clinton's concern to achieve outcomes within the Oslo context at the 
expense of principle was evident also in relation to an agreement of January 
1997 on the redeployment of Israeli forces from Hebron. Implementation of an 
agreement endorsed by the Labor government on IDF redeployment had been 
deferred. Clinton secured Netanyahu's concurrence not to renegotiate 
agreements by which both sides were bound,206 but the premier did not feel 
obligated to honour the previous Israeli government's undertaking. The 
Administration then participated in the crafting of a new agreement whose 
terms were less-favourable for the Palestinians than those of the original 
compact. In records that accompanied the new agreement, the Administration 
confirmed some of Netanyahu's precepts, and reinterpreted the terms of UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 on which the Madrid conference and Oslo 
accords were premised. 
The president chose to offer inducements to Israel rather than to 
threaten sanctions, perhaps influenced by domestic considerations. He was 
aware of congressional opposition to his predecessor's coercion through 
deferral of Israel's request for loan guarantees; and had a particular need to 
assure congressional support in the event of his impeachment, and to assist his 
wife's Senate candidacy. He sent American specialists to the region to 
participate in antiterrorism arrangements among Israeli, Palestinian and 
regional governments; authorised an antiterrorism programme for Israel, 
supplemented by intelligence-sharing with the CIA; announced the provision 
of fighter aircraft to Israel; and concluded a memorandum of understanding 
addressing the challenges of weapons of mass destruction, counter-
proliferation and theatre missile defence and Israel's acquisition of an Arrow 
anti-missile battery. The Administration was conscious of a gradual cooling of 
its relations with Israel during Netanyahu' s premiership and of a concomitant 
warming of its relations with the Palestinian Authority, and may have seen 
value in reassuring both the people of Israel and their supporters within the 
United States of America's enduring commitment. American inducements 
206 p.210 n14 
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may have encouraged Netanyahu to keep the dialogue open, but were 
insufficient to dissuade him from building settlements. It cannot be shown 
whether he would have been susceptible to American coercion because it was 
never tried. 
A consistent feature of Clinton's approach was a somewhat naive belief 
that resolution of differences was possible once protagonists engaged in face-
to-face negotiation. He employed this many times in his mediation between 
Israel and, respectively, the Syrians and Palestinians. He brought the Israelis 
and Palestinians together at the Wye River Plantation in 1998, after a year's 
estrangement; and again at Camp David in 2000. Inducements were offered to 
both parties. In addition to negotiating the transfer of more land to the 
Palestinians, albeit for the price of the Har Homa settlement, a significant 
element of the package agreed at Wye was the Administration's commitment 
to become involved in a high level US-Israel-Palestinian committee to restrain 
terrorist activity in the region, marking a substantial departure from Clinton's 
original hands-off approach, and demonstrating flexibility in devising 
measures to overcome unexpected impediments to the peace process. Clinton 
also secured agreement that the Palestine National Council would formally 
reaffirm nullification of the provisions of the Palestine National Charter calling 
for the destruction of Israel. Albright backed up the outcome of the Wye River 
meeting, convening a conference of major donors who joined the United States 
in pledging additional economic assistance to the West Bank and Gaza. 
America's positive sanctions were not enough to assure Israel's 
implementation of the Wye River agreement. The agreement exposed the 
schism within Netanyahu's government between those who wanted a peace 
settlement and those who wanted the West Bank incorporated into an Eretz 
Israel. The prime minister may well have thought that Clinton's domestic 
difficulties were such that the president's authority would be irretrievably 
damaged and that Israel · need not, · therefore, rush to action. He suspended 
action on the Wye agreement in December 1998, and sought a renewed 
mandate at the polls. 
Israel's return to a Labor-led government in May 1999 offered prospect 
of movement toward the peace objective, but the incoming premier was also to 
face difficulty in holding together a coalition prepared to transfer land and 
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powers to the Palestinian· Authority in exchange for peace. Clinton was 
receptive to Barak' s argument that his difficulties would be eased if a summit 
were to be held at which all concessions and all rewards could be wrapped up 
in one comprehensive package to be presented to a national referendum. The 
president convened a summit at Camp David in July 2000. It was timed with 
an eye to the United States's electoral calendar rather than to the preparedness 
of the two parties. The negotiation was largely determined by what Barak 
thought the Palestinians might accept. Clinton threw himself into it, permitting 
the office of President and the authority of the United States to be used as 
instruments of Israeli diplomacy without knowing whether Israel's proposals 
represented a negotiating position or its bottom line. In so doing, he placed 
himself in an untenable position as Barak shifted his ground. Although 
Clinton expostulated against the prime minister's tactics, the fact that he 
should have permitted the world's superpower to be subjugated in this way can 
only be explained in terms of an expectation that Arafat could be persuaded to 
accept an Israel-designed peace settlement, whatever its shape may be, and the 
attraction of a legacy that might include Clinton's contribution to resolving the 
Israel-Palestinian dispute. 
Significantly, the Administration failed to advance proposals that 
addressed the parties' bottom lines. Inducements dangled before the 
Palestinians in order to secure an agreement, notably in relation to the vexed 
questions of Palestinian statehood and the future status of Jerusalem, were 
rejected because it was not within Arafat's power to exchange the site of a holy 
Islamic shrine for any benefit that might accrue to the Palestinian people. This 
sterile exchange sealed the fate of the summit, and brought home to the 
Administration and others that an American proposal would be required if a 
peace settlement were to be achieved. 
Clinton presented his own outline for a settlement in December 2000, 
endorsing a two-state solution. Barak accepted it as a basis for negotiation, 
and Arafat was to follow suit after being persuaded to do so by Clinton. But 
the president, having launched his initiative within his last month in office, was 
in no position to influence the direction of the ensuing negotiation. 
President Clinton had made the search for a comprehensive settlement 
of the Arab-Israel dispute a major objective of his two-term presidency. He 
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was emotionally committed to the objective and devoted considerable personal 
effort toward its accomplishment. For much of his presidency, he was 
convinced of the sincerity of his Israeli partners (although Netanyahu's 
contribution was a qualified one) in pursuing a peaceful settlement with the 
Palestinians. There were limits as to how far all four Israeli prime ministers 
during that period would go toward accommodating fundamental Palestinian 
demands. There were some among the Israelis and Palestinians who were 
opposed to the Oslo process in principle and sought to frustrate its realisation. 
The extremists' actions, and the reprisals they provoked, contributed to an 
erosion of confidence among Palestinians that the process would lead to a 
betterment of their living conditions. As the standard of living of Palestinians 
fell, as their sense of dispossession rose due to continued settlement activity, 
and as they appealed to the international community for understanding, Clinton 
and his Administration devoted energy to damage limitation. The United 
States's instruments were used effectively to protect the negotiation process, 
marshal international condemnation of terrorism, encourage donors to 
contribute development assistance to the Palestinians, create conditions for its 
participation in tripartite anti-terrorist arrangements with Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority, and to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. In 
doing so, the Administration's address perforce focussed on the process rather 
than its projected outcome. Personal disinclination and political constraints 
inhibited Clinton's employment of coercive or punitive instruments to enhance 
the prospect of realising his objective. By the time that he was persuaded to 
employ America's ideational power to propose the 'non-negotiable' shape of 
an outcome, it was too late in his presidency for him to be able to attain his 
goal. 
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Chapter 8 
Vision and reality: a post hoc evaluation 
During the 1990s the United States employed some of the instruments 
at its disposal to produce a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Arab-
Israel dispute. The post hoc evaluation undertaken in this chapter will focus on 
the objective, strategy and efficacy of the measures used. The evaluation will 
address the three elements in Holsti' s definition of power. 1 The methodology 
will start with an analysis of the United States' s objective and the relevance of 
the negotiating structure it devised in order to achieve it. It will then note any 
constraints upon the ability of the United States to attain its objective. This 
will be followed by an analysis of the efficacy with which the Clinton 
Administration employed the instruments of statecraft discussed in chapter 1. 
The president's disinclination to use some of them will be addressed. That 
analysis will include an appreciation of how the Administration addressed 
unintended consequences where they arose. 
The evaluation is a preparatory contribution to the discussion in the 
Conclusion to this thesis whether the case study reveals limits to America's 
power, and whether any such limits might be more generally applicable. 
The objective 
The salience of the Arab-Israel dispute in relation to America's Middle 
Eastern interests was established in chapter 2. The first President Bush was 
motivated to seek a settlement of the dispute. He sought 'not simply the end of 
the state of war in the Middle East', but real peace, by which he meant 
'treaties, security, diplomatic relations, trade, investment, cultural exchange, 
even tourism', and a condition 'based on fairness' .2 His successor, President 
Clinton, also employed visionary language, insisting that 'peace must be 
comprehensive', encouraging the wider Arab and Islamic worlds to normalise 
1 Holsti, K. J. International Politics. In his view power comprises the acts by which one actor 
influences another actor; the capabilities utilised for that purpose; and the responses solicited. 
p.142 
2 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). Remarks at the Opening Session of the Middle East Peace Conference 
in Madrid, Spain, 30 October 1991. Public Papers - President Bush, 1991, pp.1362-3 
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their relations with Israel. 3 An objective common to the two Administrations 
was that a Middle East peace should mean a good deal more than simply the 
absence of hostilities. Neither Jordan nor Syria was engaged in hostilities with 
Israel at the time, yet neither was at peace with its neighbour. The peace that 
was sought was one that would legitimate Israel's place in the region and 
facilitate the development of friendly relations with it. 
The desirability of achieving such a peace is incontestable. What is 
more problematic are questions about how it might be attained, and its terms. 
As the architect of the process, the Bush Administration focussed on the first 
question. It eschewed the second: Bush said that the United States had not 
gone to Madrid 'to impose a settlement'. 4 Clinton, too, was predisposed in the 
earlier years of the negotiation to avoid articulating the detail of any 
settlement. The negotiating process was dynamic and the Clinton 
Administration's eight-year contribution cannot be assessed solely in terms of 
a pre-embarkation statement on how peace might be achieved. A post hoc 
evaluation of the effectiveness of American power must necessarily recognise 
that the United States's contribution extended to both the means of how peace 
might be attained, and to the terms of any settlement. As a broad 
generalisation, Bush was accountable for the former, Clinton for the latter. 
The negotiation structure 
The Bush Administration designed a structure capable of facilitating a 
comprehensive settlement. The structure could not, of itself, assure a 
satisfactory outcome. Tensions emerged during the course of the bilateral 
negotiations between Israel and respectively the Palestinians and Syrians, 
leading to the suspension of negotiations. The United States had to persuade 
the parties to return to the table. When the process was threatened by 
international condemnation of Israel's settlements practices, the Clinton 
Administration moved to protect it. It did so because there was risk of the 
process unravelling. Clinton accorded absolute priority to protection of the 
Madrid process, which in its early stages had produced positive results 
3 Clinton, W.J. (1994). Teleconference Remarks with B'nai B'rith, 24 August 1994. Public 
Papers -President Clinton, 1994, p.1497 
4 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). The President's News Conference with President Mikhail Gorbachev 
of the Soviet Union, 29 October 1991. Public Papers - President Bush, 1991, p.1356 
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between Israel and respectively the Palestinians and Jordan, and was prepared 
to employ the US veto in the UN Security Council for this purpose. 
The terms of any comprehensive settlement 
The United States's objective was both overly ambitious and 
imprecisely defined. Bush launched it with a broad statement of objectives. A 
precise statement of objectives would have had to address the particular 
concerns of five different entities. This may have seemed prescriptive. The 
Arab parties would probably not have entered into negotiation if they had 
thought that America would be pressing a pre-determined outcome. Nor 
would Yitzhak Shamir have been receptive to an American prescription. It 
was ambitious in that a comprehensive settlement would involve, at a 
minimum, a number of different bilateral treaties, and probably also 
international agreements covering regional or sub-regional issues. Initial 
exploration of matters that might need to be encompassed by regional 
agreements was broached within the multilateral working groups, but none 
-
advanced even to the pre-negotiation stage. 
Clinton implicitly endorsed the Bush Administration's undertaking to 
accept whatever the parties' leaders decided would be in their national 
. 5 interest. This assumed that the parties would negotiate bilateral 
accommodations. As the Arab parties' relationships with Israel were the focal 
point of the negotiation, the comparative strength of Israel ( attributable in part 
to decades of American support) in relation to that of its neighbours was a 
factor. Israel had secured military victories over its neighbours in 1967, 1973 
and 1982; it enjoyed a strategic partnership with the United States; and it was 
generally held to be the only Middle Eastern state with a nuclear capability. Its 
military deployments were on territory occupied through conquest. Central to 
the negotiation was the desire of Lebanon and Syria to regain occupied 
territory, and of the Palestinians to achieve independence from Israeli 
5 Baker said of the catalyst role: 'If the best way for us to do that is to not be involved, that's 
what we want. If the best way for us and our co-sponsor, the Soviet Union, to do that is to be 
in the room and intimately involved, then that's what we would like. However, the ground 
rules are that the parties will negotiate bilaterally without anybody else in the room unless the 
parties themselves invite others in the room ... [W]e would be available, if wanted'. Baker 
(1991). "U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's Press Conference, Madrid, 3 November 1991." 
Journal of Palestine Studies Vol.XXI No.2 (Winter 1992) p.149 
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occupation on their own larid. Israel's predominance was such that any 
accommodation could only be on the basis of what Israel was prepared to 
concede. The Clinton Administration could argue that regional peace was not 
a zero sum game and try to demonstrate its advantages through regional 
cooperation, but that could not alter the imbalance in the parties' negotiating 
strengths. Contrary to the Administration's intent, the prospect of regional 
economic cooperation aroused Arab suspicion that Israel would become the 
principal political and economic beneficiary of any comprehensive settlement. 
Imprecision about objectives and strategies produced an apparent 
dissimulation in America's stance early in the negotiation: the post-Cold War 
confidence shown in bringing the parties together at Madrid was not matched 
by an evident intent to propose a pax americana. The Clinton Administration 
was reasonably confident that whatever accommodations Israel concluded 
would be acceptable to the United States. A pax judaica, concluded within the 
framework of the Madrid conference, would serve America's interests. It was 
only when the negotiation process stalled that the Clinton Administration felt 
obliged to intervene. It did so principally to advance the process, not to further 
the interests of individual parties, although that was a collateral outcome of its 
action. The Administration brought the parties back to the negotiating table 
too many times for doubt to be entertained about its commitment to the 
process. 
In reviewing America's foreign policy objective, it can not be asserted 
that some course of action would have been more productive than the one 
pursued by the Bush and Clinton Administrations to 2001. Possible alternative 
directions at particular points have been postulated in earlier chapters. They 
were not tried, and there is no evidence that they were among the options 
considered by Administrations - Clinton's in particular - when determining 
America's foreign policy. 
Constraints 
There were a number of constraints on the ability of the Clinton 
Administration to effect a negotiated comprehensive settlement of the Arab-
Israel dispute. Domestic constraints and constraints external to the United 
States were apparent. The domestic constraints were of different kinds, 
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affecting the thinking of the Administration in various ways . They were either 
intrinsic to the president's approach, or domestic political factors that he felt 
necessary to take into account. This section will discuss the constraints under 
which the Clinton Administration operated. 
Clinton's predisposition towards Israel 
The principal domestic constraint, intrinsic to the president, which set 
the tone for his Administration's approach to the issue, was Clinton's 
attachment to Israel. Any discussion of the employment · of American power 
during his Administration must be within that context. His attachment was 
emotional, as well as a factor that earned him the support of many members of 
the pro-Israel lobby. It is not always easy to distinguish the political element 
from the personal in his decisions. He and his wife had visited the Holy Land 
in 1981 in the company of his pastor.6 The pastor had warned him that God 
would not forgive him if he ever forgot Israel,7 an anecdote of sufficient 
significance to the president to warrant its retelling. Clinton had determined at 
the outset of his . presidency to protect the peace process, and the 
Administration 'was not about to do anything to cause an open crisis with 
Israel'. 8 Partly because of his policies, Clinton was presented during the 1996 
presidential campaign as the best friend Israel had ever had. 
It was one thing for him to pledge never publicly to criticise Israel, 
another to decline to uphold the provisions of an international agreement 
formulated with American input. Why did the Administration accord higher 
priority to backing Israel in the face of clear evidence of its breach of the 
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, than to upholding the 
Convention's normative value? Israel denies that the West Bank is occupied 
territory, and consequently the applicability of the Convention to it, because 
Jordan relinquished its claim to the West Bank in 1988. There is, however, a 
responsible body of opinion, including UN Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338 on which the Madrid conference was based, that contests the Israeli 
6 The visit took place between Clinton's two periods as Governor of Arkansas. Clinton, H.R. 
Living History, p.488 
7 Clinton, W.J. (1998). Remarks at a Dinner Hosted by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of 
Israel in Jerusalem, 13 December 1998. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1998, p.2172 
8 Cobban (1999). Israeli-Syrian Peace Talks, cites her interview with the head of Policy 
Planning at the State Department. Original emphasis. p.47 
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position. This example is illustrative of choices that governments have to 
make when objectives collide. A frequently used diplomatic procedure is to 
reaffirm support for the principle in question, while refraining from naming 
any recalcitrant party. Clinton chose not to offer even this back-handed public 
rebuke. He may have feared that American criticism of Israel in relation to the 
building of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories would have given 
Netanyahu an excuse to jettison the peace process. 
There was a number of occasion_s during Clinton's presidency when 
chastisement of Israel, or coercion, might have pressured Israel into addressing 
critical issues. Such measures were seemingly proscribed by the president: 
America's power was constrained by their inoperability. A convincing 
circumstantial case can be made for Clinton's reluctance to place his 
attachment to Israel under stain from the fact that they were not tried. 
Clinton, the politician 
Another intrinsic constraint was the president's propensity to accept a 
'political' accommodation rather than to uphold a principle. His response to 
Israel's settlement policy also provides an example of this. While opposed to 
the Har Homa project, Clinton was prepared to use Netanyahu' s need to assure 
his position within his own cabinet as a means of extracting his agreement to 
the transfer of land to the Palestinians. In return for Netanyahu' s agreement, 
the president acquiesced in the project. 9 
America's pro-Israel lobby 
Extrinsic to the president was the need to retain the support of 
America's pro-Israel lobby. Both Bush and Clinton were well aware that their 
Middle East policies were under scrutiny as they sought second terms. 
American Jewry supports both Democrats and Republicans, but favours the 
former. Clinton drew heavily upon Jewish electoral support in 1992, and again 
in 1996.10 Having secured a second term, his concern to husband their vote 
9 Clinton said: 'We weren't going to stop him on Har Homa now, so I thought we should get 
what we could for it'. Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.467 
10 Internet Public Library (2003). Presidents of the United States - William Jefferson Clinton. 
In the presidential election of 1996 Clinton received a greater popular vote and an increased 
number of electoral college votes than in 1992. http://www.ipl.org/div/potus/wjclinton.html -
accessed 26 June 2003 
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extended to the electoral prospects of his Vice-President for the Democratic 
succession in 2000, and to his wife's candidacy as a prospective senator for the 
State of New York. 
The pro-Israel lobby, which derives from a congruence of support for 
Israel among America's Jewish community and that of fundamentalist 
Christianity, backed by defence industry interests, has been described in 
chapter 2. No Administration can afford to be insensitive to the lobby, which 
uses America's democratic processes very effectively. It is easier, however, to 
exaggerate than to discount its influence. The lobby is not monolithic: it is 
open to the competing claims of forces in support of, or opposition to, Israeli 
governments. Rabin had championed the creation of the Israel Policy Forum 
in an attempt to off set the influence of AIP AC. In the final stages of the 
negotiation of 'Oslo II', Israel's Labor government had to exercise such 
influence as it could muster within the American lobby to counter a campaign 
launched by its opposition to discourage the provision of US assistance for 
Palestinian economic and social development. The Administration had to 
navigate carefully between these shoals, on that occasion relying on the 
pilotage of the governing party in Israel, whose commitment to the peace 
process had been proven. 
Congressional constraints 
The most formal extrinsic domestic constraints upon Clinton and his 
Administration were whose imposed by the legislature. The Administration 
failed domestically to sell an Arab-Israel peace as an American strategic 
interest, 11 with implications for its relations with the Congress. Clinton's 
inability to articulate a clear foreign policy objective, together with a decline in 
public interest in international affairs, left the field open to media-wise special 
interest groups, like AIP AC. 12 After the mid-term election of 1994, he faced a 
Republican-dominated Congress for the remainder of his presidency. His 
foreign policy had to be conducted within the context of an antagonistic 
11 Haass, R.N. and S. Telhami (1999) . The Israel-Syria Talks: an assessment. Washington DC, 
The Brookings Institution. http://www.brook.edu/comm/transcripts/19991217 .htm - accessed 
25 September 2003 
12 Haass, R.N. (1997). "Fatal distraction: Bill Clinton's foreign policy." Foreign Policy Iss.108 
Fall 1997. p.116 
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opposition, which held 'a deep dislike and distrust for President Clinton' 13 as 
one Republican senator said; and the House Majority Leader of the period, an 
evangelical Christian, was proud to tell a Knesset audience that he was 'an 
Israeli at heart' .14 
Yet Clinton was able to form temporary coalitions with centrist 
Democrats and Republicans to secure support for a number of his foreign 
policy objectives 15 and could have tried to forge a centrist coalition to 
strengthen his presentation of an American position on the terms of any peace 
settlement. His record shows that it was possible to govern during a period of 
divided government: 16 the second session of the 104th Congress (1994-96) was 
one of the most productive on record. 17 Clinton was able several times to 
secure congressional authority to extend inducements to Israel. Might not the 
inducements have been accompanied by forceful argument in favour of a 
preferred course of action? Might not Clinton have approached the Congress 
about assistance to Israel to overcome its water shortage, thus addressing one 
of the concerns in relation to a settlement with Syria; or for funds to build 
housing settlements within Israel, thus attempting to deflect the Israeli 
government away from further demographic change in the West Bank? Such 
initiatives ought to have been possible without provoking a confrontation with 
13 Mitchell, A. (2000). "News Analysis: Bush and the G.O.P. Congress." The New York Times 
on the Web, 19 May 2000. 
14 Bennet, J. (2003). "DeLay says Palestinians bear burden for achieving peace." The New York 
Times on the Web, 30 July 2003. Tom DeLay has been a member of the House of 
Representatives in the Republican interest since 1984, and became House Majority Leader in 
1994. He is described by Bennet as an evangelical Christian and a leader of the Christian 
Zionist movement in the Congress. 
15 Haass. "Fatal distraction." The tactic was used to secure majority support for the North 
American Free Trade Agreement, the World Trade Organisation and the Chemical Wea pons 
Convention. Haass argues that Clinton should make greater use of this tactic, but cautions that 
without 'a guarantee of steadfast support from the White House, centrist Democrats and 
Republicans have little motivation to break ranks with the ideological extremes of their 
respective parties'. p.116 · 
16 Mann, T.E. (2001). Assessing Bill Clinton's Legacy: how will history remember him? 
Washington DC, The Brookings Institution. He commented that Clinton 'adapted a style of 
governance that was tactical, that was defensive, that made heavy use of executive orders, that 
involved a good deal of a sort of campaigning, that actually allowed him and his party to 
pursue a number of objectives'. http://www.brook.edu/comm/transcripts/20010109a.htm -
accessed 11 August 2003 
17 Murphy, J.M. (2001). Book Review - Jones, C.O.: Clinton & Congress 1993-1996: risk, 
restoration, and reelection. Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol.4 No. I. 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/rhetoric and public affairs/v004/4. lmurphy.html - accessed 
15 August 2003 
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the Congress, and would have afforded leverage in his dealings with the 
Israelis. It is hard to know why he did not explore them. 
The Congress had adopted, over a number of years, instruments 
favouring Israel and critical of its Arab neighbours that could have constrained 
the Administration in the search for a Middle East settlement. US aid to 
Jordan, the Palestinians and Syria was either proscribed or restricted, limiting 
an Administration's ability to gamer support through positive sanctions. The 
Bush Administration recognised that Jordan's participation was essential to 
any comprehensive settlement and, against congressional opposition, provided 
food aid to that country as part of its process of re-establishing friendly 
relations with it after the 1991 Gulf War. The incorporation of Jordan into the 
negotiation framework was to be rewarded by the conclusion of a peace treaty 
between Israel and Jordan. Some American aid was channelled to the 
Palestinian Authority, although, respecting congressional constraints, project 
implementation was largely through American non-governmental agencies. 
The Clinton Administration largely circumvented this constraint by mobilising 
international assistance for the Palestinians, and the Europeans became the 
principal donor to the Authority. 
Some congressional requirements that might have seemed proscriptive 
proved capable of being employed by the Clinton Administration to strengthen 
its leverage, especially in relation to the Palestinians. The Administration used 
a legislative prohibition on dealing with the PLO to insist on the PLO abjuring 
terrorism and excising denial of Israel's right to exist from the Palestine 
National Charter as preconditions of its establishing normal relations. After 
the passage of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act, it used regular 
congressional reviews of Palestinian policies to encourage Arafat to conform 
to congressional prescriptions. 
It could not always expect the dice to fall so fortuitously. A casualty 
was the proposition that America might station a military observer force on the 
Golan Heights should Israel and Syria agree on the terms of a peace settlement 
and seek such help. A ruthless campaign within the Congress brought any 
thought of an American presence on the Golan Heights to an end. 
There was one significant decision of the Congress that Clinton felt 
able to set aside until a moment he judged appropriate. The Congress favoured 
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the relocation of the Embassy of the United States from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 
Land had been allocated in Jerusalem for that purpose. Hillary Clinton 
supported the congressional view on the hustings, leading her husband to 
distance himself from her position. He cited legislation that permitted 
members of the Congress, and those seeking election to it, to express their own 
opinions without constraining the authority of the executive branch. 18 
External constraints - terrorism 
The principal external constraint to confront the Clinton Administration 
was terrorist activity against Israel conducted by individuals and groups 
opposed to the peace process. Israelis, Lebanese and Palestinians, in varying 
measure, were either determined to derail the process or accorded higher 
priority to their immediate interests than to the prospect offered at some 
remove by a negotiated settlement. A need to prevent the peace process from 
foundering under terrorism became a major preoccupation of the 
Administration. It is discussed in greater detail in the section below on 
unintended consequences. 
International differences 
There were two other external constraints upon the Clinton 
Administration. The co-optation of European assistance was not without 
complication for the United States because the Europeans viewed the Arab-
Israel dispute differently from the Americans. The Europeans had taken the 
initiative in commissioning the World Bank to prepare an estimate of the needs 
of the Palestinian Authority; and they were interested in the prospect offered 
for regional economic development through the multilateral working group 
that they chaired. The Clinton Administration's convening of an international 
pledging conference predicated on the World Bank's estimates , without the 
Europeans' co-sponsorship, and its attempt to exclude the occupied territories 
from consideration within the working group chaired by the European Union 
on regional economic development, caused the Europeans to feel undervalued. 
The Administration's desire to engage the Europeans , while retaining 
18 Clinton, W.J. (1999). Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak, 
19 July 1999. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1999, pp 1410-1 
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the reins of the peace process in its own hands, reflected a long held view by 
America and Israel that the intrusion of other states could be unhelpful. Other 
states had other agendas. The United States and Israel had consistently 
opposed calls for a UN conference to address a Middle East settlement. The 
international conference at Madrid in 1991 was as far as they were prepared to 
go in accommodating 'internationalisation' of the issue. They had a propriety 
interest in keeping the Madrid process under American control. Even so, Israel 
was initially a reluctant participant, fearing a possible opening for the anti-
Israel agenda prevalent within the UN. 
The other international constraint 1s related in that it involves the 
attitudes of other states to the Arab-Israel dispute. Britain and France, while 
enjoying good relations with Israel, were more disposed than was the United 
States to judge Israel on its practices, and comparatively more sensitive to 
Arab positions than was America. 19 Together with the other Western members 
of the UN Security Council, they co-sponsored a draft resolution critical of 
Israel's decision to build a settlement at Har Homa. In their view, settlements 
altered the facts on the ground and pre-empted the final status negotiations. 
Although the United States was to use this argument in private with Netanyahu 
a year later, it tried unsuccessfully to persuade the co-sponsors to employ 
language that would permit it to abstain when the matter was before the 
Council. In an all-too-evident difference of opinion within the Western 
alliance, the US vetoed the draft resolution. 
In short, the Clinton Administration did_ not enjoy an unfettered ability 
to exercise the power of the United States. There were domestic and 
international constraints upon it. The constraints, however, were not 
comprehensive. There was sufficient rema1n1ng flexibility for the 
Administration to prosecute its objective. 
The measures employed 
The Clinton Administration employed some of the instruments of 
statecraft at its disposal in order to effect its objective. The constraints 
19 European Community (1980). Venice Declaration on the Middle East, 12-13 June 1980. As 
members of the EEC, Britain and France subscribed to the Venice Declaration's assertion of 
the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. 
http://www.euromed .net/eu/mepp/venice en.htm - accessed 22 April 2002 
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discussed above explain why it did not use all the instruments at its command. 
This section will analyse the efficacy of the instruments selected. Whether 
other instruments might have been efficacious is a hypothetical question. The 
fact is that Clinton was either unwilling, or felt unable, to employ them. 
Positive sanctions 
Positive sanctions may be offered either as an inducement to achieve an 
objective or as a reward for 'services rendered'. The United States made 
extensive use of this instrument. The Administration persuaded Egypt to 
provide leadership on many occasions, knowing that Egypt had its own interest 
to serve in re-establishing its credentials among Arab states after having 
concluded a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and that Egypt's economy was 
heavily dependent upon the United States' s annual $2 billion aid contribution. 
It urged the Egyptian government to intercede with Arafat in support of 
American positions; sought Egyptian backing in its dealings with other Arab 
states; acknowledged Egypt's role in hosting the signing of the Cairo 
Agreement; and persuaded Egypt to host international meetings at Sharm el-
Sheikh in support of the peace process,20 and to convene one of the regional 
economic conferences. The Administration also co-opted the services of 
Jordan's King Hussein who helped secure the Hebron agreement in 1997 and 
the conclusion of the Wye River memorandum in late 1998. Jordan became a 
recipient of substantial American aid after its conclusion of a peace treaty with 
Israel in 1994; its contribution in 1998 brought additional rewards; and a free 
trade agreement was concluded. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states played a 
critical part in the removal of the secondary and tertiary boycott; while Jordan, 
Morocco, Qatar and Tunisia received Israeli and other delegations at 
international conferences. Through such collaboration, the Administration was 
able to demonstrate at critical times that the peace process enjoyed regional 
support; and to create an environment in which regional cooperation with 
Israel was practised and Israel's legitimacy as a neighbour was facilitated. 
Some of this latter group of states may have entertained expectations that their 
contributions would be recognised by the United States. Cairo was advanced 
as the location for a regional development bank; Tunis became the 
20 Meetings were held at Sharm el-Sheikh in March 1996, September 1999, and October 2000. 
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headquarters of the Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism 
Association; and Morocco's longstanding contribution as chair of the Arab 
League's Jerusalem Committee and sympathetic attitude toward its Jewish 
population, suggested Casablanca as an attractive venue for the first of the 
regional economic conferences. The conference offered the Moroccan 
authorities an opportunity to display their wares before a large and influential 
business community. 
Israel's vulnerability and sense of insecurity exposed a weakness that 
was susceptible to American manipulation. The Administration induced 
Israel's continued cooperation with the peace process a number of times by 
assuaging its security concerns. Israel's security throughout the 1990s was 
challenged from within territory that it claimed to control. The Administration 
undertook a number of measures to deal with Israel's discordant relationship 
with the Palestinians. At the Wye River Plantation, Clinton agreed to involve 
his Administration in a high level US-Israel-Palestinian committee to restrain 
terrorist activity in the region. The CIA became involved as a full partner of 
the Palestinians in the systematic and effective combat of anti-Israeli terrorist 
organisations and their infrastructure. 
The positive sanctions extended to the Palestinians by Clinton had both 
a psychological and material dimension. In material terms, America's aid was 
not voluminous because of legislative constraints. It pledged $500 million 
over five years; and augmented this by another $400 million after conclusion 
of the Wye agreement, which was tied to expenditure on infrastructure, 
. 21 1 education, community development and "Rule of Lawn proJects. Tota 
American aid to the Palestinians was insignificant when compared to 
American disbursements to Israel and Egypt and was unlikely in itself to 
provide a significant lever. The value of American aid lay in its psychological 
dimension as a tangible expression of interest. In their dealings with the 
Palestinians the Americans employed positive sanctions many times, drawing 
.heavily upon the psychological dimension of this instrument. The prospect of 
United States recognition secured Arafat's public disavowal of terrorism and a 
voiding of the provision in the Palestinian National Covenant that had called 
21 Mark (2003). Palestinians and Middle East Peace, p.4 
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for Israel's extinction. After the conclusion of the 1993 Declaration, Arafat 
was accepted as a major player in the ensuing drama, and received at the White 
House by Clinton more often than any other international leader. His 
previously proscribed PLO metamorphosed into the Palestinian Authority as 
Clinton extended support for the purposes of the Declaration. The 
Administration provided aid for the PA and marshalled international assistance · 
for the nascent Authority in 1993, and additional assistance in 1998. Clinton 
addressed the Palestine National Council in December 1998; and in framing 
his parameters for any settlement two years later came closer to endorsing a 
two-state solution than any previous American president. Although the United 
States' s international behaviour, especially in the UN, showed its clear bias 
toward Israel, America's strategic partnership with Israel did not prevent 
Clinton or his officials from urging Israelis to accept Palestinian positions that 
they held to be reasonable. Arafat attached great value to Clinton's 
participation in the peace process.22 
Use of this instrument in these ways demonstrated the importance the 
Clinton Administration attached to the peace process, and helped keep the 
Palestinians engaged in it despite reversals and breakdowns. It was ineffective, 
however, in restraining those Palestinians committed to violence against 
Israelis. Despite regional condemnation of terrorism and Clinton's 
imprecation that Arafat act to end it, this intermediate objective was not 
attained, with detrimental consequences for achievement of the overall 
objective. 
International nonns 
The strength of an international norm's influence in foreign relations 
depends upon the number of actors that share a value-based expectation of 
behaviour, and how precisely the norm distinguishes between appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour. Peer pressure may induce compliance where a state 
accords importance to its reputation, but reputation can not guarantee 
observance where a state believes that some overriding interest would be 
compromised by doing so. In predicating a comprehensive settlement of the 
22 Arafat pleaded with Clinton in November 2000 'to finish the peace and that if we didn't do it 
before I left office, it would be at least five years before we'd be this close to peace again'. 
Clinton, W.J. (2004). My Life, p.929 
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Arab-Israel dispute on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the 
principle of territory for peace,23 Bush reaffirmed the United States's 
commitment to an international requirement that it had helped to shape. Not 
only do these resolutions command respect due to their provenance from the 
UN Security Council, they also fulfil the second requirement for normative 
behaviour in indicating that the only appropriate action would be Israel's 
withdrawal from territory occupied during the 1967 war. The demand for 
Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon is the subject of UN Security Council 
Resolution 425. A value-based expectation of Israeli behaviour in relation to 
occupied territory is also expressed in the Fourth Geneva Convention. States 
hold an expectation that Israel is obligated by its subscription to the UN 
Charter and to the Convention to observe Security Council resolutions and the 
provisions of the Convention. 
From the outset of the Madrid process, the Bush Administration had 
shown ambivalence about its expectations of behaviour in accordance with 
these norms. The formal invitation to attend the conference mentions UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 twice.24 But the United States was 
more circumspect in its letters of assurances issued to the negotiating parties 
on the eve of the Madrid conference. In the absence of authoritative texts of 
the letters, this study has drawn on material published in the Journal of 
Palestine Studies25 and Le Monde diplomatique. 26 The UN Security Council 
resolutions were mentioned in the letter to the Palestinians, and in the letter to 
Syria as bearing upon the Golan Heights, while the letter to Israel noted that it 
'holds its own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 242, alongside 
other interpretations' .27 An analysis of the Journal and Le Monde documents 
also reveals inconsistencies in respect of the substance of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. Baker assured the Palestinians that the United States 'is opposed 
to the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem and extension of Israeli law on it 
23 Bush, G.H.W. (1991). Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of 
the Persian Gulf Conflict, 6 March 1991. Public Papers - President Bush, 1991, p.220 
24 Aronson (1992). "U.S .-Soviet Letter of Invitation", p.121 
25 Butler, L. (1992) . "The Madrid Peace Conference", pp.118-20 
26 Le Monde Diplomatique, 18 October 1991. "US Letters of Assurances to the Palestinians 
and Israel." http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/madrid-garantie-en -
accessed 30 October 2003 
27 Baker (1992). "U.S. letter of assurances to Israel", p.120 
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and the extension of Jerusalem's municipal boundaries' and that 'the US has 
opposed and will continue to oppose settlement activity in territories occupied 
in 1967 which remain an obstacle to peace' .28 The letter to Israel makes no 
mention of either Jerusalem or the settlements question. Such coyness 
presumably .indicated Baker's anticipation that the United States would face 
difficulties when debate opened on Israel's settlements policy and claim over 
Jerusalem. 
International norms are not generally prescriptive. They commonly 
provide a standard against which a state's behaviour may be assessed and a 
moral basis for any international demand for reformative behaviour. The 
international community adopted a series of progressively more insistent 
demands for the cessation of Israeli settlement activity based upon an almost 
universal understanding of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The intent was to 
shame the United States and Israel (and Micronesia) that alone stood in the 
way of universal acceptance of its normative value, and to embarrass the 
United States into pressuring Israel to acquiesce in its demand that settlement 
activity be stopped. The Clinton Administration urged the Netanyahu 
government to desist. Even as it did so, the Administration denied any role for 
the international community in determining an outcome in this matter, notably 
in the UN Security Council where it used the United States's veto power to 
that effect. Although outnumbered in the UN General Assembly, the United 
States held to the view that these were matters for the parties themselves to 
determine in the context of final status negotiations. The Administration also 
tried in 1994 to have all General Assembly resolution language referring to 
final status issues dropped.29 Unable to persuade the Israeli government to 
alter its policy, and unable to stem a mounting international tide of criticism, 
the Administration sought to induce the Israeli government to reverse its 
policies through an expanded programme of security assistance. Clinton's 
failure to endorse the application of the Convention to the occupied territories 
diminished the worth of a norm in international relations that the United States 
had helped to forge and that it might, conceivably, wish to uphold under other 
28 Baker (1992). "U.S. letter of assurances to the Palestinians" , pp.118-9 
29 El-Fassad, A. (2000). Palestinians defend their right to return, Protest.Net. 
http://www.protest.net/view.cgi?view=l935 - accessed 24 July 2003 
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circumstances. In tum, the erosion of the norm weakened the strength of the 
Administration's argument that Israel desist from practices that were altering 
the bases of any final status agreement while the parties were proceeding 
toward its negotiation. 
The Clinton Administration had also worked to secure an indefinite 
extension of the NPT and the adherence of putative nuclear-weapon states to 
both the NPT and CTBT. Egypt's attempt to make Israel's accession to the 
treaties a precondition of its support for the NPT extension, led to the closure 
of the multilateral working group on arms control and regional security. The 
Administration was unable to silence criticism of the United States for 
pressunng some Third World countries to subscribe to the treaties while 
remaining silent about Israel's non-participation. In closing down debate 
within the ACRS working group, the Administration gave greater credence to 
shielding Israel from international pressure to subscribe to the NPT than to the 
universality of an international regime that it was championing. Again, the 
United States was content to forgo the moral force of an international regime 
as either the basis for, or as supplementary to, the projection of its power. 
Persuasion 
The purpose of persuasion is to appeal to the national interest of the 
target state, which may involve encouraging the target state to change its 
perception of its national interest or to conform to international standards of 
behaviour. Persuasion may take different forms. Its moral element may be 
subsumed within normative behavioural expectations, while the application of 
the punitive or coercive element lies within the compass of negative sanctions. 
The political element was the measure most frequently employed by the United 
States in seeking to foster a settlement between Israel and its neighbours. 
Many of the ideas advanced by the United States went to getting the 
parties to remain at, or to return to, the negotiating table. The Clinton 
Administration brought Syria into direct negotiation with Israel. Christopher 
was able to parlay his 'special channel' role between Israel and Syria into an 
avenue for the advancement of American ideas, eventually securing Assad's 
concurrence to negotiation between the parties at ambassadorial level and later 
between senior military advisers and ministers. The Administration's 
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contribution opened the way for bilateral negotiations at the Wye River 
Plantation in late 1995 and early 1996. The process collapsed when in 1996 
Israel decided to launch an attack against a terrorist group in southern 
Lebanon. It was resumed at Shepherdstown at the end of 1999, again through 
American intercession. 
The Administration also effected a resumption of negotiations between 
Israel and the Palestinians. Christopher invited representatives of Egypt, 
Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians to Washington in March 1995 in an attempt 
to re-energise the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation when it stalled. In September 
1996, Clinton, with the assistance of King Hussein, secured a commitment 
from Netanyahu and Arafat to negotiate an agreement on redeployment from 
Hebron. Albright succeeded in getting Arafat and Netanyahu together iJ?. 
September 1998 after more than a year's separation, paving the way for the 
meeting at the Wye River Plantation at the end of October. Then, after a 
change in the Israeli leadership, Clinton urged Arafat in July 1999 to meet with 
Barak and to hear him out. He had to intercede again to get the parties to 
Camp David in 2000 and, after the collapse of that initiative, to present 
proposals that brought the parties back to the negotiating table in early 2001. 
Each time the Administration was successful in persuading the parties 
that it was in their interest to continue negotiating. It was less successful in 
persuading them to make the accommodations necessary for peace. A 
necessary intermediate objective was attained, but the overall objective 
remained out of reach. Although preoccupied with the need to keep the 
dialogue going, and resigned about Syria's refusal to conclude an agreement 
with Israel, Clinton never lost faith in the need for an Israeli-Palestinian 
settlement. 
Public diplomacy 
Public diplomacy is a diffuse measure that seeks to influence foreign 
audiences through the projection of the differing views of individuals, 
organisations and governments. It is qualitatively different from governmental 
public information programmes. It is a vehicle for the projection of Nye's 
'soft power' in that it seeks 'to entice and attract'. Clinton had an instinctive 
ability to project a message to target audiences, evident in his empathetic 
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address to the Palestine National Council, and in his challenge to Israelis and 
Palestinians to determine not whether but how to live side by side. Throughout 
the vicissitudes of the negotiation process, he managed to convey his 
determination to work for a positive outcome. He tried to encourage Assad to 
assure the Israeli public of Syria's interest in reaching an accommodation, but 
was dealing with someone who was neither naturally inclined nor trained in 
public diplomacy and who failed to make any impression. 
More might have been done through public diplomacy and non-
governmental 'second track' channels to build a constituency for a desired 
outcome without necessarily transgressing norms of acceptable diplomatic 
behaviour. It was apparent that Israel, Syria and the Palestinians had done 
little to prepare their peoples for the transformations that would occur were 
peace settlements to be achieved. Mythologies that shaped perceptions, such 
as the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their original homes or that 
Israel's security could only be assured through a maximalist land grab,30 had to 
be pricked. There was a real need for the promotion of people-to-people 
contact. 31 The Administration might have encouraged informal debate within 
academic and other cultural communities, nationally and internationally, about 
issues that could affect the outcome, the accommodations that would have to 
be made to achieve it, and what the future might hold. The Clinton 
Administration accepted too readily that challenging the direction of Israeli 
policy could be seen as interference in Israel's domestic affairs. There is a 
qualitative difference between seeking to persuade a foreign government that a 
particular course of action is in the state's national interest, and interference in 
its affairs. The former is accepted as customary diplomatic practice, whereas 
the latter is deemed unacceptable behaviour. 
Unintended consequences 
The negotiation produced a number of unintended consequences to 
which the Administration had to react. The most significant of these was the 
extreme to which Israeli and Palestinian perpetrators were prepared to go to 
ensure that the Oslo accords foundered. Opposition to the Oslo accords may 
30 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.337n 
31 Ibid. p.770 
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have been expected, but Clinton's Administration could hardly have 
anticipated that it would assume so violent a form. The Administration was · 
not a party to the negotiations in Norway and was not responsible for the 
accommodations made by the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships that disturbed 
elements on both sides. The aberrant activities of Baruch Goldstein and Yigal 
Amir threatened the entire process. The Oslo accords were seen by Palestinian 
rejectionists as offering too little, which encouraged them to engage in 
expressive behaviour. That Israel would react to Palestinian civil disturbance 
could be anticipated, but probably not the wholesale and prolonged shut-down 
of the borders affecting commercial intercourse between Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. Israel's response caused a significant decline in the 
living standards of Palestinians, exacerbating the situation. Clinton described 
the cycle of violence and retribution as the toughest issue he had to face. 32 He 
sought to address it by proscribing assistance to Hamas, and committing 
American personnel to work with Israelis and Palestinians to prevent the 
violence. In order to advance the peace process, the Administration had to 
persuade the parties to remain engaged notwithstanding the situation. It 
successfully achieved this in the procedural sense, but its inability to persuade 
Arafat to make a 100 per cent effort to restrain dissident elements, or to 
persuade the Israelis to ameliorate the socio-economic condition of the 
Palestinians contributed materially to the failure of the negotiation. The 
rejectionists were never under Arafat's control; and some may have become 
encouraged after 2000 by Barak's withdrawal of the IDF from southern 
Lebanon to believe that sustained insurgency could work to the Palestinians' 
advantage. 
The functionalist approach championed by the Administration through 
the economic conferences was intended to encourage the participants to foster 
regional development, incorporating Israel, and to produce a win-win result for 
the region's inhabitants. The Administration could not have foreseen that an 
Israeli government would work against the country's longer-term economic 
interests. The approach was working well until it was jeopardised by the 
policies of Netanyahu's government, and an apprehension began to emerge in 
32 Clinton, W.J. (1995). The President's News Conference, 5 April 1995. Public Papers -
President Clinton, 1995, p.468 
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some Arab states that a comprehensive settlement would establish Israeli 
economic hegemony in the region. The proposal for a regional bank was 
intended to offset Israeli predominance by assisting in the development of 
Arab states, but it was set aside when the relevant multilateral channel was 
abandoned. 
Post hoc evaluation 
Having employed some of the resources available to it in the manner 
described above, and having shown flexibility in moving to counter 
unexpected obstacles, why was the Clinton Administration unable to achieve 
its objective? Three reasons are adduced: the United States's objective was 
imprecise; the negotiation process was predicated upon a false expectation; and 
the United States was unable to persuade other parties that accommodation was 
in their national interests. 
Imprecision, but flexibility 
America's objective was presented in broad terms. hnprecision 1n 
defining the objective and tactical means of attaining it contributed to 
America's inability to achieve a comprehensive settlement. This is not to argue 
for a prescriptive outcome: flexibility was essential. Any compact freely 
entered into by the parties was more likely to endure than one imposed by an 
external actor. The Israel-Jordan peace treaty, concluded with little more than 
Clinton's encouragement, has survived notwithstanding an ill-judged Israeli 
attempt to assassinate Khaled Mashal, a senior Hamas official, in Amman in 
September 1997; and the continuing strain of Palestinian resistance and Israeli 
reprisal along the River Jordan's western bank. Ambiguity, moreover, is built 
into UN Security Council Resolution 242, which is deliberately vague about 
'territories occupied in the recent conflict'. Baker was asked, in the lead-up to 
the Madrid Conference, to define more precisely America's interpretation of 
the areas in question. He refused to do so, arguing that 'removing the 
ambiguity would mean prejudging the negotiations' .33 Nevertheless, the 
33 Ross, D.B. (1993). UNSC 242 and Arab-Israeli Peacemaking. UN Security Council 
Resolution 242: the building block of peacemaking. Rostow E.V. [et al.] Washington DC, The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. p.60 
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wisdom of embarking upon a journey without some idea of how to get to the 
destination might be questioned. 
Clinton found that leaving matters of substance to the contesting parties 
was not without cost or personal embarrassment. Lacking precise objectives of 
its own, natural curiosity might have led the Administration to clarify the 
parties' intents with a view to assisting in securing particular outcomes. 
Clarification was not always easy. The Administration probed for Syria's 
bottom line; Ross found it difficult to extract position statements from Arafat, 
whose negotiating technique was to withhold decision-making until the last 
possible minute;34 Rabin was less than frank with Christopher about the 
negotiation at Oslo; and Barak deliberately concealed his intent from Clinton at 
Camp David. 
It is hard to understand why Clinton should have permitted the office of 
the President of the United States of America to be used as an emissary of 
Israel to both Assad and Arafat without having first arrived at some common 
ground with the Israelis about their intentions. Clinton had foreseen that a 
comprehensive settlement would entail considerable concessions on Israel's 
part. The Administration failed to establish with the Israelis the implications 
of Israel's ceding territory on its northern, eastern and western frontiers. The 
absence of agreement on so fundamental an issue produced divergent priorities 
between Clinton's preference for a resolution with Syria, and Israel's 
ambivalence about whether to proceed with the Palestinians or Syrians. 
In respect of Syria, any distinction the Administration might choose to 
maintain between Christopher's roles as intermediary and secretary of state in 
conveying Israeli views to Assad was bound to become blurred, and the subject 
matter perceived as being supported in some degree by the United States. 
Assad might be forgiven for thinking that the basis of a settlement was at hand, 
having received a message from Clinton saying that he had agreement on the 
4 June 1967 line in his pocket. He may reasonably have anticipated that 
Clinton would tell him that Barak was ready to conclude an agreement on that 
basis when they met in Geneva in March 2000. The Administration had 
invested heavily in the Syrian negotiation, and had brought Israel very close to 
34 Interview with Ambassador Dennis B. Ross in Washington DC on 20 April 2001 
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acceptance of Syria's basic territorial demand. It is surprising that Clinton did 
not press for its conclusion. Also, he appears not to have questioned Barak' s 
decision unilaterally to withdraw from Lebanon, which was a lesser-order 
achievement than a settlement with Syria. Had a peace agreement been 
concluded between Israel and Syria - even a 'cold peace' like that between 
Israel and Egypt - Lebanese and Palestinian insurgents would have been 
deprived of Syrian support, and the way opened for the conclusion of an 
agreement with Lebanon. 
The Damascus-based Palestinian groups would have had to seek 
alternative patronage and a base in some locality further away from Israel, or 
some rapprochement with the Palestinian Authority, or wither away. An 
agreement with Syria would leave the Israeli government unencumbered to 
focus wholly on the Palestinian question. This course of action, like any other 
in the Middle East, was not risk free. Assad may not have been receptive to a 
'Syria first' strategy, fearing that he would be abandoning the Palestinians to 
whatever concessions the Israelis might be disposed to offer. The 
Administration would have had to convince him that its strategy was designed 
to lead to, and to embrace, a resolution of the question of Palestine. The 
Clinton Administration ought to have presented it to Barak as a gamble worth 
taking, provided that an agreement could be reached with Syria about the 
volume of water that might be withdrawn by both parties from the Sea of 
Galilee and that Israel could be assured of alternative water supply, including 
from desalination plants. 
The Administration became engaged in detailed negotiation about 
Palestinian territory when it helped reformulate the Hebron agreement in 1996-
97. That unequal compact provided some 450 Jewish settlers with 20 per cent 
of the town, leaving the remainder to Hebron's 160,000 Palestinian inhabitants. 
The Wye River Plantation and Camp David discussions drew Clinton further 
into the debate about area. Following the unproductive meeting at Camp 
David, Clinton suggested principles that might be pursued in allocating 
territory between Israel and the Palestinians, but refrained from being drawn 
into detail. Israel's bid was to secure at least 77 per cent of the ' total area of 
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Israel and Palestine between the Jordan river and the sea' .35 Israeli negotiators 
had in mind an eventual transfer to the Palestinians 'of slightly under 90 per 
cent of the area of the West Bank' 36 which, were it to be accepted, would see 
an expansion of the area controlled by the Palestinian Authority to 21 per cent 
of the area of the former British mandated territory. The Palestinian Authority 
seeks 22 per cent. 37 The issue for Clinton, no less than for the Palestinian 
Authority, was whether the Palestinian people could be persuaded to endorse 
and honour a peace agreement that offered the prospect of sovereignty and 
independence over less than one-quarter of their former inheritance. 
As the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation progressed, as the depth of 
Clinton's understanding increased, and as the actions of Palestinian 
rejectionists became more insistent, the United States reappraised the position 
it had adopted in 1991. American policy would have precluded Palestinian 
statehood and preserved Jerusalem's integrity as an undivided city. By the end 
of his term Clinton had decided that 'there could be no genuine resolution to 
the conflict without a sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that accommodated 
Israel's security requirements and the demographic realities'. 38 The US policy 
change in favour of a two-state solution that Clinton foreshadowed was 
confirmed by the Administration of President George W. Bush in November 
2001, and the president persuaded the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon 
publicly to endorse it in 2003. 
America's policy that Jerusalem remain undivided seemingly 
complicated any prospect of the Administration achieving an outcome on 
Jerusalem acceptable to both parties. Was it originally code for acquiescence 
in Israel's conquest of East Jerusalem in 1967, suggesting that sovereignty 
over the whole city be vested in Israel? Or did Clinton's subsequent 
proposition that a solution might be found on the basis that 'what is Arab 
35 MidEast Web (2003). The Israeli Camp David II Proposals for Final Palestine-Israel Peace 
Settlement, July 2000. p.1. Israel's exclusion of certain areas from the base figure from which 
calculations are made affects the calculation. 
http://www.mideastweb.org/campdavid2.htm - accessed 6 June 2003 
36 Ibid. p.3 
37 Bennet, J. (2003). "Abbas sums up vision for a Palestinian State." The New York Times on 
the Web, 20 July 2003, reports Abbas as saying that 'Palestinians were asking for 22 percent of 
that land'. 
38 Clinton, W.J. (2001). Remarks at an Israel Policy Forum Dinner in New York City, 7 
January 2001. Public Papers - President Clinton, 2001, p.33 
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should be Palestinian ... what is Jewish should be Israeli' 39 offer prospect of 
separate sovereign areas within an undivided city? From the negotiation in 
early 2001 it appears that 'undivided' might be interpreted as implying unity in 
a municipal sense, presumably embracing a city-wide provision of services. 
The Administration and Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were prepared to 
discuss measures that would have resulted in separate Israeli and Palestinian 
sovereign areas within the city. The Administration offered inducements to 
Arafat at Camp David to conclude an agreement on Jerusalem, but Arafat 
rejected the proposition that Israel and the Palestinians should share the Haram 
al-Sharif/Temple Mount platform and insisted on full Palestinian sovereignty 
over it. The Israeli foreign minister is reported to have said that 'he would be 
content if the Palestinians would merely acknowledge the Temple Mount as a 
site holy to Jews' .40 Ideas were advanced that would have recognised the 
attachment of various religions to sectors of the Old City of Jerusalem, but 
they were submitted too late in Clinton's term for him to facilitate an 
agreement. Both sides were later to express the view that during the 
negotiations at Taba in January 2001 they had arrived at common ground on 
Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish quarter of the Old City and parts of the 
Wes tern Wall. Even if the negotiators were to be satisfied that an agreement 
could be reached broadly in conformity with Clinton's proposal, they could 
well face a difficult task in selling it to their own domestic communities and to 
Jews, Muslims, and perhaps also to Christians, abroad. 
Although imprecision about the Administration's preferred terms of 
any settlement enabled it to accommodate the dynamic of the negotiation and 
to respond flexibly to changing circumstances, a broadly expressed objective 
did not present an operational target. Diffusion worked against the goal's 
attainment. 
False expectations 
The second reason for Clinton's failure to secure a comprehensive 
settlement was that the negotiation process was founded on three significant 
false expectations. The United States had assumed that confidence-building 
39 Ibid. p.33 
40 Makovsky, D. (2003). "Taba mythchief. " The National Interest No.71 Spring 2003 p.124 
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measures would create sufficient trust among the parties to permit the 
conclusion of peace agreements; that the demography of the West Bank and 
East Jerusalem would not be materially altered during the negotiation; and that 
countries of the Middle East would find peace an attractive public good. 
Lasting peace could not be achieved in the absence of trust, but there 
was no guarantee that sufficient trust could be built. The premise was not 
tested in the context of the Madrid process in relation to Jordan, and had not 
been sufficiently developed in relation to Syria before Israel's negotiation with 
that country was aborted. In relation to the Palestinians, the building of 
confidence in accordance with a three-phase process over five years proved to 
be too protracted. Neither Israelis nor Palestinians could see immediate 
positive returns from the peace process, and both harboured communities that 
worked to see the process fail. Clinton tried unsuccessfully to prevent either of 
these negative forces from gaining credence. 
An expectation that demographic change in occupied territory prior to 
any final status negotiation was unlikely to be significant was eroded by 
Israel's building of settlements between East Jerusalem and its Palestinian 
hinterland. Although some of the new accommodation was to be allocated to 
non-Jews, the majority would be reserved for Jews. Both Clinton and the 
Administration of the first President Bush had made clear America's objection 
to any unilateral action that would predetermine an issue that had been 
reserved for final status negotiations.41 Had Clinton chosen to do so when 
witnessing signature of the Declaration of Principles in 1993, he could have 
expressed a general expectation that nothing should be done by either party to 
complicate a possible resolution of the matters that had been reserved for final 
status negotiations. That would have been consistent with the Declaration's 
statement that the integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 'will be 
preserved during the interim period' .42 The Administration could then have 
held both parties to account. Clinton's failure to issue such a statement on an 
occasion when it would have seemed appropriate to do so complicated his 
search for an accommodation between the two parties. Israel's settlements 
41 Clinton, W.J. (1999) . The President's News Conference with President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt, 1 July 1999. Public Papers - President Clinton, 1999, p.1238; Baker (1992). "U.S. 
letter of assurances to the Palestinians", p.119 
42 
"Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements", Art. IV 
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policy became a major cause for the loss of Palestinian confidence in the peace 
process, and they were able to build it into a cause celebre in the United 
Nations that the Administration was unable, by then, to contain. 
The United States expected that peace would introduce a public good 
that would be attractive to the peoples of the region, and lessen the prospect of 
further outbreaks of hostilities in the Middle East requiring American 
intervention. The multilateral negotiations and the regional econormc 
conferences were intended to demonstrate the value of cooperation. The 
Administration hoped that the medium to longer-term benefit of an Israeli-
Palestinian settlement would be such that any opposition to its terms would be 
confined to the Israeli and Palestinian parliamentary systems. Palestinian 
violence was a manifestation of deeper grievances deriving from dispossession 
of Palestinian lands and humiliation arising from 'foreign' domination.43 
There were 21 incidents in Israel between the execution of the Declaration in 
1993 and the expiry of Clinton's presidency in 2001, resulting in 169 deaths 
and many more injuries to Israelis and others.44 Violence was not the sole 
cause of the periodic breakdown of negotiation because the parties' aspirations 
differed markedly, but it was a major factor. And for so long as violence 
persisted between the two principal protagonists, any expectation of peace 
ushering in a region-wide public good was illusory. 
Persuasion, but no coercion 
The third explanation for Clinton's inability to effect peace settlements 
between Israel and Syria and the Palestinians is that he was necessarily obliged 
to work through authorities that had their own dynamics . He could appeal to 
legislators and the Israeli public and to people within the Palestinian Authority 
through persuasion and inducements, but he could not command. Rejection of 
the terms of the Oslo Declaration of Principles by Palestinian groups, and their 
subsequent boycott of the election of the ra 'is and the Legislative Council, 
43 Pape. "Dying to Kill Us." Pape's study shows that 'the raw number of suicide attacks is 
climbing ... even while the rates of other types of terrorism actually declined' over the period 
1980-2001, and that 'nearly all suicide terrorist campaigns have in common ... a specific 
secular and strategic goal: to compel liberal democracies to withdraw military forces from 
territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland'. 
44 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003). Suicide and Other Bombing Attacks in Israel since the 
Declaration of Principles (September 1993). Israel. 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH0i5d0 - accessed 26 May 2003 
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meant that Arafat's ability to carry the Palestinian community was 
circumscribed. He was either reluctant or unable to rein in his critics; was 
vulnerable to their charge of accommodating the Israelis, accepting far too 
little in return for what he was prepared to give up; the Oslo accords were 
perceived by Palestinian refugees as detrimental to their legal, national, and 
human rights, reinforcing their sense of dispossession and 
disenfranchisement; 45 and his secularist policies were contrary to the sectarian 
ambitions _of his Islamist opposition. 
Moreover, Arafat and his Tunis-based cohort represented a 'foreign' 
culture, grown apart from the indigenous liberation movement that flowered in 
the first intifada. Arafat hoped to earn the support of his critics and to realise 
his claim to speak for all Palestinians. He felt that he could not put too much 
pressure on his opponents, whose opposition he had unsuccessfully tried to 
channel into the Palestinian legislature. When inclined to do so, he was able to 
exert authority over dissident groups in the West Bank and Gaza through 
repressive means, but had no leverage over those working from abroad. The 
importance attached by the Administration to restraining the insurgency 
involved American agencies working in close collaboration with Palestinian 
instrumentalities that showed scant regard for human rights, and whose 
activities ran counter to Clinton's global aspirations in that field. 
Israel's complex political system constrained its leadership. 
Notwithstanding the direct popular election of its prime minister, the premier's 
mandate was hampered by the need to form a coalition government and 
vulnerability to the special interests of the minority parties within it. Both 
Netanyahu and Barak saw advantage in concluding a comprehensive 
'Palestinian' package that might pass through the Knesset, rather than having 
to present serially a collection of piecemeal agreements. Both saw their 
governments fragment over possible terms of settlements. Clinton showed 
understanding of the Israel leaders' political difficulties, and concurred in their 
'package' approach. 
The United States, which jealously preserved the Arab-Israel peace 
process as a matter for its direction, showed a marked reluctance to employ 
45 Bowker. Palestinian Refugees, p.160 
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coercion in its bilateral relationship in order to achieve its objectives. Clinton 
preferred employing positive sanctions to negative ones. He may have 
concluded that the commitment of the parties to the peace process was too 
fragile to withstand negative sanctions. This was true of Netanyahu, but not 
generally of the other leaders: even Assad had been coaxed into negotiation. 
While a policy of working constructively with the various parties toward an 
outcome has its attraction, a respectable argument can be made for the 
application of pressure in circumstances where it is seen that cooperation is not 
likely to produce a desired result. Such was Clinton's domestic standing 
during the early part of his second term that he could have afforded to exert 
pressure on Netanyahu in relation to Israel's settlements policy. Clinton need 
not have employed the 'money lever' as bluntly as his predecessor because the 
US-Israel relationship is broad-ranging and deep. He could have supported the 
principle that the Fourth Geneva Convention applied to the occupied 
territories, or he could have insisted that American funds used for the housing 
of Jewish emigres from the former Soviet Union be spent within Israel.46 He 
might also have urged states contributing financially to the Palestinian 
Authority to impress upon Arafat the need to make a wholehearted and 
sustained effort to halt Palestinian violence as a condition of their continued 
support. 
Dennis Ross has pointed to another means of applying pressure, namely 
to insist that parties to various agreement be publicly accountable for their 
implementation. The danger that one recalcitrant party may seek to attribute 
inaction on its part to the provocation of another, has been previously 
addressed. The fact remains, however, that 'there must be a consequence for 
nonperformance' .47 He suggests that America's involvement 'should have 
been dependent on public conditioning for compromise, on each side fulfilling 
46 While the number of immigrants into Israel steadily declined over the decade of the 1990s 
from its peak in 1990-91 , the percentage of immigrants from the former Soviet Union 
remained at 7 4.4 per cent in Clinton's last year in office. Ministry of Immigrant Absorption 
(2003). Immigration from Former Soviet Union (F.S.U.) by Year of Immigration. Israel. 
http://www.moia.gov.il/english/netunim/yachas.asp?KodTeur=l&KodShemDoch=4&ezor=0 
- accessed 26 June 2003 
47 Ross, D.B. (2004). The Missing Peace, p.771 
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commitments and behaving in a way that fit the objectives of the negotiation 
process'. 48 
Clinton's disposition to shy away from exerting bilateral pressure on 
Israel contrasts with his exceptional resort to the UN Security Council to 
impose conditions on other countries. Almost 40 per cent of all resolutions 
adopted by the Security Council to January 2001 were passed during Clinton's 
presidency. There are advantages in the instrumental application of a 
multilateral consensus where unilateral action is likely to exacerbate bilateral 
relations and to provoke criticism of the wielder. But Clinton's use of the 
United Nations sent confused or contradictory signals: in the Administration's 
view it was acceptable to use the Security Council to impose sanctions on Iraq, 
but unacceptable for the Council to criticise Israel; it was desirable in most 
cases to demonstrate American hegemony through that UN institution, but 
undesirable that the United Nations should play a central role in the search for 
a Middle East peace settlement. Prescriptions of the UN General Assembly 
had to be removed. Clinton was prepared unashamedly to draw a distinction 
between the world at large and a resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute in which 
the United States had a propriety interest. In respect of the dispute, the 
consistent thread in Clinton's approach was that no external force should be 
permitted to interfere in the United States-designed peace process; and if any 
pressure were to be applied to Israel, it should be by the United States and in 
private. Such persuasion as Clinton sought to exercise over Israel in private 
was insufficient to attain his goal. Doubt must be entertained about the force 
f h . • 49 o 1s representations. While he was willing to wield a big stick in 
multilateral company, he was less inclined to do so bilaterally. Clinton was 
endowed with an extraordinary capacity to reach out to people and to convey 
empathy with them50 but, as a student of leadership has commented, he was 
seemingly averse to conflict.51 
48 Ibid. p.769 
49 George, A.L. and J.L. George (1998). Presidential Personality and Performance. Boulder 
CO, Westview Press. They describe the president as thriving on intellectual conflict, but 
moderately uncomfortable with personal conflict and confrontation. p.247 
50 Ibid. p.247 
51 Webster (1999). President Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy: a critical assessment, 7 May 1999. 
The James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership. College Park MD, University of 
Maryland. Webster cites the aphorism that 'he who wants to be everyone's friend has no 
friend in the end'. 
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Three reasons have been adduced for the failure of the Clinton 
Administration to achieve its objective. They intertwine and it is difficult to 
identify one strand as being of greater significance than the others . Ultimately, 
the president is responsible for the policies pursued by his Administration. 
Clinton encouraged debate within his cabinet and among his advisers, but the 
policy choice was his. There is no doubt about the strength of his commitment 
to the attainment of the overall objective, or that he worked for its realisation. 
A different outcome might have been achieved had the United States applied 
greater pressure to the parties at critical moments. The president displayed 
flexibility in adjusting to changing circumstances, especially the cycle of 
violence and retribution among Palestinians and Israelis, but was clearly 
reluctant to authorise coercive measures that might have assisted in the 
attainment of his goal. 
Conclusion 
The employment of power to produce a desired outcome is a function 
of the wielder's choice among available resources and the efficacy with which 
they are used. Clinton's intent to secure a settlement was clear, but fell short 
of ability, or preparedness, to use effectively all measures available to him to 
achieve his objective. He applied some measures in order to achieve his 
objective, but did not apply others. He used the UN Security Council to 
impose negative sanctions on other states, but preferred to extend positive 
sanctions to Middle Eastern actors to encourage them move forward. He was 
not prepared to put the United States's relationship with Israel under strain, or 
to press the boundaries of his own relationship with the pro-Israel domestic 
lobby on Middle Eastern issues. He was not disposed to maximise the support 
of his European partners on certain issues where it would have seemed 
appropriate to do so, nor was he willing to associate himself with a legal 
interpretation, which commanded almost universal support, about the 
responsibilities of an occupying power. He could have used the weight of the 
European Union or wider international community to strengthen the force of 
http://www.academy.umd.edu/publications/presidential leadership/Clinton Roundtable.htm -
accessed 11 August 2003; George and George. Presidential Personality and Performance. 
They state: 'When it comes to political persuasion and the exercise of power, Clinton seems 
more at home with the carrot than the stick' . p.247 
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his own representations, but chose not to do so. And he was reluctant to 
advance ideas of his own until far too late in the process to be able to influence 
their acceptance. It was not until the Wye River meeting in late 1998 that he 
became intimately involved in the negotiation process. He was to do so again 
at Shepherdstown in early 2000, at Camp David in the middle of that year, and 
in the ensuing months. His direct engagement in the detail thus occurred so 
late in his presidency that there was insufficient opportunity to bring 
appropriate pressure to bear. The opportunity to prosecute an outcome through 
America's ideational power earlier in his presidency was not effectively used. 
The critical comment of the Clinton presidency by one observer is that he was 
unable consistently 'to use the muscle of his office effectively to push over the 
long haul for something that he really believe[d] in' .52 A similar view was 
echoed by Rabinovich in relation to the ill-starred negotiation with Syria.53 
The Administration's most significant achievement was in keeping the 
negotiation process alive for so long, despite obstructions and constraints. It 
did this principally through the efficacious employment of positive sanctions. 
The process was in danger of collapse in 1997. Had it done so, it would have 
been extremely difficult to persuade the parties to recommit to negotiation. It 
was difficult enough in 1998 to get Arafat and Netanyahu back to the table 
under the existing structure after a year's estrangement, without having (in all 
probability) to devise and obtain regional concurrence in a new structure. 
Criticism of the Administration's actions in the United Nations and in relation 
to the Fourth Geneva Convention needs to be tempered by acknowledgement 
of this. 
The Clinton Administration's greatest failing was its inability to 
persuade the parties to reach the accommodations necessary for peace. This 
was partly because it eschewed coercion as a tool. Clinton did not apply that 
measure to the Israeli government or urge the European Union to coerce the 
Palestinian Authority, presumably fearing that negative sanctions, when 
applied to the Israelis in particular, might prove counterproductive. Nor did he 
uphold expectations of normative behaviour, even in the context of their 
affirmation by friendly states that shared America's value-system. Positive 
52 Webster. President Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy . 
53 Rabinovich. The Brink of Peace, p.253 
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sanctions had proven useful, but without the countervailing threat of negative 
sanctions America's power of persuasion was circumscribed. The utility of 
positive or negative sanctions as instruments of power lies in the target state's 
uncertainty about their application. Clinton's consistent use of the one, 
without employing or threatening the use of the other, removed the element of 
unpredictability and diminished their combined force. This contributed to his 
inability to convince the leaders of Israel, Syria and the Palestinian Authority 
to make the accommodations necessary to effect a comprehensive peace that 
would be in their own interest. 
Constraints that bore upon the Administration's actions included 
Clinton's need to be sensitive to domestic opinion; an obligation to deal with 
foreign actors who held strongly to perceptions of their national interests; and a 
requirement to address the involvement of Iran and Syria which supported 
groups that rejected the Oslo accords. The Administration was generally able 
either to circumvent legislative restrictions by co-opting the services of other 
states, or to use congressional restraints to maximise its leverage. External 
actors' perceptions of their national interests proved particularly difficult to 
overcome. Prime examples were the Administration's failure to dissuade Peres 
from his adventure in Lebanon, or Netanyahu from his settlement activity; and 
to sustain regional economic cooperation in the context of Arab apprehension 
of Israel and displeasure with its practises. A peace between Israel and Syria 
would have addressed the third issue. 
In choosing jealously to direct the process, the United States cut itself 
off from a possible source of independent advice and assistance. The 
European 'sponsors' of the Palestinian Authority might have been pressed to 
exercise leverage to halt the violence against Israel; and to use their 
relationship with Iran to urge restraint in the provision of assistance to 
insurgents. Consultation and cooperation among allies might have led to a 
more careful examination of the negotiation process and identification of 
appropriate tactics. On some important matters relating to Israeli objectives, 
this may have exposed the need for clarification before the Clinton 
Administration embarked on certain courses of action at Israel's bidding. A 
state may exercise its statecraft to co-opt others to assist it attain an objective. 
Baker did so effectively in order to bring the parties into negotiation at Madrid 
291 
in 1991. The Clinton Administration might have done so too, had it not held 
so proprietorial an attitude toward the peace process. 
This post hoc evaluation has identified reasons for Clinton's failure to 
achieve his objective. Power is not an absolute: its capacity to produce an 
outcome is a function of circumstances, the effective utilisation of available 
resources, and leadership. Its limits may be exposed by the efficacy of the 
application of available resources under particular circumstances, but 
circumstances vary. _ Not even the most determined and effective utilisation of 
resources will produce a desired outcome in every case. A target state may be 
able to evade, directly or indirectly, the affect(s) of the wielder's power. 
America's failure to achieve an objective does not necessarily, therefore, 
expose the limits of its power. What this case study shows is that the president 
and his Administration failed to marshal and apply effectively all of the 
available resources at their disposal in order to persuade the parties principal to 
accommodate one another. There may be lessons that could be learned from 
this analysis about the effective projection of American power that could be 
susceptible of more general application. The Conclusion will suggest that this 
is probably the case. 
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Conclusion 
When the Clinton Administration articulated its v1s1on of a global 
society of states it identified an 'enlargement of the world's free community of 
market democracies' 1 as its primary objective, which it would hope to realise 
through American leadership and international cooperation. Human rights 
would be advanced through the process of democratic enlargement. The 
United States would capitalise on the demise of the Soviet Union, maximising 
the opportunity extended by the 'unipolar moment' to achieve it. An implicit 
thread in Clinton's foreign policy was a belief that states recognise certain 
interests and cooperate in their achievement. In this, he mirrored the views of 
'Rationalists', like Hedley Bull. Like the 'Realists', his Administration 
asserted that power matters, but avowed that the United States would not seek 
to extend its reach by force.2 Rather, it pursued a syncretic approach 
somewhat akin to that envisaged by Carr when he looked to peaceful change in 
international relations effected 'on that uneasy compromise between power and 
morality which is the foundation of all political life' .3 Albright was to confirm, 
on the basis of her service in the Administration at the UN and in the State 
Department, that in the current era no president or secretary of state could 
manage events without combining Wilsonian idealism and geopolitical 
realism.4 
Clinton saw a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute as consistent with 
his global vision of a post-Cold War world order. Its peaceful resolution 
would demonstrate that under US hegemony a 'new world order' could bring 
benefit to the Middle East by diminishing the likelihood of another conflict 
developing between Israel and its neighbours that would adversely impact 
upon American interests and disturb the tenuous pattern of regional 
cooperation established during the 1991 Gulf War. 
Clinton's Administration sought to effect change through the projection 
of the United States's unrivalled power. Conceptually this might be through 
physical means, but power is more commonly exercised though other means 
1 Lake (1993) . "From Containment to Enlargement", p.659 
2 Ibid. p.660 
3 Carr. The Twenty Years ' Crisis, p.220 
4 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.505 
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whose psychological dimension is pervasive. Power is exercised to encourage 
or influence a target to produce an outcome desired by the power-wielding 
agent. 'Costs' might have to be borne by both the state wielding power and its 
target. It is assumed that a state decides to project its power in the expectation 
that it can affect others more than they can affect it. A democratic state, such 
as the United States, might be presumed to embark upon such a course only 
after undertaking a cost/benefit analysis. 
David Baldwin has identified the instruments by which a state exercises 
its power. They have provided the basis for this case study. The United States 
employed instruments from among the range specified by Baldwin in pursuit 
of a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. It used some more efficaciously 
than others, but declined to use the use the full range at its disposal. That it was 
unable to achieve its goal would not surprise Kenneth Waltz, who has declared 
that 'powerful agents fail to impress their will on others in just the way they 
intend · to' ,5 or Herbert Simon who has concluded that '[a]ttainment of 
objectives is always a matter of degree' .6 But the three authors might have 
expected that a state having decided on a course of action, would employ all 
reasonable means at its disposal to achieve its goal. It seems unlikely that in 
developing their theses either would have entertained the prospect of an agency 
prosecuting its objective with one hand behind its back, which is what 
happened when Clinton eschewed coercion and the threat or employment of 
negative sanctions. 
Did Clinton's decision not to use all appropriate instruments suggest a 
lack of commitment to the attainment of a peace settlement? Glib assumptions 
have been made about the United States only exerting sufficient authority over 
Israel to satisfy Arab oil producers that it was doing something to address 
Palestinian grievances, or that the United States was constrained by the 
influence of the pro-Israel domestic lobby. The post hoc evaluation does not 
support so cynical a view. It shows that Clinton and his Administration never 
gave up on their efforts to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. Even 
if the president's expectation that face-to-face encounters could produce results 
was overly optimistic, movement was impossible without it. And it is a matter 
5 Waltz (1979). Theory of International Politics, p.192 
6 Simon (1957). Administrative Behaviour, p.177 
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of record that negotiation did produce some positive results. Reasons for 
Clinton's reluctance to threaten or employ negative sanctions have been 
advanced in the previous chapter, as were some alternative measures that 
might have been used to augment the inducements that were extended. 
Attachment to Israel, aversion to conflict, and the need to husband domestic 
support in the event of impeachment provide some explanation for the 
president's hesitancy about imposing negative sanctions. 
These reasons do not address his failure to promote alternative 
measures. Nor do they address America's ideational 'deficit', apparent from 
the outset of the negotiation in 1991. The United States properly declined to 
impose a settlement: it preferred to offer bridging proposals than to identify 
some particular outcome and to advance argument in favour of it. For seven of 
his eight years in office, Clinton was reluctant to employ America's ideational 
power to propose terms on which a comprehensive settlement might be 
reached. 
The existence of these lacunae does not expose the limits of America's 
power, for power was never applied. The self-selected 'no-go areas' became 
ipso facto 'no-power areas'. If the argument advanced in the previous chapter 
that a pax judaica concluded within the Madrid framework suited American 
interests is correct, why did Clinton decline to press Israel harder for it? He 
was prepared to back Israel in relation to the Hebron agreement, and to use the 
US veto in the UN Security Council to shield the peace process, but was 
seemingly unable to convince Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu or Barak that certain 
courses of action offered prospect of solution favourable to America's and 
Israel's common longer-term interests. Conclusion of a settlement with Syria, 
refraining from attacking Lebanon, and deferring withdrawal from Lebanon 
until after reaching an agreement with Syria, are cases in point. 
The answer seems to lie in the president's reliance upon a relatively 
small company of advisers which was engulfed in the minutiae of the 
negotiation process, preoccupied by a necessity to keep it alive and to get 
recalcitrant parties back to the table, and obsessed with a fear that a breakdown 
of the process would leave the United States looking 'impotent' .7 A well-worn 
7 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.303 
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approach of aid, and yet more aid, was tried - especially to accommodate 
Israel's insecurities - rather than explore an efficacious use of resources 
through careful targeting. The provision of fighter aircraft to Israel could have 
little direct bearing on the peace process: a diversion of settlement construction 
away from the West Bank, or investment in alternative water supply, could. 
Clinton's personal commitment to Israel and his numerous 
interventions ostensibly to protect the peace process led to questioning of the 
United States' s credentials as an 'honest broker'. Despite its initial profession 
of that role, the United States was never an honest broker. A state exercises its 
power to protect, or to advance, its national interests. There are many means 
by which it may do so, but moral considerations and pretence of judicial 
impartiality do not normally inform the projection of power. It was the 
Administration of the first President Bush that claimed that it would be an 
honest broker, but the framework that it instituted at Madrid formalised the 
disparity between the Israelis and Palestinians. Clinton's Administration made 
no such claim. Both Israeli and Palestinian negotiators understood that the US-
Israel partnership was inviolate. They learned that Clinton was deeply 
committed to a negotiated resolution of their differences, which he believed to 
be in America's national interest. They saw that he could not to be deflected 
from that objective and that he was prepared to employ some of the 
instruments at his disposal to that end. They were more receptive to his 
contribution - albeit a partial one - than many external observers and persons 
within their constituencies who hankered after a 'judicial' American fiat. The 
efficacy of Clinton's contribution must be read in that context, not Secretary of 
State Baker's questionable undertaking to be an honest broker. 
Clinton's vision of enlargement of the community of democratic states, 
could not determine his course of action in the Middle East. Indeed, it is 
questionable whether his aspiration could offer a real direction for foreign 
policy because in too many situations democracy could not be given a central 
place. 8 Its application in the Middle East rested on an assumption that 
economic cooperation would fuel demand for political liberalisation within 
Arab states. That was a very long-term proposition, and a questionable one. 
8 Haass (2001). Assessing Bill Clinton's Legacy. 
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The Middle East and ·North Africa Economic Conferences might facilitate 
development and regional cooperation, but it is debatable whether they could 
produce a regional contribution to an enlargement of the world's community of 
market democracies. Strong self-preservation instincts within autocratic Arab 
states would need to be overcome. In the end, the functionalist approach failed 
not because it could not realise the Administration's expectations, but because 
regional mistrust of the policies of the Israeli government, and fear of Israel's 
probable pre-eminence in a peaceful Middle East, caused its collapse. 
In the circumstances, the Administration had little choice but to 
conform to Tony Smith's 'selective liberal democratic intemationalism' 9 in the 
Middle East. Albright concluded in her memoir that the Administration 
'should have had the vision to risk upsetting traditional friends in the Middle 
East by pressing for democratisation within the Arab world - including a direct 
challenge to the indoctrination of young people in tenets advocating violence 
and hatred' .10 That was never a realistic option. The one opportunity open to 
Clinton to inject an elected and accountable government into the region was 
presented by the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Some of the 
characteristics expected of a democracy were displayed during its formation, 
but neither the Palestinian Authority's European backers nor the Clinton 
Administration was ever able to encourage it to transcend the authoritarian 
practices of its progenitor organisation, the PLO. The Administration accorded 
a higher premium to a strong central system likely to be able to rein in 
insurgents; and was prepared to overlook transgressions of human rights by 
both Israelis and Palestinians in its singular focus on the peace process. 
Does the United States' s inability to attain a significant objective, in the 
context of an exceptionally benign international environment, have 
implications for the global unipolar inter-state structure? Can lessons be drawn 
from its failure that might be applied more generally to the projection of 
American power in a unipolar world? 
Implications of Clinton's failure for the unipolar structure can be 
dismissed. The post hoc evaluation shows that the Administration failed to 
maximise the potential of the instruments at its disposal; and a single case 
9 Smith. America's Mission, p.325 
10 Albright (2003). Madam Secretary, p.507 
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study is unlikely to support so broad an extrapolation. There is at present no 
other state with the resources or capacity to challenge the predominance of the 
United States, whether it succeeds or fails in discrete adventures. A succession 
of US failures to achieve objectives over time will lead to questioning of the 
wisdom of American Administrations, and might encourage other states to 
develop a countervailing capacity to that of the United States, but that rests in 
the realm of conjecture. 
Of more direct concern is the implication of failure to resolve the Arab-
Israel dispute for other American interests in the Middle East. Linkages exist 
between them and the dispute. But before America's failure had a chance to 
impact directly upon other US regional interests, the Administration of 
President George W. Bush moved against Iraq in 2003. It led a 'coalition of 
the willing', whose effect was to remove from power the one Arab regime that 
posed a real threat to Israel. Iraq had launched SCUD missiles against Israel 
during the 1991 Gulf War. Thereafter it had been contained by the United 
States, but concern was voiced that it retained ability at some later date to 
target Israel with weapons of mass destruction. Syria did not pose a direct 
threat to Israel, despite its proximity: its forces had been convincingly trounced 
by Israel a number of times. Israel was beyond the reach of an accurate Iranian 
attack at that time, but vulnerable to insurgency and terrorism supported by 
Iran. 
Bush's pre-emptive action against Iraq foreshadows a changed 
geopolitical environment in the Middle East. All regional states are conscious 
of this reaffirmation of American predominance; and that it was demonstrated 
contrary to the views of a majority of the permanent members of the u-N 
Security Council and of most other nation states. If the Administration were to 
behave in a comparable manner elsewhere in the Middle East, it could have 
far-reaching implications for member states of the region. I I The latent threat is 
potent. Much depends, however, on the outcome of America's intervention. 
Its adventure has provided an opportunity for Arab and Muslim extremists to 
target American troops and international institutions in Iraq. Their action 
commands, in varying degrees, the sympathy of less radical Islamic elements 
11 Glass, C. (2003). "Is Syria Next?" London Review of Books, 24 July 2003 
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critical of the United States's intervention and the manner in which it seeks to 
engineer a regime change in Iraq. The potency of the latent threat of American 
power to regional states is diminished to the extent that the extremists are able 
to frustrate, or delay, the imposition of America's fiat. 
America's Iraqi adventure pushed the Arab-Israel dispute off the 
region's centre stage, ·but Palestinian insurgents have persisted with the al-
Aqsa intifada, which has been running unabated since September 2000. It has 
inflicted pain upon the Israelis, but Israeli reprisals have severely hurt the -
Palestinians. Israel has been emboldened by Bush's policies to reframe its 
response to the intifada as consistent with America's war against terrorism, 
and to show determination that any accommodation with the Palestinians must 
be on Israel's terms, which now extends to the choice of its Palestinian 
interlocutors. 
The Bush Administration has taken advantage of the changing 
geopolitical environment to try again to resolve the Israel-Palestinian contest. 
There are lessons that can be learned from the experience of the Clinton 
Administration in prosecuting a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute which are 
relevant to Bush's ambition, and susceptible of application to America's power 
projection elsewhere. The touchstone is that peace is intended to be enduring, 
while force is generally a short-term phenomenon. The attainment of peace 
deserves to be planned and executed with at least as much skill and 
commitment as military intervention. Were an American Administration to 
proceed in accordance with this precept, the following tactical considerations 
would enter its calculus: 
• the need to define the objective, or objectives if a staged process is 
envisaged, with precision. It is insufficient to leave the terms of 
any final outcome to others; 
• the need to determine how the objective, or objectives, might be 
attained, including preparedness to advance ideas and to employ all 
appropriate measures; 
• the need to consider whether the objective might reasonably be 
achieved within a certain timeframe. Where a staged process is 
envisaged, time-lines should be established for each stage. 
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Insistence on conclusion of a negotiation by a deadline imparts a 
sense of urgency to the process; 
• the need to build a constituency for the desired outcome at home, 
and within the target state through public diplomacy; 
• the need to maximise the assistance available, co-opting the 
assistance of other states, involving them in planning, and making 
effective use of them as partners, rather than agents; 
• the need to apply pressure to the target state as well as offering 
inducements. Coordination with partners could be helpful in 
sending a consistent message; and 
• the need to respond flexibly when unforeseeable circumstances 
anse, or the power-wielder's efforts produce unintended 
consequences. 
These principles are not exceptional: most are standard practice 1n 
relation to the application of force. Why should they not be employed in more 
pacific circumstances? After the expiry of Clinton's presidency, the Bush 
Administration engaged in conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, but in neither 
country has it been able effectively to apply its power to post-conflict 
reconstruction. Evidence has now emerged of a lack of coordination on the 
question of how to tackle this question in Iraq, with early planning by the State 
Department jettisoned in favour of an approach undertaken within the 
Pentagon. 
There are other international issues to which the principles advanced in 
this conclusion may apply. The present Administration has successfully 
persuaded Russia to reconsider the extent of its nuclear assistance to Iran and 
to encourage Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. This cooperative international 
endeavour is contributing to the achievement of America's long-standing non-
proliferation objective. Whether a similar approach in relation to North Korea 
might produce a comparable result remains to be proven. Counterterrorism 
measures also require international cooperation and resolve. If America is to 
protect its state and non-state interests in a porous global environment, it must 
demonstrate an ability efficaciously to deploy the resources at its command in 
order to maximise the assistance of other actors. The general applicability of 
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these principles would need to be analysed against the projection of US power 
to attain particular objectives. That is beyond the scope of this thesis. Prima 
facie, however, the principles would appear to be applicable to America's 
attempt, launched in 2003, to effect a settlement between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. 
The approach to be pursued in relation to Israel and the Palestinians 
under the initiative announced in April 2003 shows that some of the lessons of 
the ill-fated Madrid process have been absorbed, principally by other interested 
parties but also by the US Adniinistration. Those lessons include the benefits 
of operational planning and international cooperation. Having heard Bush's 
Administration comniit to a two-state solution, the Europeans gave thought to 
how to realise that objective, 12 producing a performance-based and goal-driven 
roadmap 13 that the United States undertook to pursue. The new plan's 
authority derives from its quartet of sponsors - the United States (power), the 
European Union (economic assistance), the United Nations (legitimacy) and 
the Russian Federation ( a co-sponsor of the Geneva and Madrid 
conferences) .14 This approach narrows the original objective of a 
comprehensive Arab-Israel settlement to the core question of the Israel-
Palestinian relationship. The aggression displayed by both sides in the al-Aqsa 
intifada is qualitatively different from that of the earlier intifada. Israel's 
quiescent northern approaches suggest that the setting aside of Lebanon and 
Syria to a later date, and the priority accorded to the Palestinian question is 
appropriate to this second peace attempt. The roadmap defines the Palestinian 
objective with greater precision than that of the Madrid process, envisioning 
'two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, 
living side-by-side in peace and security' 15 in 2005, although it is silent on 
contentious matters like border deliniitation, area, sovereignty over the holy 
12 Ma'oz (2003). Policy Brief Israeli Options on the Road Map. Washington DC, The Middle 
East Institute. 
13 US Department of State (2003). A Performance-based Roadmap. Although crafted in 2002, 
it was not launched until April 2003. 
14 Interview with Mr Terje Roed-Larsen, Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General 
to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) on the 
West Bank and Gaza in Tel Aviv on 23 May 2002. 
15 US Department of State (2003). A Performance-based Roadmap. 
301 
sites, and the future of Jerusalem. 16 Tactically, the outcome is to be achieved 
by reciprocal steps undertaken within 'clear phases, timelines, target dates, and 
benchmarks' in the 'political, security, econormc, humanitarian, and 
institution-building fields'. The plan's performance-based character is explicit. 
The quartet will evaluate the parties' performance on implementation against 
declared time-lines and a general expectation that they will perform their 
obligations in parallel. 
Quandt is critical of the Clinton Administration for not having 
possessed 'a serious strategy for attaining [it§] goal' .17 To some extent the 
roadmap remedies this defect. Its gradualist approach may be 'Oslo under a 
different name', 18 but its compressed timeframe imparts a greater sense of 
commitment to achieving the designated target than that of the earlier process. 
Opinion may vary about the relative imposition on the parties as they proceed 
toward the target, and the fairness of the outcome, 19 but both parties have 
professed support for it; and the Palestinian Authority secured an uncertain halt 
to the actions of militant Palestinian groups. Once again an attempt is being 
made to set aside prescriptive UN language, this time by Israel.20 
A hopeful situation has again been jeopardised by attacks on Israelis by 
Palestinian suicide bombers, and Israeli activity that seems certain to 
perpetuate Palestinian grievances. They are not of the peace-makers' making. 
Israel has begun constructing a wall that encroaches upon the June 1967 line. 
Erected to assure Israel's security, the wall isolates some Palestinian villages 
and Israeli settlements, 21 and separates some Palestinians from their farm 
16 Doran, M.S. (2003). "Q&A: Michael S. Doran on the Middle East road map." The New York 
Times on the Web, l August 2003. He said that 'Oslo and the road map take all of the really 
difficult political issues ... and put them off until the end. Those are Jerusalem, borders, the 
return of Palestinian refugees, the uprooting of settlements, and so forth. Those are the issues 
that everybody is concerned about'. 
17 Quandt (1999 (2nd edit.)) . New U.S. Policies for a New Middle East? The Middle East and 
the United States: a historical and political reassessment. D.W. Lesch. Boulder CO, Westview 
Press. p.429 
18 Agha, H. and R. Malley (2003). "Three Men in a Boat." The New York Review of Books, 14 
August 2003 
19 Said, E.W. (2003). "A road map to where?" London Review of Books, 19 June 2003, states 
that 'The road map, in fact, is not a plan for peace so much as a plan for pacification: it is 
about putting an end to Palestine as a problem'. 
20 Williams, I. (2003). UN offensive. Middle East International No.707 (22 August 2003). The 
Israeli foreign minister has launched a diplomatic initiative to rescind 'anti-Israel resolutions 
passed over the years by the UN and other international agencies' . p.15 
21 Newman, D. (2003). "Time to Move." The New York Times on the Web, 2 August 2003 
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lands. 22 Its value to Israel lies in sealing Palestinian territory behind an 
impermeable barrier. The wall's hermetic character has given rise to 
speculation that Israel's intent is to force an unviable, but 'independent' 
Palestine into a long-term arrangement with Jordan. Sharon has said that the 
wall's construction will continue. 
The objective of the roadmap remains much the same as that of the 
Madrid process. Setting out anew on a more considered basis does not mean 
that. the goal will be attained. The previous chapter exposed Clinton's 
weakness in failing to employ all the resources at his disposal. Could he have 
induced Netanyahu to stop building settlements? Can Bush persuade Sharon to 
stop building the wall? These examples do not cover the gamut of issues that 
need to be resolved. They expose questions, however, about the extent to 
which the United States can expect to persuade a sovereign democratic state, 
whose policies enjoy considerable domestic support, that an alternative course 
is in its national interest. The people of either side of the conflict have 
'passions and interests' and the challenge for the Bush Administration is to 
'alter the balance between them' .23 This cannot be achieved overnight, or 
with a Palestinian Authority whose power has been severely circumscribed by 
Israel, but Israel can create the context in which Palestinians are more likely to 
pursue their 'interests' than their 'passions'. There is an instrument at the 
disposal of the Administration that could be used to encourage the Israelis to 
do so, and which could offset the cost of relocating settlers from the West 
Bank and Gaza to Israel.24 Both relocation and the wall's construction are 
expensive, and the Israeli economy is in difficulty. The Administration is 
22 United Nations (2003). New Wall Projections. UN New York, UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Only 11 per cent of the wall's length will run along the 
1949 armistice line. It will be 687 kms long and is estimated to cost $4.7 million per kilometre 
to build. It will annex 14.5 per cent of West Bank land into Israel. Approximately 680,000 
Palestinians, or close to 30 per cent of the Palestinian population in the West Bank, will be 
directly harmed by the wall. http://www.reliefweb.int - accessed 12 November 2003; Said 
(2003). "A road map to where?"; Sheehan, E.R.F. (2003). tlThe Map and the Fence.ti The New 
York Review of Books, 3 July 2003 
23 Friedman. tlPassions and Interests. ti 
24 Grunzweig, E. (2003). "Settlers positions towards withdrawal from territories." Peace Now 
(23 July 2003). More that 70 percent of settlers, a significant increase from previous polls, 
would agree eventually to leave the West Bank and Gaza if they were compensated, while 29 
percent are ready to leave right away. Seventy-one percent of them said they believed that a 
peace agreement that would require them to leave their settlements was inevitable. 
http:/ /www. peacenow. org.il/English.asp ?Redirect=4&Category ID=5 &ReportID=53 3 -
accessed 28 August 2003 
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well-placed to argue that American financial assistance should be allocated to 
relocation rather than toward the building of the wall.25 Bush pere took 
affirmative action in relation to the settlements, but Clinton declined to do so. 
It is clear that the resources to hand exceeded Clinton's inclination to 
maximise their efficacy. There was scope for the advancement of initiatives 
that lay untapped and avenues of persuasion that were not explored. The 
extent to which Clinton might have been advised to employ these resources is 
unclear. The responsibility to employ them lay with the president. Clinton 
made much of the fact that there was no issue to which he had devoted more 
time than that of a resolution of the Arab-Israel dispute, and that he had 
undertaken to work on that matter until his term expired. He engaged 
personally in negotiation, and invested the office of the President of the United 
States in the search for a solution. He tried to produce a settlement, first 
between Israel and Syria, and later between Israel and the Palestinians. He was 
not unduly constrained, he tried hard, but he could have tried harder for the 
United States' s power was not extended. Its limits were empirically 
determined by the president's decision on how far he was prepared to go to 
achieve his objective. In the hands of someone averse to conflict, that was not 
far enough. 
25 The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 August 2003. "It's the Security Fence or Loans, US tells 
Israel." The Administration is considering deducting $50 million from recently approved loan 
guarantees, 'and might make further deductions based on the amount Israel spent on roads 
being built to route Jewish settlers around Palestinian towns and villages' . 
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